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 A NOTE ON NAMES 
The research contains a lot of Chinese names whose spelling might not be the spelling that other 
readers are accustomed to. For example, Mao Zedong (as written in this thesis) has bas been 
referred to as Mao Tse-Tung by some writers (e.g. Payne 2014), just as Zhou En-Lai has 
occasionally been written as Chou En-Lai. The researcher implores readers to take these 
variations into consideration. Finally, Chinese family names (surnames) precede forenames when 
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Relying on China-Zambia relations as a case study, this dissertation uses the constructivist 
approach to international relations to look at the role that identity and interests play in shaping 
relations between nations. The study has established that the Chinese and Zambian governments 
have assumed and constructed relations that have kept the intimacy between the two countries 
largely undisturbed for fifty-three years. Factors such as third world solidarity and a concerted 
struggle against colonial and foreign domination were major points of unity between the two 
countries. After the Cold War, these ideological leanings have been largely replaced by a more 
economically inclined basis for relations but the two countries remain cordial and intimate allies. 
The constructivist/interpretivist paradigm of research was used to arrive at the findings made. 
The research approach used was qualitative, the research style used was case study and the 
research methods included interviews, focus group discussions and document analysis. In order 
to answer the research questions satisfactorily and to draw credible conclusions, purposive 
sampling was used to draw participants from various fractions of the Zambian society – ranging 
from the civil society, a congress of trade unions, political commentary, Zambian workers in a 
Chinese firm to ordinary Zambians. 
The research findings suggest that at state level, Zambia and China have constructed very 
influential intersecting identities and common interests that have fortified relations between the 
two countries. However, the findings also suggested that these identities and interests should not 
be conflated with identities and interests of non-state actors which are – at some points – at 
variance with national identities and interests. Primary data exudes an amount of apprehension 
among ordinary Zambians about the growing presence of Chinese nationals who are not coming 
at the behest of their government and hence whose interests differ from those stated by the 
Chinese government. The study recommends that more attention be paid to how dynamics 
between ordinary Chinese and Zambians are likely to influence relations at a state level because 
of Zambians’ concerns about “the Chinese.” This notwithstanding, the study argues that as things 
stand, national identities and interests, crafted at the highest echelons of both countries and the 
practical and developmental importance the two countries have for each other are the most 
overriding factor in insulating China-Zambia relations from renunciation or any substantial 





Don’t hate China – but don’t trust her either. 
Trust ourselves – have faith in Africa. 
I have faith in the future of Africa, a faith as strong as only an African heart can hold. 
I have faith in an Africa where neither the foreigner’s rod nor the dictator’s heel shall be felt. 
I have faith in an Africa with democracy and justice so firmly entrenched that the cocoon man 
can laugh with pitying contempt at anyone who says we need a violent revolution to achieve 
progress. 
I have faith in an Africa too sensible to allow nuclear and other armaments to play a part in her 
internal and external policies. 
The road to such a future is no easy road. So much the greater, then, must our efforts be to 
follow it; and so much the greater the prize for achieving it. 
I have faith in the future of Africa. 







GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
1.1 Background   
Charles Glaser postulates that “the rise of China will likely be the most important international 
relations (IR) story of the twenty-first century” (2011:80).  China’s growth has divided observers 
into Sino-optimists and Sino-pessimists (Adem 2010; Oshodi 2017; Atwi-Boateng 2017). With 
its growth and influence on global affairs, no player in the international system could be 
indifferent to China. “For pessimists China represents a terrifying threat while for optimists it is a 
tantalizing opportunity” (Naidu and Mbazima 2008:748). China’s growth has provoked a 
simultaneous demand for energy resources and hence its focus on Africa. The growing 
international rapport “between China and Africa could be one of the most important 
developments in the international relations of the Post-Cold War era” (Ampiah and Naidu 
2008:3). Africa and China’s current relations were formally established at the celebrated 
Bandung Conference in Indonesia, 1955 (Anshan, 2007; Atwi-Boateng 2017). Since then, China 
has managed to ensconce itself comfortably in Africa, and its relations with Zambia are one of 
the most enduring on the continent.  
At the time when China became formally recognised by certain African countries, it undertook to 
support liberation movements that were seeking independence from their European colonizers 
(Segal 1992; Muekalia 2004). China and Zambia established relations shortly after Zambia’s 
independence in 1964. These relations were mainly reinforced by a mutual stance against 
hegemonism and imperialism, and an intersecting self-identification as countries of the Third 
World. With the passage of time and the changes in the international system, however, economic 
and political factors have become more prominent determinants of China-Zambia relations, and 
have replaced the ideological factor of the Cold War era.  
Most of Africa has been “sanguine” (Ndulo 2008) about China’s growth and its presence in 
Africa (Negi 2008). This optimism stems from the fact that China does not have a history of 
colonialism in Africa; in fact, it helped the African struggle against colonialism. The Chinese 
have been in contact with Africa for centuries (Atwi-Boateng 2017) but, unlike the Europeans, 
the Chinese did not come “with the urge to impose their religious convictions, to lay siege to 
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African souls. All they sought from Africans was a gesture of symbolic acquiescence in the 
Chinese view of the world” (Snow 1988:29). As will be shown in the ensuing pages, the West 
has been generally negative about China’s presence in Africa arguing “that Chinese policies in 
Africa are set to economically and/or politically colonise Africa” (Atwi-Boateng 2017:179). 
 
1.1.1 Contribution of the Study to Current Academic Inquiry 
China-Africa and China-Zambia relations have been a popular topic of academic inquiry 
especially after China’s go-out policy was embarked upon. For this reason, cogent explanations 
should be adduced justifying what contributions this study will make to extant inquiries. The 
current research draws on both primary and secondary data to assess the role that national 
identity and interests have played in fortifying Sino-Zambian relations. The unique bent that the 
current research bears is the use of constructivism to analyse China-Zambia relations. Ferdinand 
(2007) and Qin (2010) form a part of writers that have used constructivism to describe China’s 
international relations. However, a thoroughgoing academic research using constructivism, and 
its emphasis on national identity and interest construction, to analyse China-Zambia relations has 
yet to be undertaken and the current research endeavours to fill that gap. The research is apprised 
of the fact that there has been, and continues to be, a proliferation of literature on China-Zambia 
relations because this friendship is likely to shape Zambia’s future to a significant extent. 
However, as will be shown in the third chapter, constructivism has not been commonly used to 
analyse Sino-Zambian and Sino-African relations. The reasons for this stem from dissonance 
among those who attribute to themselves the moniker of constructivists and the dominance of 
established theories of international relations.  
 
1.2 Research Problem  
With its breathtaking economic growth and the consequent influence emanating from it on an 
international level, China has increasingly become a power that cannot be ignored on the 
international political scene. China’s growing prominence has been so obvious that some people 
predict that China could be the most powerful player of the twenty-first century (Macionis and 
Plummer 2008). This raises concerns from certain quarters about a growing China’s impact on 
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Africa. With the history of colonialism and Africa’s continued weak economic and political 
status, concerns have been raised about China being just another exploiter of African resources, 
and a possible colonizer of the continent (Clinton 2011). By and large, negative attitudes about 
China have often been sponsored by Western observers (e.g. see Malone 2008), although there is 
also a sizeable amount coming from Africa.  
Much of the sentiment from Africa has been largely optimistic, precisely because China presents 
itself to Africa as a non-interfering power even though some observers assert that China “has 
never remained a passive on-looker when its interests were at stake” (Adem 2010:341). Much of 
the type of literature that has been written about China is a consequence of the theoretical 
assumptions that writers use in their analyses and interpretations. The use of realism has played a 
major role in influencing people’s perception of China’s rise. This inclination betrays the lack of 
theoretical creativity or the exploration of other theories of international relations that can aptly 
explain what the rise of China entails. The current research challenges such theoretical 
parochialism. Apart from this, the research has also observed the error of generalizing China’s 
behaviour and interests, irrespective of the state it relates with. Thus, there are two distinctive 
features that this research comes with. First, the research uses the theory of constructivism to 
present how the evolution of national identity and interests has impacted on China’s relations 
with Zambia. Second, the research will also show whether or not the identities that Zambia and 
China ascribe to themselves are shared by non-state actors, in this case Zambians who are not in 
government positions. Through qualitative analysis, the research will prove that China’s relations 
with different states are equally driven by specific contexts and cannot be ascertained a priori. 
The research also shoulders the responsibility of being balanced in its interpretation; neither 
being exaggeratedly optimistic about China’s relations with Zambia nor being impulsively 
negative.   
 
1.3 Research Hypothesis 
This study will look at the long history of Sino-Zambian relations but the main hypothesis that 
drives this research can be stated thus: 
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1. If two nations share identities and interests, be they real or merely stated, but accepted by 
both, then their relations are more likely to take what could be reasonably termed as 
mutually reinforcing behaviour.  
Certain changes in national identity are not so significant as to substantially change the nature of 
relations that states share. From this, the second hypothesis could be framed in this way: 
2. If there are certain changes in Zambia’s and China’s identity and interests that cannot not 
in any significant way affect the formidability of Sino-Zambian comity, then relations 
between the two countries will remain largely unchanged. 
Conversely, the research postulates that:  
3. Any substantial changes in the way Zambia regards China and vice-versa are likely to 
temper with Sino-Zambian relations.   
 
1.4 Research Questions 
This study seeks to answer the following questions: 
1. What has been the major contributor to the longstanding Sino-Zambian relations 
from the time of the Cold War to the present? 
 
2. To what extent, if any, have national identity and interest influenced the formation 
and maintenance of Sino-Zambian relations?  
 
3. What have been the major factors behind the construction of identities and 
interests in China-Zambia relations? 
 
4. In what ways have the Chinese and Zambian governments fortified relations 
between the two countries despite ordinary Zambian sentiments attributing 




5. What are the possible effects of the divergence of understanding China’s identity 
and interests between state and non-state actors in Zambia? 
 
1.5 Research Objectives   
At a basic level, the research aspires to give a constructivist perspective on Sino-Zambia 
relations. The research will seek to accentuate the social dimension of international relations and 
how the construction of ideas of Third World solidarity, a shared history of colonialism and 
foreign domination and the structure of the general international system (e.g. the Cold War) has 
impacted on Sino-Zambian relations. The specific objectives of this research have been 
identified as such:  
1. To discern what has been a central contributor to the longstanding relationship between 
China and Zambia. 
2. To critically point the degree to which shared identities and interests between China and 
Zambia have played a central role in keeping relations between the two countries largely 
stable. 
3. To highlight how Sino-Zambian relations have been crucially influenced by social 
practice and the construction of both real and rhetorical ideas and interests 
4. The research also seeks to find ways that are likely to transform Sino-Zambian relations 
to be mutually beneficial, while admitting that the two countries are significantly 
different in terms of economic and political strength. 
5. Finally, the research aims to be evenhanded in analysing Sino-Zambian relations. It 
questions literature, mostly of Western provenance and the media, that has mostly been 
alarmist in appraising China’s effect on Africa and Zambia. However, the research also 
aims to advance some cautions in Zambia’s reception of China’s overtures. 
 
1.6 Importance of the Current Research  
The flurry of emerging literature, especially Western oriented, on “China in Africa” has 
provoked what Rohit Negi calls “the conceptual resuscitation of colonialism” (2008:41) which 
he finds problematic. Negi (2008:41) “calls for a critical and contextual understanding of the 
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Chinese presence in African countries.” To further support the context-based analysis of Sino-
African relations, the current research adopts a more specific approach by looking at China’s 
interaction with a single African country, bearing in mind that these country-to-country relations 
are, to an appreciable degree, impinged upon by the more general Sino-African synergy. 
Nevertheless, it is important to look at China-Zambia relations because there are unique features 
found in the relations between the two countries that are not invariably transferable to what 
characterizes China’s relations with other African countries. The importance of this research is 
not confined to the specificities of Sino-Zambian relations; it goes further to look at the impact 
that these relations are likely to have on the two countries.  
As a less developed country, found in the poorest continent, Zambia is susceptible to the travails 
that beset Third World countries. Zambia’s weak economic status and the consequent limited 
influence it has on global politics, that have an effect on the country, set Zambia on a vulnerable 
footing that, by default if not design, encourages well-off regions and powers to ordain 
themselves with the task of prescribing how Zambia can develop. Zambia’s ideology during the 
reign of Kenneth Kaunda was partly influenced by the socialist powers that had not colonized 
Africa. The adoption of structural adjustment in the twilight years of the Kaunda era 
demonstrated Zambia’s desperation to court Western largesse as the socialist powers were 
disintegrating. Furthermore, Zambia’s privatisation policies after 1991 also betrayed the 
country’s readiness to implement recommendations by more powerful and economically 
developed countries after the Cold War. All these illustrations show how susceptible Zambia is 
to more influential and powerful players. The post-Cold War era has also ushered in an 
international system wherein the United States has been joined at the summit of international 
politics by regional powers such as China in Asia and Russia in Eastern Europe. If history runs 
on linear logic, it would thus be predicted that Zambia would be inclined to follow the precepts 
of the emerging powers, especially if they become more involved in Zambia and so powerful that 
they can influence global politics.   
It is with this in mind that the current research gains further importance. The reality is that China 
has become almost indispensable in Zambia and the primary data that have been used for this 
research justify this claim. Both in investment and the presence of Chinese personnel, China is 
mentioned whenever investment in Zambia is the subject. Thus, economic development or lack 
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thereof in Zambia will be to a significant degree influenced by the size of Chinese investment, 
the veracity of China’s claim to mutually beneficial friendship and Zambia’s agency in 
appraising China’s presence. The research is important because of how Zambia and China, at a 
formal level, present each other as two countries that are unwaveringly committed to foster 
mutually beneficial cooperation. However, these formal sentiments might not be representative 
of ordinary Chinese and Zambian citizens and indeed, the formal pleasantries could be a veneer 
masking suspicions that the two countries harbour against each other. Thus, the research should 
strive to probe deeper the role that socially constructed identities and interests have played in 
reinforcing Sino-Zambian amity. 
The foregoing might give the impression that the current study argues that it is easier to account 
for China’s importance to Zambia than vice versa. On the contrary, the research is important in 
that it argues that Zambia is also of importance to China as the latter, with its growing influence 
and attendant global responsibility, seizes every opportunity to present its rise as peaceful and 
harmonious. Furthermore, global powers do not only seek to be economic juggernauts and 
political heavyweights; they also seek to be moral examples especially to weaker and less 
developed powers. Thus, China’s comportment in Zambia sends a message on the type of global 
power it is likely to be. Its records on human rights, labour ethics and political practice come into 
question and when applied to an exemplary degree in Zambia, can embellish China’s 
international reputation. Thus, the current research will contribute to putting paid to academic 
allegations that Africa, let alone Zambia, is of marginal importance to China (e.g. see Segal 
1992), a country that is currently the second largest economy in the world.  
Finally, the current research is vital to the study of international relations as it uses 
constructivism to analyse Sino-Zambia relations. This is a variation to the study of relations 
between the two countries that has yet to be undertaken. The influence of effected identities and 
interests in shaping Sino-Zambian relations is emphasized. The research still calls for vigilance 
on how far China can affect Zambia, especially in terms of human rights and the maintenance of 






1.7 Research methodology and methods: 
1.7.1 Research Paradigm: Constructivism 
Constructivists in international relations explain how social practice can influence state 
behaviour. However, as a research paradigm, constructivism pays a lot of attention to language, 
communication and “to interpretation of meaning” (Rodwell 2015:3 see also Kim 2014). The 
constructivist paradigm highlights the importance of people’s perceptions and allows the 
researcher to consider the worldview of his/her sample. This paradigm, therefore, does not seek 
answers in the manner that exact sciences would want; it leaves room for a variety of possible 
interpretations (Dasgupta 2015). Constructivism takes into account the notion that social realities 
are constantly changing and that at times they might even assume conflicting properties. This 
dynamism emerges because people construct their understanding of lived experiences subject to 
their context (Howells and Fletcher 2015). 
This becomes clearer when the sample for this research is explained and when the analysis is 
done in chapter seven. Different sectors of Zambia’s society might have different perspectives on 
China-Zambia relations. Even the meaning that they impute to the Chinese dynamic has been 
established to be varied. For government officials, for example, the perception of China to which 
they attach importance and greater meaning is mainly tied to China as a state. However, non-
state actors perceive China from a different perspective because they mainly talk about Chinese 
nationals who are not state actors. Nevertheless, the constructs of China that are made at the state 
level hold sway and dictate policy on China-Zambia relations. This study, however, also attaches 
importance to the perception of non-state actors. Their perceptions might not have been salient 
enough to dictate national policy, but are important in understanding the China-Zambia dynamic.  
Studies about social phenomena can accommodate any research approach. They can use 
triangulation (Webb et al., 1966), which is the combination of qualitative and quantitative 
approach “in the study of the same phenomenon” (Denzin 1978: 291). The quantitative 
approach, which uses surveys and statistical data, is mostly tailored towards “objective theories” 
(Creswell 2014:4) and is more suited for physical and positive sciences (Creswell 2014). This 
does not consider the specific contexts (Maxwell 2005) in which information is generated and 
how this can influence the veracity of derived conclusions. This makes it problematic for studies 
of social phenomena that take context as an important factor. The research approach employed 
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for this study is the qualitative approach. The choice of this approach has been influenced by the 
factors outlined in the following section and the researcher’s lack of expertise in using 
quantitative analysis.  
 
1.7.2 Research Approach: Qualitative Research  
Qualitative research is a broad enterprise, comprising a range of approaches and methods. Even 
though researchers might differ on many grounds regarding qualitative research, there is 
convergence on certain traits of qualitative inquiry. Many qualitative research scholars would 
agree that their research method is interpretive, naturalistic and pays an enormous amount of 
attention to the meanings that research participants attach to their surroundings and the world at 
large. The social world, in qualitative research, is constructed by participants. 
Qualitative research probes and seeks to understand the meaning individuals or groups attribute 
to certain “social or human” (Creswell 2014:4) phenomena. Similarly, Kalof et al (2008:79) 
assert that “the tradition of qualitative research tends to focus on meaning and motivation 
[original emphasis] that underlie…understandings of processes in the social world.” Qualitative 
researchers play a big role in understanding and interpreting “what the respondents and 
participants say and do” (Dasgupta 2015:154). There is thus the possibility of bias from both 
researchers and subjects under study. Thus, qualitative findings acknowledge the complexity of 
social phenomena (Mason 2002:1) and are likely to be flexible.  Accordingly, this research does 
not claim that its findings and interpretations will be universally and eternally generalizable or 
applicable. 
The research probes affinities between variables like the rhetoric and literature of officials from 
Zambia and China, their actual or apparent deeds and the outcomes of these actions. This test 
addresses the research questions of this study. Qualitative research seeks to establish what 
informs and motivates certain human actions. Silverman asserts that theories that deal with social 
constructions are “concerned with questions of ‘what?’ and ‘how?’ which inform much of 
qualitative research” (2010:108). Qualitative research can help researchers to better discern “how 
events, actions, and meanings are shaped by the unique circumstances in which these occur” 
(Maxwell 2005:22). This dovetails with the constructivist argument that social relations are 
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shaped by specific contexts rather than exogenous impositions. In fact, constructivist paradigms 
employ qualitative methods and data are gathered through interviews, observation, case studies, 
life history, narrative research and by identifying themes (see Lomborg and Bechmann 2014). 
The current research has been influenced by some of these modes of research and data collection, 
mostly by interviews, identification of themes and placing Sino-Zambian relations in their 
historical context.   
Guba and Lincoln also made a case for constructivism in qualitative research and they reported 
that constructions that form a part of social inquiries are changeable and so are their “associated 
realities” (Guba and Lincoln 1994:111). This is in tandem with the current research because, as 
shown in the following chapters, constructivists argue that the identities and interests that states 
share are always subject to change and hence the quality of future relations cannot be 
predetermined to positivist certainty.  
For a more practical reason, qualitative research was convenient for this undertaking because it 
promotes a flexible reading of phenomena without necessarily relying on bloated samples 
(Sinkovics, Penz and Ghauri 2008). The typically small purposive sample that is selected for 
qualitative research design does not mean that there is a proportionate small amount of data 
collected. On the contrary, qualitative research design “involves collecting a large amount of 
data on a rather small, purposive sample” (Hox and Boejie 2005:593; see also Collingridge & 
Gantt 2008). The amount of data, as evinced by the recording and transcripts of the primary data 
that were collected will be typical of this character of qualitative research even though from a 
numerical point of view, this research had a small sample of sixteen participants, ten of whom 
formed the two focus group discussions.  
 
1.7.3 Research Style: Case Study  
From the range of primary data gathered for this study, it is discernible that the author intends to 
carry out and in-depth understanding of the identities and interests of China and Zambia from 
different fractions of Zambia’s population. Case study as a research style has been chosen for the 
study because it “allows the exploration and understanding of complex issues” (Zainal 2017:1; 
see also Hancock and Algozzine 2017) using information that was gathered from a relatively 
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small sample representing a wide range of possible respondents. Case studies tend to concentrate 
more on detail about a specific issue (Thomas 2016). As has been argued, China carries multiple 
identities depending on who is engaging with “the Chinese” subject. Generalizations have been 
made about China’s identity and interests in the international system and even when related to its 
interactions with Africa, the “China in Africa” discourse is treated as though affairs of China 
with particular African countries are invariably replicable elsewhere on the African continent.  
The current study employed a case study research style to escape generalized explorations of 
“China in Africa.” A case study approach will give the current study a unique angle in that it will 
avoid generalizations in analyzing international relations, especially regarding national identities 
and interests.  
 
1.7.4 Research Methods and Sampling: Data Collection  
This study used both primary and secondary data. The researcher is alive to the importance of 
both the forms of data as will be explained in the sections ahead. The research methods for this 
study included interviews, focus group discussions and document analysis and the ensuing pages 
reveal the types of data that were collected through these methods.  
 
1.7.4.1 Primary Data 
Primary data is information that is expressly collected for the purpose of the research being 
undertaken “using procedures that fit the research problem best” (Hox and Boejie 2005:593). 
However, primary data might also be gathered from information that is not derived; data that 
comes from original sources that have not been manipulated or interpreted. In the classical sense, 
then, primary data is gathered from interviews. Primary data is important in that by nature, it 
directly responds to research questions. Secondary data is also important in that it helps to situate 
research in the broad scope of work that has already been done in relation to the research that one 
is undertaking. For this reason, this research used both forms of data. Primary data was very 
useful with responding to questions raised as will be demonstrated in the seventh chapter. 
Secondary data formed the majority of the literature review. Some of the primary data used for 
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this research comprised government documents, policy documents, literature by trade unions and 
other parties that are not written for academic purposes but nonetheless address the subject under 
study. Historic documents, such as the FOCAC commitments that are signed by China and its 
African counterparts formed a part of primary data. In addition to written data, the research 
generated more primary data from relevant interviewees with the aid of semi-structured 
questions. The researcher initially hoped to interview diplomats from the Chinese embassy in 
Zambia. It was hoped that officials from the Zambian Department of Foreign Affairs would be 
interviewed. The first preference was that these interviews would be carried out on a face-to-face 
basis, which would have required travelling.  
As will be demonstrated in the following section, these interviews did not take place because of 
the unresponsive nature of prospective interviewees. The option of using skype, telephone or 
email interviews was mulled upon but with no avail. The option of this sample size was 
influenced by practical circumstances. It is difficult to secure interviews with diplomats because 
of time constraints. For an academic perspective, interviews with at least ten representatives 
from Confucius Institute at the University of Zambia were considered. After frequent visits to the 
Institute, the research assistant was unsuccessful in securing one interview, despite having been 
given assurances. The following section will recount how an academic perspective on China’s 
interaction with Zambia was accounted for. A qualified graduate of international studies was 
chosen as a participant for the research.  
 
1.7.4.2 The Sample for Primary data and its Justification  
The researcher used purposive sampling, mainly for practical reasons and also in the spirit of the 
type of methodology that the current research employs. As explained in the section on qualitative 
research, the researcher did not have to survey a huge number of respondents. The intention of 
choosing the selected sample was so that the researcher gets data from various sectors of Zambia 
and their respective takes on China-Zambia relations. Initially, the researcher intended to conduct 
interviews with officials from the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Zambia, but 
frequent visits to the embassy by the research assistant could not secure a single interview. The 
Chinese officials were going to give crucial information on how China perceives Zambia, 
especially at the level of state-to-state interaction. Instead, the writings and speeches of 
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government officials from both China and Zambia are used, especially for the fourth and fifth 
chapters. These are the two chapters that deal separately with the evolution of China and Zambia. 
Thus, the writings of leaders such as Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Mao Zedong and Deng 
Xiaoping of China are used to exhibit how these leaders perceived identities and interests of their 
respective countries and how they wanted their countries to be situated – both politically and 
ideologically in a constantly changing international system.   
 The second institution at which the researcher wished to carry out interviews was at the 
Zambian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry seemed to be more promising and a letter 
approving of an interview with officials at the ministry was sent to the researcher and is included 
in the appendix of the research. Unfortunately, the promised interviews were also not realized 
and, despite citing the unavailability of suitable individuals for interviews, the researcher is of 
the opinion that the 2016 general elections in Zambia that took place after the interview was 
secured played a part in offsetting the bureaucrats who had initially assented to an interview.   
One of the major points of awkwardness between China and Zambia is the issue of labour laws 
and practices. Indeed, the most turbulent times in Sino-Zambian relations have been blamed on 
what is perceived as China’s iniquitous labour practices. As will be shown in chapter six, the 
issue of labour laws was a feature in most of the interviews done for this research. From this 
background, the researcher deemed it necessary to interview officials from the Zambia Congress 
of Trade Unions (ZCTU). Two officials from ZCTU were interviewed. The importance of this 
interview is self-revealing; ZCTU has been a dependable voice of workers in Zambia against 
both local and foreign employers. ZCTU has openly been critical of government policies that it 
deems unsuitable for Zambian workers. Thus, ZCTU can be relied upon to offer a nuanced 
analysis of Sino-Zambian relations without reverting to appraisals that are aimed at appeasing 
the governments of the two countries. Another organization from which an interview was 
obtained is the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection, a faith-based organization whose values 
include option for the poor, social justice and critical analysis. A Catholic priest, Fr. Kelly 
Michelo1 was the respondent. Apart from agreeing to the interview, Michelo also offered a short 
article that he wrote on China-Zambia relations. The said article will also be added as part of the 
information presented in the sixth chapter. The current study acknowledges the importance of 
                                                          
1 Fr Kelly Michelo consented to his name being mentioned in the study.  
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civil societies in interrogating the main forces behind Sino-Zambian relations. Civil society 
organisations have more latitude to strike out from the mainstream rhetoric of government 
officials whose interests are best served when they paint an attractive picture of the intentions of 
China and Zambia as the two countries relate.  
Furthermore, the research has made use of a wide variety of literature from the Chinese and 
Zambian government. Expectedly, officials from the two countries would have been more 
inclined to merely repeat what the available literature from their respective governments proffer. 
Thus, the handicap of not having secured interviews with government officials is ameliorated by 
this access to government literature. The information from ZCTU offers another perspective.  
The current research has noted that though constructivism offers a fresh view of looking at what 
informs relations among states, it has also fallen into the trap of analyses that look at 
international relations largely from the perspective of governments or the elite (see Wendt 
1994:385). This research sought to get the impressions of ordinary citizens on China-Zambia 
relations. This was both a challenge and a benefit. It was a challenge in that ordinary citizens, not 
academics, are wont to look at the prima facie or everyday implications of China Zambia 
relations. Thus, issues of national identity and interest constructions do not feature much. On the 
other hand, interviewing ordinary Zambians could offer a different view from the much vaunted 
rhetoric on mutual cooperaton and development between China and Zambia. To accomplish this, 
the researcher conducted two focus group discussions. The first focus group comprised five 
Zambians who are working for a Chinese firm.2  
Labour disputes and conflicts over working conditions have been a major feature in ascertaining 
the quality of China-Zambia relations and hence, apart from academic literature on how Chinese 
employers treat their Zambian workers, it is politic to get insight from Zambians who actually 
work for the Chinese. The second focus group discussion comprised ordinary Zambians who are 
not employed by Chinese but are nonetheless consumers of Chinese products and are impacted 
upon by the growing Chinese presence in Zambia in terms of personnel and investment. The 
rationale behind this group is to establish whether or not the picture painted by Zambian and 
                                                          
2 The separation of the two focus group discussion will become useful in chapters six and seven. What will be 
referred to as the first group discussion is that done at Kamwala Market with Zambians working for a Chinese firm. 
The second focus group discussion is that done with ordinary Zambians who are not employed by Chinese but are 
aware of China’s involvement in Zambia. 
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Chinese elite about the nature of Sino-Zambian relations and the identities and interests that the 
two countries share also apply to ordinary Zambians. Focus group discussions are deemed a 
crucial part of collecting data for qualitative research because participants from a similar 
background are afforded the opportunity to probe their experiences and, in the light of the 
experiences of others, to refine their own opinions. This checks-and-balance brand of discussion 
plays a pivotal role in discouraging false and exaggerated contributions (Lomborg and 
Bechmann 2014). Furthermore, a Zambian who has not only worked under the Chinese but lives 
very close to a Chinese corporation in Zambia was also interviewed. His insights were 
invaluable. 
The researcher also made use of a Zambian graduate based on the Copperbelt of Zambia, a 
mining region where China has most of its mining investment in Zambia. Interviewing this 
participant offers the research data of someone who is almost immediately impacted upon by 
China’s presence and labour practice in Zambia. To offer the research another perspective, a 
Zambian national with a university qualification in international studies was enlisted to help 
offer a presumably scholarly perspective on the role that identities and interests have played in 
strengthening China-Zambia relations. For practical reasons, a face-to-face interview was not 
possible with this particular respondent and hence a questionnaire was sent through email and the 
responses were sent back within a short period of time. Finally, more primary data was generated 
from Laura Miti who is one of Zambia’s foremost political commentators. She claimed no 
expertise on Sino-Zambian relations but still gave her view which actually fitted insights 
gathered from other respondents. The variety of sources for primary data is expected to yield 
different takes on China-Zambia relations; however, it could also happen that certain themes 
might permeate the information generated from the different participants. The discussion and 
analysis of results in the sixth and seventh chapters of the research are tailored towards 
establishing that.  
 
1.7.4.3 Secondary data   
Secondary data is information that was originally intended for another study but is used to 
answer the research questions of the current study (Hox and Boejie 2005:593). Analyzing such 
data “entails the use of already produced data to develop new social, scientific and/or 
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methodological understandings” (Irwin 2013:295). For secondary data, the research will rely on 
relevant books, book reviews, journal articles, newspaper articles, relevant gazettes, visual and 
audio material, and relevant and credible information from the internet. The importance of 
secondary data cannot be over-emphasized. It broadens the quality of the research and gives 
another perspective to what researchers gather from primary data.  Furthermore, the origin of 
secondary data will be more extensive than the origin of primary data in that constraints of 
availability and time will not be formidable barriers to the size of the sample gathered. With the 
use of the internet the research will also be privy to a vast array of on-going debate on the subject 
matter. The scope of the second chapter (literature review) attests to the wide range of secondary 
data that has been used for the current research. With the type of analysis that will be used for 
this research, the use of secondary data is inevitable as the researcher will attempt to answer the 
research questions raised and test the hypothesis by noting points of convergence and divergence 
between primary and secondary data.  
 
1.8 Data Analysis  
The method used to analyse the data for this research is the thematic method of data analysis, a 
commonly used method in qualitative research (Jirwe 2011). Thematic analysis offers a 
“theoretically flexible approach to analyzing qualitative data” (Braun and Clarke 2008:77). This 
flexibility, however, should be informed by astute engagement with data, lest the conclusions 
drawn add to the ongoing critique of qualitative research as an “anything goes” enterprise. Braun 
and Clarke (2008:78) go further to state that “thematic analysis should be seen as a foundational 
method for qualitative analysis.” This technique of analysis “focuses on identifiable themes and 
patterns of living and/or behaviour” (Aronson 1995:1). Thematic analysis can also be used to 
analyse secondary data and identifying, analysing and reporting themes from qualitative data that 
have been collected from an array of literature (Braun and Clarke 2008; Kien, Nußbaumer, 
Thaler et al 2014).  
The first stage of analysis, after data have been collected and transcribed and arranged into 
codes, involves listing certain patterns from the sampled literature and responses of interviewees. 
These patterns are derived from “direct quotes” and paraphrased “common ideas” (Aronson 
1994) from both primary and secondary data. For this research, patterns were informed by the 
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information gathered during interviews and tested against the literature that was sampled in the 
second chapter. The patterns gathered from data were then arranged into themes that constituted 
the material for analysis. Themes have to speak directly to a phenomenon under discussion and 
have to be consonant with the issues addressed in the research questions (Braum and Clarke 
2008). What amounted to a theme was informed by what the researcher sought to investigate. 
This is important because attention should be given to what the research seeks to pursue and 
what contents of data are of paramount importance. That certain subjects might be given 
significant attention in the data set does not warrant those subjects to constitute themes if their 
relevance to the research questions is tenuous. Here again, the agency and discretion of the 
researcher was imperative, although the conclusions reached have to be reasonably credible and 
valid.   
As has been written elsewhere, there are different types of data that were used for this research; 
some material was transcribed directly from the interviews conducted and some of it was 
acquired through responses via email. Audio and written material was collected and 
appropriately labelled for the purpose of verification. Analysis of this data followed a sequence 
that has been used by other qualitative researchers (e.g. see Tuckett 2005) with slight variations. 
The first thing the researcher did once data was gathered was to interrogate the data with the aim 
of finding recurring codes. This state could be summarized as coding. The second stage was 
theorising at which the author had to test whether or not the codes emerging were in tandem with 
what was raised in the research questions and objectives. To give a concrete illustration of this 
process, the author got some of the information given to ascertain whether or not it was linked to 
national identities and interests that China and Zambia have constructed to such a degree that 
they have played a pivotal role in the retention of cordial relations between the two countries. 
Upon engaging deeper with primary data, the researcher realized that analysis had to be done 
with a two tier approach because it emerged that China should not be taken at face value because 
it bears different meanings and identities depending on who is being interviewed. Thus, the 
analysis made a difference between China, at state level, and “the Chinese” who are not acting 
on behalf of their nation, and have assumed identities from the Zambian populace that have 
shaped perceptions of certain Zambians on China as a whole.   
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Chapter six will reveal that there were convergences in terms of data gathered from different 
types of respondents. For example, there was an assumption that respondents from focus group 
discussions might provide data that is not academically inclined. However, as will be shown, the 
concept of agency, came from a respondent who was presumably primarily concerned with the 
practical dimension of Sino-Zambian relations. This challenged the preconceived bias that the 
researcher originally had. This is an instructive discovery because the issue of agency came up as 
a strong theme in this research. Constructivism in international relations accommodates the 
agency of nations in crafting their identities, interests and the quality of relations that they share 
with others. It is also noteworthy that human agency, on the part of the researcher and the 
sample, is one of the ideologies that drive the constructivist research paradigm. Thus, apart from 
taking into considerations the agency of the sample, with its varying understanding of the topic at 
hand, the researcher also had to exercise agency interpreting data. This is why, coupled with 
thematic analysis, interpretivism, as a method of analysis was used for this research as it ties in 
suitably with constructivist research. The third stage of analysis involved the writing of 
information that accrued from the first two stages. Chapter six will involve writing up of primary 
data, and will make use especially of direct quotes from interviews. The analysis in chapter 
seven will seek to situate primary data within extant literature on China-Zambia relations. 
Convergences and divergences have been noted and the sections according to which the chapter 
is structured represent the common themes that emerged from primary and secondary data.  
 
1.9 Limitations of the Current Research 
This study argues that the international system is in a constant process of flux, and thus its 
players undergo both intentional and inadvertent changes of identity and interest. Merriam 
(1988: xii) states that the concentration of qualitative study, “is in process rather than outcomes.” 
The study might be using material which in the near future might not hold true or might soon be 
outmoded. This concern can be addressed by the fact that this is a qualitative study, and by that 
fact it has an immanent flexibility which does not feature much in quantitative study. The study 
makes no illusions about being invariably and eternally applicable. Even when testing 




To partly circumvent the practical barriers confronting the research, the aid of a voluntary 
research assistant was enlisted to carry out a number of interviews. This was both positive and 
challenging; it was positive because the research assistant got much needed primary data 
especially from Zambia’s biggest trade union, the Zambian Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU) an 
influential organization in promoting workers’ rights. However, enlisting a research assistant was 
also a challenge in that the researcher would have tried to ask some of the questions according to 
the dynamics of the responses gained from the interviewees. The researcher appreciated the 
instances when the research assistant improvised follow-up questions, without straying from the 
topic, in order to seek more clarification on certain responses. Information from ZCTU and from 
ordinary Zambians was important because it gives another perspective of looking at the seeming 
intimacy that Zambia and China share. Still on data collection, this research would have been 
richer if resources were available to collect data from Chinese nationals, preferably in China, to 
assess how they perceive their country’s relations with Zambia and the forces behind them. This, 
of course, is done with acknowledgement that the amount of influence China has in Zambia is 
not the same as Zambia’s influence on China in China. Thus, ordinary Chinese might not be 
privy to how their country is affected by its relations with Zambia but for now this remains in the 
realm of speculation because of the author’s inability to access resources to ascertain this 
argument from Chinese citizens themselves. Apart from appreciating the crucial details that this 
endeavour could give, it has to be mentioned that credible data could only be gathered from a 
people whose views would not put them in jeopardy. China is notoriously known for its strict 
censure on political commentary, especially that which might appear critical of the government. 
The question of whether or not Chinse citizens residing in their country could candidly give their 
impression of their country and its relations with other countries to a foreign researcher without 
courting the ire and wrath of their leaders, remains unanswered.  
It has been shown previously that, though generally stable, the comity between China and 
Zambia has gone through troubled episodes. It is thus almost impossible to predict how Sino-
Zambian relations will ensue even in the near future. The quality of data that will be used for this 
research can also be a cause for concern. The pronouncement of government representatives or 
any other commentators on the subject matter are not always consistent with the behaviour of the 
parties involved. Furthermore, at the heart of literature about China and its growing influence is a 
Western paranoia and suspicion on the one hand (Ofodile 2008), and China’s defensiveness on 
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the other. Thus, there is mostly the possibility of bias in the way literature of Western origin is 
likely to present China’s interests in Zambia. Bias is also a possibility in Chinese literature about 
China’s intentions over Africa. In addition, this research uses qualitative methodology and hence 
the researcher will play a part in how data will be presented and might influence the tenor of the 
findings. This also raises questions of validity, bias and falsifiability.  
 
1.10 Definition and Clarification of Key Words/Terms 
China  
For the purpose of this research, China refers to the People’s Republic of China. This is in 
contrast with the Republic of China (Taiwan). Furthermore, with reference to the subject of the 
current study, China refers to the government of China as it relates to Zambia at a state level. 
 
Constructivism  
Constructivism has been used in a lot of enterprises. This research has used constructivism as the 
research paradigm and as theoretical framework. In terms of research methodology, 
constructivism looks at the social construction of knowledge and takes a context-embedded 
approach in divining the meaning that respondents attach to their worldview.  
In international relations theory, constructivism is an approach that argues that relations among 
nations are shaped by ideas rather than material forces. Constructivism argues that national 
identities and interests emerge out of social practice which could be influenced by both domestic 
and foreign circumstances (Chan 2014). However, as will be shown in the ensuing pages, the 
current research has noted the importance of the impression of non-state actors in influencing 
relations at the state level. Hitherto, constructivism has mainly been used to analyse relations 
from the level of the state (e.g. see Wendt 1994); hence the current study has made a departure 






Identity refers to how one entity conceives itself and the perception that other entities have of it. 
At a national level, identity refers to how China and Zambia perceive themselves, how they 
perceive each other and how other powers perceive them. For this reason, identity as applied in 
this study, is both subjective and intersubjective. The identities of non-state actors have also been 
taken into cognizance after the revelations that emerged from primary data. As a reminder, 
though, there are corporate and social identities in constructivist understanding of national 
identity; corporate identity is an individualizing identity while social identities are many and 
changeable. The third chapter will elaborate on this 
 
Interest 
Like, identity, interest has also been looked at from both the state and non-state level. The 
research will show that while China and Zambia commit themselves to certain interests at the 
state level, these interests do not automatically translate into the interest that ordinary Chinese 
residing in Zambian have. Basically, interest means the aspirations that individuals or nations 
have in their interaction with each other.  
 
The Chinese  
This study was initially aimed at analyzing China-Zambia relations from a state level. However, 
it emerged during primary data collection that Zambians do not necessarily mean the same thing 
when referring to China; the Zambian government talks about its interaction with the Chinese 
government but the non-state actors referred mostly to the Chinese who are not state actors. The 
term “the Chinese” refers to Chinese nationals residing in Zambia who are not under the 
sponsorship of the Chinese government. Chapter seven will demonstrate the importance of 
making the difference between China i.e., the government and “the Chinese” i.e. ordinary 






Zambia refers to the government of the Republic of Zambia. The research will also make a 
difference between Zambia at the state level and ordinary Zambians who were interviewed for 
this research. As will be shown in the study, the Zambian government has constructed meanings 
China-Zambia relations that are not invariably replicable when one takes stock of the impression 
of non-state Zambian actors.  
 
1.11 Structure of Dissertation  
The research comprises a total of eight chapters. Chapter one traversed the general introduction 
of the study and the research methodology employed. Research questions, objectives and the 
research problem were outlined in this chapter. The importance of the first chapter is that it gives 
direction to what this study seeks to achieve and how that will be accomplished. The importance 
of this research has also been outlined in the first chapter. The researcher is alive to the fact that 
Zambia might not play a significant role in singlehandedly influencing China’s status and future. 
China has the potential to decisively shape Zambia’s status and future and to some extent is 
already doing that when one observes how relations with China have actually been used to shape 
political opinion in Zambia. With this in mind, studies that delve into analyzing Zambia-China 
relations with emphasis on how they are likely to chart Zambia’s destiny are both opportune and 
relevant and the first chapter has addressed that.  
Chapter two of the study is the literature review. Literature has been arranged in a cascading 
pattern starting with China’s interaction with the international system in general, coming to its 
relations with Africa and finally Zambia. It should be noted that the thematic manner in which 
information is presented and analysed is also discernible in the fashion with which the literature 
in the second chapter is arranged. Related perceptions of China from both within and outside 
China have been organised in a systematic manner so that readers will easily notice the patterns 
of how China has been perceived and perceives itself. In addition to that the chapter will sample 
different opinions that have hitherto been submitted in analyzing China-Zambia relations. When 
reading the seventh chapter, readers are advised to reacquaint themselves with the themes 
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alluded to in the second chapter because the primary data that was collected expressly for this 
study was tested against published material found in the second chapter.   
Chapter three was reserved for this study’s theoretical approach. Constructivism is the 
approach that was used and the third chapter gave motivation for this selection and the merits of 
constructivism as a lens through which Sino-Zambian relations can be observed. Before going 
into the details of the specific brand of constructivism to be used, chapter three first looked at the 
role of theory in research and the role that notions of human behaviour play in building theories 
of politics, state behaviour and international relations. After that the chapter presented a brief 
outline of more prominent theories of international relations whose usage has staved off the 
emergence of constructivism as a feasible approach to international relations, at least until 
recently. After that was done a general overview of constructivism was given. Following that, a 
Wendtian brand of constructivism was presented as the type of constructivism to be used for this 
research. The third chapter is important because the analysis of this research was done with a 
steady gaze on how constructivism could infer the influence of identities and interests on Sino-
Zambian relations from the variety of data gathered.   
Chapter four tackled the evolution of China’s national identity and interest. This is the same 
pattern found in chapter five, only chapter five refers to Zambia. China as a country has had an 
infinitely older documented political history than Zambia in its current form. Thus, the fourth 
chapter traced how history, extending before the establishment of the PRC in 1949, has shaped 
or constructed China’s identity and interests. It is noteworthy that China has been shaped by, and 
has to some degree shaped, the international system. Its interactions with the outside world have 
contributed to how China postures itself in the international system.  
Chapter five is an exploration of how Zambia’s identities and interests have evolved since the 
birth of the Republic on 24 October 1964. That particular chapter is of critical importance 
because constructivism looks at the social dimension of relations between nations and how 
socially constructed identities and interests could either unify or divide nations. By looking at 
Zambia’s identities and interests over time, one could pick out what sort of states the country is 
more likely to forge mutually beneficial relations with and the states with which it is likely to 
harbour misgivings. It should also be noted that identities and interests, though socially 
constructed, are not divided in a clinical sense according to the vicissitudes of the international 
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system. That the chapter looked at the different republics that have divided Zambia’s political 
history does not mean identities and interests emerged and collapsed subject to these divisions. 
Indeed, some identities and interests that Zambia assumed at independence are likely to be noted 
even today, more than half a century later.  
Chapter six was a descriptive presentation of data that was gathered for this research. The 
chapter was arranged according to the different sources of primary data literature. This chapter, 
of course, was not totally devoid of secondary data. 
In chapter seven, the reader will be constantly led to how certain information from the 
interviews supports or diverts from the literature that was sampled. It is because of this manner 
of analysis that, when reading chapter seven, the reader has to refer to what was written in 
chapter two. The seventh chapter also shades light on how the research questions raised in the 
first chapter were addressed.  
While the penultimate chapter gives a constructivist analysis on how identities and interests have 
shaped Sino-Zambian relations, Chapter eight gives the summary, recommendations and 
general conclusion of the research. Chapter eight also gives a general overview of what the 
research set out to do and how it did it. A number of recommendations are given on how further 
research can proceed from this one. The limitations mentioned in the first chapter inform some of 













 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter will use some of the themes that have informed China-Africa relations in general 
because certain uniformities are traceable on how China has interacted with Africa. For example, 
the “presumed” intersection of interests and “ideational affinity” (Mensah 2010) that informed 
Mao-era China-Africa relations in general were to some extent present even in China’s relations 
with individual African states. Literature on what observers, scholars and analysts have hitherto 
written and said about Zambia’s foreign policy from 1964 – when the country got independence 
– will also be reviewed. The main essence of literature review is to present material that has been 
written on topics that touch the subject of current research with the aim of identifying any gaps 
that have been left unaddressed.  
This chapter, therefore, bears the responsibility of clearly identifying main themes on the 
international relations and behaviour of China and Zambia from the perspective of those who 
have weighed in on these matters. The contents of this chapter will make obvious the originality 
of this study because a close examination of what has been written should exposes the lacunae 
that still remain in tackling the issue under investigation. The evident lack of applying 
constructivism will be established by showing how much of preceding literature, especially of 
Western origin, has conflated Africa into one monolithic and weak region, in the face of a 
marauding prospective colonizer i.e. China. In contrast to this, there is a wide range of literature 
that is optimistic about China’s incursions into Africa and Zambia in particular. China’s self-
identification as a country of the South and its desire for deeper South-South cooperation has 
appealed to Africa (Chin 2012).  By and large, African states that have formal relations with 
China have lauded China-Africa relations (Sautman and Hairong 2007) and see them as a 
possible panacea of Africa’s relentless underdevelopment - partly engendered by historical ties 
with Western powers. Thus, Africans and Chinese have mounted what Sautman and Hairong 
(2007:75) call “a spirited defense” to counter Western perceptions that have been largely 
negative about China-Africa relations. Subsequent chapters will demonstrate how this research 
offers different insights on China-Zambia relations in contrast to insights that have been 
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influenced by those who subscribe to more popular theories of international relations such as 
realism.  
Referring to China’s foreign policy taste, Fairbank argues that “to deal with a major power 
without regard for its history, and especially its tradition in foreign policy, is truly to be flying 
blind” (1969:449-450). With this in mind, this chapter looks at China’s international posturing 
from the time the People’s Republic of China was instituted in 1949, but with a brief outline of 
how China has been presented in international affairs even before the 1949 communist takeover. 
The material used in this chapter will offer comprehensible insight on what have been the main 
themes in the study of China’s foreign policy and national behaviour. The rise of China has 
raised speculations about China’s multilateral impact on world order; whether or not China is a 
status quo power or a revisionist power and what impacts this might have on international 
politics (Alves 2011a). 
The influence that Zambia is likely to have on international politics, as has been suggested by the 
dearth of literature on this, is, at best, negligible. This is mainly because, as Hurrell (2006) 
argues, weak states are not very concerned with gaining global prominence, apart from securing 
what they can from the international system. It is powers with potential or “second tier states”, 
like China, who are likely to vie for global dominance. For this reason, while words like 
“revisionism” and “bandwagoning” exist in analysis of China’s foreign policy, the words are 
conspicuously missing when discussing Zambia’s foreign policy. In addition to this, China’s 
economy has grown tremendously while Zambia’s economy has not grown to the extent that is 
likely to influence global politics and dynamics. China’s growing relations with Africa have also 
taken prominence as Africa is often seen as a buffer that China seeks to use in its insatiable 
search for natural energy resources to sustain a stably growing economy and industrialization 







2.2 China’s foreign policy history 
2.2.1 Mao Zedong, Marxism and Revolutionary Internationalism 
With an age-old civilization that is still appreciated and marvelled at, China has historically seen 
itself as a repository of sophistication. Furthermore, China has retained a culture that has been 
guarded jealously especially against the perceived taint of foreign mores. Even certain writers 
have argued that China approaches the rest of the world from a Sino-Centric perspective (Segal 
1992). Its proud demeanour is manifest even in names that China attributed to itself. Names like 
the “Middle Kingdom” (Jacques 2012) betoken an attitude on China’s part of regarding itself as 
the centre of the universe. The suspicion that China has harboured towards the outside world 
forced it to be a state not fully integrated into the international system. It is fair, though, to 
mention that though Mao retained scepticism against Western influence, he was heavily 
influenced by Western ideas and, as the current research will show, considered himself a fervent 
follower of Karl Marx. What tempered the Western influence in Mao’s thinking was the effort he 
invested in adapting traits of Marxism to the Chinese context (Meisner 1999).3 
Gernant (1990) writes that the yangwu (Westernization) movement that was prominent between 
1860 and 1895 emphasised importing science and technology of Western origin to reinforce 
China. This movement has also been accused of suppressing revolution at the time.  It is thus not 
surprising that the literature that was written during Mao’s era was caustic in criticising the 
yangwu movement because Mao’s rule was firmly based on revolution. However, sources that 
came after Mao’s death were more moderate in their criticism of the yangwu movement and its 
alleged support for the Qing dynasty. By and large, however, China has historically been 
presented as a closed nation. Its own “go out” policy of 1999 presupposes that China was 
hitherto not fully incorporated into the international system. 
It is thus recently that China is undergoing its transition from being a country with limited 
interaction with the outside world “to a developed country that is fully integrated into regional 
and global economic, political, and security regimes” (Glaser 2001:304). Blanchard (2008) 
argues that China’s decision to be more integrated in global affairs was necessitated by its 
                                                          
3 This helps to appreciate the complex history that China has had with the rest of the world; a history punctuated 
by implacable opposition to the outside world, but also immense changes in policies to integrate into the world.   
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growing footprint which created expectations from both local and external forces for a more 
integrated China.  
In contact with other nations, some observers expect China to take on an officious deportment. 
Fairbank (1969) states that even though Mao belaboured revolutionary verbiage in contrast to the 
Confucian tenets of civility and etiquette that had hitherto informed dynastic China’s foreign 
policy, he still maintained China’s ancient superiority attitude. Thus, China’s foreign policy has 
often been represented as exuding its unswerving resolve to retain a purely Chinese worldview 
and try to convince other powers in the international system to acknowledge this. There is 
evidence that this perception of a proud China has continued to present times, regardless of the 
changes that China has undergone from the nationalist era to the current times since the 
communist takeover.  
The People’s Republic of China was initiated in 1949, after the communists, led by Mao Zedong, 
toppled the nationalist-led leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek. The communists faced a daunting task 
of revamping an economy that was left vulnerable after more than two decades of internecine 
war. The urgency for economic recovery vied for prominence with the will to create a proper 
communist nation. Not surprisingly, China’s foreign policy during this time was occasionally 
explained in Marxist terms (Schwatrz 1968) and was therefore “circumscribed by Beijing’s 
ideological position” (Anshan 2007:70). The communist approach to China’s foreign policy was 
closely linked with Mao’s personal influence and often drew differences between communist 
China and the China of the past. In Mao’s worldview of the three worlds (Wang 2000; An 2013), 
he grouped Asia (save for Japan), Africa and Latin America as belonging to a third world, which 
traversed the region between the Superpowers, which he considered as members of the first 
world, and Canada, Europe and Japan as making up the second world.  
In Mao’s composition, the third world was a subjugated group of actors and hence had to put 
more premium on transforming the unjust world system. This was in effect a revisionist tendency 
added to Marxist-Leninist ideology. Mao’s understanding of Marxism-Leninism arguably 
influenced revisionism by asserting that the unjust world order could be changed by a wave of 
revolutionary internationalism. Hevi (1963:9) argues that Mao’s China sought to convince other 
international players “that China is a paradise and that communism is the only possible road to 
that paradise.” Furthermore, because the foreign policy of Marxism-Leninism also reflected 
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revisionism, every Third World country, regardless of its socio-political makeup, was expected 
to range itself against hegemonism and imperialism. China put itself in the forefront of this 
distinctly Third World struggle (Anshan 2007). 
While arguing that revolution was the most effective way of fighting domination, China argued 
that the passion for liberation grows naturally from people who become conscious of the 
necessity to fight hegemony and imperialism (Cheng and Huangao 2009); furthermore, China 
realistically conceded that revolutions are not importable and hence Third World countries have 
to carry them out according to specific local contexts (Van Ness 1970). Cheng and Huangao 
(2009:88) estimate that Maoist China “was the major power that was most forthcoming in 
supporting the Third World’s demands.” As will be shown later this support was limited by 
China’s internal economic circumstances. Even though China appreciated that the initiative to 
launch revolutions must spring from the individual nations affected rather than externally 
imposed, it occasionally tried to export Mao’s thought to other nations. For example, during his 
long visit to Africa from 1963 to 1964, Chou En-Lai declared that Africa was ripe for revolution, 
without taking into consideration the specific circumstances of different African nations. It is 
worth mentioning that this was during the Sino-Soviet split and hence by making this declaration 
Chou was deftly trying to reassure Africa that time was right to end colonial domination. By this 
message, China presented itself as an anticolonial power, in contrast to the Soviet Union which it 
presented as a revisionist and socialist imperialist power. 
It is noteworthy to write that much literature that was written by Chinese leaders before and 
shortly after their victory in 1949 was brazenly communist and hence had one thing in common 
with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (from henceforth referred to as the Soviet Union or 
simply USSR). Being a smaller power than the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the 
Chinese Communist Party was “originally a branch of the Comintern and a protégé´ of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)” (Shen and Xia 2010:514). 
 
2.2.2 The Sino-Soviet Split 
At the time when Mao Zedong and his acolytes were agitating for a communist takeover of 
China, and shortly after succeeding, the Chinese communists deferred to the Soviet Union as the 
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leader of global communism. Mao admitted that “the Communist Party of China is a party built 
on the model of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union” (Mao 1961:284). However, after the 
death of Stalin, his successors wilfully wanted to drift from his mode of rule. At the1956 20th 
Party Congress Nikita Khrushchev gave a scathing criticism of “Stalin’s purges” (FitzGerald 
1976:94) or excesses, his cult of personality, his obsessive despotism and antipathy to collective 
governance. The Polish-Hungarian crisis of 1956 compounded the already palpable division 
between China and the Soviet Union that followed the 20th Congress of the CPSU (Shen and Xia 
2010). 
Post-Stalin leaders started entertaining the possibility that apart from revolutionary means, 
parliamentary methods could also be used to replace capitalism with socialism/communism 
(MacFarquhar 1983:8). This change in Soviet leadership and political outlook ruptured Sino-
Soviet concord. Mao was publicly enamoured of Stalin and he was a doctrinaire Marxist who 
could not brook the possibility of a parliamentary victory of socialism/communism over 
capitalism; neither could he accept peaceful coexistence between the socialist /Eastern bloc and 
the capitalist/Western bloc. In China’s mind-set, war was an inevitable presage of the communist 
defeat of capitalism. China accused the new Soviet leadership of revisionism when it allowed for 
other modes of achieving a communist triumph (Hunter and Sexton 1999).  
The accusation of revisionism was an indictment that post-Stalin Soviet Union was an apostate 
of socialism and China was a credible custodian of socialist doctrine (Singh 1968). Goldman and 
Ou-Fang Lee (2002:448) assert that China, from the time of the Cold War, always nursed the 
desire to be recognised as a commensurate player to the superpowers. This assertion implies that 
by attacking the Soviet Union, China had lofty ideas of not only discrediting the Soviet Union, 
but of being recognised as a superpower too. As Taylor (2006) puts it, China has always 
entertained the thought that it has been cheated of its real and prestigious status in international 
affairs, and that its rich history of civilization and its unparalleled population create justification 
for a bigger status in global affairs. Mao’s speech that will be referred to in the fourth chapter 
will demonstrate Mao’s dissatisfaction of the lowly place that China occupied at the time of the 
People’s Republic’s establishment; he attributed this lowly status to imperialism, outside force, 
and the reactionary leaderships from China. The Sino-Soviet rift, then, though ideological, was 
arguably a fraction of a complex Chinese mindset.  
31 
 
From the foregoing, though, it would seem that ideological variances were significant in 
deepening the Sino-Soviet rift. However, Jones and Kevill (1985: ix) argue that “the underlying 
causes” of Sino-Soviet discord had “much more to do with realpolitik” issues than with 
competition on who was a “true fount of communist wisdom.” Attributing Sino-Soviet animosity 
to realpolitik matters could partly be explained by how China and the Soviet Union tried to 
curtail each other’s power and simultaneously augment their influence in the Third World and 
Africa in particular. Daan S. Prinsloo (1978) actually asserts that “it is not exaggerated to state 
that most of China’s activities in Africa can be attributed to its conflict with the Soviet Union, 
rather than a belief in or a commitment to any African cause.”  The Sino-Soviet split had a 
devastating effect on Sino-African relations (Martin and Johnson 1985; Cajee 2016). China 
considered Soviet imperialism i.e. imperialism of Soviet provenance, as similar to, (Friedman 
2010) if not more sinister than, Western imperialism. To this end China started working more 
towards curtailing Soviet influence in Africa (Brautigam 2009). On the other hand, the Soviets 
also wanted to present China as having imperialist designs over Africa (Legum 1982:204).  
Colin Legum argues that during this period, albeit maintaining its anti-Western rhetoric and 
stance, China “concentrated more on attacking the Russians” (1982:202). This did not bode well 
with African liberation movements that benefited from the USSR’s largesse. The South African 
Communist Party (SACP) was particularly scathing in its attack on China. The SACP accused 
China of disingenuously renouncing its anti-imperialist stance because it assailed the Soviet 
Union which was the “rock on which the whole anti-imperialist structure of the world rests” 
(African Communist 1979:7). 
In their defence, the Chinese branded African liberation movements that maintained ties with the 
Soviet Union as revisionists (Anshan 2007). While China committed itself to fight against what 
it perceived as revisionism, some writers described China’s actions and its intent to change the 
status quo as revisionist (see for example Qin 2009). The Sino-Soviet split proved costly for 
China because it started supporting any movement, defunct or otherwise, that was not under 
Soviet auspices. Alan Hutchison (1975:233) puts this succinctly by asserting that during this 
period “with very few exceptions, China’s choice of movements to support, and her actions 
towards these and to other groups, have been dictated by the need to challenge, surpass or 
embarrass the Soviet Union.” Rubinstein (1975: v) qualifies this statement by arguing that by the 
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early 1960s, the West realised that the two most influential communist players were more of 
rivals than partners and that their activities in the Third World were more tailored towards 
“parrying the moves of the other than with undermining the Western position.” This must have 
come as a relief to Western powers that feared the communist influence on the newly liberated 
and impressionable African states.  
Liberation movements that were not on China’s side during this discord found China’s dogmatic 
adherence to the nature of communist revolutions unsavoury. China was regarded as a war 
monger, determinedly bent on defeating its political and ideological foes “through the barrel of 
the gun” (Kasrils 2004). Scalapino (1964:640) describes China’s and the Soviet Union’s fight for 
“African affections” as “a titanic struggle.”  This assertion came in the aftermath of 
Khrushchev’s visit to Africa where he reaffirmed Russia’s antipathy to imperialism and its 
determination to see it ended in Africa. This meant that the Soviet Union would continue to 
support African liberation struggles. By arguing for a more progressive brand of Marxism, 
Khrushchev was essentially daring China to abandon its Marxist zealotry (The New York Times, 
May 29, 1964). 
The Khrushchev visit could also be read as a countervailing initiative to Chou Enlai’s 
“whirlwind” African trip that began in December 1963 and lasted almost two months when he 
declared Africa “ripe for revolution” (Legum 1982:202; Singh 1968:4). Furthermore, conceding 
that Africa and China had different ideological persuasions and cultures, he emphasized the 
unifying factors which were “the struggle for full independence and … the fight against 
imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism” (Scalapino 1964:641). Scalapino (1964) 
concludes that Chou had a complex mission of challenging the perception of China’s detractors; 
this was because on the one hand Chou had to convince Africans of China’s commitment to 
revolution and hence the total eradication of imperialism but also on the other hand had to 
present China’s image as that of a peace-loving and non-interfering power sensitive to the 
internal and specific dynamics of African states. Thus China had to present a “dual image” 
(Scalapino 1964:642) in its mission to court Africa and discredit the USSR. 
Mao considered post-Stalin Soviet Union as revisionist. Among his own people, however, there 
were those, sceptical of Mao’s cult of personality and mode of rule – redolent of Stalin’s style – 
whom he considered revisionists or “capitalist-roaders” (Short 1982:172); it was thus the fear of 
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revisionism, capitalist inclinations among his colleagues, and the erosion of his immense 
authority that Mao embarked on the Cultural Revolution to cleanse communist China of 
elements that he considered inimical to his political philosophy (Payne 2014).  
 
2.2.3 The Cultural Revolution  
Mao’s personal influence on China’s foreign policy from the communist takeover of 1949 is 
beyond dispute. However, it was during the Cultural Revolution (from 1966 to 1976) that 
“Maoism” and Mao’s cult of personality became more manifest in China and in Chinese foreign 
policy. During this time, Chinese artists and writers who somewhat deviated from Mao’s 
Thought were accused of revisionist leanings and thus had to be corrected through a cultural 
revolution (Singh 1968). One of the distinctive features of the Cultural Revolution was the 
emergence of “the Red Guards, the People’s Liberation Army, and the inchoate Revolutionary 
Committees” as the main political players and custodians of pure communism (Schwartz 
1968:20). The resultant effect of this shift was the relegation of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) to a less prominent place and the notion that it could no longer solely embody proletarian 
dictatorship. In addition to chastising certain fractions of the CCP, untold numbers of youth, the 
so-called lost generation, were shunted to the countryside where, it was thought, they would be 
encultured (Kleinman and Kleinman 1994).  
In terms of China’s international relations and repute, the Cultural Revolution was “a disaster 
and the PRC’s interests and influence in Africa and in the world in general suffered a great set 
back during the turmoil” (Taylor 2006:32; see also Singh 1968). Hutchings (2001:90) argues that 
the Revolution “marked a departure from the norms of civilized behaviour producing cruelty and 
oppression on a horrific scale.” Violence and disorder took on rife and nationwide proportions 
(Bridgham 1967). China was accused of spreading Maoism to other countries (Cornelissen and 
Taylor 2000). The number of African dignitaries visiting China greatly reduced during the 
Cultural Revolutions because China’s provocations in Africa during this period were “bizarre” 




2.2.4 China after Mao  
Much of China’s foreign policy up to 1978 was characteristic of Mao’s disposition. After his 
death, China embarked on a modernization period which changed the country’s focus on foreign 
policy. The figure that has been credited for much of China’s changes after Mao is Deng 
Xiaoping. Post-Mao China retained, in rhetoric at least, much of what the Chairman stood for but 
in reality showed a visible departure from Mao’s communist and revolutionary dogma that saw 
the world in a Manichaean sense. China’s support towards, and relations with, Africa, became 
even more qualified as China concentrated more on cultivating an identity that would enhance 
China’s fortunes (Taylor 1997). In the words of Hutchings (2001:143), after Mao, “China’s 
national interests [became] more important than its revolutionary interests.” Thus, Thompson 
(2005; see also Vines 2006 and Peh and Eyal 2010) argues, China has shifted “from 
ideologically-driven interactions during the Cold War, today’s China-Africa relations combine 
pragmatic economic and political means to achieve China’s objective of establishing a world 
order that is peaceful and conducive to continued economic growth and stability at home.” 
 
2.2.5 Theoretical Interpretations of China’s Foreign Policy  
Added to the Marxist explanation of China’s foreign policy are the realist and liberalist 
interpretations. From the realist perspective, China has always been seen as a threat to its 
perceived competitors and hence must be contained (see Wang 2000). This perspective stems 
from the fact that in realist terms, a rising or an aspiring rising power becomes more assertive 
and competitive in its demeanour and hence could disrupt prevailing forms of international order. 
States that are more powerful, according to realists, will always hanker for instituting hegemony 
in their region and at the same time forestall other powerful states from doing the same in other 
regions. The final aim of states, according to political realism, is the realization of national 
interest and the maximization of power in order to control the international system. It follows, 
thus, that China is likely to dominate and control its region with the aim of curtailing other 
powers, mostly the United States, from gaining more ground in the international system 
(Ikenberry 2008). What should also be borne in mind is that at the core of their analysis, realists 
argue that national identity and interests are enduring and unchangeable irrespective of specific 
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contexts. Even though China underwent certain changes after the 1949 revolution, “the sense of 
[its] identity remains and continuities … reappear, mixed in with discontinuities” (Fairbank 
1969:461). 
The end of the Cold War facilitated the emergence of the unipolar system with the United States 
of America as the sole superpower. However, the prevalent unipolar system, Waltz (2000:32) 
argues, is a fleeting arrangement and the development of the multipolar world order is “all-but-
inevitable” and is already underway, though it is not being led by erstwhile dominant powers of 
Europe but Asia. Arguing from a realist perspective, Waltz is persuaded to write that China and 
Japan manifest more potential among the Asian countries of assuming the role of great powers in 
the coming multipolar disorder (see Waltz 1993). However, he goes on to argue that China 
shows more willingness to assume this role than does Japan and with its outstanding economic 
growth and military advancement, Waltz seems convinced that China will increasingly provoke 
concern from the United States and will rise to the status of a great power if it is able to remain a 
united polity. Mearsheimer (2006:160) argues that his theory of international politics submits 
that mighty powers seek “to establish hegemony” in their regions while curtailing the chances of 
rival powers to establish hegemony in other regions. From this he draws the conclusion that this 
is what is likely to happen between the United States and China as China continues to rise. This 
argument is supported by Carmody and Owusu (2007:505) who write that China’s “desire to 
become a global economic powerhouse and a counterweight to U.S. hegemony in the 
international system is now clear.” Hurrell (2006:2) asserts that China, and other emerging 
powers like Brazil, Russia and India, believes it is entitled “to a more influential role in world 
affairs.” 
Shiping’s (2008) analysis of China’s identity ascertains that China is a realist state even though 
the analysis ascribes different types of realism to China. This analysis describes China under 
Mao as an offensive realist state that was ready to engage in radical confrontation with those it 
deemed as its political and/or ideological foes and those who threatened China’s security. This 
conclusion is drawn from the conviction with which Mao hoped for a radical change of the 
international system. China after Mao, according to Shiping’s argument, could be described as a 
defensive realist state which manifests signs of restraint in its international behaviour (see also 
Foot and Walter 2010). China after Mao is thus not expected to be bellicose in its demeanour, 
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though there is an argument that the Taiwan question (reintegration of the Republic of China into 
mainland China) is the only preoccupation on which China seems reluctant to temper its desire. 
For Shiping and others who argue in this line, defensive realism is helpful to China’s 
international status because an offensive realist states could attract “containment” (Shiping 
2008:152) from other powerful international players.  
Glaser (2001:304) argues that China, while essentially seeing itself “as inherently a great power 
by virtue of its history, culture, territory, and population”, usually presents contradictory 
identities to suit its “parochial” and Sino-centric interests. He goes on to argue that China 
reckons that it can best realise its interests by posturing itself as a “great power” but at other 
times identifies itself as a poor and developing country,4 with the latter identity aimed at gaining 
benefits from the international system. The argument goes that taking up the status of a 
superpower will encumber China with more responsibility in regional and international issues. Li 
(2011:331) suggests that factors such as China’s identity as a developing country on the one 
hand, and siding with the developed world on the other hand are likely to constrain China from 
tinkering with “the multilateral architecture at the global level.” Thus, “pragmatism rather than 
grand vision” is likely to shape a growing China’s international presence. In almost a similar 
fashion, Zbigniew Brzezinski, a prominent Polish-American political scientist of the realist 
school, has said that China’s rise does not necessarily portend war. He goes on to say that 
“China’s leadership is not inclined to challenge the United States militarily, and its focus remains 
on economic development and winning acceptance as a great power” (Brzezinski 2005:46). 
Furthermore, a more “confrontational foreign policy” is likely to disrupt China’s economic 
growth trajectory which might actually aggravate ordinary Chinese and threaten the Chinese 
Communist Party’s hold on power (Brzezinski 2005).  
This argument counters that of adherents of the reapolitik who express alarm at the growth of 
China and its possible interference with the prevalent status quo. Indeed, China, as Wohlforth 
(1999:25) writes, has no alternative to bandwagon with the United State. It also might be 
compelled not to disrupt the prevalent world order. Kang affirms that there is little evidence that 
China’s rise has caused “undue alarm” in its region or that other Asian powers seek to balance 
                                                          
44 Kerry Brown (2007:161) argues “that China does not already classify itself as a middle country” because of the 
alarmingly high number of people in the countryside of China that still in what is internationally accepted as 
absolute poverty.  
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against China’s rise. The argument is supported by the assertion that China has been rising for 
more than three decades and that if “the pessimistic argument view that states prepare for future 
contingencies today” is universally applicable then East Asian states would have been jolted into 
reacting against China’s rise (Kang 2005:551). 
Realists argue that the economic growth that China currently enjoys gives certain scholars reason 
to argue that China is likely to be a great power in the near future because it combines the factors 
needed for such a status. These include “size of population and territory, resource endowment, 
economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence” (Waltz 1993:50). 
Taylor (2006) suggests that China rues being deprived of great power status in the international 
system which seems to overlook the country’s longstanding civilization and huge population. 
From these perspectives, a China that is growing in all necessary dimensions is an inevitable 
great power in the making and could hence cause certain changes in international politics, some 
of which are likely to be disruptive. Zhu (2008) avers that, contrary to the opinion of realpolitik 
devotees, China’s rise is unlikely to stoke conflict because the United States has made its global 
leadership unchallengeable and has “compelled China to bandwagon with the United States.” In 
other words, China is a follower, albeit a grudging one, of the status quo (see Hurrell 2006). Li 
(2011:331) calls this “rising from within the international order.” Those who toe this line have 
hinted that China lacks “revisionist ambitions” (Verhoeven 2014) because “attempting to 
dislodge the United States would be futile” (Brzezinski 2005:47). 
 
2.3 China and Africa’s Liberation  
2.3.1 China and the African Struggle against Colonialism and Minority Rule 
At the time when the People’s Republic of China was instituted in 1949, much of the African 
continent was either under colonial or minority (settler white) rule. Despite Sino-African contact 
“dating back to ancient times” (Anshan 2007:70), current relations between China and Africa 
were formalized at the “Asia-African Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia from April 18 to 
April 24, 1955” (Ofodile 2008:512; see also Yun 2014). The countries represented at the 
conference vowed to deepen Afro-Asian solidarity and to oppose colonialism. It is easier to 
surmise that the Bandung Conference aroused China’s interest in Africa’s struggle against 
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colonial domination. Sautman and Hairong (2006:44) categorically state that “unlike the US, 
which passively or actively backed colonialism from the 1950s to the 1970s and apartheid until 
the late 1980s, China opposed colonialism.”   
However, due to China’s state at the time, the support that it gave to Africa’s liberation 
movements was mainly “rhetorical” (Segal 1992:115) and “ideological” (Ofodile 2008:515; see 
also Anshan 2007:70) rather than economic and material (Taylor 2006). Taylor (2006) states that 
China’s support for African liberation was shorn of massive material aid because of the Chinese 
belief that those who wanted liberation should rely primarily on their own resources before 
appealing to foreign aid. Nevertheless, China’s aspiration to fight imperialism and its “support 
for non-alignment…. served its purpose well” (Cheng and Huangao 2009:88). African members 
of the United Nations at the time reciprocated China’s support by upholding its “claims to 
permanent membership on the United Nations’ Security Council” (Negi 2008:42; see also Atwi-
Boateng 2017). However, despite its stance against imperialism, China did not enjoy Africa’s 
confidence invariably. One of the episodes that eroded China’s good repute among African 
liberation movements was the Sino-Soviet split.  
 
2.3.2 China and Post-Colonial Africa 
After the death of Mao Zedong and the almost simultaneous policy of modernization, there was a 
seeming lull in Sino-African relations. The decline in Sino-African relations characterizing this 
period became more manifest in the1980s (Hairong and Sautman 2010). This could be connected 
to the fact that China was seeking to improve its economy and for that reason was more drawn to 
countries that would help it realise this aspiration. In addition, most of Africa was economically 
weak and was under unstable governments that could not be used to China’s economic 
advantage. China cultivated relations with the West to the extent that the issue of human rights, 
which was the mainstay of the China-West impasse, was skirted around (Mann 2000).  
It is also noteworthy that at the time of Mao’s death most of African states had been liberated 
from colonialism. This development was to China’s benefit as the pressure to help liberation 
movements with material aid was reduced. China even started promoting a negotiated settlement 
between South African liberation movements and the apartheid government (Xinhua, September 
6 1987). At this stage China was more concerned with promoting national interests rather than 
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practicing and exporting revolutionary fervour (Hutchings 2001). It could safely be argued that 
China concentrated more on courting the developed world for economic growth. However, the 
Tiananmen Protests of 1989 excited the wrath of Western governments and China had to rely, 
once again, on Africa for political support (Taylor, 1998). The Tiananmen Crisis proved that 
though China had concentrated more on cultivating and improving relations with the West, 
independent Africa was a strategic partner in the international system. China’s own history of 
Western/imperialist and capitalist domination was exploited to gain Africa’s sympathy (Mohan 
and Power 2008; Yun 2014). The Western censure that China incurred after the 1989 crisis was 
dismissed as imperialist interference. All these factors combined to make Sino-African solidarity 
more pronounced and natural.  
From 1989 to date economic and trade relations between China and Africa have grown 
exponentially (Carmody and Owusu 2007; Rugumamu 2017) and “attracted unprecedented 
global attention” (Peh and Eyal 2010:4729; Shen 2015). In 2008 China supplanted the European 
Union and the United States to become Africa’s biggest trade partner (van Dijk 2009). The 
conditions that China seemingly recoils from attaching to its foreign policy (McCormick 2008) 
have played a seminal role in cementing Sino-African relations (Lee 2006; Vines 2006). China 
gives respite to countries like Sudan and Zimbabwe that are under Western sanctions that are 
perceived as punitive and imperialist tendencies of Western nations and institutions. For other 
players, however, by having close ties with such countries, China is aiding and abetting rogue 
regimes and playing an indirect role in perpetuating human rights abuses (Carmody and Taylor 
2010; Dreher et al 2016:8). In some quarters China has been called a “rogue donor” (Naim 2007) 
because its foreign direct investment arguably targets “countries that combine large natural 
resource endowments and weak rule of law” (Noland 2014:198). In addition to this, some 
observers do not believe the win-win approach that China claims to promote in its relations with 
Africa. Dreher and Fuchs (2015:988) have a different view, arguing that “China's aid allocation 
seems to be widely independent of recipients' endowment with natural resources and institutional 
characteristics [and hence] denoting Chinese aid as rogue aid seems unjustified.”  
Allegations of China being baneful for Africa have been made for decades and from both 
Africans and non-Africans. Ghanaian Emmanuel Hevi (1963:1967) argued that China was 
involved in the African liberation struggle not altruistically and certainly not for the benefit of 
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Africa but it had decided to also embark on its own imperialism. Hevi argues, quite 
convincingly, that Africans were mistaken in thinking that colonial tendencies are the exclusive 
preserve of the capitalist West. That socialist or communist powers can be colonisers, cannot be 
gainsaid. For this reason, Hevi offers a prescient caution to Africans who might be inclined 
towards a careless embrace of China and other nations that have no history of colonialism in 
Africa. As regards current Sino-African relations, much Western literature has been scathing or 
“alarmist” (Negi 2008:43; see also Corkin 2014) in its analysis (Ndulo 2008), with some 
accusing China of seeking to spread its “empire” (Watts 2006) and some considering China as 
the “new colonial power” (Walsh 2006) while others still considering China’s incursions into 
Africa as part of a “new scramble” (Downs 2007;Carmody 2011; Marton and Matura 2011) for 
African resources (The Independent, November 4, 2006; Kamoche, Siebers and Mamman 2015). 
Metaphors like “dragon in the bush” (Large 2008:45) have been used to describe China’s forays 
into Africa in search of needed resources (Abdulai 2016). Thus, “many Western officials, 
commentators and academics have been extremely suspicious of China’s growing role on the 
continent” (Hess and Aidoo 2014:130). Howard French (2014) has advanced the argument that 
ordinary Chinese who are flocking to Africa are the more potent harbingers of establishing a 
Chinese empire in Africa “than any carefully planned action by the Beijing government to build 
state power and reinforce national prestige.” 
 
In 2006, the then Foreign Secretary of Britain, Jack Straw, cautioned his Nigerian audience that 
what China is currently doing in Africa is reminiscent of the beginning of European colonialism. 
Two years later Andrew Malone (2008) wrote that China is agitating to turn Africa into a colony. 
He went on to say that the current influx of Chinese into Africa is even more determined than the 
European invasion of the continent which occasioned colonialism. Peter Hitchens has made the 
conclusion that “China has created a new slave empire in Africa” (Hitchens, 2008). McLaughlin 
(2005), almost in the same vein argues that China’s current involvement in Africa is more 
myopic than the European one in the 1800s which was driven by ideals of “Christianity, 
civilization and commerce.” Negi (2008:44-45) argues that such sentiments “tend to sanitize the 
historical colonization of Africa and have the effect of expiating Europeans of their excesses, 
which are only too recent to be forgotten.” Negi’s argument dovetails that of Taylor (2008) by 
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arguing that unlike European invaders who imposed their political practices on Africa, China has 
steered clear of interfering with Africa’s political inclinations. 
 
The argument that China is interested in taking over Africa and augmenting its influence is 
strongly tied to realist arguments that have hitherto dominated analysis of China’s foreign policy 
in general and its ties with Africa (See for example Taylor 2006; Botha 2006). Those who 
subscribe to the realpolitik are of the idea that China’s rise will have devastating impacts on the 
status quo as it is unavoidable that rising powers become more assertive and determined to 
change the existing state of affairs (Mearsheimer 2001; Jonhston 2003; see also Walt 1998 and 
Kang 2005). Mearsheimer began his 2006 article with a question of whether or not China can 
rise peacefully. His answer was a definite “no” (Mearsheimer 2014; see also Mearsheimer 2010). 
He qualifies his position by saying that if China maintains its “impressive economic growth”, it 
is likely to engage in a heated security competition with the United States “with considerable 
potential for war” (Mearsheimer 2006:48; Mearsheimer 2014:160; Mearsheimer 2010:382). 
More has been said about this position in this chapter.   
The general attitude of those who dread China’s rise and its potential to wreak international order 
have variously been referred to as Sino-pessimists (Wang 2000). Their opposite number has been 
referred to as Sino-optimists (Ampiah and Naidu 2008) and by and large, the African elite, who 
deal directly with China at institutional levels, have often been branded as such. Sino-optimists 
are guided by liberalism as they argue that it is in China’s best interest to rise peacefully in a 
world that is more interdependent economically (see Callahan 2013). Furthermore, they are also 
guided by the conviction that values, interests and social history engender different behaviours in 
China’s relations with other nations. Much literature has often used what Ampiah and Naidu 
(2008; see also Mohan and Power 2008) call a Manichaean method of interpreting China’s role 
in Africa or what Hess and Aidoo (2014:129) call “the existing binary exploitation/opportunity 
paradigm through which growing Chinese engagement in Africa is often analyzed.”  
Yun (2014:1) observes that “with a few exceptions, there is a strong tendency to assert moral 
judgements” in assessing China’s role in Africa. Those who think of China as a selfish power, 
out to consume Africa’s resources and a bad political example squandering Africa’s efforts and 
opportunities to improve governance (Zafar 2007) and assure a sustainable future, consider 
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China’s relations as “evil.” Those who perceive China as a timely sponsor of much needed 
funding and infrastructure in Africa consider China a “virtuous” partner. In their conclusion, 
Ampiah and Naidu (2008) cited realism as a theory through which Sino-African relations can be 
analyzed while Hess and Aidoo departed from the aforementioned binary and analyzed Sino-
African relations away from China’s alleged benefits and threats to the structure of African 
institutions. Ofodile (2008) also broke ranks with realist perceptions that see China-Africa 
relations as a “zero-sum” (Downs 2007) equation meaning the gains in China will ultimately 
occasion losses for Africa. Ofodile (2008:510) advocates “guarded optimism regarding the 
deepening relationship between Africa and China.” 
The depth of current China-Africa relations controverts arguments that put a very low premium 
on Africa’s importance to China and the world at large. In 1992, for example, Gerald Segal 
started off an article with the statement: “It is hard to make a case that Africa matters very much 
to China” (Segal 1992:115). Segal’s argument was driven by the priorities that China adopted 
after Mao, most especially the growing connections with developed states who were considered 
essential for China’s growth and integration in the global economy. With the passage of time, 
however, observers have noted Africa’s importance for China and vice versa. While China has 
helped to place Africa back at the focal point of global attention, it has also played a big role in 
improving “Africa’s fortunes” (World Bank 2011) in the second decade of the new millennium, 
as exhibited by the impressive recovery of Africa economies after the global recession (Shaw 
2012). In other words, growing Sino-African (and South-South) relations have also prompted 
interest of other actors in the international system, leading others to state that Africa has latterly 
assumed the centre stage in current international politics (Modi 2011). 
Departing from reductionist analyses that consider Africa as having a single importance for 
China i.e. provider of much needed resources, Yun (2014) gives at least four interests that China 
seeks to pursue in its interactions with Africa. The continent is strategic in satisfying China’s 
national interests in terms of politics, the economy, security and ideology. In terms of political 
support, China intends to convert the whole of Africa into adopting the One-China policy 
entailing the incorporation of Taiwan as a part of mainland China (Alden 2005). Africa is vital in 
boosting China’s economy as it is a consumer of China’s products as well as the fount of 
resources needed to keep China’s domestic economy afloat. Security wise, Africa could play a 
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big role in securing China’s foreign investment and curbing criminal activities and political 
instability which are inimical to China’s “commercial interests” and the safety of its personnel 
(Yun 2014:1). Ideologically, even though China has departed from the Marxist zeal that was 
characteristic of the Mao era (Mensah 2010), the country has sought to promote its “socialism 
with Chinese characteristics” paradigm as an effective economic system that refutes claims that 
Western economic systems are universally applicable.  
In sum, China-Africa relations have brought Africa to the centre of global attention. It is no 
wonder that Segal’s (1992) claim that it is far-fetched to argue for Africa’s importance in 
China’s case becomes harder to sustain. Calderisi (2006:4) also mentioned that in recent times 
“Africa has fallen almost completely off the map.” The zeal with which China has courted 
Africa, especially after the 2006 FOCAC summit wherein China crafted the Africa Policy, 
accentuates Africa’s importance. The rise of China-Africa relations has also aroused the interest 
of Western players. After the Cold War, there was little incentive for Western countries and the 
former Soviet Union to continue competing for African favours. The reduction of European and 
Russian presence in Africa created a space which other actors filled, China being the most 
prominent of these (van Dijk 2009). As has been shown, the attention that Africa is currently 
enjoying is characterized by Western fears over China’s influence in Africa on the one hand and 
Africa and China’s undertakings to deepen their relations, on the other.  
From what has been presented thus far, realist interpretations of China’s identity and interests 
become explicable. The fact that post-Mao China sought relations with countries that could aid 
its material aspirations justifies realist claims of pragmatism. China’s partial relegation of 
Africa’s importance in the 1980s portrays China as a practical and pragmatic power that puts a 
low premium on players that are not materially viable. Courting Africa after the 1989 Tiananmen 
Square crisis also shows that China uses Africa for expediency. In essence, this kind of 
behaviour comprises the fundament of realism. However, amid all these factors, the current 
research identified certain gaps in one-dimensional interpretations of China’s foreign policy 
behaviour and the likely forces behind it. In addition to the practical reason shaping China’s 
relations with other players in the world, there is a social dimension which constructs China’s 
and other players’ identities and interests through social processes. For this reason, the study 
used constructivism to analyse how socially constructed identities have also played a part in 
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influencing China’s foreign policy posture. To look at China’s relations with a particular state 
will also prevent generalizations of what China wants as it relates with its partners. Furthermore, 
the growing number of non-state actor Chinese adds a new dimension to the “China in Africa” 
discourse and makes necessary the question of which China one is talking about and what 
interests it is pursuing. 
 
2.4 Zambia’s Foreign Policy: The Cold War and non-alignment  
Perhaps the most exacting circumstances in the international systems at the time Northern 
Rhodesia became independent and was christened the Republic of Zambia in 1964 were white 
rule in Southern and Central Africa – where Zambia is situated - and the Cold War. At 
independence Zambia was in an invidious position of having to tactfully steer an apparently 
contradictory course; two thirds of its imports came from the white-ruled Rhodesia (later to be 
called Zimbabwe) and most of Zambia’s exports were ferried out of the country through the 
railway of that country. Further south, South Africa provided a significant number of managers 
and industrialists. This position was a difficult one because Zambia had strong ties to movements 
that were fighting the regimes in Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa. As will be shown later, 
China was to play a great deal in trying to ameliorate the dependence that Zambia had on its 
minority-ruled neighbours.  
Zambia gained independence nine years after the celebrated Bandung Conference, a conference 
which played a pivotal role in Afro-Asian solidarity against imperialism, hegemonism and in 
constructing a neutralist (i.e. non-aligned) stance against the Cold War belligerents. Zambia was 
one of the first countries to gain independence in Southern Africa and hence was surrounded 
largely by countries that were riven by anti-colonial and anti-minority conflict. Zambia’s foreign 
policy had to be crafted within these different contexts. The ruling United National Independence 
Party (UNIP), under the leadership of Kenneth Kaunda condemned minority rule in Rhodesia, 
South Africa, Mozambique and Angola as immoral. Judging from its position as a landlocked 
country surrounded by minority regimes, Zambia’s foreign policy towards its neighbours was 
radical but this radicalism had a strong connection with morality (Mtshali 1970). 
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The moral dimension of Zambia’s foreign policy was not invariably beneficial to Zambia’s 
prestige. For example, Zambia supported the independence of Biafra during the Nigerian civil 
war on what were called strictly moral grounds. Zambia’s stance was that even though it 
supported African unity, it also thought it morally better for unity to come out of people’s 
volition rather than a unity based on bloodletting and coercion. The independence of Biafra was 
not supported by the majority members of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and Zambia 
found itself in the minority of those who supported the move (Mtshali 1970).  
Zambia’s unwavering stance on South Africa presumptively put it at variance with the United 
States. This was a consequence of Cold War politics because, while appreciating the repugnant 
nature of apartheid and the minority government in South Africa and Rhodesia respectively, the 
United States was more concerned with reducing Soviet influence in Africa. Thus, its stance 
against minority rule was “ambiguous” (Legum 1975:747). The most obvious ways of curtailing 
Soviet influence in South Africa was to preclude the success of movements like South Africa’s 
ANC and the SACP that had close ties with the USSR. Signs of the United States humouring 
apartheid South Africa could be traced to the 1970s before the accession of the Reagan 
Administration which O’Meara (1981) had predicted, as early as 1981, that it would be 
sympathetic to apartheid South Africa. The foregoing, as already mentioned, effectively put 
Zambia and the United States in antithetical positions regarding minority rule and black 
liberation. However, Kaunda was also alive to the fact that Zambia could not utterly antagonize 
and isolate the West, if it were to retain some capital and expertise. As Mtshali (1970) states, on 
intercontinental matters, Zambia had to balance the moral bent of its foreign policy with national 
interests. Shortly after Kaunda’s accession to power, he met Dean Rusk, who was the US 
Secretary of State and Rusk  concluded that, despite adopting a non-aligned exterior, Kaunda 
was “decidedly pro-West.”5 Rusk’s appraisal was informed by Kaunda’s strong Christian views, 
his devotion to non-racialism and a seeming commitment to democracy. Shaw argues that after 
independence Zambia adopted a foreign policy that was “pragmatic” in nature, and this explains 
why the country “maintained and modified, rather than rejected, links with Western capitalist 
nations” (Shaw 1979:47). This was done with the hope that Zambia could accomplish a number 
                                                          
5 LBJ, NSF – Country File, box 102, folder “Zambia Kaunda Visit,” Rusk’s memorandum for 





of its goals including “national development, regional liberation and global distribution” (Shaw 
1979:47) 
The economic malaise which gripped Zambia in the 1980s and continues to this day was mainly 
blamed on the structural adjustment programmes, prescribed by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) (Larmer 2006). It is noteworthy that structural adjustment programmes were a source of 
tension between African leaders in general and Western institutions that promoted these 
adjustments (McCormick 2008). Kaunda was quick to blame Western influence on Zambia’s 
economy and this is the attitude that even today informs much of Africa’s preference for the 
Eastern option. The countervailing argument of course, is that structural adjustment was going to 
work if governments to which they were prescribed had created a conducive political and 
economic atmosphere. Apart from the dismal performance of Zambia’s economy due to the 
miscarriage of structural adjustment, the struggle for majority rule in southern Africa, of which 
Zambia was an integral player, influenced Zambia’s economy and foreign policy.  
 
2.5. Zambia-China Relations during Southern Africa’s Independence Struggle 
As has been mentioned in the previous section, Zambia was one of the first Southern African 
countries to gain independence. This feat came with a lot of responsibility: the country had to 
offer succour to liberation movements from other southern African countries that were still 
agitating for their own independence. Zambia formed a part of what was then called the Frontline 
States (Shaw 1979), an organisation of Southern African nations that was created in order to aid 
the birth of non-racial democracy during apartheid in South Africa. This reality impacted on 
Zambia’s foreign policy and credibility as a non-aligned power. The dynamics of the day were 
that liberation movements, like the South African Communist Party and the African National 
Congress, received a lot of Soviet aid and hence were more inclined towards the Communist 
camp in the Cold War. China was also to prove an important player in this regard as it also 
supported certain liberation movements (Peh and Eyal 2010; Kragelund 2014) enjoying 
Zambia’s succour, like the Zimbabwe African National Union. The fact that Zambia hosted 
countries that had strong ties to the communist camp questioned Zambia’s commitment to non-
alignment in its foreign policy.  
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China recognised Zambia a few days after the latter gained independence (Taylor 2006). Kaunda 
described Zambia and China as “all-weather friends” (Kopinski and Polus 2011; Duggan 2016), 
an allusion that the two countries maintained close relations irrespective of prevailing 
circumstances in the international system. Kaunda, of course, was not invariably incautious of 
China. Taylor (2006:31) reports that “Kaunda was extremely wary of allowing Zambia to 
become a centre for liberation intrigues as well as being suspicious of Communist China’s 
motives.” This brings in perspective the chequered nature of China-Zambia relations. According 
Carmody and Hampwaye (2010), relations between Zambia and China have undergone three 
phases. They argue that the first phase was characterized by solidarity, the second by geopolitics 
and the third by geoeconomics (see also Mensah 2010). The lynchpin of solidarity between 
China and Zambia was the intersecting interest of ending colonialism where it was extant, and 
hegemonism in global politics.  
While interested in ending white rule in other African countries, Zambia also hankered for lesser 
or no dependency on white-ruled Rhodesia and South Africa. One of the major points of 
dependency was the Rhodesian route used to transport Zambia’s exports. China played a pivotal 
role by constructing the Tanzania-Zambia railway (TAZARA) from the port city of Dar-es-
Salam in Tanzania to the Kapiri Mposhi district of Zambia (McGreal2007; Ndulo 2008). This 
project was huge both in its monetary demand and political significance. It confirmed China’s 
commitment to end Zambia’s reliance on the southern route (Hampwaye, 2008). It also presented 
China as a credible anti-colonialist power more than Western countries to whom that idea had 
been broached and mooted but was never entertained. Van Dijk (2009:10) writes that China 
undertook the TAZARA project “because no other donor was willing to provide the necessary 
support to the socialist government of Tanzania.” At the time China was still a “very poor” 
country but still undertook the massive project (Chen and Myers 2013). According to George Yu 
(1971) the railway line was a landmark in China’s foreign policy. For Tanzania and Zambia 
China’s commitment represented the culmination “of a long and frustrating dream … which 
would contribute both to the economic development of the two countries and Eastern Africa and 
to the support of ‘the liberation struggle in Southern Africa’” (Yu 1971:1101). 
An empirical research done by Song (2015) has recently revealed that the construction of the 
railway was mooted from as early as 1963 before Zambia got independence. The declassified 
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material Song uses states that both Kaunda and Nyerere had made continuous appeals to the 
United States, Britain, the World Bank and the USSR, with their appeals failing to attract aid. 
China was at the time involved in a conflict with the Soviet Union and was thus reasonably eager 
to find allies at the international level. Its decision to carry out a project from which richer 
players had shrunk was a victory to China’s anti-colonial propaganda and firmly established it as 
a strong member of the Third World. It has to be said that Kaunda was initially reluctant to enlist 
Chinese aid and to put a high premium on Zambia’s relations with China (see Taylor 2006). 
However, the seeming reluctance of bigger economies to help with the construction of the 
railway, and the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Ian Smith’s Rhodesia, gave more 
urgency to the necessity of the railway and China’s willingness to commit to its construction 
convinced Kaunda of China’s intentions in ending dependency on colonial powers and minority-
ruled countries (Song 2015).   
Ideology still played a role in cementing relations between Zambia and China after Mao’s death. 
However, these relations were also influenced by post-Mao China’s pragmatic approach to 
international relations (emphasis on economic development rather than usage of ideology as the 
only basis of international relations) (Anshan 2007) and a growing agitation for democratic 
reform in one-party ruled Zambia. There was at the time, a general lull in China-Africa relations. 
Despite this let-up, however, in the 1980s China embarked on another major investment in 
Zambia which came in the form of the Zambia-China Mulungushi Textile Factory in Kabwe 
(Carmody 2009).    
Ian Taylor (2006:172) argued that compared to the earlier period of China-Zambia relations, “aid 
to Zambia was allowed to decline before Tiananmen.” The anti-government protests of 1989 at 
Tiananmen Square were to prove a turning point in international opinion on China’s foreign 
policy. China had been thoroughly trying to rehabilitate its international repute after Mao, and 
was shedding much of its communist fanaticism. However, the high-handed means used to end 
the protest, and the resultant death toll, shattered Western goodwill towards China. Africa, and 
Zambia in particular, was more sympathetic to China’s mode of ending dissent and more 
credulous to China’s explanation that Western censure after Tiananmen was driven more by the 
West’s imperialist tendencies and instinctual interference in Third World politics. Tiananmen 
also showed how tenacious China was in retaining political homogeneity and preventing the 
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predicted defeat of communism which had swept most of East Europe at the time. China was 
once again alive to Africa’s importance in international affairs. It made donations towards 
building medical clinics and upgrading “the Engineering School at the University of Zambia” 
(Taylor 2006:172).   
 
2.6 Theoretical assumptions of China-Zambia relations after the Cold War 
The modernization programme that was implemented under Deng Xiaoping has bountifully paid 
off for China and this improvement has had an impact on how the rest of the world views China. 
The economic status of a country is often taken as commensurate with its influence on 
international politics. Hence, China’s economic growth and its likely impact on international 
politics have not gone unnoticed. To those who pander to the theory of realpolitik (e.g. 
Mearsheimer 2001), a growing China is likely to disrupt the current international architecture. 
China’s relations with other countries are thus expected to change as the country becomes more 
influential in global politics and as the international system undergoes changes. Carmody 
(2011:85) affirms this by stating that “Chinese foreign policy in Zambia has … seen evolution in 
recent years.” 
The close post-Cold War ties that Zambia has shared with China have been associated with 
Zambia’s disappointment at the apparently ineffectual policies of Western provenance i.e. the 
structural adjustment programme. Condon (2012:5) asserts that Western economic and political 
conditions in Africa have been “developmental failures” and that “[t]he Chinese model, with no 
colonial past or explicit political agenda, is a legitimate challenger to the Western aid status-
quo.” This argument has often been used to explain Africa’s “look East” attitude that seems to be 
a reaction to a seemingly imperious West that imposes policies on poor countries with disregard 
for the specific contexts of those particular countries. Frederick Chiluba, the president of Zambia 
from 1991 to 2001, partly sponsored this line of argument. Reviving the mining industry in 
Zambia is also another matter that has improved China-Zambia relations. Zambia is one of 
Africa’s biggest producers of copper and China is “the world’s largest consumer of copper 
followed by the United States” (Besada, Yang and Whalley 2008:22; see also Zafar 2007). Apart 
from copper, China has also invested in the extraction of other minerals with which Zambia is 
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endowed, like coal, gemstones and uranium (The New Yorker 2013). According to Kopinski and 
Polus (2011:184), “the most important aspect of Sino-Zambian relations during the post-Kaunda 
era have been Chinese investments in the mining industry.” Kragelund (2014:151) argues that 
China after the Cold War “sees developmental finance as a central part of its relationship with 
Zambia.” This shift has superseded ideology and the fight against colonialism and minority rule 
which were the principal lynchpins of China-Zambia relations during the Cold War.  
Despite the stated friendship that China and Zambia have shared, relations between the two 
countries have not been immune to mutual criticism and suspicion. As stated earlier, even certain 
sectors of Africa have been critical of growing China-Africa relations. The main point of 
disenchantment from ordinary Zambians vis-à-vis Chinese presence is centred on labour 
practices. There have been complaints about China’s labour practice being oppressive or 
unnecessarily punishing to Zambian workers. Workers at the Chinese owned Collum mine 
protested against labour violations, leading to the death of one Chinese national (The New Yorker 
2013). To those who buckle under what they perceive as China’s oppressive labour ethos, 
China’s presence in Zambia typifies colonial oppression.  
 Guy Scott, who was a prominent member of Zambia’s Patriotic Front (PF) political party, 
argued that China was “out to colonise Africa economically and also to get Africa’s solidarity at 
United Nations” (Lusaka Times 2007). The Patriotic Front made anti-Chinese sentiment the pith 
of its campaign rhetoric in 2006. Michael Sata, the once presidential candidate of the PF, went 
further to threaten that he would sever ties with China and recognize Taiwan if he won the 2006 
election. China in turn said it would not have anything to do with Zambia if Sata won the 
election (Agence France-Press [AFP] 2006; see also Hitchens 2008; Masterson 2011). Arguably, 
this was one of the very few times when China directly interfered with internal affairs of another 
country (Kopinski and Polus 2011). Ordinary Zambian citizens, some of whom worked side by 
side with, or under Chinese, were persuaded by the PF’s rhetoric and riots broke out on the 
Copperbelt and Lusaka, two regions with the highest Chinese population in Zambia, when the PF 
lost the election. Incidentally, despite his loss at the polls, Sata dominated the votes in Lusaka 
and the Copperbelt (Larmer and Fraser 2007). 
When eventually in 2011 Sata won the presidential race, he did not cut off ties with China 
despite what many have termed his relentlessly populist attitude towards China. Hess and Aidoo 
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(2014) argue that Sata whipped up anti-Chinese sentiment as a way of gaining votes from 
disenchanted Zambians who saw the Chinese as occlusions to Zambia’s economic independence. 
Furthermore, Negi (2008) has argued that Sata’s electoral success was not so much an indictment 
on China, but on neoliberal policies that have been blamed for Zambia’s alarming levels of 
poverty and unemployment. Furthermore, fingering China as the bane of Zambia’s development 
put a face on what could have been abstract factors hampering Zambia’s advancement. 
According to Hess and Aidoo (2015), Sata played “the China card” in order to defeat the MMD 
in 2011.  
There has been an opinion that anti-Chinese sentiment among ordinary people in Zambia 
betokens the possibility that the Sino-optimism often promoted by the African political elite is 
not always shared by ordinary Africans. A study done by Mano (2016:163) in Zimbabwe on 
residents of Harare supports this view by arguing that “while the official view [of China-
Zimbabwe relations remains positive], nonofficial perspectives tend to be critical of Beijing’s 
actions and policies as narrowly benefiting itself and ruling elites.”  On her visit to Zambia in 
2011, Hilary Clinton warned of outside forces that come to Africa and deal only with the elite to 
the detriment of ordinary Africans. She went on to say that it was that manner of doing business 
that led to the European colonisation of Africa. David Cameron has also lent his voice to this 
sentiment by assailing the Chinese model as a brand of “authoritarian capitalism” (Sautman and 
Hairong 2014) that is likely to engender neo-colonialism in Africa and undermine Western calls 
for democracy (Zhao 2014). A 2009 study by Sautman and Hairong offered a different view 
from that of Western observers. They carried out what they called the first empirical study of 
how Africans in general think of the rise of China. Their conclusions were that African sentiment 
on China is not as negative as Western media presents it, and that African perspectives of China 
are complex and varied. Furthermore, most of the attitudes were shaped by the country where 
respondents live rather than factors such as “age, education and gender” (Sautman and Hairong 
2009:728). 
In a 2014 doctoral dissertation, Chang (2014) seeks “to challenge generalizations made in the 
media about a unified and neo-colonial ‘China’ and a cohesive and victimized ‘Africa.’” Chang 
sampled three types of work places in Zambia to get an idea of how ordinary Zambians and 
Chinese interact in the sampled workplaces and how trust between the two groups can grow and 
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benefit both sides of the workforce. One of Chang’s defining points is that unlike what is often 
presented in Western media, she notes that Africans are not invariable victims in the Sino-
African nexus. China’s dependence on African resources has provided “opportunities for 
resource-rich countries on the continent” (Naidu and Davies 2006). Africa has benefits to derive 
from Chinese investment in terms of infrastructure, resource exportation and the improvement of 
agriculture (ibid).  
The preceding information is shaped by the theoretical assumptions of those appraising China-
Zambia relations. The African elite is wont to be influenced by the liberalist perspective that 
looks at China-Zambia relations as mutually beneficial if the two countries maintain cordial and 
stable relations. Furthermore, the liberalist perspective looks at the importance of values in 
shaping relations among nations. China-Zambia relations have been historically influenced by 
values such as political equality and the fight against domination – especially of a colonial or 
imperial type. Furthermore, pragmatism has also been central to maintaining China-Zambia 
relations, especially after Zambia’s Patriotic Front came to power in 2011. This will be tackled in 
detail in the seventh chapter. Realism has been central to Western and media perceptions of 
China-Zambia relations. The warnings given to Zambia and Africa by Western representatives 
such as Hilary Clinton and David Cameron smack of realist leanings that do not allow for the 
possibility of a peaceful rise of a player with requisite influence to change the international 
political landscape. Thus, depending on the theoretical framework influencing one’s political and 
economic views, there is bound to be different and conflicting interpretations of China-Zambia 
relations and the main idea behind them.  
 
2.7 China, Africa, and the allure of the policy of non-interference    
China is a controversial state. Its self-perception as the “Middle Kingdom”, its demographics and 
its long history of civilization are justifications for China’s claim to be counted as a global 
superpower (Shiping 2008). Thus, China is expected to take on an officious demeanour in its 
relations with other players. With its current economic status and resultant political influence, 
China has become more of what it envisioned for itself before it was as powerful as it currently 
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is. It has adhered more to the “go out” policy wherein it seeks opportunities in foreign countries 
while claiming not to interfere  with their political make-up.6  
China-Africa relations have arrested global attention for at least two reasons: the first is that 
Africa has often been treated as an economic fiefdom of former colonialists and hence the 
emergence of a new competitor has been met with paranoia and suspicion from the West 
(Mutambara 2013). As Okonjo-Iweala says, much criticism against China emanating from the 
West is driven by the fear that Western monopoly over African resources is slipping (Okonjo-
Iweala 2006; see also Breslin and Taylor 2008). Carmody and Owusu (2007) argue that 
deepening China-Africa relations have roused US anxiety over its role in Africa, especially after 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (Thrall 2015). This has caused the US to augment its 
involvement on the continent, like the increase in purchasing oil from Africa, and has become 
more involved in African security. To Carmody and Owusu (2007:505), this prefigures a “new 
scramble for Africa.” Mearsheimer (2010:382) bluntly argues that “China cannot rise 
peacefully.” This opinion is informed by what Verhoeven (2014:57) calls the “power-transition 
paradigm” which analyses China’s rise in negative terms as the “clash between the established 
hegemon, (the US) and the rising (China) power” and that Africa is the arena for this tussle.  
The second reason that Western opinion has lamented China’s growing footprint in Africa is that 
many African countries are still developing and a number of states are under Western censure for 
human rights abuse and lack of good governance. This condition bears two fold incentives for 
anti-Chinese sentiment, especially from the West: the first is that by being underdeveloped and 
hence less influential in global affairs, Africa is pliable and can easily be turned into China’s 
lackey, outpost or colony. Secondly, Western countries have been prescribing the adoption of 
neoliberalism in Africa and the observance of human rights (Okonjo-Iweala 2006). That China 
(through its so-called “Beijing Consensus”) does not use these conditions as benchmarks for 
trade with Africa has been interpreted as aiding and abetting Africa’s authoritarian states.  
In Africa, China’s vowed regard for national sovereignty has been greeted with more favour than 
policies of Western origin (Thompson 2005). This has given controversial regimes alternatives to 
                                                          
6 As will be shown in this research, China’s vow of non-interference in the internal affairs of its partner nations has 
been contested.  For example, Verhoeven (2014) argues that China “is slowly but surely giving up its controversial 
policy of non-interference.” 
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Western economic ties when the West demands certain reforms from African countries. To this 
effect, China-Africa relations have offended those who profess commitment to democracy, 
human rights and neolibralism. On the other hand, Carmody and Taylor (2010:508) have argued 
that certain Western corporations, “with the tacit approval of their home governments” have 
employed an assortment of methods of striking oil deals with African regimes while 
circumventing democracy and regard for human rights as conditions (Shaxson 2007). Downs 
(2007:52) puts this in another way by saying that “American policy makers and pundits 
exaggerate the differences between Chinese and American oil policies.” This counterargument 
supports the view that the West is not leery of China’s intervention in Africa for the sake of 
Africa.  
Zambia’s foreign policy has historically been shaped by prevailing structures in international 
affairs. From its independence to 1990, Zambia’s foreign policy was shaped by the need to 
emancipate (especially) southern African countries that were under colonialism or minority rule. 
China proved a dependable partner in this undertaking. China’s commitment to help end 
hegemonism and imperialism resonated with Zambia’s goals. However, relations between the 
two countries have evolved over time because of the shift in international affairs. The end of the 
Cold War and the reintroduction of multi-party politics in Zambia had bearing on the new terms 
or motivations for Sino-Zambian relations. South-South cooperation took increasing importance. 
Despite Zambia’s democratization, it still saw in China a fellow country of the South and a 
protester against what are perceived as Western imperialist tendencies.  
Despite these identifications, China-Zambia relations present a unique scenario on China’s 
engagement with Africa. Only in Zambia has there been so much anti-Chinese resentment as to 
escalate into physical violence that has left some individuals dead, and only in Zambia has anti-
Chinese rhetoric been so tactfully exploited as to initiate political change as was the case when 
Michael Sata’s PF eventually won the general election in 2011 toppling the incumbent MMD. 
China-Zambia relations refute much of hitherto literature on China-Africa relations that has 
“describe[d] China’s rise in Africa in terms of a monolithic Chinese dragon in an un-variegated 





2.8 Conclusion   
This research aimed at entangling the interpretation of “China in Africa” from over generalized 
opinion and overused theories using an underutilised theoretical terrain and with reference to 
China’s relations with a particular African country - Zambia. Constructivism was the theoretical 
approach used. This was not the first time constructivism was used to interpret China’s foreign 
policy posture. Qin (2010) applied constructivism to analyse China’s identity and interests in 
global affairs. Peter Ferdinand (2007:655) interpreted China’s quest to improve relations with 
Russia through “a transformation of the traditional identities that… dominated bilateral 
relations” between the two countries for four decades as fitting constructivist analysis. In 
constructivist terms, China “is not a self-enclosed, self-contained entity. Rather, it is a process, 
an open process of complex social relations in motion” (Qin 2010:138). This assertion bears a 
resemblance to those who reckon that China can be socialized into the international system. This 
position argues that "states are embedded in dense networks of transnational and international 
social relations that shape their perceptions of the world and their role in the world. States are 
socialized to want certain things by the international society in which they, and the people in 
them, live” (Finnemore 1996:2). Constructivism accentuates the social fabric of international 
relations and avers that state identity and interests are forged according to specific social contexts 
and are impinged upon by the different social structures in which they feature. From the 
foregoing, the usage of constructivism to interpret China’s posturing is not new; what is new is 
the application of constructivism in analysing China-Zambia relations.   
What is germane for this research is how the process of evolving identities and interests has 
shaped China’s relations with Zambia. Yu (1977) offered an analysis of China’s motives and 
involvement in Africa by putting the issue of identity at the centre of China-Africa relations. He 
avers that China’s role in Africa during the Cold War was driven by three factors: the first was 
China’s ideology, the second being the struggle against the superpowers and the third was 
China’s perceived role in the Third World. China, Yu argues, identified itself with the Third 
World and this leaves “no doubt that Africa occupied a central place in Chinese foreign policy” 
(Yu 1977:96). China still evokes its experience with privation as hope that Africa can also 
overcome its woes. Thus, Africa is not a hopeless case in China’s eyes, but a continent that “is 
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on the verge of developmental take-off” (Gill, Huang and Morrison 2007:8). This optimism 
“resonates powerfully with [China’s] African counterparts” (ibid).  
 
The current research also aspired to show how strong the evocation of intersecting identities (e.g. 
Third World identification) and interests (fighting hegemony and superpowers), whether real or 
contrived, has helped to sustain China-Zambia relations despite episodes that have threatened to 
undo these relations. Zambia is arguably the only country in Africa where anti-Chinese sentiment 
has been more radical and has occasionally led to death of both the Chinese and Zambians. 
Sautman and Hairong (2014:1084) argue that “There is much online racist abuse… against the 
Chinese in Zambia” who are often referred to with the pejorative term ‘Choncholi.’ Against such 
a gloomy backdrop, relations between the two countries have continued in earnest and Taylor 
(2006) wrote that Zambia has enjoyed one of the most enduring and stable relations with China 
compared to many other African states. Constructivism is thus apposite for this particular 
research. Much literature has used realism (e.g. see Taylor 2006; Botha 2006; Ampiah and 
Naidoo) to explain China-Africa relations. Constructivism argues that there have been certain 
moments in China-Zambia relations when realist arguments could hold true, but it recoils from 
arguing that those conditions are immutable, irrespective of changes in international political 
conditions. From the literature presented in this chapter, it is clear that constructivism has not 
been thoroughly used as an approach to understand China’s international relations with Africa, 
and Zambia in particular. This research identified, and intended to fill, that gap in the 
international relations discourse. The following chapter is mainly dedicated towards giving an 













THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CONSTRUCTIVISM AS AN APPROACH TO 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ANALYSIS 
3.1 Introduction  
The present chapter mainly focuses on presenting the essential elements of constructivism; this is 
an approach through which the current study was analysed. A few caveats are necessary before 
the chapter delves into the core of its subject; first, there are many strands of constructivism but 
the current one is the variant that pertains to international relations. Furthermore, even among 
scholars who have looked at constructivism from an international relations theory perspective, 
divergences are legion. However, despite the many variations, the current chapter utilized the 
essential similarities that the different strands share.   
Another caution about constructivism is that it has been variously referred to as an approach or 
meta-theory rather than a theory, an attitude that undermines the distinctiveness of 
constructivism as a separate theory of international relations. Even to some constructivists, their 
approach is an addition to the already prominent theories of international relations and merely 
accentuates what they downplay or overlook, without introducing anything fundamentally new to 
the study of international politics. For this reason, more enduring and dominant theories of 
international relations i.e. realism and liberalism are briefly presented so as to make more 
apparent their differences from the less utilized constructivism. After the Second World War 
realism, “with its emphasis on international relations as ‘power politics’ continues to dominate 
the academic study of the international system” (Vogler 1996:26). Its current biggest challenge 
has been neo-liberalism.  
Another disclaimer is that constructivism is not presented as an approach that is universally 
applicable and hence make no claim to scientific (positivist) accuracy. One of the major 
authorities of constructivism, as it has latterly emerged is Alexander Wendt and hence much 
literature on this approach was done under the auspices of his writings. However, there are other 
scholars whose views are at variance with Wendt’s views and those too claimed some attention 
in this chapter. This probably gives the chapter a more critical character and presents 
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constructivism as a proper approach of social science in its dynamic nature. Limitations of the 
approach are also noted. 
The first part of the chapter is a brief presentation of the role that human behaviour has played in 
influencing the emergence of theory in politics and international relations. The second, third and 
fourth parts of the chapter briefly present the main elements of realism, idealism and liberalism 
respectively. The chapter then ultimately moves to constructivism; presenting constructivism 
after the aforementioned theories is logical because constructivism partly emerges because of 
certain weaknesses that beset realism and idealism.  
 
3.2 The Role of Theory and Human behaviour in International Relations Research  
Theory is the background from which observations and understandings of phenomena are made. 
In other words, what is seen and how it is seen and interpreted is driven by the framework called 
theory. Connections between the theoretical and the empirical, the abstract and the concrete are 
influenced by specific theories at play. In international relations studies, what people observe as 
state behaviour and how they interpret it, is based on the theory influencing that person. This 
means, even if people are observing the same ‘reality’, they may arrive at different conclusions if 
they are using theories that are at variance with each other. Thus, theory is the proverbial lens 
through which researchers engage with their subject. For a social study such as the current one, a 
more appropriate theory would be one which appreciates that relations among nations are social 
in the same way that human relations are. This means the study of human behaviour, and the 
theories imputed to it, are important for understanding state behaviour if the analogy can be 
drawn between individuals and the state.  
Aristotle wrote that human beings are by nature political and social beings (1253a1-18; see also 
Onuf 1998). Furthermore, he argues that the city-state and political rule emanate from nature. It 
is thus from such a background that the study of political theory has often been linked to 
concepts of human nature. In an increasingly integrated world with relations between nations 
becoming manifest to almost inevitable, it logically follows that those who talk about 
international politics will still use their notions of human nature and behaviour as entry points for 
their theorizing. In interacting with each other, states are thus expected to retain certain basic 
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elements of human nature to meet the challenges engendered by interaction with other states and 
the global system in general.7 Newman argues that while basic human needs, like biological 
survival and sustenance, have remained unabated through time, other factors of statehood like 
security have been influenced and thus evolved.8 Different theories and approaches to state 
behaviour and international relations attribute differing properties to human behaviour. Some 
theories argue that man’s atavistic inclination for physical survival, at the expense of other 
players, foists the same conduct on states. Some theories argue about the potential for change 
and evolution in human behaviour and ascribe the same potential to states.  
The theory that has looked at concepts of national security, survival, and interest as impervious 
to human preference, international dynamics and the passage of time is classic realism. Hans J. 
Morgenthau argues that “politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have 
their roots in human nature.” This brand of realism, which Mearsheimer (2001:19) calls “human 
nature realism”, was dominant from the end of the Second World War to the late 1970s. Hans 
Morgenthau was one of its most popular defenders. The necessary conclusion of a realist stance 
is that human nature itself is incorrigible and hence identity and interests of human nature and 
their general manifestations (states) are immutable. The counterargument that concepts of 
security evolve and that human identity and interests are not only subject to change but multiple 
too has been linked to constructivist thought. Constructivism, therefore, goes against what 
Newman (2001:239) calls “the logic of realist determinism.” 
 
3.3 The Historical Origins of Realism 
Defining realism is a very taxing undertaking even to those who might attribute to themselves 
the title of realist. That the theory is a time-honoured one, existing for centuries in philosophical 
                                                          
7 This argument is held especially by theorists who argue that there is a synonymous relationship between 
individual and state behaviours. As will be shown in the ensuing pages, Wendt argues that if states are an 
aggregation of human beings, then they should manifest properties that are akin to human ones.  
8 The notion that biological needs have relatively remained unchanged while notions of security have changed will 
become important in the subsequent pages. Concepts of security are influenced by socio-/cultural factors within, 
between and among nations. Furthermore, Newman (2001:239; see also Klotz 1995) goes on to say that concepts 
of human and national security and how they evolve “reflect the impact of values and norms on international 
relations.” This assertion will become important when this chapter turns to constructivism wherein the emphasis 




and political discourse, does little to render it more easily definable.9 Indeed, even the very usage 
of the word “theory” in relation to realism has been challenged because, as Elman (1996:26; see 
also Spegele 1987)10 claims, realism is ‘“a big tent,’ with room for a number of different 
theories.” Ferguson and Mansbach (1988:79) regard realism as “a set of normative emphases 
which shape theory.” Garnett (1984:110) considers realism as “an attitude of mind” and this take 
is what is intended in layman’s talk when a person is described as a realist. The closest attempt at 
understanding realism in the realm of international politics is that it is a theory which draws its 
support from the argument that relations among states are driven by rational (national) actors that 
seek survival, typifying the human need for self-preservation and individual security. Its name 
“suggests the pretension that its principles accord closely with the realities of life in a harsh 
environment, where states are endlessly engaged in competition for power” (Bretherton 1996:13; 
see also Zuolo 2016).  
Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi (2012) state that though there could be some divergences among 
scholars who identify themselves as realists, they all seem to share the four fundamental 
assumptions of realism. The first assumption is that states are the main and most significant 
actors in a world characterized by anarchy and bereft of any central or overarching governance 
or authority (Morgenthau 1949; Elman, Elman and Schroeder 1995). Morgenthau (1949:211) 
disputes the concreteness of international justice because “there is no society above national 
societies.” Each society, in other words, conceives what is good for itself and acts on it. Even 
when it comes to political analysis, states are the basic units of analysis and this has been valid 
for ancient as well as current states. The second assumption of realism is “that states are unitary 
actors” (Goldgeier and McFaul 1992:467) and thus even though there might be some internecine 
discord, states will always have one foreign policy, representative of the whole state. Thus, 
realism perceives states as impregnable entities whose basic interests are not easily influenced.  
The third assumption, as stated in the previous paragraph, is that states are rational and purposive 
players. This rationality helps states to discern what their objectives should be, how these should 
be pursued and the alternatives open for pursuing them. Rationality helps states to compute the 
chances of gain and loss in any endeavour they take (Elman, Elman and Schroeder 1995). The 
                                                          
9 Donnelly, J 2000. Realism and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
10 Colin Elman, “Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?” Security Studies 6, 26 (1996); 




final assumption shared by realists is that “national or international security usually tops the list” 
(Viotti and Kauppi 2012:40) of the pecking order of interests that a state has. Though these 
assumptions have been refined with changes in politics among nations, realism had some of its 
foundational basis in thinkers who were not necessarily international relations theorists.  
Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) is often cited as having given realism its loudest voice through 
his book The Prince, though Thucydides has usually been credited as being the first realist 
(Ahrensdorf 1997). Machiavelli analysed political conduct from what he thought to be its 
primary genesis - human nature. He argues that it must “be taken for granted that all men are 
wicked and that they will always give vent to the malignity that is in their minds when 
opportunity offers” (1970: Book I, ch. 3). When it came to political conduct, Machiavelli argued 
that the aspirations of politicians are laced with the same wickedness, manifesting a selfish and 
brazen pursuit of power that is characteristic of human nature. Thus, the pursuit and retention of 
power does not pander to what moralists would perceive as ethical political behaviour.  
Machiavelli can, therefore, be regarded as an amoral political theorist. To him, acts of selfishness 
and wickedness were real to human beings; therein arguably lie the foundations of what has 
come to represent realism when applied to human and national behaviour. Morality is thus 
presented as a ‘smokescreen’ concealing the real and all-enduring struggle for power 
(Morgenthau and Thompson 1950). Morgenthau (1949:210-211) argues that a foreign policy that 
puts precedence on moral principles rather than national interest “is of necessity a policy of 
national suicide, actual or potential.”  
After Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes perhaps gives realism one of its powerful confirmations. In 
Leviathans, a classic text of philosophy, Hobbes theorizes about how nations and their leadership 
come into being. He does so by stating that prior to the institution of governance, human beings 
existed in an apocryphal state of nature which was characterized by relentless anarchy. In the 
state of nature, insecurity is rife, and even one’s possession could at any moment be wrested by 
another. This existence, as Hobbes, puts it, is characterized by a war of all men against any man. 
Life is brutish and short. Apart from insecurity with one’s possession, Hobbes talks of another 
form of insecurity caused by lack of trust. To him, people in the state of nature cannot bargain 
with their competitors because those who make commitments to peaceful co-existence put 
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themselves at the risk of betrayal by others because one’s need for peace might not necessarily 
resonate with those he or she thinks are forging the path to peace with (Kronman 1985).  
However, Hobbes says, people came to the realization that maybe ceding power to an all-
powerful actor, say a government in modern parlance, would actually guarantee more gains for 
people living in the state of nature. For this reason, people enter into a social contract that 
governs human behaviour and ambition. Thus sovereign powers come as enforcers of the social 
contract.  
Hobbes becomes important for realists because of his description of what he perceives as 
inherent human inclinations. Even though the state of nature graduated into a more life-assuring 
existence, human security is dependent on sovereign power although it seemingly does not 
obliterate primary human propensities to accumulate power and protect one against real, 
prospective or imaginary threats to one’s life, security and possessions. Thus, while states can 
undergo behavioural change, the nature or identity of humans and states and their interests 
remain intact, though they are denied free reign and expression by other factors. To many of his 
analysts (e.g. Doyle 1983; Keohane 2002; see also Slomp 2010), Hobbes was advocating an 
authoritarian version of government, one that would coerce naturally warring parties into an 
estimation of mutual recognition of each other’s right to survive. This trend has continued to this 
day and realism, generally speaking, has upheld survival and security of national interests as the 
main concerns of nations and that, left to themselves, nations do not have a chance for an 
existence that is totally independent of competition and selfishness – also referred to as national 
interest.    
By emphasizing anarchy, the proponents of realism claim to have a “prudent” view of the 
international system and hence avoid falling into “the naïve idealism of many liberals” 
(Bretherton 1996:13). Even though realism has a long history, it came into prominence under the 
banner of neo-realism especially after the Second World War (Bretherton 1996). In The Twenty 
Years Crisis E. H. Carr assailed the idealism that had characterized international politics during 
the mid-war period. He stressed the point that international relations should be viewed in their 
true nature of conflict and the interest to augment power. Furthermore, neo-realism stresses the 
point that state behaviour is conditioned by structure and that states are the primary actors in the 
international system. This was another departure from the idealist position that international 
63 
 
community and concord could be achieved by institutions such as the League of Nations. 
Though organizations like the United Nations, which succeeded the League of Nations, “may 
aspire to the status of independent actor…this aspiration has not in fact been achieved to any 
significant degree” (Viotti and Kauppi 2012:39).  
 
3.3.1 Neorealism                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Kenneth Waltz has often been credited as the biggest influence on neorealism. In his book The 
Theory of International Politics (1979) anarchy is presented as the characteristic of interstate 
relations, and relative (military) power as the distribution of national capabilities. That national 
units are not organized in an orderly distribution of power means states have to balance against 
each other in anarchic conditions (Bretherton 1996). Furthermore, the bahaviour of states is 
influenced by the social structure in which they are embedded. Neo-realists claimed to have 
improved realism from its classic garb that “explained world politics primarily through 
individual-level characteristics, typically a will to power that drove state behavior and 
international outcomes” (Parent and Baron 2011:193). Thus, according to neo-realists, classic 
realism was not sufficiently structural and lacked theoretical rigour. Neorealists took it upon 
themselves to bring structure at the centre of state behaviour.  John Vogler (1996:24) states that 
various “significant social structures arise as a consequence of a myriad of human interactions 
which both constitute and reinforce them.”  Structures in international relations play a pivotal 
role in that they regulate or chart state behaviour and they also provide options that are open to 
actors in the international system.  
For realists, balance of power seems to be the predominant structure of international relations. In 
this case, actors strive to be more powerful than other actors, and “a rough equilibrium” (Vogler 
1996:24) among states emerges when all of them pursue the same objective i.e. trying to gain 
more power than competitors. In an anarchic structure, where states seek to preserve or augment 
their power, conflict seems to be inevitable. While classical realists argue that anarchy stems 
from basic human nature, which is self-regarding, neorealists argue that behaviour is impacted 
upon exogenously from the anarchic structure of the international system. One unifying factor 
between realists and neo-realists is their convergent understanding of the world as anarchic. In 
this anarchic system, the survival of states is largely dependent on the actions of states 
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themselves because no state shoulders the responsibility of saving another state (Morgenthau 
1958; Waltz 1979).  
 
3.3.2 Brief Critique of Realism 
The longevity and dominance of realism in international relations are perhaps its biggest 
strengths. They give an impression that realism has yet to find an equal contender in IR theory. 
Furthermore, realists pride themselves in having the prudence to accept the world as it is, rather 
than as it ought to be. For this reason, they avoid the lofty imaginations of “idealists” or utopians 
as E. H. Carr calls them (Palan 2000:575). Hans Morgenthau (1946) repudiates the liberal 
position that says a more peaceful world is likely to emerge because of advancement in 
education, democracy, technology and culture. Realists argue that technological wonders that 
have made communication easier among traditional borders are not tantamount to the possibility 
of the world becoming a community.  
The fact that realism has permeated the foreign policy of powerful actors like the United States 
(Ahrensdorf 1997) also adds to its fortunes as frontrunner in international relations theory. Since 
1945, argues Robert Keohane (1986:9), discussions on foreign policy have often been through 
the parlance of political realism, the language that privileges “power and interests rather than 
ideals or norms.” The vicissitudes of the international system from WWI to WWII also gave 
realism the conviction that it has a cogent predictive quality. E.H. Carr’s book, to which most 
realists revert as a seminal piece in realism, was written just before the start of WWII. This 
arguably shows that Carr correctly inveighed against the League of Nations and the 
understandable but misplaced optimism that followed the treaty of Versailles. In short, he validly 
repudiated idealism. Another strength of realism is that its arguments are consonant with the 
politics of statecraft in general (Viotti and Kauppi 2012). It cannot be naysaid that, generally 
speaking, many nations would want to secure their interests and relate only with nations that can 
make that possible.  Amid all these credits, however, realism and neo-realism have had to endure 
their share of criticism.  
One of the biggest criticisms of realism is its claim that politics are objective, and hence almost 
impregnable to the dynamics of the wider international system. In other words, realists perceive 
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the world as though it has its own life, independent of the states that actually compose it. This 
eschews the fact that the international system is actually a consequence of the inclinations, 
aspirations and actions of its constituent parts. Following the logic of realism would persuade 
one to believe that statesmen have their hands tied and hence have no leeway to maneuver, and 
that their actions do not spring from self-will; rather, they are mechanistic. Thus, human beings 
are victims of a world that is uncontrollable. Even if statesmen would yearn for a more peaceful 
world, they are unable to engender it because the system is unchangeable and no state would 
want to be a lone utopian in an international system replete with self-interested and selfish states. 
“In sum, critics claim there is a fatalistic, deterministic, and pessimistic undercurrent to much of 
the realist work” (Viotti and Kauppi 2012:75). Tabensky (2007:98) excoriates realism, especially 
of the Machiavellian inspiration, for making the erroneous leap “from raw observation to 
normative recommendation.”  To confine people’s interest to those of Machiavelli, Tabensky 
argues, “is incoherent and this incoherence is at the heart of IR realism” (Tabensky 2007:98).  
Neorealism has often been criticized for being deterministic; it apparently disregards human 
agency and free will in international relations.11 The collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
emergence of the United States as the major superpower, arguably by default rather than intent, 
challenged neo-realist arguments that states deliberately seek to dominate others. Friedrich 
Kratochwil (1993:63) asserts that neo-realism was embarrassed by the “chain of events” that 
ultimately led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, it was easy to divine 
who was ally and foe in a world dichotomized into the liberal world and the communist world. 
This status quo provided neo-realism with an unassailable credibility. However, the seemingly 
peaceful end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet Union were beyond the expectations 
of most neo-realist theories (Lebow and Risse-Kappen 1995; Viotti and Kauppi 2012; see 
Mastanduno 1997).12  
Furthermore, neo-realism has been considered more rigid on its stance regarding the influence of 
material forces in international relations. Viotti and Kauppi (2012) argue that classic realism 
                                                          
11 The end of the Cold War “was particularly depressing for neo-realist theorists of international structure 
who…exhibited a depressing inability to predict the events of 1989-91” (Vogler 1996:28). 
12 Expectedly, Kenneth Waltz (2000), who has been a de facto godfather of neorealism, has defended the relevance 
of neo-realism even in the post-Cold War international system. One of his arguments is that the changes that took 
place after the dissolution of the Soviet Union did so within the system, they were not changes of the systems. 
Thus, the international system, according to him, still remains a self-help realm characterized by anarchy. 
This, then, should repudiate claims that neorealism is an obsolete theory in international relations studies.  
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seems more amenable to the notion that international relations could be influenced by factors 
such as ideas, and how domestic dynamics can influence a state’s international relations. Even 
within the realist school itself, some scholars have sought to disentangle realism from its 
longtime dissonance with ethics, for example. Zuolo (2016:68) argues that the realist contention 
that human relations are “primarily shaped by power commits realism to a form of power 
reductionism, holding that power is the only element that should be taken into consideration in 
the political sphere.”  
John D. Carlson (2008:619) proposes ethical realism because it “charts a middle path that 
ennobles traditional realpolitik while eschewing certain perfectionist tendencies of moralism.” 
This possibility was first broached by Reinhold Niebuhr (1953; 1964). Ethical realism is 
premised on the argument that certain conflicts, even war, among nations, erupt not because of 
the intent to show how powerful one state is; a moral standpoint can actually justify conflict 
among nations. Put in other words, “the human hopes and moral passions that realism opposes as 
unreasonable are indelible features of political life” (Ahrensdorf 1997:231). Carlson (2008) 
attempts to bridge the gap between realism and idealism, the theories that have historically been 
taken as diametrically opposed.  
Gordon L. Anderson (2009:3-4) assails realism and neo-realism because they treat social ideals 
as if they were of the same level “as wishful thinking.” E. H. Carr dismissed idealism by arguing 
that the world should be read as it really is, a system fraught with conflict and irredeemable 
selfishness. However, Anderson (2009:4) argues that while it is sensible to surmise that certain 
players in the international system might want to augment their status by limiting that of others, 
this should not be promoted as a “goal” (original emphasis) for states in the international system. 
The possibility that states can exercise restraint and forge mutual development of capabilities 
cannot be totally dismissed, however strongly realists might argue the case of self-help. Elman et 
al. (1995:188) argue that the opposite of self-help is other-help which is a “sense of community 
or collective identity which fosters the belief that one's own security and well-being are tied to 
the security and well-being of others.” This, to realists is viewing the international system as we 
would want it to be rather than as it really is. In short, accommodating the possibility of a world 
where states can actually seek community in the international system is idealistic and hence at 
variance with reality.  
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Another possible criticism of realism is that it is “a self-fulfilling prophecy” (Viotti and Kauppi 
2012:75), because realists play a part in continuing the international system’s status quo that they 
analyse. Realists characterize the world as violent, deceptive and prone to war; they then proffer 
advice on how leaders should act under these circumstances, by employing the means of survival 
in such a world. Thus, realists preclude themselves from understanding the world in any other 
way and thus lack resourcefulness in acknowledging alternative conceptions of the world and 
how they can be achieved.  
Furthermore, the realist argument that states are the most significant actors in the international 
system has been put under increasing scrutiny. Realist arguments have to contend with the fact 
that non-state actors have increasingly become influential in world affairs that states could 
actually yield to this influence. The influence of multinational and transnational organisations13 
is palpable; so is the influence of terrorist groups and international institutions like the United 
Nations, International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Realists, to their defence, argue that 
they focus on state behaviour but do not make any claim that non-state actors are immaterial. A 
theory of international relations that has always acknowledged the potential of non-state actors to 
determine state behaviour is idealism, or as some would call it, liberal idealism, to which the 
chapter now turns.     
  
3.4 Idealism in International Relations  
The term “idealist” is often used pejoratively to describe those who are at variance with other 
doctrines, mostly realism. Thus, adherents of internationalism, global federalism, liberalism and 
other non-realist doctrines have often been branded as idealists (Viotti and Kauppi 2012), 
notwithstanding certain differences between them. It is actually telling that generally, scholars 
shrink from ascribing to themselves the title of idealist (Dunne, Kirki and Smith 2010) because 
their detractors characterise them as wishful thinkers.  
In its twentieth century form, idealism traced its genesis after World War I, a period which was a 
salutary lesson in international politics. President Woodrow Wilson’s 14 points in 1918 set the 
                                                          
13 As will be shown later, constructivism somehow departs from the materialist and rationalist understandings of 
national sovereignty and “allows one to explore the hypothesis that transnational authority structures construct 
state identities and interests” (Wendt and Friedheim 1995:689).    
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tone for this type of idealism. The destruction that WWI wrought convinced many influential 
individuals of that time that war was not only morally offensive, but costly and futile. Therefore, 
further war had to be forestalled and this could be done by establishing international laws and 
institutions charged with the mandate to maintain peace (Mehmetcik 2014).  
Idealists are convinced that the spread of liberal democracy and education is likely to influence 
the foreign policy and behaviour of actors in the international system. This idea could be linked 
to Immanuel Kant with his belief that chances of war among democratic nations are remote.14 
Idealists appreciate the importance of international bodies like the League of Nations in creating 
world peace. The implication of this is that states have to surrender some of their inclinations to a 
broader vision. They have to cede some of their power for the greater good of human 
community. The fact that idealism talks of central authority above individual states already 
separates it from the realist emphasis on the primary role of states in international relations. The 
rise of democratic ideals, international organisations and economic interdependence has created a 
situation where both state and non-state actors rely on each other to build a more stable 
international system. Ian Hurd begins the second edition of his International Organizations: 
Politics, Law, Practice (2014: vii) with the notion “that international politics cannot be 
understood without thinking about international organization.” 
The formation of the League of Nations was done with the hope that global peace and 
community could be achieved through an international organization of that magnitude 
(Mehmetcik 2014). Wilsonian internationalism, a major influence behind the League, believed in 
the subordination of national interests to international legal fiat, as prescribed by international 
organizations such as the World Court (Kristol 1990). Contrary to realist views of self-interest, 
idealists argue that, at the core, there is a convergence of interests in human beings which is 
often concealed by the aggressive and self-interested way in which states and governments act. 
Despite divergences in culture, religion and race, human beings have the same interests; they all 
desire safety, acknowledgement and other human ideals. Human beings are more or less active 
participants in the international system rather than objects seeking to fulfill predetermined laws 
of nature. The Kantian argument that human beings should be treated as ends in themselves 
forms a theoretical part of idealism.    
                                                          
14 Constructivism, an approach used to for this study, argues that “collective identity” prevents war among 
democracies (Pouliot 2008:4).  
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Wilbert J. Lemelle (1978) argues that contrary to what has been written about idealism being a 
discredited theory, after World War II, especially in the United States, idealism continues to play 
a significant role in foreign policy. Secondly, he also argues that idealism is not mutually 
exclusive with pragmatic or practical politics. Melakopides (2012) calls this “pragmatic 
idealism.” The role that the United States played in helping Germany and Japan after World War 
II displayed in the most glaring fashion the fact that states are capable of transcending tension to 
help even powers that were erstwhile foes. Even more recently Michael Boyle (2004:83) has 
argued that “utopianism defined as a religious–political belief in the perfectibility of human 
experience—is deeply embedded in American religious and political tradition.” He further 
argues that throughout history, utopian thought has played a seminal influence on how 
Americans perceive themselves and their country and what they think should be the general 
mode of state and human conduct.   
Idealism recoils from resigning itself to a future that is cynical of human nature and bereft of 
compassion. Lemelle (1978) argues that idealism bears the concept of “enlightened self-interest” 
which continues to be a fundamental component of America’s interests. G. John Ikenberry 
(2010:1) is optimistic that the future of the international system will be increasingly influenced 
by “institutions and relationships created over the last 60 years.” Furthermore, he argues that 
though power dynamics might change in the future, the liberal institutional order will not be 
replaced in any meaningful way. Thus, prospects for international cooperation will increase 
rather than diminish.   
 
3.4.1 Critique of idealism 
When applied to international relations idealism is seen, mostly by realists, as a theory that 
argues for what is impossible. The eradication of the nuclear races, the potential of the United 
Nations to initiate international peace, and the elimination of injustice are often seen as fanciful 
or idealistic. The assault on idealism comes from a retrospective view of the international system 
and how prospects for international peace have proven too remote to secure. Secondly, idealism 
has also been criticized by those who have a pessimistic understanding of human nature. 
Idealism is optimistic in its reading of human nature, arguing that human selfishness is not 
unchangeable. It is also convinced of the possibility of a world that is characterized by genuine 
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peace and harmony (Wilson 2011). The theory has been criticized for its apparent reluctance to 
read human nature and international politics as they really are. To its detractors, idealism is 
utopian and in a world characterized by aggressive self-serving politics, idealists could be seen 
political masochists. Realists present it as a counterproductive theory because human nature can 
never be perfect and hence idealist hopes are fanciful. For example, the emphasis that the Carter 
Administration put on human rights in its foreign policy was criticized as being idealist and 
hence self-destructive. 
After the eruption of WWII, the hopes of idealism were dealt a grievous blow. Some argue that 
idealism had the same optimism after the Cold War that it had after WWI. Realists argue “that 
post-war periods, whether after 1815, 1918, 1945 or 1989, have been characterized by the 
emergence of ‘entirely natural’ but misguided, periods of optimism that the future will be less 
perilous than the past” (Gray 1994:31).  Kaplan (2001: xi) argues that post-war optimism is 
misguided in that there is no substantial change in the international system, save for the fact that 
“evil wears new masks.” Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, conflict still characterizes 
international politics. The communist superpower might have died but scholars of power politics 
state that the rise of China and, to some extent, Russia, proves that power politics are still at play 
in the international system. With China’s rise, ideology seems to have taken centre stage in 
global politics once more. Russia’s seizure of Crimea and China’s more belligerent claims of its 
coastal regions are apparently an indictment on idealistic views that peace will characterize post-
Cold War politics. The emergence of international terrorism is another phenomenon that seems 
to challenge idealist positions. The arguments seem to be that religious terrorists abhor Western 
cultures which they see as threatening religious purity, especially Islamic faith.   
Furthermore, Layne (1994) argues that prevention of war in the world does not occur simply 
because states realise the common good. Rather, realist elements of force and deterrence are the 
main factors. Rational states calculate how much damage they may cause or incur by resorting to 
war. This is likely to discourage war if the state calculates that war might be counterproductive. 
Furthermore, a realistic reading of the capabilities of other states is likely to forestall war if 
competing states have more chances of winning. To Layne, these are more believable reasons for 
the prevention of war.  
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As is demonstrated in the ensuing pages of this chapter, constructivism does not utterly repudiate 
some rationalist arguments. Indeed, rationalists would argue that it is in the interests of rational 
states to prevent war, if the cost of engaging in it would be incalculable. Furthermore, rationalists 
would also argue that, by preventing war and forestalling violent confrontation, states act 
because they believe in certain common interests. This argument is in tandem with 
constructivism. The point of departure comes because rationalist arguments accentuate the 
overriding and determining influence of the structure of material power while constructivists 
contest this argument by asserting that shared interests among states are constructed through 
ideas and social interaction. The next subsection will look at liberalism as another influential 
theory of international relations. It is noteworthy that this theory has been charged with 
resembling certain aspects of idealism.   
 
3.5 Liberalism   
Like realism, liberalism also weighs in on international relations from analyzing human nature 
which it says is primarily good and human beings can be more moral and materially comfortable 
and this can in the end bear progress (Naaz 2012). Liberalism could be traced to the buoyancy 
that characterized the Enlightenment period in the 18th century, the theories of political and 
economic liberty that were the staple of the 19th century Europe and the idealism that came in the 
20th century (Mingst 2004). With idealism came the presumption that if there can be an 
agreement of interests among individuals there can be such harmony even on an international 
level. Idealism was basically reading international relations from an ethical perspective. Idealists, 
mainly Woodrow Wilson, argued that organizing a worldwide confederation and an international 
system devoid of power politics and war, international relations can enjoy continuing peace and 
eliminate or reduce the chances of war (Folker 2007). This explains the rationale for forming the 
League of Nations (Nau 2012). 
Liberalism is also based on what Doyle (1983) calls its four facets that include: the equality of all 
individuals; that people give authority to their leaders and thus should not be abused by the 
leaders charged with this authority; individuals have rights to own property and means of 
production and that a market based economy (capitalism) and democracy provide the best basis 
for economic exchange and reaffirm the sacrosanct nature of human freedom. Neoliberalists 
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argue that states can cooperate even in an anarchic international system and that when all states 
adopt democracy, the possibility of war will be greatly undermined.  
Liberalism, especially its idealist bent, has been criticised for being unrealistic and utopian (Carr 
1956) and that most of the liberal ideas are simply Western world views (like democracy and 
free trade) and cultures that adherents of liberalism want to foist on the rest of the world. Realists 
attack liberalism by arguing that the control and hegemony of the strong over the weak is a fact 
of international relations and human interaction and that by not taking this seriously liberalism 
fails to take “into account the realities of human nature and, hence, politics” (Naaz 2012). This is 
borne out by the argument that struggles to build peace and calls for disarmament have achieved 
limited success. A theory of international relations that has gradually emerged to challenge or 
point the blemishes in (neo)realism and (neo)liberalism is constructivism.  
 
3.6 Constructivism:  A General Introduction 
Constructivism comes under many varieties. Among other uses it has been applied in moral 
theory and cognitive psychology as an approach that looks at knowing as a process of individuals 
actively construing and constructing what to them are modalities of knowledge (Jonassen 1991; 
Jonassen et al. 1995; von Glasersfeld 1995). Constructivism has also been used in education 
(Philips 1995; Duffy and Cunningham 1996) and learning theories (Perkins 1999). For Guzzini, 
constructivism has both an epistemological and an ontological dimension. In epistemology, 
constructivism deals with the social construction of knowledge and ontologically it deals with 
“the construction of social reality” (Guzzini 2000:147). 
Constructivism has been used as a lens through which its adherents look at the world. With 
respect to what we know about the world and human behaviour, constructivism is inclined to 
foist more responsibility on humans and how they interact with the world. A contrast would 
clarify this point better. While behaviourists are more likely to apportion blame or responsibility 
for shaping human behaviour to environmental factors and biologists attribute the blame and 
responsibility to genes, constructivism somewhat accentuates human agency. To its detractors, 
constructivism simply fails to acknowledge or chooses to ignore the traditional, presumably real, 
way of looking at human life. A significant number of natural scientists are still convinced of the 
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existence of “an objective reality and that it is the aim of science to develop hypotheses and 
theories that adequately describe parts of reality” (Gadenne 2010: 77). For natural scientists, 
therefore, constructivism, especially in its radical garb, is an absurd position because, seen from 
the perspective of objectivists, constructivism supports skepticism.   
This study, however, uses constructivism in its application to international relations. This, of 
course, is stated with the presumption that, essentially, international relations are social relations. 
That Nicholas Onuf (1998:58), one of the authorities of constructivism, argues that 
“constructivism is the way of studying social relations – any forms of social relations” makes 
this approach germane to international relations study. There are positivist or causal 
understandings of international relations on the one hand; on the other hand, there are 
interpretive understandings sometimes generally referred to as critical theories. Critical theories 
include reflectivists, postmodernists, neo-Marxists and constructivists. According to Wendt, 
what unifies all these branches of critical international relations theory is the notion that relations 
among states are socially constructed. The implication of this is that structures of world politics 
are social and that these structures play a formative role in national identity and interest. Thus, 
national identity and interests are actually changeable. This is a departure from rationalist 
theories that attribute change to behaviour only, rather than national identity and interests (Wendt 
1995).  
Positivist interpretations of the social world, especially the realist variant of them, have been 
indubitably dominant since the second half of the twentieth century. Though there were 
seemingly different approaches to international politics (e.g. realism, pluralism and 
structuralism) all these approaches were crucially positivist in their analysis. This, according to 
Smith (1996:11), has “fundamentally stifled debate over both what the world is like and how we 
might explain it.” Smith says the English School and a paltry other approaches were the 
exceptions. Even the more prominent debate between neo-realism and liberalism becomes more 
insipid when one realizes that both theories are “firmly positivist” (Smith 1996:11). Positivism 
thus limits debate because it reduces the international system to things that are readily available 
or observable to positivist inquiry. Positivist interpretations of the world are actually more 
applicable to positive science (Wendt 1998).  
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Constructivism argues that even the world that scientists study is to some degree a consequence 
of social dynamics, “a social construction” (Onuf 2012:39). It is thus easy to note why 
constructivism has been heavily influenced by sociology and thus “has considerably enriched 
theoretical debate in IR” (Schimmelfennig 2002:417). Human beings, being social beings who 
find meaning in social interaction, also create the world to be what it is “from the raw material 
that nature provides” (Onuf 1998:59). Richard N. Boyd’s argues that “the world that scientists 
study, in some robust sense, must be defined, or constituted or constructed from the theoretical 
tradition in which the scientific community in question works” (Boyd 1991:202). This is not a 
denial of the existence of a material world as positivists perceive it. It merely emphasizes that the 
world to some extent makes sense because of how human beings observe, understand and 
interpret its existence.  
Thus, between positivism and interpretivism, constructivism falls under the interpretivist shade. 
Constructivist analysis proffers IR scholars with a more critical or innovative alternative to what 
has become mainstream theories of international relations. The constructivist approach has 
become so prominent in international relations studies that it ranks with realism and liberalism as 
one of the three principal perspectives in international politics (Viotti and Kauppi 2012) and that 
this development has taken a surprisingly short period of time (Katzenstein et al. 1998).  
This part of the chapter endeavours to display the constructivist position on material forces and 
their influence in the international system and the importance of ideas in shaping political 
interaction (see Sørensen 2008); it will also look at the profundity of power that social structures 
have on national identity and interests; the agent-structure nexus is also another factor that 
persuades proponents of constructivism of the uniqueness of their approach in contrast to other 
approaches to international relations; the constructivist idea of anarchy was also tackled. The 
chapter directly and obliquely demonstrates that constructivism has not had an easy time to break 
through the ranks of recognition as a cogent approach to international relations. For this reason, 
the chapter assigns a reasonable portion to the critiques of constructivism.  
Finally, the chapter culminates in trying to justify why constructivism is arguably appropriate for 
the subject under study. The admission that constructivism is not an all-applicable approach is 
vital if intellectual honesty, especially in social sciences, is to be maintained. Moreover, applying 
the same approach or theory to all aspects of international behaviour would present such an 
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approach or theory as “a single theoretical orthodoxy” (Walt 1998:30) and therefore preclude the 
development of new insights and strengths and the exposing of weaknesses in prevalent theories.  
A disclaimer is apt before an in-depth engagement of constructivism is embarked upon: one of 
the assumptions of this study is that relations among nations are primarily social and hence 
changeable. Thus, constructivism, as adopted in this study, does not attempt to undermine the 
efficacy of what has traditionally been regarded as objective “scientific method[s]” (Viotti and 
Kauppi 2012:279). In other words, constructivism would forfeit some of its promise if it 
vigorously contested mathematical axioms, for example, using social logic. The brand of 
constructivism to be used here is not of the radical variety that totally dismisses science and 
promotes ideas as the sole determinants of international politics. A less radical variety is 
favoured though the primary interpretive bent of constructivism in general is retained.  
Alexander Wendt has been one of the most influential proponents of constructivism and for that 
reason, his insights dominate constructivism as presented in this study. This, of course, is done 
with the acknowledgement of other important constructivists such as Onuf (who wrote the first 
book on constructivism in IR in 1989), Ruggie (1998) and Kratochwil (1993). Their insights also 
inform certain elements of this chapter.  
 
3.6.1 Filling Extant Gaps or Bringing New Insights? Identity in Constructivism 
Theories of international relations like idealism, realism and liberalism share certain concepts 
though they differ on how these concepts affect interaction among nations. Materialism, conflict, 
national interests and instrumentalism can all be somehow explained by the above mentioned 
theories. On this score, constructivism does not seem to offer any novelty to what has hitherto 
been mooted as the main possibilities and factors of international relations. But, Ruggie (1998) 
argues, though constructivism addresses the same issues as those tackled by neorealism and 
neoliberalism, it does so from a different theoretical plane, thus drawing different conclusions 
and inspiring a different effect.  
In a review article of books by Klotz (1995), Finnemore (1996) and Katzenstein (1996), Jeffrey 
T. Checkel (1998) argues that the neorealist-neoliberal debate about international politics and 
how gain-seeking behaviour occurs in the international system is consonant with constructivist 
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research. Implying that constructivism does not introduce novelty in international relations 
theory, Checkel (1998:324), argues that the constructivist “critique of neorealists and neoliberals 
concerns not what these scholars do and say but what they ignore: the contents and sources of 
state interests and the social fabric of world politics.” However, constructivism has latterly 
launched an attack on neo-realism especially since the end of the Cold War (Copeland 1999). 
The ideational shift that constructivism has made in understanding state behaviour indicates “a 
substantive [rather than negligible] theoretical shift in the field” of international relations (Blyth 
2003:695). 
According to Martha Finnemore (1996), certain activities of the post-Cold War international 
political system defy realist and liberal argumentation. These two theories look at the 
instrumentality of international relations: how state actions can bolster their power, economic or 
geostrategic fortunes in their interactions with or involvement in, other states. After the Cold 
War economically and militarily bigger states have been called upon and have responded 
favourably to protect citizens of other states; food relief missions to other states have been 
launched; there has also been relentless efforts to help build stumbling states like Cambodia and 
Somalia, to mention a few. That these states do not offer any real advantage or benefits to the 
countries helping them seems to defy realist and liberal thinking, in Finnemore’s argument. What 
seems to be the driving force for these interventions is the change of norms in the international 
system. Norms play a part in shaping the interests that states pursue and realist theorization 
would have little to say about this. Finnemore (1996) goes further to say norms shape state 
behaviour in “both systematic and systemic ways.” This, of course, does not diminish the fact 
that states might intervene for reasons other than material, including soft power.  
In Wendt’s (1999:4) words, the end of the Cold War invigorated constructivism because it 
“caught scholars on both sides off guard but left orthodoxies looking particularly exposed.” 
Constructivism argues that anarchy and relative power are not the principal elements of state 
behaviour as neorealists would argue (Hopf 1998). Ideas that are shared intersubjectively and 
shape national identities and interests are regarded as the primary influences of state behaviour 
(Copeland 1999). This point will be stressed more in the ensuing content. At this level, it is 
sufficient to hint that if national identities and interests can change in the international system, 
then “the prospects for change in world politics” (Hopf 1998:172) become possible.   
77 
 
Constructivism differs from the other theories in that it attaches social meaning to international 
relations phenomena (Hurd 2008). It does not controvert the practice and objectives of 
international relations; it merely introduces a social dimension to how practices are carried out 
and objectives are pursued. By doing this, constructivism has opened new theoretical pursuits in 
international relations on identity and interests (the aspect often “bracketed” by neorealist and 
neoliberals) and has therefore brought a fresh view of international politics (Checkel 1998:325). 
The etymology of constructivism itself makes obvious the constructivist claim that relations 
among nations are socially constructed. State identities and interests, which ultimately shape 
state behaviour are also constructed; they are endogenous rather that exogenous to social 
interaction (Wendt 1992). Realist and liberal theorists seem to take identities and interests as 
given and hence independent of social dynamics and interpretation (Viotti and Kauppi 2012). 
Relations among entities, in this case state actors, are shaped by the meaning that other actors 
evoke. Human and state actions are tuned towards objects and other states, influenced by the 
standing (or meaning) of those objects. For example, the meaning that North Korean and British 
nuclear weapons would have for the United States would vastly differ, though being equally 
destructive. To the United States, North Korean nuclear weapons carry a sinister threat and are 
likely to elicit hostile behaviour. British weapons are not likely to provoke such an attitude 
because Britain is considered a traditional ally of the United States, but North Korea is not. Thus, 
states act differently towards others depending on whether those other actors are friends or allies, 
or are foes and rivals (Wendt 1992).   
Jackson and Sørensen (2007:162; see also Finnemore and Sikkink 2001) state that constructivism 
trains its eye on “human awareness of consciousness and its place in world affairs.” 
Constructivism, according to Ian Hurd (2008:299, original emphasis) also looks at the 
“social and relational construction of what states are and what they want.” This opens a new 
vista as to what constructivism observes as national identity (what states perceive about 
themselves and others and vice versa) and national interests (what their specific social standing 
with others will compel them to pursue or want). In essence, constructivism challenges the 
argument that interests have an objective existence, independent of national and international 
dynamics and their attendant social circumstances.  
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Nations acquire certain social identities which can be dominant and stable at certain times; it is 
these identities that influence national interest. These identities are acquired through collective 
meaning that states attach to each other (Wendt 1992). However, the stability of these identities 
does not go on ad infinitum; they can be changed by more powerful domestic and international 
factors (see Checkel 1993). Furthermore, states do not have a single social identity. Identities are 
essentially relational; Peter Berger (1996:111) argues that "Identity, with its appropriate 
attachments of psychological reality, is always identity within a specific, socially constructed 
world.” If, as Wendt argues, states are akin to human personality with similar properties, it 
logically follows that state identities will also follow the pattern of human identity. Depending 
on whom one is interacting with, people take up a range of identities; for example, as mother, 
daughter, sister, wife and friend. In the same manner a state can be a competitor to one, an ally to 
another, and an enemy to a third, subject to the meaning it attaches to others and also to the 
meaning others attach to it. However, identities are complex in that even within nations identity 
complexities can abound.  
A single nation can have identities that at some point can be almost diametrically opposed to one 
another. These complexes influence national preferences for economic development, political 
stability and social cohesion. Shulman (2005:68) cited Ukraine as an example of a country with a 
“national identity complex” comprising eastern Ukrainians who identify more with their Slavic 
roots and those who identify themselves as “ethnic Ukrainians” (Shulman 2005:60). The 
difference in identities in a nation could also be accompanied by the strength of those holding 
opposing identities. A valid illustration would be whether the identity that matters the most in 
international relations is the identity of those who are charged with crafting foreign policy or the 
identity of the majority who might not necessarily be in power but embody the demographically 
dominant view of the country (White and McAllister 2010).  
This becomes important in countries with parties and populations that are sustained by different 
political ideologies. For example, a party that has socialist inclinations, in rhetoric even if not in 
substance, and exhibits a suspicion to multiparty competition would presumably be more 
amenable to China. In the case that such a party is in power, it could muster the means to sell its 
identity as representative of its country. However, national identity could be transformed if a 
party with different ideological sympathies were to accede to power. In a country that carries out 
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what, for African standards, could amount for credible elections, like Zambia, the dominant 
voice of leaders could actually be tempered by the voice and opinion of prospective electorates. 
In other words, if an identity that a certain political party is selling is at variance with popular 
opinion, the concerned party could be compelled to experiment with other identities. Apart from 
identities and interests, the role of ideas in international relations is one area that constructivism 
emphasizes. 
 
3.6.2 The Role of Ideas in International Relations  
This section looks at the role that ideas play in international relations. This particular dimension 
to international studies harks backs even to the classical realism of Hans Morgenthau but has 
partly been reinforced by the increasing usage and exploration of constructivism as an approach 
to international relations analysis. Just like realism, constructivism also starts its analysis of 
international relations from the atomic, human level. However, while neo-realism would be more 
inclined to materialism as the main influence of human interaction, constructivists include 
“ideational factors” among determinants that shape human interaction (Finnemore and Sikkink 
2001:391). In other words, while realism might present individuals and states as entities that 
have certain unchanging properties, constructivism is more inclined to looking at individuals and 
states as socially embedded, always a part of social contexts and relations.  
Significant ideational factors are “intersubjective” and hence held by more than individuals. 
They aggregate into a common belief which then drives the interests pursued by “purposive 
actors” (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001:391). Intersubjectivity and institutionalization of norms, 
values, ideas and beliefs is essential to constructivist analysis of international politics and 
behaviour.  What intersubjectivity implies is that whatever drivers of political behaviour states or 
agents might have are held in connection with other states or agents. Norms and ideas are 
institutionalized in that they are bred “in the social world as structures or institutions, practices, 
and identities” (Viotti and Kauppi 2012:282). Ideas and interests occasionally reflect the 
preferences of certain influential individuals. As will be shown in the subsequent chapters, 
certain individuals have played a central role in shaping the identities and interests that China 
and Zambia have.  
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Apart from the traditionally held interests, there has been a growing scholarship on how norms, 
values and political and economic ideas influence how policies are conceived. The emphasis on 
ideas, rather than sole materialism, and the possibility that uniform ideas could form a society of 
states, likens constructivism to the English School (e.g. see Dunne 1998)15. There is a 
convergence to their argument about the possibility of community (often dismissed by 
Hobbesian arguments)16, the role of identity in the international system (Dunne 1998) and an 
intersecting incredulity towards the scientific and causal method of international relations theory 
(Viotti and Kauppi 2012).17 Barry Buzan (2001:472) actually says that the English School and its 
“constructivist” approach has actually become more germane to explaining international 
relations after the Cold War whence the international system is characterized by change and 
globalization. It is noteworthy, too, that the unexpected events that led to the end of the Cold 
War proved serendipitous for the emergence of constructivism as an influential approach to 
international politics (Viotti and Kauppi 2012; Mastanduno 1997).18 One of the main points of 
divergence between constructivism and the English School is that the latter is amenable to ethical 
or normative viewpoints to international relations, while constructivism does not invariably have 
this inclination.  
 
3.6.3 Agency and Structure: The Problem of Other Minds 
The agency-structure problem has been the root of many “entrenched disputes” in various 
disciples ranging from “science, epistemology and political philosophy” (Carlsnaes 1992:245). 
This problem has been very much a playground for the tussle between constructivism and its 
competitors. Constructivism includes international organizations and institutions as crucial 
players or agents in international politics. It does not merely devolve responsibility to states. As 
                                                          
15 Checkel (1998) argues that the constructivist approach to international relations drew some of its insights form 
the English School, liberalism and sociology.  
16 Onuf, N., 1994. Constitution of International Society, The. Eur. J. Int'l L., 5, p.1. 
17 The English School could also be said to chart the middle path between realism and idealism, charting the via 
media that has been attributed to constructivism (see Adler 1997; Zehfuss 2001; and Viotti and Kauppi 2012). 
Alder, E (1997). Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics. European Journal of International 
Relations, 3 (3). 319-363.   
18 This point will be repeated a number of times throughout the study. The point is debatable in that those who 
support neorealism, especially, have also stoutly defended the applicability of their theory even after the end of 
the Cold War.  
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could be deduced from the introduction to this chapter, the structure of international politics in 
constructivist terms is social. Wendt argues that structure and agents are “mutually constitutive” 
(Wendt 1987:335; Wendt and Duvall, 1989; see also Hopf 1998). This is analogous to what Onuf 
(1998) intends to mean when he says that there is an ongoing mutual constitution between people 
and society. Human exertion manifests itself in the structure of the international system; this 
structure, in other words is not impervious to human activity.  
If realist and liberal interpretations of the world are that of an objective entity with fixed 
identities, the world under the constructivist prism is always being created and recreated, a work 
under construction rather than a fixed reality; “a case of becoming as opposed to being” (Viotti 
and Kauppi 2012). The problem of other minds becomes important for constructivism partly 
because of how it and its competitors understand social reality; the main question is whether or 
not social reality is objective, predictable or changeable. The causal perspective of international 
relations argues that state behaviour is driven by rational instrumentalism wherein states pursue 
goals that may be irreconcilably at odds with other states and hence can precipitate conflict. 
However, behaviour could also stem from beliefs that are not strictly rational but could combine 
rationality with values.  
Human beings are cultural beings that have the capacity to adopt certain reasoned approaches 
towards the world and make sense of it. Thus, the social world only makes sense because of how 
it is perceived by its components (humans and states).19 The values and beliefs that could inform 
national choices need not be adduced by a predetermined script of what national behaviour is. 
They can be significantly informed by cultural experiences, religious persuasion and moral 
standpoints. The problem of the other minds, according to neorealists, could persuade one that 
nations act preemptively under anarchic conditions that pose natural threats to states. The role of 
social dynamics of these actions is gravely undermined.  
The crux of the problem of other minds is that states cannot discern the designs or intentions of 
other states. This impossibility makes states to be suspicious of other states (Copeland 1999). In 
an anarchic system, therefore, states have what is similar to a Hobbesian attitude towards other 
states; thus, it is near-impossible for states to escape the realpolitik. Anarchy compounds the 
                                                          




problem of other minds. To those who look at anarchy as the primary structure of international 
politics, other states are a constant threat and hence all states have to augment their material 
position to gird for confrontation or stave off threats to security. This train of thought is 
objectivist and positivist, in that it lays claim to being predictive. However, this study contests 
such ideas with the argument that relations among nations are fundamentally social and hence 
objectivist and positivist analyses of these relations are challenged by constructivism (Crotty 
1998).  
Wendt somewhat argues that states know each other’s intentions most of the time; short of this 
international life would be impossible to exist as we know it. For example, countries that are 
suspicious of the United States are likely to be defensive because the United States has not veiled 
its hostility towards them. But other states are not afraid because the United States has not shown 
any manifest resentment towards them. Wendt (2005:208) argues that sates can solve the 
problem of other minds by “learning through reflected appraisal.” States do this by regulating 
their anticipations of what other states think by observing the response or attitude these states 
give. With the passage of time, states can thus learn who they are, who they are with respect to 
others and what their ambitions are. This enlightening process has been increasingly facilitated 
by certain standards (norms) of international conduct which are products of international 
institutions. The regulation of state behaviour by common norms and international institutions 
helps to read the intentions of other states but also regulates the intentions of states towards 
others.  
The problem of other minds cannot be solved if states do not have an appreciable idea of other 
minds, their functions and intentions. Even in the Hobbesian state of nature, states react in the 
way they do - not out of ignorance of others’ intentions - but out of the belief that others “are out 
to get them”. Thus, even in Hobbesian politics, anarchy does not regulate behaviour without the 
influence of culture. Peaceful and conflictual circumstances are thus products of culture and 
social practice (Copeland 2005). Consequently, if culture regulates state behaviour, and culture is 
mutable, it logically should follow that states can change.20  
                                                          
20 The implication here is that culture has a fundamental role to play in how a state perceives itself. It is partly 
through culture that individuals, or in this case states, define themselves (thus determining their identity). Culture 
does not only shape behaviour. If it did so without really shaping the identity of states, then culture could fit a 
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Finally, in circumstances where culture is stable, constructivism could arguably not be predictive 
enough and thus could be silent on one of the most crucial aspect of IR theory – the capacity to 
have a fair idea of what states might do in future so that one is not caught off-guard. But how 
often does this happen? Indeed, there can be a revolution to change the state. But does the 
change in personnel always precipitate a transformation of identity and interests? Not 
necessarily. In some cases, ideas and interests can remain intact even for centuries. Even 
countries that undergo radical revolutions do not change permanently over time (Wendt 2004). 
With time, possibilities are high that they can shed some of their initial zeal and follow the 
mainstream conduct. Copeland (2005) suggests that states should look more to the future for 
their actions with regards to others. But looking to the future is meaningless if one does not refer 
to experience. 
 
 3.7 Wendtian Constructivism 
Alexander Wendt is indubitably one of the most resolute defenders of constructivism in 
International Relations theory. His works, especially Anarchy is What States Make of It (1992) 
and Social Theory of International Politics, are now staple for constructivist scholarship. In the 
“acknowledgement” of Social Theory, he states that his analysis of international politics is 
“philosophical” in character (Wendt 1999: xiii). When pitted against realism, Wendt (1999:189) 
admits his work smacks of idealism. From the outset of his thesis, Wendt concedes that the 
international system is problematic for a constructivist approach with its social bent. This is so 
because, while it is easier to understand how laws and norms could dictate domestic conduct and 
politics, it is harder to controvert the argument that self-interest and power politics are the 
dominant factors of international politics. Thus, it is not surprising that Kenneth Waltz’s Theory 
of International Politics (1979), which emphasized the primary influence of power and 
materialism in international relations, held sway for a long time.  
While standards of international conduct have been established through bodies like the United 
Nations, there seems to be insufficient capacity to check the material ambitions and interests of 
countries, even if they may run athwart with established norms. Seen from this perspective, a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
realist prism. However, when put under constructivist analysis, culture goes further to also influence self-
identification and “othering.” 
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reason emerges to dismiss the social dimension of international relations in favour of 
materialism. In short, by and large, national behaviour has often justified realist opinion. 
However, realism has mostly been seen to be a positivist theory of the international system. 
Wendt (1999) sets for himself the task of charting a middle path between positivist theories and 
interpretivist theories, or between the rational and reflectivist theories.  
The two central doctrines of Wendtian constructivism are that “(1) the structures of human 
association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces and (2) that the 
identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given 
by nature” (Wendt 1999:1). Identity and interests are created, sustained or changed through 
social processes (Zehfuss 2001).  Relations among states are not charted by some supposed 
innate anarchy. State actions are shaped by how actors conceive themselves (their identities and 
interests) and this conception of self does not develop in a vacuum but develops through practice. 
If ideas are intersubjectively shared, then the state conception of self emerges from the contents 
of interaction with other states.  
 
The actions of others would play a part on how the state perceives itself and its interests in 
relation to the others. Thus, state identity and interests can be molded, shaped or changed if there 
is a shift in how the state relates with the other. In circumstances that are “other-regarding” states 
can transform their identities and interests in a way that can engender authentic peaceful 
coexistence with other states. The possibility of a global or international community is upheld in 
constructivism so long as the actors involved identify each other as sharing similar identities and 
intersecting interests.21 This community becomes possible because through collective identity 
formation “the Self-Other distinction becomes blurred and at the limit transcended altogether” 
(Wendt 1999:229). In his earlier writing Wendt (1992:183) wrote:  
 
A world in which identities and interests are learned and sustained by 
intersubjectively grounded practice, by what states think and do, is one in which 
‘anarchy is what states make of it.’ States may have made that system a 
competitive, self-help one in the past, but by the same token might ‘unmake’ 
those dynamics in the future. 
 
                                                          
21 A conflictual atmosphere is much a possibility as international amity. However, these two possibilities, as 
Copeland (1999) and Wendt argue, are products of discursive social practice and culture rather than inherently 
embedded in the being of actors.  
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The argument that states are socially constructed can lead to what Wendt calls an “over 
socialized approach to state identity” (Wendt 1994:385). To avoid such an approach, Wendt 
distinguishes between corporate and social identities of states (Kowert 1998). He states that 
“corporate identity refers to the intrinsic, self-organizing qualities that constitute actor 
individuality” (Wendt 1994:385). Corporate identities are identities that states have as 
individuals, such as their specific geography and so on. The four basic interests that issue from 
corporate identity are illustrations of this type of identity: (1) states are interested in securing 
their physical security; (2) ontological security or predictability in relationships to the world, 
which creates a desire for stable social identities; (3) recognition as an actor by others, above and 
beyond survival through brute force; (4) development, in the sense of meeting the human 
aspiration for a better life, for which states are repositories at the social level” (Wendt 1994:385). 
Corporate interests are thus typical of interests that are developed without the state interacting 
with another state, but their attainment depends on how the state identifies itself with respect to 
another state and this is when and where social identity and its consequent interests come in.  
Wendt (1994:385) describes social identities as sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself 
while taking the perspective of others, that is, as a social object. While a state has a singular 
corporate identity, social identities are numerous and depending on which state(s), institutions or 
organization a state is socializing with, certain social identities become accentuated while others 
are downplayed. Therefore, unlike identities that are created within states with no influence from 
specific social contexts and interactions, social identities breed social interests and hence cause 
states to be “cooperative or conflictual” in their comportment depending on who they are 
interacting with. Furthermore, social identities are not only influenced by the players a nation is 
interacting with. Social identities and interests could also emerge from changes in the global 
configuration. Thus, nations might change their outlook on development, their priorities, their 
idea of security, as a response to changes in the global system, and this can reorient the basis and 
depth of relations among nations. In the seventh chapter, these identities are applied to the Sino-
Zambian relations at both the state and non-state level. The analysis in that chapter clarifies the 
corporate and social identities of China as they obtain in Zambia, how they have influenced 




Constructivism is essentially a social approach to knowledge. It deals with the importance of 
human influence on social structures. Indeed, being a social theory rather than a strictly 
international theory of international politics, constructivism could be applied to analyses of how 
actors and their identities and interests are socially constructed (Wendt 1999). Ideas become 
important because they are fundamental determinants of social complexes and dynamics. 
Constructivism, as a social theory then, can be applied to human interaction as well, rather than 
being confined to national and international dynamics. The nation becomes an analogue of 
individuals and the international system becomes an analogue of interpersonal structures. 
Making person and state as analogies automatically attributes to states traits that are typically 
human. These include “rationality, identities, interests, beliefs, and so on” (Wendt 2004:289). It 
is important to note that constructivism has no monopoly over this analogy. It has been used by 
realists, idealists and just about any theory of international relations. It is one of the subjects that 
unify all manner of international relations theories.  
Constructivism in international politics also retains the notion of state-centric analysis22 because 
by their nature approaches of international relations would require that the basic units of 
analysis, states, acquire international proportions. However, constructivists are more amenable to 
the possibility that non-state actors (Keck and Sikkink 1998) could influence state identity and 
behaviour (see Slaughter 2011).23 This argument is bolstered by at least two reasons: the first 
being that constructivism is essentially a social theory and hence is not strictly reducible to 
international political theory. Secondly, constructivism looks at how actors are constructed but 
does not venture into stating what these actors are (Wendt 1999). Thus, even actors that do not fit 




                                                          
22 It is important to note that even though Wendt argues that neorealism fails to explain structural change, this 
failure is not because neo-realism employs state-centric analysis. There are state-centric theories that can cogently 
explain structural change (Wendt 1999).  
23 Non-state actors can also influence state behaviour by criticism, naming and shaming errant states (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998). Furthermore, while institutionalists are wont to argue that no-State bodies are mere proxies of 
states, these bodies have often furthered their own interests (e.g. human rights and disarmament), independent of 
states (Barnett and Finnemore 2004).  
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3.7.1 Anarchy: Alexander Wendt’s Position 
Wendt’s arguments on anarchy came to join the ongoing debate between realist and liberal 
understandings of anarchy (as the structure of the international system), and process, (which is 
interaction among states) and the role that institutions play in shaping human behaviour. The 
focus on these elements came as a step further from the focus on human nature as the 
determinant for international behaviour. Neorealists and liberals are both considered rationalist 
theorists of international politics. Rationalists look at how states act in a system that is anarchic; 
realists argue that states act in self-interested ways in order to minimize losses and maximize 
gains. Thus, state identities and interests remain constant while state behaviour may be 
susceptible to some form of transformation. While simple changes in terms of particular 
behaviour are possible, identities and interests are immune to change. The formation of identity 
and interests in the international system is thus not central to rationalist (especially realist) 
theorists. 24Liberals differ from realists in that the former concede that even in circumstances of 
exogenously given anarchy, states are capable of “cooperative behavior” (Wendt 1992:392).   
If, as realists argue, anarchy and power politics form the essence of international interaction, 
does that mean anarchy is unchangeable and that states are, by nature, compelled to act in self-
serving ways or are naturally doomed to engage in power politics? Secondly, if the answer to the 
first question is affirmative, does that mean anarchy is exogenously given to states?  
Wendt does not dismiss anarchy as the structure of the international system. What he says, rather 
is that anarchy is shaped by cultural rather than inherent or material influences. If the 
international system is mired in power politics and selfish behaviour, it is because of a social 
process that has sponsored an enabling environment for such behaviour. Self-help and power 
politics are thus not the logical consequences of anarchy. States learn to be selfish. Learning 
(which is process) rather than structure (anarchy) is thus more influential in shaping state 
behaviour. Realists, on the other hand, argue that states cannot help but act in ways that exude 
self-help behaviour and power politics because of the absence of any central government to 
provide ambits of behaviour.  
                                                          
24 Social theories that explain the formation of identities and interests exist. Robert Keohane calls them 
“reflexivist” while Wendt calls them constructivist.  
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Wendt tries to bridge the gap between constructivism and the liberal claim that international 
institutions can breed and change national identities and interests. Power politics and anarchy in 
the realist sense do not offer a cogent explanation for intersecting or divergent identities among 
nations and how these identities could create similar or diametrically opposed interests. Nations 
that identify as allies act in ways that can be mutually reinforcing and the meaning of strength or 
power among them takes a more positive or at least non-threatening dimension. For example, the 
military strength of the United States has a different meaning for Britain and Russia. Britain has 
been a traditional ally of the United States while Russia has had a historical suspicion of the 
United States (Wendt 1992). American strength and its meaning to other actors is thus dependent 
on the identities that other actors and the United States attribute to each other. A realist 
explanation would be more applicable in situations where military strength is invariably a 
threatening quality to all other players. In situations where this might not be the case, realist 
arguments become difficult to sustain. Thus, the ordering principle of states in the international 
system is collective meaning rather than anarchy. Through social interaction, states can avoid the 
anarchy and rivalry stressed by realism and “achieve a variety of intersubjective forms of order, 
one of which is” (Pouliot 2008:3) international community, a possibility that Wendt sees as 
almost inevitable.  
Wendt lists at least three forms of culture that are possible in the international system. They can 
either be Hobbesian, Lockean or Kantian (see Suganami 2001). These three forms represent 
progress of how persons or states regard each other, from the atavistic, selfish and brutal instincts 
of Thomas Hobbes’s state of nature, to the formation of some kind of rules guiding the behaviour 
of self-interested actors, to the more civilized society of Immanuel Kant. In Hobbesian analysis, 
as mentioned before in this chapter, actors perceive each other as enemies and hence always act 
in ways that would curtail enemies and secure personal survival. The three forms of culture, 
respectively characterize actors as enemies (Hobbesian), rivals (Lockean) and friends (Kantian). 
The fact that culture shapes anarchy means anarchy comes out of dynamic processes and thus 
does not take on an all-enduring manifestation. Anarchy in the Hobbesian system and, to some 
extent the Lockean system, is similar to anarchy as referred to by realists. It is a state in which 
actors consider each other natural enemies or threats. From a constructivist plane, the anarchy 
that characterizes this system is a product of the specific process of the state of nature.    
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3.7.2 Self-Interest: A Wendtian Explanation   
For realists, human nature and the force of material ambitions makes it hard for states to forge 
interests that can benefit others; indeed, these two factors could forestall any significant changes 
of national interest. Drawing from what has been written about realism, states act in ways that do 
not provide ground for shared interests in the international system. For this reason, authentic and 
significant cooperation becomes harder to forge. The debate on the fate of realism in the post-
Cold War era was partly influenced by the fact that the United States, in particular, would find it 
hard to define what its interests would be in a world bereft of a significant enemy. Irving Kristol 
(1990:16) asserts that “it is, after all, one’s enemies that help define one’s ‘national interest’, in 
whatever form that interest might take.” This point, in one way, supports Wendt’s (1992:398) 
constructivist stance that speaks of nations as not having a portfolio of interests. Interests 
develop through interaction and when pursued among states, they depend on how states regard 
each other.    
Neoliberals, while conceding that authentic cooperation is possible because of international 
institutions and knowledge, still take state interests as though they are exogenously imposed on 
states. Neoliberals are agreeable to the possibility that state interests might change but that this is 
mostly due to domestic politics and that though interests need not be constant, they are still 
exogenous to international politics and relations. Joseph Nye (1999:23), an authority of 
neoliberalism, defines national interests, in democracies, as “the set of shared priorities regarding 
relations with the rest of the world.” Like constructivists, neoliberals also draw a logical 
connection between identity and interests. A country can pursue certain interests, material or 
otherwise, as long as they are important to how the country perceives itself. Thus, values can 
feature in national interests from a neoliberal perspective.  
Wendt also supports the argument that interests are mainly determined by identity. In Samuel P. 
Huntington’s (1997:28) words, “national interest derives from national identity” and as nations 
“we have to know who we are before we can know what our interests are” (ibid).   Nations do 
not have a readymade (Wendt 1992) catalog of interests that are impervious to specific actors’ 
interactions and the dynamics of these interactions. Mark (2003:695) argues that the emergence 
of constructivism as a popular approach to international relations came with a theoretical shift in 
studies of international politics “because it problematizes notions of action that take interest as 
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given.” The foundation for such a project was a direct indictment on the limitations that beset 
realist and rationalist treatments of interest and ideas. Wendt apportions for himself the task of 
building an argument that puts interests as endogenous to interaction. Wendt, partly because of 
his inclination to idealism, believes that states can form a community, something deeper than a 
haphazard collection of inherently selfish actors. Following his argument to its logical 
conclusion means states are capable of actions that are beneficial to the other or to the 
community. Interests are thus not immutably tailored to benefit states that carry them.  
 
3.8 Critique of Constructivism 
Despite gaining traction after the end of the Cold War, constructivism has been dogged with 
numerable concerns and skepticisms (Hopf 1998) that have left both its proponents and 
detractors with the dilemma of whether or not this approach is worthy of the name “theory”25 of 
international relations. Others refer to it as a meta-theory (Guzzini 2000; Zehfuss 2002), but 
many more simply refer to it as an approach rather than theory of IR. Nicholas Onuf avers that 
“constructivism is not a theory as such” (1998:58). “It does not offer general explanations for 
what people do, why societies differ [and] how the world changes” (ibid). Constructivism has 
also been questioned on its take on ideas in the international system. Palan (2000:575) states that 
constructivism “asserts, but never proves, the primacy of norms and laws over material 
considerations, in domestic and international politics.”  
The attitude of undermining constructivism is understandable when one looks at the longevity of 
realism and the global influence of those who support neoliberalism. The retention of certain 
assumptions by neorealists, neoliberals and idealists has also played into the hands of 
constructivism’s critics. In Constructing International Politics (1995), Wendt espouses what he 
calls Mearsheimer’s five realist assumptions: “that international politics is anarchic, and that 
states have offensive capabilities, cannot be 100 percent certain about others' intentions, wish to 
survive, and are rational” (Wendt 1995:72). He further shares a realist assumption of states as 
being units of analysis. This position elicits at least two concerns; the first is that it risks 
presenting constructivism in an adulterated light; as an approach that simply toes the line of 
                                                          
25 Anne-Marie Slaughter argues that constructivism is an ontology rather than a theory of international relations. 
She regards it as “a set of assumptions” about human agency and motivation.   
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realism, with a few cosmetic changes and additions. Secondly, the rising tide of globalization has 
impacted on how much room states have to pursue their interests. Maintaining the centrality of 
states in the international system should contend with the fact that “the controllers and owners of 
the transnational corporations (TNCs), globalising politicians, globalising professionals and the 
like represent interests which are not national in origin but globally linked” (Moisio 2008:79). 
Moisio goes on to say in the era of globalization taken up by capitalists, interests are 
conceptualised more “in terms of the market rather than in terms of the nation” (Moisio 2008). 
To its defense, constructivism has actually given more attention to the role that non-state actors 
play in international politics than its realist counterparts. As stated elsewhere in the chapter, non-
state actors have grown in prominence and cannot be ignored. 
Constructivism has also been assailed for manifesting an alleged postmodernist streak and 
elements of anti-positivism (Hopf 1998). That liberalism and realism are both positivist makes 
this attitude predictable. Henry Nau (2012) regards constructivism as a welcome approach to IR 
studies, but that it still falls short of the thoroughness and rigour that realism and liberalism 
enjoy. Constructivism has also been denied the ranks of other mainstream IR theories because it 
has been closely associated with idealism (see Wendt 1999 and Nau 2012). Nau states that those 
who have dismissed constructivism on these lines, especially those of realist inclinations argue 
“that reality must be accepted as it is, namely anarchy and power politics, not as we might wish it 
to be, namely utopian ideas and universal institutions” (2012:46-47). 
While others have claimed to draw lines between constructivism and idealism, others have 
sought to draw lines between constructivism and rationalism (see Checkel 1997). A valid 
synthesizing of constructivism and rationalism would put paid to the claim that constructivism is 
treading the via media or the middle ground between contesting approaches to international 
relations. If constructivists are to religiously follow the claim to tread the middle ground, they 
must be willing to engage with rationalist theorists on the one hand and reflectivist theorists on 
the other hand. Zehfuss (2002:5), already doubting the possibility of the middle ground, seems to 
argue that constructivism is more amenable to building bridges with rationalists than those who 
are “more radical than the constructivists.”  
The foregoing concerns could point to the assumption that readers have a clear idea of what 
constructivism is. This is not the case and has fuelled controversy on the usage and importance 
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of this approach. Thus, even offering a cogent critique of constructivism risks being an awkward 
exercise because critiquing something presupposes that it is known (Zehfuss 2002). There is 
always the temptation of branding any non-rationalist approach to IR as constructivist. 
According to Adler (1997:322), constructivism “is the view that the manner in which the 
material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic 
normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world.” Adler’s definition brings the 
debate over the material world to the centre stage of constructivism. The definition reinforces the 
equal importance and influence that human agency and material reality have of each other. This 
reinforces Wendt’s (1992:399) earlier arguments on the agent-structure dynamic, attributing to 
the two entities “equal ontological status.”  
In Social Theory (1999:189) Wendt reiterates the argument that he does not undermine the 
presence and influence of “material elements in the structure of social systems.” By this 
argument, Wendt avoids Sørensen’s (2008:5) criticism that constructivism does not sufficiently 
address “how material forces impact with the social world in IR.” Indeed, players who comprise 
social systems are biological (hence material) entities endowed with manifold capabilities and 
properties. However, left on their own, material elements “explain relatively little” (Wendt 
1999:189). A variant of knowledge is needed to render meaning to material conditions. Thus, 
while the material world impinges on human agency, the same could be said of how human 
agency attaches meaning to material objects. However, this clarity of the mutual constitution of 
the agent (human action) and structure (material world) in shaping behaviour is more 
comprehensible when one strand of constructivism (i.e. Wendt’s variant) is under discussion. 
Whether or not it represents all analysis claiming to be constructivist is a moot point.  
Taking an extreme stand on social constructivism is a temptation to which adherents of social 
constructions can be vulnerable. By extreme here is meant the argument that there can never be 
stability in the social realm; that everything happens at the break-neck speed of flux. The sharp 
linguistic turn (of which constructivism is a subset) in the study of IR has often been blamed for 
putting social practice and human habit at bay (see Neumann 2002). The argument that the 
material world does not make sense outside of language runs the risk of disregarding the current 
of practised and unreflective conduct or behaviour among states.  
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Wendt concedes the fact that given unchanging circumstances, identities and interests within, 
between and among states, can remain stable and unchanging. Actors mostly remain stable in the 
way they perceive their identity and interests over a long period of time. It would be near 
impossible for actors to interact if they did not have any prediction on the behaviour of fellow 
actors. This is tantamount to habitual human behaviour. The caveat, however, is not to take this 
behaviour as innately given. Practice should not be mistaken with inherent nature.  For example, 
that states often act in egoistic ways cannot be gainsaid; however, it is logically erroneous to then 
take this particular practice for a natural property (Wendt 1994).  
One of the major challenges of this study was to use constructivism in a way that would not 
indicate an endorsement of extreme relativism; the argument that all knowledge is context-
specific, that truth cannot be universalized, and that ultimately the mind is the arbiter of all 
knowledge, external and internal (Crotty 1998). The variant of knowledge and behaviours under 
discussion in this study is that of a social nature. Therefore, wherever it is said that knowledge of 
one’s and others’ ideas is not imposed exogenously on interaction, it is social knowledge that is 
under discussion. It is this type of knowledge that comes with experience and social learning 
(Hendry, Frommer, and Walker 1999).  
The study should thus guard against traversing other realms or approaches to knowledge in 
which it does not have authority. Furthermore, theories of knowledge, by the mere fact of 
bearing the name theory, harbour no pretentions of being universally applicable (Mashele and 
Qobo 2017). In Karl Popper’s (2002:80) words, “all theories are trials; they are tentative 
hypotheses” tested to see if they could work and that they can be rejected if new evidence is 
discovered that debunks them. The popularity of constructivism after the Cold War is on the 
ascendant not because constructivism has finally found the answers to the questions that have 
hitherto confounded international relations theory. The emergence of this approach has been 
supported by the Kuhnian26 idea of pointing out anomalies and puzzles that proved insoluble to 
formerly dominant theories, in this case realism, idealism and liberalism. Constructivism, 
                                                          
26 The word was coined by Thomas Kuhn, an influential philosopher of science who gained prominence especially 
through his book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn argues that knowledge develops through specific 
circumstances and is adopted as the norm for specific epochs. However, when the prevailing knowledge 
encounters problems it cannot easily solve, people start agitating for a paradigm that can be more effective in 
addressing those anomalies and puzzles. It is through this process that paradigm shifts are made. With respect to 
the research underway, the author uses Kuhn’s insights to demonstrate the rise of constructivism and how it came 
about in the aftermath of the Cold War.     
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therefore, may point out what has eluded the grasp of other theories of international relations. 
Other theories might emerge to challenge constructivism and proffer more clarity on what this 
approach ignores or is incapable of solving. There could also be events that could revive the 
strength of extant theories to challenge constructivism.27 Indeed, it is this process that sponsors 
the growth and dynamism of knowledge.   
 
3.9 Conclusion 
The primary intention of this chapter has been to present constructivism, an approach to IR that 
informs the analysis of this research. To set the background of what partly prompted the rise of 
constructivism, the chapter began by giving a general overview of more enduring theories of 
international relations, i.e. realism, idealism and liberalism. Insights of realism and neorealism 
were conflated, not erroneously, but with the aim of limiting the space given to theories that are 
not meant for the current research. In a similar way, idealism has also been somewhat linked 
with theories such as liberalism. The importance of mentioning this is that while idealism is a 
time-honoured theory, scholars are loath to attribute to themselves the mark of idealist, opting for 
more palatable descriptions. Thus, liberalism, especially in the United States, has, to some 
extent, taken up the idealist cudgels.   
Constructivism has been shown to be a multifarious approach used in sundry disciplines. 
However, when applied to international relations studies, it has been presented as an approach 
that seeks to accentuate the importance of ideas, the construction of identities and the pursuit of 
interests in the international system. Constructivism belabours the impact that ideas and shared 
identities, rather than material forces in isolation, have in shaping relations among states. The 
argument that states can have multiple and at times, seemingly contradictory, identities was a 
novel addition to IR theorizing. States identify themselves through self-perception, social 
practice and according to the type of structures they are embedded in. This combination of 
                                                          
27 The withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union in June 2016 will undoubtedly make staple for 
near-future debates on international relations. The success of the European Union was an example of how 
transnational organizations have become increasingly important and that nations have somewhat accepted that 
certain causes transcend beyond national interest. However, the withdrawal of the UK could revive realist 
arguments that nations only really care about their individual interests and cannot surrender them to an institution 
above individual sovereignty.  
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different factors compels states to accentuate certain identities at given times and in given 
circumstances, which might appear confounding to those who ascribe uniform and all-enduring 
identities to states.  
National interests emerge from national identities. If identities can be multiple and are 
changeable, the same has to be the case for interests because the latter are a consequence of the 
former. This argument has bearing on the constructivist understanding of anarchy. Anarchy is 
not a natural property of international politics; specific circumstances, either historical, cultural, 
political or economic can compel sates to act in ways that might present the international system 
as innately anarchic. Under these circumstances, actors might comport themselves in ways that 
can somewhat validate realist analysis. However, when national identities and their resultant 
interests converge or intersect, it is possible for states to conduct themselves in ways that defy 
rationalist understandings of state behaviour and anarchy. In other words, states can pursue 
interests that are not considered possible or rational by other theories.  
This study is cognizant of the fact that constructivism, even among IR theorists identifying 
themselves as constructivist, has inspired robust debate and dissension. However, this particular 
study has adopted Wendt’s variant of constructivism, albeit acknowledging its shortcomings. 
Wendt, as argued above, has struggled to disentangle constructivism from realism, idealism and 
liberalism. His insistence on states being the main units of IR analysis is in tandem with 
neorealism. This argument will increasingly become controversial in a system that has non-state 
institutions that have the wherewithal to influence state behaviour. In his seminal work, Social 
Theory, Wendt concedes that his work is idealistic to some extent. This might diminish the 
importance of constructivism as a separate approach to international relations. What is of utmost 
importance for this study are the basic notions of constructivism as presented above. The fact 
that constructivism is a social approach means that it does not pretend to be an infallible position. 
The possibility of another approach coming to challenge constructivism is almost certain.  
With the background that the theoretical framework has set, the next chapter will be a practical 
illustration of the argument that nations are not impervious to identity and interest changes as 
they feature in internal and international politics. The next chapter of the study will look at China 
through a historical prism, and focus more on its self-perception and its ties with the rest of the 





 CHINA THROUGH HISTORY – A PRESENTATION OF EVOLVING NATIONAL 
IDENTITIES AND INTERESTS 
4.1 Introduction  
Every state is a product of its past; a cliché statement which nevertheless carries almost 
axiomatic notions about the nature of human societies. However, it is also correct to say 
substantial changes are possible within states because human societies can be influenced, to a 
substantial and significant degree, by major events. Quoting the last British governor of Hong 
Kong, Jonathan Dimbleby (1997:367) states that “a community is a living thing which grows and 
changes.” When taken as cultural consequences, human societies can be changed in ways that 
might appear almost completely antithetical to what they were historically. Behaviour, social 
identity and interests emerge because of how individuals and groups impact and are impacted 
upon by the contexts in which they are embedded.  
From this background, the present chapter focuses on China’s political culture, how internal and 
external events (occasionally and collectively called contexts) have shaped China’s behaviour, 
identity and interests. Wang noted that image building, a projection of certain identities, has been 
central to China’s foreign policy, and that this projection radiates both continuity and dynamism 
from the Mao era to the present. Wang’s insights are of great import to the current study because 
she uses constructivism to present the images that China seeks to portray in contrast to the 
images that others ascribe to China (Wang 2003). This duality of national identity is central to 
constructivist analysis because the quality of interactions with China is based on how others 
perceive the country. In a similar way Chan (2014) has done a study on China’s evolving 
identities after the opening up policy of the late 1970s, but he used a theory called social 
evolution as an alternative to social constructivism and realism.  
Similar to the previous chapter, the current chapter paves the way for the analysis that was done 
in chapter seven. In the analysis, readers should pick out divergent and intersecting behaviours, 
social identities and interests that Zambia and China share, and be able to comprehend why the 
two countries have retained a resilient association after more than fifty years. In keeping with the 
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historical nature of constructivist analysis (Leira and de Carvalho 2016), the current chapter 
places China’s political culture in history. The chapter seeks to expose consistencies and 
dichotomies in this culture by showing if there are clear-cut differences between what is 
considered traditional and modern Chinese political culture (see Moody 1994).  
A caution is important from the outset. The current part of the research should be seen within the 
overriding task of the whole study which looks at the role that identities and interests play in 
international relations. This has at least two implications on the character that the ensuing pages 
assume: first, the China that has had relations with Zambia is the People’s Republic of China, 
instituted in 1949 after the communist takeover. The first implication relates to the second: that 
most of the research here was dedicated to China’s identity and interests as a polity after 1949. 
The background that precedes the People’s Republic of China, such as the events leading to the 
1911 Revolution and after up to 1949 are there to give the reader some context and to show the 
rationale behind the determination of the communists to wrest power from the Kuomintang 
(GMD) also known as the Republic of China. An in-depth historical exploration of Chinese 
politics, i.e. from the Qing Dynasty, through the Republican days, to the communist takeover, is 
beyond the scope of the current undertaking. In order to give an authoritative presentation of 
China’s identities and interests, the translated works of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping have 
been extensively used. This helped in ascertaining China’s identities and interests from the very 
people who were instrumental in constructing them.  
 
4.2 China’s Political Culture: A Historical Perspective and its Continued Influence  
Hui (2004) argues that while theories of international relations presume a check and balances 
system as the norm of politicking, ancient China had “universal domination.” As will be 
explained later, Confucian ideas of obeying the status quo and social order influenced political 
obedience in China and gave leaders seemingly untrammeled dominance over their subjects. 
Thus, the style of politics that was customary in Europe (check and balances) should not be taken 
as the standard and China’s style as an anomaly (see Han 2013). For many people who witnessed 
or hinted at the manner in which Chinese citizens during Mao had been cowed into submission, 
the allegedly time-honoured fear or respect that Chinese have for authority could be a partial 
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explanation.28 Historically, China had been ruled by a long line of dynasties that emphasized 
almost absolute fealty to the ruling class from their subjects. The aversion to the encroachment of 
foreign ideas and indeed to reform China’s society was partly informed by Confucianism.  
Confucius (551-479 BC) was persuaded by the idea that bliss in life and in society at large could 
be attained through order. He “taught that human relations are the foundations on which society 
is constructed” (Han 2013:110). Confucianism holds that individuals have five fundamental 
relationships (known as Wu-Lun) that inform all human interaction. These are relations between 
the emperor and the subject, fathers and their sons, husbands and their wives, older and younger 
brothers and among friends. The virtues that control these relationships are also five: humanity-
benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and trustworthiness. The five fundamentals and 
the attendant virtues regulating them compel individuals to conform to societal values, hence 
sustaining “social order and stability” (Han 2013:111). This emphasis on submitting to the status 
quo or social order had the logical consequence of inculcating people with the notion that 
yielding to society and authority was absolute duty. Naturally, this shored up the support of those 
in positions of power. Elements that were deemed as attempts to tinker with the natural order 
could then be condemned with the assurance that the larger society would join in denouncing the 
errant parties.  
Michael Lynch (2004:4) observes that “a notable nature of Chinese history is the severity of the 
punishment meted out to rebels.” He quickly advises that the cruelty with which rebels were 
treated was not wanton; it was meant as a deterrent to any other individuals who might entertain 
aspirations of changing the status quo of society.29 This partly explains why those who managed 
to assume dynastic positions in China enjoyed a lot of submission from their subjects. 
Leadership in China was related to metaphysical fiat; leaders were looked upon as almost having 
a divine instruction to rule, what Lynch calls the “mandate of heaven” (see also Chai 1997). 
                                                          
28 As a note of fair judgement, revolt against authority was not totally absent in China. Indeed the 1911 revolution 
that ended dynastic rule was evident of a streak of rebellion in the Chinese psyche against suppressive authority. 
The 1949 victory of the communist was another such display of displeasure against authority. Tobin (2014) has 
actually written about how constructive criticism was an intimate part of the Chinese lifestyle among peers and 
learners.  
29 To this day, though China has changed in terms of integrating itself with the external world, the Chinese 
leadership retains a harsh antipathy towards those it considers as threats. From Lynch’s (2004) argument, this 
continued trait could be borne out by the jealousy with which authority guards its power and the determination to 
forestall any changes.  
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Those who successfully managed to wrest power from rulers could claim to have inherited this 
mandate. The brand of “rebel” was thus reserved for individuals or groups that fought, 
unsuccessfully, against societal order. Those who successfully gained power were no longer 
dismissed as rebels. They enjoyed the respect, fear and devotion of their subjects and were thus 
relied upon to maintain the newly established order. Seen from this perspective, political 
contestation – whether violent or otherwise - in China had a utilitarian bent; it was used as a 
means to an end.   
Apart from a noted presence of fear or respect for authority, another defining characteristic of 
China was its confidence in its culture and civilization. China deemed itself to have an unrivalled 
civilization and a culture that was way more superior than that of foreign lands. China had had 
relations with foreign powers but these did not undermine the sense of pride in China’s 
uniqueness. It could be argued that this sense of imperviousness to foreign norms played a huge 
part in China lagging behind other nations, like Japan, that had adapted to a changing 
international environment. The nineteenth century, however, brought challenges to China that the 
Qing dynasty could scarcely cope with. Trade with Western countries grew and China had to 
adapt or become effete. These were necessities pressed on China from external forces. However, 
external forces combined with internal forces to cause major upsets in China especially in the 
last two decades of the nineteenth century. This was the time when the European Scramble for 
Africa was in full flight and similar incursions were being made in Asia. China also suffered 
from the Japanese threats of invasion. The capitulation of the Qing dynasty to external force had 
a strong effect on internal politics. Japan offered refuge to admiring Chinese citizens who saw in 
it an Asian model for development, especially after its adoption of certain Western mores of 
economics and culture. The nucleus of the people who sought to end Qing leadership were 
Chinese based in Japan, the most influential of whom was Sun Yat-sen (Bergère and Lloyd 
1998).  
The dynastic system was changed, in style if not substance, with the 1911 Revolution that 
toppled the Qing Dynasty. The culmination of the Revolution had a humiliating build up from 
which China still reverts in its defense of territorial integrity. The Qing dynasty had suffered 
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defeats that cut to the very core of Chinese national, economic, political and social esteem30. 
External forays into China grew steadily. The two Opium Wars that China fought against Britain 
resulted in the loss of Hong Kong, an inalienable part of China that to date, even after the 
transfer back to mainland China in 1997, has been a curious part of the mainland. Foreign 
incursions and their influence also led to the loss of territories such as Taiwan and Manchuria 
and ushered in Japan’s claim to certain regions that were hitherto parts of China.  
China’s continued touchy attitude towards external influence should partly be seen from the 
perspective of a proud nation whose march through history was rudely disrupted by foreign 
influence. Under such circumstances, a climate through which nationalist sentiment could thrive 
emerged. While some sectors of Chinese society wanted a total transformation of the socio-
political order of the dynastic system (revolution as an absolute break with age-old dynasties), 
and still others wanted the retention of some form of monarchy, there was a general convergence 
on the yearning to change from a traditional dynastic setup. The 1911 Revolution, led by Sun 
Yat-sen (1866-1925) held the promise of a break with what was a humiliating history not only 
for China as country in relation to foreign powers, but as an end to the subjugation of ordinary 
Chinese by an age-old dynastic order.  
Assessment of the revolution which instituted the Republic of China has been varied. To some, 
the revolution was “superficial” (Goldman and Lee 2002:110). Jonathan Fenby (2011) argues 
that the only thing that was certain with the 1911 revolution was that it had effectively ended the 
oldest imperial court in the world; but its aspiration to change China in any substantial way was 
not realized and the revolution spawned “issues that persisted through much of China’s 20-
Century history and beyond” (Fenby 2011:30). The institutionalization of the Republic of China 
did not translate into the unification of what had become a fragmented nation. The retreat of the 
Qing Court precipitated a vacuum in some regions, thus emboldening warlords. Under such 
circumstances, warlords who laid claim to certain territories as their fiefdoms were disinclined to 
cede their strength to the Republican government.  
                                                          
30 For the sake of conscientious analysis, the racial dimension to the agitation against the Qing Dynasty has to be 
noted. Members of the Qin court were from Manchuria and hence were not part of the Han race. It is safe to argue 
that Sun Yat-sen seized on his heritage as a native from Guangdong to mobilize forces against a dynasty that was 
foreign (See Fenby 2011).   
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These and many other factors created a justification for a more far-reaching revolution. It has 
been argued that the 1911 revolution was elitist in its manner, mainly led by merchants and 
military members of the Qing court who had been hired by the dynasty in a last-ditch effort to 
modernize the army to retain power but had defected to the side of the revolutionaries (see Lynch 
2004:29). In terms of humiliation at the hand of foreign forces, like the 1895 defeat of the Qing 
Dynasty by Japan (Fenby 2011; Wang 2014) (and the subsequent takeover of Manchuria), the 
suzerainty that the United Kingdom exercised on certain of its territories, and the failure of the 
post-1911 regimes to hold China as a unified whole coalesced into an intolerable atmosphere for 
some Chinese. Those who argue with the advantage of hindsight usually refer to China’s history 
at the hands of foreign domination as the most influential factor in its foreign policy to date. 
From Asia, Japan continued harassing the Republic of China, culminating in the war between the 
two countries from 1937 to the eventual defeat of Japan in 1945 (see Johnstone 1998; Tzu-chin 
2016) as the Second World War drew to a close.  
The protestations that China continues to make, with significant support from Africa, against 
foreign censure and interference, has often been viewed from this antipathy to foreign 
domination.31 Another feature that makes China and Africa argue from the same standpoint is the 
Chinese rhetoric against capitalism, an ideology which much of Africa and China used to 
erroneously link with imperialism. The influence of the Chinese Communist Party has been very 
notable in this attitude. It is noteworthy that most influential members, if not all, who formed the 
CCP were members or adherents of the GMD and the two organizations formed a formal 
alliance. Thus during the nascent years of the CCP an intersection of membership existed with 
the GMD.  
 
4.3 The Chinese Communist Party 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was formed in 1921. As stated in the previous section, at 
the onset, the CCP and GMD shared members because aspirations that united them were 
seemingly greater than those that separated them. They both sought the reorientation of China as 
                                                          
31 As will be argued in the analysis in chapter seven, the intersecting history that China shares with Africa, with 
regards to Western and foreign domination, has been a strong unifying force in Sino-African relations and, 
consequently, Sino-Zambian relations.  
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a country and were both revolutionary organizations. The nascent CCP needed the army of the 
GMD for it to have any chance of a successful struggle in casting off imperialism (Schram 
2002). Furthermore, the Communist International, known more popularly as the Comintern,32 
which exercised some influence at the inception of the CCP, favoured a coalition with the GMD. 
Mao Zedong, who is undoubtedly the most influential architect of Chinese communism, served 
as a member “of the Shanghai Executive Bureau of the Kuomintang (sic)” (Schram 2002:283) 
from about 1923 to 1924.  
Expectedly, right from the formation of the CCP, a section of the communists were against the 
CCPs’ alliance with the GMD.33 Mao is one of the members who upbraided the communists who 
were against the CCP-GMD alliance at the CCP’s Third Congress in 1923 (Lynch 2004). The 
fissures that eventually deepened between the two organizations were partly because the 
communists had grown disenchanted with the GMD’s failure to stop Chinese subjugation to 
Japan and the West, and the failure to hold the country together through turbulent episodes like 
warlordism. Chiang Kai-shek, the eventual leader of the GMD, capitulated to Japan when the 
latter took over Manchuria. This further disillusioned the communists who loathed Japanese 
occupation.34  
At the time that the CCP was finding its ground, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was 
the most influential communist organization and, inevitably, a model on which Chinese 
communists could build their organization. As Schwartz (2002:137) points out “from the very 
outset, the Leninist theory of imperialism and its image of the Western world was to win wide 
                                                          
32 The Comintern was an organization primarily of Soviet origin, formed in 1919, to secure interests of the Soviet 
Union in the international system. The main fashion through which this was sought was the promotion and 
exportation of revolutions. For a long time the CCP remained a follower of the Comintern and, during the first few 
years of CCP rule, Mao still considered the Soviet Union the “teacher” of international communism.  
33 The highhanded means with which Chiang Kai-shek subsequently tried to suppress the communists point to the 
possibility that he had always harboured a scepticism if not utter resentment for the communists. Apart from their 
voiced hostility towards the imperialists and the influence of the Comintern, the CCP and GMD had little else that 
held them together with the passage of time.  
34 Prior to the capitulation to Japan which happened in 1931 (Tzu-chin 1927), in 1927 Chiang Kai-shek ordered 
what became known as the White Terror when his subjects hunted down and killed thousands of communists and 
members of the GMD who were thought to have leftist inclinations. His rampage was lauded by business men and 
foreign nationals. That the rampage started in Shanghai was a telling detail: it was in Shanghai that the 
communists were putting up a strong trade union movement. As expected, the business men who cheered the 
White Terror did so because they did not want an influential trade union movement to circumscribe their latitude 
over their workers (Lynch 2004). This period was against the most intimate of communist ambitions – the 
protection of the workers and, in China, the peasants.  
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acceptance not only among those close to the Communist Party but even among the 
Kuomintang-affiliated individuals and politicians.” While the general understanding is that the 
Chinese Communist Party subordinated itself to Soviet communism, it also sought to assert itself 
as somewhat independent of the Soviet version of communism because China was faced with 
particular circumstances that the Soviet Union did not share. In “Problems of Strategy in Guerilla 
War” (1938) Mao belaboured the fact that China had unique circumstances which could not be 
coped with by a wholesale importation of the Soviet style of communism.  While he conceded 
that the Soviet experience had some valuable insights, he urged his fellow communists to “value 
even more the experience of China’s revolutionary war, because there [were] many factors 
specific to the Chinese revolution” (Mao 1938:79). This attitude was to take on the character of a 
direct challenge to Soviet leadership of international communism after the CCP assumed power 
and Nikita Khrushchev succeeded Stalin as leader of the Soviet Union.  
By its nature, the CCP had at least two objects to struggle against: the first was to end what could 
be termed as Japanese imperialism (Mao 1965; Sullivan 1979), and the second was to fight for 
the peasants who made up the biggest section of the population of China. For these two 
preoccupations to be carried out effectively, strong leadership and political expediency35 were 
needed and this meant the accretion of absolute power in an individual or a high ranking body of 
the party. In the case of the CCP, Mao, through his thought, was the authority of what the CCP 
could pursue. This was not a unique case of the CCP. As mentioned in the third chapter, 
individuals can acquire adequate power that can actually shape the course of a country. Lynch 
(2004:126) asserts that twentieth century “Marxist leaders gave an indelibly personal character to 
the communist systems they created.” Mao was inured to violence as the means of gaining 
political power or achieving revolutionary ideals. Thus, the CCP had to yield to Mao’s insistence 
on violence as a process through which non-communist forces and imperialists could be replaced 
with communism. His insistence on gaining political power through “the barrel of the gun” (Mao 
1938; see Onate 1978 and Kasrils 2004) was often used to present communist China as a 
bellicose and violent country.  
                                                          
35 The Communists and nationalists were intermittently brought together to fight against Japanese aggression. 
With time and the increase of influence of the CCP, maintaining this expedient alliance became increasingly 
difficult. From about 1938, the struggle against Japan was coupled with an effective civil war between the 
nationalists and the communists.  
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Both the communists and the nationalists in China had arguable reasons to resort to violence in 
their struggle against Japan and each other. Both shared the feeling of isolation when Western 
powers especially seemed to dither on whether or not to intervene and end Japanese aggression 
in China. However, in a speech given in 1935, Mao asserted that while the peasants, workers and 
petty bourgeoisie were proactive in promoting revolution and stemming the tide of on-coming 
Japanese imperialism, the Kuomintang, local gentry and landlords, had long decided “that 
revolution of whatever kind was worse that imperialism” (Mao 1965:155). China started 
receiving more attention after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour which drew the United States 
into the Second World War. However, even the attention that China received after that incident 
was not much and led the Chinese to reckon that what they ultimately achieved against Japan 
was out of their own efforts with negligible assistance from the West. The reasoning that China 
was isolated from the West continued even after the communists took over. Furthermore, the 
Japanese refusal, to this day, to apologize for its imperial past and occupation of China still 
stymies mutual trust between the two countries (Johnstone 1998; Christensen 1999; see also 
Burkman 2014). The identity that China sought to affect was that of a power that was isolated by 
other powers who it accused of supporting imperialism or at least doing little to stop it. The 
material and theoretical help that communist China offered to colonized Africa could also be 
traced to this attitude. Furthermore, that the West continued to recognize Chiang Kai-shek as the 
de jure representative of China further hardened the communists’ stance against Western powers.  
 
4.4 Politics in China in the Aftermath of WWII to 1949   
The fourteen-year long Japanese occupation of China came to a sudden end in 1945 with the 
dropping of the atomic bomb on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The defeat of Japan raised 
China’s international profile and, after the formation of the United Nations, China was offered 
the illustrious position of being a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. 
However, China was still mired in internal strife. While Japan had been eliminated as a crucial 
threat, Chiang Kai-shek was more interested in liquidating Mao and the communists to 
consolidate his nationalist rule. Chiang’s refusal to form a coalition government with the 
communists meant that he retained the endorsement of foreign capitalist powers as the 
representative of China. For this reason, it was the nationalist Republic of China, led by Chiang 
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that was the permanent member of the Security Council, with the exclusion of the communists 
(Chiu 1998). From 1946 internecine war escalated between the communists and the nationalists 
(Coble 2007).  
Japan had occupied the northern parts of China and so credit was due to the communists who 
took over these parts. However, Chiang and the nationalists sought to dislodge the communists 
from these territories. Albeit being aided by the Americans, morale among nationalist fighters 
continued to flag and a communist victory seemed closer as the 1940s was coming to an end. 
The collapsed economy, which was partly a result of the Japanese occupation of the productive 
northern region, compounded the problems of the nationalists. By mid-1949, it dawned on 
Chiang that he could no longer hold the whole of China under his rule. He had lost key cities - 
Shanghai and Nanjing - and other cities were on the brink of a communist takeover. In 
September 1949 Chiang decided to flee mainland China for the island of Taiwan. It was there 
that he established the Republic of China and vowed to return and wrest mainland China from 
the communists. Similarly, the communists also resolved to take over Taiwan, an island that they 
continue to regard as an unalienable part of mainland China. This awkward relationship between 
the communist People’s Republic of China (mainland China) and the Republic of China 
(Taiwan) preceded the establishment of the PRC and continues to this day though periods of a 
thaw in hostilities have also accompanied this chequered history (Conclusion 1999).36  
 
4.5 The Establishment of the People’s Republic of China 
The Chinese People have stood up! (Mao, 21 September 1949) 
 
The People’s Republic of China was proclaimed on 1 October 1949. The country was finally 
under the rule of the communists and the nationalists had settled their government in Taiwan. In 
the speech Mao gave on 21 September 1949, he referred to China’s greatness that had been 
eroded by imperialism and “domestic reactionary governments” (Mao 2014:17) such as Chiang 
                                                          
36 In the 1980s China-Taiwan relations had improved, comparatively. However, these relations were gravely 
disturbed in the 1990s when Taiwan opted for democracy, making a return to authoritarian China even more 
remote (ibid).  
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Kai-Shek’s Kuomintang. The United States and capitalist powers were also targets of Mao’s 
attack as he accused them of aiding and abetting the Kuomintang during the civil war. He spoke 
of China, a country that at the time represented a quarter of humanity as having had a proud 
history of being “a great courageous and industrious nation” (Mao 2014:16). However, the 
Chairman was aware of the fact that China was born amid a lot of challenges and that its stance 
to fight colonialism and strengthening “the people’s democratic dictatorship” (Mao 2014:17) 
would put China on the collision course with some powerful foreign and capitalist powers.  
The identity that the new government took already gave it a controversial standing in world 
politics. Being a communist government almost automatically pitted China against the capitalist 
West and put it in the same camp as the Soviet Union. In his opening address at the First Session 
of the National People’s Congress in 1954, Mao asserted that “the force at the core leading our 
cause forward is the Chinese Communist Party. The theoretical basis guiding our thinking is 
Marxism-Leninism” (Mao 2013: para. 1 line 1). Mao spoke of the Soviet Union in glowing 
terms, calling it the defender of world peace and describing its detractors as reactionaries (Mao 
1961:100). Furthermore, China’s economy had been ravaged by two decades of civil war (Payne 
2014) and the struggle against Japanese occupation. Thus, apart from identifying itself as a 
communist country, China also saw an intersection of identities with the poor countries of the 
world especially those that had experienced foreign invasion and occupation. During one of his 
speeches in 1935, Mao had described China as “a semi colonial country jointly dominated by 
several imperialist powers” (Mao 1965:153). 
It was also a galling experience that though the GMD had been the ultimate loser in the civil war, 
the exiled government in Taiwan retained its role as the representative of China at the United 
Nations. From 1949 Taiwan held this role for more than two decades. China’s identities, then, 
were coupled with certain interests: being a communist power, China aimed at inspiring other 
regions with the rightness of communism; it also sought to end foreign invasion and imperialism 
and promote sovereign integrity; in addition, it wanted an end to Taiwan’s position as the 
representative of China and for this China had to rely on other regions for political support.  
The power on which China could rely the most for sundry support was the Soviet Union (Lynch 
2004), the biggest and most influential face of international communism. Being a self-professed 
communist country meant that China was automatically pitted against the capitalist West. With 
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the high tension of the Cold War, ideological persuasion played a determinant role in 
international relations and foreign policy. For this reason, only communist powers and other 
players like India that could identify with China’s history (FitzGerald 1976), were overt in their 
support of the newly formed country. For China to establish beneficial relations with other 
powers, it required well thought out and crafted policies and diplomacy, a feat which some have 
argued China failed to achieve. Aitchen K. Wu (1950) traced China’s diplomatic ineptitude in 
dealing with Soviet Union to 1929 when the Chinese forced unilateral control of the Chinese 
Eastern Railway that was hitherto owned jointly between the Chinese and the Soviets. Philip E. 
Jacob (1951:170) also referred to “the confusion, ineptness and disorganization of Chinese 
diplomacy which opened the way for the extraordinary expansion of Soviet influence over the 
life and affairs of the vast but virtually state- less country called China.” However, the PRC won 
some diplomatic victories. The milestone agreement that the People’s Republic of China made 
with the Soviet Union, called the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, was 
signed on 4 February 1950. By signing this treaty, the Soviet Union renounced its recognition of 
the Republic of China in favour of communist China. It was a crucial diplomatic victory by the 
communists over Taiwan and this tussle for recognition continues to this day.  
However, it would be remiss of what claims to be an objective analysis to state that China and 
the Soviet Union were partners on equal footing. Indeed, the Yalta Conference signed among the 
aligned powers, in the absence of China (see Jacob 1951), devolved responsibility of Manchuria 
to the Soviet Union after the defeat of Japan in 1945. Thus, even before the institution of the 
People’s Republic the Soviet Union had questionable authority over what was rightly Chinese 
territory (Lynch 2004). The difference between the emerging circumstances after 1949 with 
those preceding was that under the new circumstances, China and the Soviet Union shared their 
ideological leanings and, in name if not substance, the two aimed at engaging in mutually 
beneficial interactions.  
Prior to the crises in relations that were to follow, China looked on the Soviet Union as “the 
teacher of socialism” (Schrecker 2004:213) and Mao averred that “the Communist Party of 
China is a party built on the model of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union” (Mao 
1961:284). These concessions have to be taken in context. Mao, as has been indicated in the 
chapter already, was convinced of the uniqueness of Chinese circumstances which demanded a 
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unique revolutionary struggle. He was essentially saying the method that guaranteed socialists 
success in the Soviet Union cannot be applied in China with expectations of similar results. 
Secondly, playing a subservient role to the Soviet Union was predictably a humiliation to 
communist China, led by a party that was virulently against subordinating China to any form of 
foreign control, physical or ideological. Thus, Mao’s adulation towards the Soviet Union masked 
a covert discomfort. Just as the intermittent and expedient comity that had characterized CCP-
GMD relations, Sino-Soviet relations were equally based on expediency and convenience. 
Indeed, concealed suspicions between the two powers that eventually escalated into open conflict 
and ideological attrition were testament to the weak foundations on which Sino-Soviet relations 
were built.  
 
4.6 The Sino-Soviet Conflict  
The conflict between what Donald S. Zagoria (1962:3) calls “the two Leviathans of Communist 
power – Russia and China” confounded many observers and impacted, sometimes negatively, on 
the posture of the two powers in the international system. Western observers were especially 
divided on how they perceived the conflict. Some were convinced that the conflict was of 
marginal importance compared to ideological and political matters that united the Soviet Union 
and China against the capitalist West and other alleged imperialist powers. The extreme section 
of those who thought along these lines went as far as contemplating the possibility that China 
and the Soviet Union were deliberately misleading the capitalist West by staging a fictitious 
conflict (Zagoria 1962:3). The claim to socialism that China and the Soviet Union shared and the 
consequent interest in conquering the capitalist bloc were thought to be of paramount importance 
and that any differences between the two powers were subordinate to these identities and 
interests. Still, some Western observers thought that conflict between China and the Soviet 
Union was unavoidable because their interests were too divergent. The Soviet Union was 
becoming more of a status quo country after Stalin and it sought to preserve its modernized 
industry. China was still buoyed by revolutionary fervour and this gave it the hankering to 
expand and spread its ideology. The control of areas like Outer Mongolia was also another 
divisive matter between the two powers. Lastly, communist powers put a high premium on 
centralized power. For this reason, one of the two powers had to cede the communist high 
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ground to the other. China had done so, at least on face value, during the Stalinist era in the 
Soviet Union.37 It grew more emboldened for a role as a leader of international socialism after 
the death of Stalin and the accession of Khrushchev to power in the Soviet Union.  
The differences in perceiving the Sino-Soviet conflict could be bridged by a balanced assessment 
of what led to the split. Those who argued that the Sino-Soviet split was a charade were probably 
unaware of how the two powers were really at variance with each other on political and 
territorial issues. Those who pointed out that Russia was more interested in pragmatic policies 
and was hence poised to recoil from conducting a campaign of international communism were 
also unaware of the fact that Russia was indeed still yearning for a communist world. The two 
powers were thus all interested in the ultimate victory of communism over other ideologies. 
What seemed to be the point of separation was the method that each power was advocating.  
The death of Stalin in 1953 and the subsequent ascent of Khrushchev to power represented a 
shift in the Soviet formula for communist domination in the world. Though it was in 1956 that 
Sino-Soviet relations became visibly strained, their genesis could be traced to 1954 when 
Khrushchev visited China. According to Taurer (1977) one of the objectives of the new 
Khrushchev’s visit to China was to try and craft a new working relationship between the two 
communist powers after the death of Stalin. In general terms, the era of Stalin was characterized 
by an accumulation of power in one individual. Furthermore, the Stalinist purges were also a 
regrettable legacy of Stalin that his successors sought to move away from. Mao, as stated above, 
enjoyed almost unrestrained influence in China and hence his style of leadership was akin to the 
style that Khrushchev was condemning. The rifts between the two sides were so deep that 
Khrushchev thought that “conflict with China was inevitable” (Khrushchev 1974:252).  
The general analysis of Sino-Soviet conflicts usually cites 1956 as the watershed moment (see 
Zagoria 1961). In that year the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held its 20th Party 
Congress. During the Congress, Khrushchev gave what has come to be known as the Secret 
Speech. It denounced the cult of personality that had been built around Stalin and the abuse with 
                                                          
37 For an evenhanded assessment of Sino-Soviet amity and the later animosity, it is politic to state that suspicions 
between China and the Soviet Union predated the accession of a more forward looking Khrushchev era. Singh 
(1968) talks of the Soviet Union’s disappointment and a probable feeling of betrayal when Mao promoted the 
notion of passive waiting after the Soviet Union entered WWII which ineffectively staved off China’s stepping up of 
the struggle against Japan in 1941 to prevent it from attacking the rear of Soviet territory.  
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which he had wielded his power. Such denunciation of a leader was uncustomary in the 
communist camp. The Secret Speech was a shock to those who heard it and it had a telling 
impact on Sino-Soviet relations. It was after the 20th Congress that China started to openly 
disentangle itself from Soviet leadership and chart a separate path, one that it thought led to a 
more credible brand of socialism. The word “revisionism” gained currency during this epoch and 
was used to describe the Soviet Union and any other power or organization that supported its 
stance.  
Apart from disagreements on collective leadership and the cult of individuals, China and the 
USSR differed on the methods they thought could bring a socialist victory. The Soviet Union 
during Khrushchev was slowly warming up to the idea that revolutionary violence was not the 
only means to defeat non-communist ideologies. Parliamentary methods were also thought to be 
possibly effective. Furthermore, post-Stalin USSR entertained the possibility of peaceful 
coexistence with the capitalist West. China disagreed on both these scores. First of all, as Lynch 
(2004) argues, twentieth century politics in China were characterized by violence and the CCP, 
mainly influenced by Mao, was the main champion of revolutionary violence (see also Kleinman 
and Kleinman 1994 on political violence in China).  
Other Marxist theorists would argue that on the march towards socialist victories violence was 
one of the processes. To Mao, violence was presented as the process of bringing about political 
rectitude and ideological purity (Lynch 2004). Thus, what the new Soviet Union was now 
promoting was antithetical to genuine socialism. Similarly, the CCP insisted that peaceful 
coexistence was not a possibility between communist powers and capitalist powers because their 
differences were too diametrical. Mao insisted on the inevitability of the Third World War which 
would bring about a communist victory. To the Soviet Union, and other movements and powers, 
the CCP’s dogged insistence on revolutionary violence was redolent of Marxist zealotry, an 
attitude that was at variance with civilized politics of the twentieth century in an evolving world 
system. Africa was the arena on which the big part of Sino-Soviet dissonance was fought.  
China lost some political ground in Africa because of its conflict with the USSR (Singh 1968). It 
is noteworthy that at the onset of the Sino-Soviet strife much of Africa was under colonial rule 
and the communist camp was involved, politically, economically, and ideologically to end 
colonialism. The edge that the communist camp had in Africa was that colonial powers came 
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from the West and hence were capitalist. China was not big on material sponsorship against 
colonialism, but it was in terms of propaganda or rhetoric. However, the Sino-Soviet rift caused 
problems for China in Africa. There was a gulf in how China presented itself and how certain 
African political movements perceived it. By insisting on revolutionary violence, China was 
trying to assume the identity of a true communist country. However, certain African movements 
like the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) were 
primarily non-violent organizations and hence were opposed to the notion of violence as the 
inevitable process of political change. The same could be said about the UNIP government of 
Kaunda that had taken power from Britain through what were mainly non-violent means.   
In sum, the Sino-Soviet split indicates an evolution of Chinese identities and interests, whether 
contrived or substantially assumed. Before the communist takeover, Mao had harboured some 
skepticism about the role that the Soviet example can play in the CCP’s quest for power. 
However, the official line had changed after the takeover and China was ready, facetiously at 
least, to be second position to the USSR in the communist camp. Its identity was that of a 
socialist power striving to revive a weak economy and determined to ruin the nationalists who 
had fled to Taiwan. However, the death of Stalin and the change in Soviet leadership had an 
impact on how China perceived itself. No longer considering itself a lowly member of the 
communist camp, China started seeing itself as a more credible face of world socialism, 
describing the Soviet Union and those that supported its new line as revisionists.  
China’s interests had also shifted. It no longer sought only the elimination of capitalism and 
imperialism but the weakening of the Soviet Union as a counterfeit of socialism. China was 
beginning to posture itself as the most principal promoter of and “as the centre of the world 
revolutionary process” (Singh 1968:331). Even China’s policy towards Africa became more 
tailored towards limiting or discrediting Soviet influence. The insistence on violence on the part 
of China was seen by the Chinese as a true identity and formula of a socialist organization 
seeking a socialist world, but its opponents saw China’s identity as fanatical and hence had to be 
rebuffed. The brief invasion of India in 1962 added another dimension to those who saw in the 
PRC a perfidious power that had reneged on the five principles of coexistence that China and 
India had signed. The CCP wanted ideological purity by arguing along the lines discussed here 
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but other players and powers interpreted this interest in opposite ways.38 Another episode during 
which China sought to rid itself of malcontents and preserve a pure identity was referred to as the 
Cultural Revolution – another controversial period that tainted China’s identity and antagonized 
many politicians, some within China itself.  
 
4.7 China’s Cultural Revolution  
Vijay Bahadur Singh (1968) asserts that by 1957 the People’s Republic of China had largely 
rehabilitated its economy and had established a firm foundation on which an industrialized 
economy could be built. However, he goes on to argue that the growth that China had 
experienced also caused a threat to Mao Zedong who feared a shift to a bourgeois society. The 
institution of a perfect communist country was thus taking too long and, in Mao’s mind was 
threatened under prevalent circumstances. To bring about radical change, Mao proclaimed the 
Great Leap Forward, an initiative that ignored the proclamation of the 8th Congress of the CPC to 
emphasize on industrial advancement as the prerequisite for a socialist country.  
Mao was convinced that the Great Leap Forward could achieve socialist aspirations within three 
years (1958-1961). However, the Leap did not achieve what it was intended to do and has been 
blamed for millions of deaths through starvation. The period saw the forced imposition of 
people’s communes39 and forced labour was also imposed on the general population. Mao was 
criticized at the Party Congress of 1961. Five years later (1966) Mao embarked on the Cultural 
Revolution, aimed partly at bolstering his power and liquidating those who might have had the 
aspirations of vying for authority with him.  
The movement from the Great Leap to the Cultural Revolution could arguably be judged to have 
been tailored to add more importance and infallibility to Mao’s thought. The personality cult that 
                                                          
38 The vigour with which the new China denounced religion, even Confucianism and Buddhism was a foretaste of 
what the country was later to be identified with – political repression, communist extremism and a demand for 
absolute submission of the citizenry to the state (Lynch 2004).  
39 Communes were established with the purpose of augmenting production, ranging from agricultural to industrial 
production. In its 1957 bid to make good the prediction that it would overtake England’s steel production in fifteen 
years, back yard steel mills sprouted in the communes (Bachman 1991), arguably contributing to environmental 
concerns that haunt China to this day (Lynch 2004). According to Schram (2002:456), this “boastful claim”, made at 
the meeting of communist and workers’ parties, added to the already growing fissures between China and the 
Soviet Union.   
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Khrushchev had denounced as a regrettable legacy of the Stalinist era was being cultivated in 
China but cleverly laced with communist vocabulary. Mao was scathed by the criticism elicited 
by the Great Leap Forward and had to turn to impressionable youths (Lynch 2004) to play a 
more authoritative role in sustaining his idea of a permanent revolution. The most obvious 
method of instituting a socialist country with the hope of engendering communism was to purge, 
from the ranks of the CCP, those who were denounced as capitalist roaders and/or revisionists. 
Mao accused the Soviet Union of revisionism which he thought might ultimately lead to 
capitalism. The Cultural Revolution was thus partly aimed at fighting revisionism in China and 
obliterating possible conditions for its future emergence (Ahmad 1967). 
Prior to the effective onset of the Cultural Revolution, Mao maintained the view that though the 
masses were the ultimate arbiter of leadership in communist countries, they still needed central 
leadership to guide them. Implicitly, this meant Mao still believed in collective and correct 
leadership. However, still harbouring the humiliation of criticism or reluctance to espouse his 
thought by certain CCP members, in 1965 Mao made a complete turn and averred that the 
masses can still make history without centralized leadership as a conduit. Mao was obliquely 
hinting that, albeit purging certain or all high ranking members of the CCP, presumably except 
him, class struggle could still be sustained. One of the most senior CCP members to help Mao on 
this quest was his fervent follower Lin Biao. He also enlisted the force of Zhang Chunqiao, Yao 
Wenyuan, Wang Hongweng and Mao’s wife Jian Qing. These formed the infamous Gang of 
Four (a term coined by Mao himself) that was used to great effect in denouncing perceived anti-
Maoists and driving a good number to either death or suicide (Lynch 2004). 
The purge was far-reaching and some high ranking members of the CCP fell victim. Many of 
these, like Deng Xiaoping, were accused of being “capitalist roaders” (Harvey 2008). Thus while 
intellectual reasons like Mao’s understanding of class struggle might have played a part in 
providing grounds for the Cultural Revolution, “political and psychological” (Schram 2002:475) 
influences on Mao, especially his interests to purge his critics were far more significant. Mao 
seemed resolved to destroy the structure of the party for which he had dedicated more than forty 
years just to liquidate his enemies, both real and imagined. The Cultural Revolution went on to 
divide people into two groups, the radicals who sought the institution of doctrinaire socialism 
and the revisionists who hankered for some change which effectively meant a different 
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interpretation of Marxism-Leninism from the one Mao professed. The Red Guards40 were 
unleashed on people that Mao and his acolytes thought represented the old order and whose 
character was not fecund for socialist progress (Hutchings 2001).41 Thus, in addition to some 
members of the CCP, intellectuals and artists were also victims of the Cultural Revolution. Mao 
regarded intellectuals and artists as the national bourgeoisie which had sided with landlords and 
non-communists. However, he thought that they could still be converted because they were “less 
feudal than the landlord class and not so comprador” (Mao 1965:155). Mao’s brand of socialism 
was from thence almost taken as divine fiat. Every other sector of the country, including 
economic progress, had to take a back seat to Mao’s ideology. 
The Cultural Revolution also traversed the Sino-Soviet split, and as has been said earlier, the 
Cultural Revolution was also aimed at forestalling the importation of post-Stalinist leadership 
style and interpretation of Marxism-Leninism of the USSR in China. The excesses that started 
during the Great Leap and continued during the Cultural Revolution were similar to Stalin’s 
Gulags and showed just how ready Mao and his close followers were to jettison anything in 
favour of ideology. Furthermore, the eventual rapprochement between China and the United 
States that begun in 1971 and culminated in President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 
was a curious product of the Cultural Revolution, the Sino-Soviet split and the Taiwan 
question.42 On one side, this development could be seen as China’s instinctual desire to 
antagonize the Soviet Union.  
The attitude that China took towards the Soviet Union during this time was interpreted by the 
South African Communist Party as an affront on the Soviet Union which was the bulwark of the 
international struggle against imperialism (African Communist 1979:6). This development could 
also be interpreted as China’s toning down on ideological sentiment. This perspective brings an 
                                                          
40 This was a group of youth who were organised with Mao’s urging and encouragement to defend socialist China 
against reactionaries. They took up regalia similar to that of the military and they organised other youth to rebel 
against who they considered as reactionaries. Students were also influenced by this group to rise against their 
teachers.  
41 This in effect meant the obliteration of China’s civilization. The reasoning behind the Revolution was that a pure 
revolution could only be founded after the elimination of vestiges of pre-communist China. With the purges of 
party members that followed, it could be argued that the old order that Mao and Red Guards wanted to be rid of 
had taken a broader proportion – it now included the order that the CCP had hitherto maintained (Schram 
2002:476) 
42 The third, and not less important factor in the improvement of Sino-American relations was the decision of the 
United States in 1971 to support the PRC’s bid to assume the permanent seat of the UN Security Council. 
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interesting dimension to what exactly the Cultural Revolution was supposed to be.  Was it aimed 
at enforcing China’s identity as a pure socialist state and fulfil the interests of ending imperialism 
and defeating capitalism? Or was the Cultural Revolution really aimed at destroying Mao’s 
nemeses locally but being open to external powers that did not cause an immediate threat to 
Mao’s monopoly of power? Or, did the rapprochement mean that China had realized the value of 
interacting with the United States (see Rosen 2016), a country it had initially referred to as a 
capitalist country with its paper tigers (atomic bombs)? It was clear that the Cultural Revolution 
was aimed at obliterating opposition to Mao’s thought. The rapprochement with the United 
States was partly aimed at mutual recognition between the parties involved as significant players 
in global affairs. It was also arguably China’s way of deepening Sino-Soviet animosity. China 
incurred the ire of certain movements because of its improved relations with the United States. 
The South African Communist Party accused China of having “abandoned the fight to end 
capitalist exploitation of the human and material resources of the world and thrown in its lot with 
forces of imperialism, colonialism and racism” (African Communist 1979:6). This statement was 
in a way accusing China of being a revisionist state, the same imprecation that China had 
directed at the Soviet Union.    
 A possible explanation of the confusion engendered by China during the Cultural Revolution is 
that a country’s identity and interest cannot be frozen into an unchanging category. The fact that 
China during Mao emphasized socialist ideology cannot be controverted. During the Cold War 
this fact put China effectively in the same bloc as the Soviet Union. This occasioned certain 
intersections of interests. However, on a domestic front, Mao was smarting from the broadsides 
launched against him after the Great Leap forward. To Mao’s disposition, this criticism was 
associated with taking an anti-socialist route and hence the Cultural Revolution had to rescue the 
communist revolution from peril. International factors, like the Taiwan question and China’s 
fight to gain the permanent seat of the United Nations Security Council meant that China had to 
court certain powers, from Africa included, that could play a pivotal role in isolating Taiwan and 
acknowledging China as the de jure representative of the Chinese people. This last question 
explains China’s curious international relations. In 1972 China managed to get its permanent seat 
at the United Nations Security Council but the Taiwan question persists to date and has been 
used as the lynchpin of China’s diplomatic relations with any nation.  
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In sum, the Cultural Revolution was a period that had numerous consequences on China, both 
nationally and internationally. At a national level, the era of the CCP as a collective and central 
Party was vastly undermined by the activities of the Gang of Four and the Red Guards. CCP 
members such as Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping who had mustered the courage to voice 
concerns about the excesses of the Red Guards and the extent to which universities had been 
disturbed were ostracized as harbouring bourgeoisie and capitalist tendencies, a serious charge in 
a system that claimed to be fiercely defending socialist ideals (Lüsted 2010).  
Education and other activities that were seen as vestiges of a corrupt past were disrupted and 
destroyed by the Red Guards. The role of censorship given to Mao’s wife - Jian Qing - was used 
to stifle anything that could not be directly linked to socialism or had no value in a proletarian 
society. Creativity was thus stifled and, ironically, instead of enhancing Chinese culture, Jian’s 
severe censorship destroyed it. In retrospect the Cultural Revolution could be judged as China’s 
self-inflicted disaster engendered by a helmsman’s unremitting pursuit for absolute personal 
power. The destruction wrought by the Red Guards was to such an extent that by 1970 industry 
in China was acutely affected. There was a growing realisation that the Red Guards had to be 
tamed and that defending the revolution, whatever that meant, had to be done by the People’s 
Liberation Army – the PLA – who were real soldiers.  
On an international level, the period of the Cultural Revolution served to present China as a 
bellicose country and a Marxist-Leninist extremist. Mao’s own insistence on anarchy rather than 
order and war rather than peaceful coexistence between the socialist East and the capitalist West 
undermined China’s standing in the eyes of certain global players, including some who shared 
China’s resentment towards capitalism and imperialism. By taking a hardline approach towards 
imperialism and capitalism, China was openly advising those that were fighting against these two 
things to do it in a classical Marxist fashion – by employing violence. A number of organisations 
in Africa that were fighting colonialism during the 1960s were not persuaded by Mao’s 
insistence on violence and what Chou En-Lai might have meant when he declared Africa ripe for 
revolution. As aforementioned, South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) and Zambia’s 
UNIP were not formatively inclined towards violent struggle. Indeed, the ANC’s option for 
violent struggle in 1961 was taken after almost half a century of non-violent advocacy. This fact 
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exposes what could safely be called a fundamental difference between Mao’s predisposition to 
violent struggle and the inherent non-violent nature of certain liberation movements.  
Even though ideological sentiment does not currently play the pivotal role that it once played 
during Mao’s time in China’s international relations, a significant part of the international system 
still retains the picture of China that it had taken up during the Cultural Revolution. This is a 
picture of country that denies its people basic human rights, democracy as understood in the 
West, and harbours a deep skepticism of the world outside China. Even though some of these 
traits might be discernible to many an observer, even more than four decades after the Cultural 
Revolution, China has undergone some marked changes, mainly economic, from the Maoist era. 
With the immense power that Mao wielded over China, the most important break from his past 
was his death, which came in September of 1976. The ensuing sections of this chapter look at 
China after Mao and how it has postured itself on the international scene.  
 
4.8 The Post-Mao Era 
From the preceding section, China from 1966 to 1976 sought to present itself as the cornerstone 
of socialism in the world. Mao’s own thought became almost holy writ, calling into question 
whether or not what he sought was authentic socialism or the imposition of his Thought.43 
However one may judge China during this time, there is no gainsaying his personal mark on 
China’s political identity which was intimately linked to Mao’s personal tastes, like the 
elimination of those he considered potential and actual enemies; his firm hold on power was not 
enough to dispel fear of his authority being ephemeral. Thus, the whole of China had to be 
cowed into submission for Mao to maintain his power. This notwithstanding, there were real 
threats to China at its inception that were inimical to China’s corporate identity. It was afraid of 
Japan’s continued interference in China and Mao expected Taiwan and its international 
supporters to continue threatening China as a government and territory. Being an economically 
weak country at the time, China was vulnerable to these possibilities. Thus, drastic episodes like 
the Cultural Revolution were in part reactions towards real threats to Mao’s China.  
                                                          
43 In its nascent years, the PRC had invited independent thinking and criticism of the government through the 
Hundred Flowers Campaign. However, Mao Zedong gradually took a hardline stance on his critics (Lüsted 2010).  
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The CCP regretted the Cultural Revolution after Mao’s death. To the rest of the world, China 
represented an outmoded socialist state, doggedly trying to maintain ideological purity but 
wreaking havoc on its own people. However, it should also be noted that it was during the 
Cultural Revolution that China embarked on détente with the United States. The curious nature 
of this rapprochement is deepened by the fact that one of the main differences between China 
and the Soviet Union during the Sino-Soviet rift was that the Soviet Union had latterly started 
entertaining the possibility of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist players and that violence 
was not the sole method through which socialism could supplant capitalism. 
These confounding facts could be well understood by using an analytical theoretical framework 
that does not judge a country’s identities, interests and actions or behaviour in a one dimensional 
manner. At one time a country can assume different identities and interests without 
contradiction, depending on how the country perceives itself in relation to other actors. National 
identities have the possibility of both change and continuity and so are national interests. China 
during Mao may, on face value, be simply categorized as fanatically Marxist-Leninist. However, 
by observing the influence that Mao exercised, it could also be cogently argued that Maoist 
China was mostly aimed at preserving the distinctiveness of China and not its subordination to 
any ideology, especially one shared by foreign players in the international system. This fuels the 
possible argument that China was not so much enamoured by communism in its classical sense, 
but was rather seeking to entrench communism with a Chinese bent. Henry Kissinger, a chief 
negotiator in the preparation for the commencement of Sino-American rapport commented that 
far from being the doctrinaire ideologues that the Chinese were thought to be, they were 
pragmatic politicians with an unwavering desire to secure China’s interests and importance in the 
international system. This notion became more apparent after the death of Mao. The Nixon visit 
presents a good presage to the changes that followed after 1976. 
The subsequent sections look at the identities and interests that China has had and been given 
after the Mao years. It has to be said, however, that China after Mao still committed itself to Mao 
as an integral part of the People’s Republic. Speaking in 1980 at a Party Session, Deng (1980) 
enjoined the CCP to “never sully the glorious image of Comrade Mao Zedong in the entire 
history of the Chinese revolution, and never waver on the principle of holding high the banner of 
Mao Zedong Thought.” In a show of continuity with past identities and interests, Deng still 
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reiterated China’s commitment to advance the cause of “socialism in China and the cause of the 
international communist movement” (Deng 1977). He also reiterated China’s mission to help 
“the revolutionary people the world over and support their struggles against imperialism, 
colonialism and hegemonism as well as their struggles to win or safeguard national 
independence and to make social progress” (Deng 1978). Deng’s proclamation hint at continued 
identities and interests constructed at the state level after Mao though the implementation of the 
four modernizations was seizing the centre stage.  
It is important to note that what a country chooses as its identity and interest might not 
necessarily be what other players think of it. It is because of this that the current research argues 
about identities and interests that a country manifests and what others choose to ascertain as 
identities and interests of that particular country. Once again it has to be emphasized that the 
ensuing information is preparation for the themes that are discussed in the subsequent chapters 
regarding intersecting and divergent identities between China and Zambia that have shaped 
relations between the two countries. Furthermore, it is of cardinal importance to repeat the notion 
that identities and interests are subject to both continuity and change. It would thus be unwise 
and dishonesty to argue that China underwent a complete and wholesale change of identity and 
interests after the death of Mao and the effective petering out of the Cultural Revolution. To 
deepen the originality of this part of the chapter, translated works of Chinese officials, most 
prominently Deng Xiaoping have been used. The decision to use this material has been done 
with the intention of lessening dependence on commentary and adding more reliance on primary 
data.  
 
4.9 Aftermath of the Cultural Revolution and Mao’s Leadership by the CCP 
The following pages do not estimate to a comprehensive history of China after Mao. That 
exercise would stretch the capacity of this research and would render the ensuing pages a dour 
stretch into China after Mao, a fate that the research seeks to avoid. Post-Mao China has been 
ruled by numerous leaders, who have been influential in their own right. The division of China 
between the Mao era and after is an acceptance of how pivotal a role Mao played in defining the 
People’s Republic of China in a way that no other twentieth century Chinese leader ever did. 
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Just as Mao sought to rid China of the old order by removing all what he thought were its 
trappings and manifestations, for post-Mao China to drift from the ideological extremism, the 
economic redundancy, the political violence and the closed-in nature of Mao’s China, it had to 
rid itself of those who typified Mao’s regrettable policies. By the time Mao was dying the Red 
Guards had been reined in. The other manifestations of Mao’s era were Mao’s chosen successor, 
Hua Goufeng, the first Chinese leader to be head of the Party, the State and the Military 
simultaneously. The Gang of Four were also a relic of the Mao  era mainly responsible for 
executing Mao’s purges of CCP members and independent minded intellectuals, artists, writers 
and so on.  
Once at the helm, Hua Guofeng neutralized the Gang of Four, signaling the end of the Cultural 
Revolution. The fall of the Gang of Four was necessitated by the fact that they seemed not to 
enjoy any power base in the CCP except the backing of Mao (Dittmer 1978). Indeed, Deng 
(1994) noted that “the entire Chinese nation rejoiced at the downfall of the Gang of Four.” The 
Gang was arrested less than a month after the death of Mao. The litany of their charges ranged 
from subjecting almost a billion people to terror and dread, discouragement of foreign trade, 
unfairly targeting CCP members, stifling of education, to severe and unwarranted censorship that 
ensured no writing, play or any other performance could go ahead without their sanction (Onate 
1978). Deng was an admirer of Western technologies and what they had achieved in the West. 
He thus sought to import these technologies for the benefit of China in the manner that other 
nations had imported China’s inventions such as gunpowder for their benefit. The downfall of 
the Gang of Four provided an opportune moment for adopting foreign technologies because at 
the height of their power the Gang thought that making use of foreign technology was “a slavish 
comprador philosophy” (Deng 1994). 
The arrest of the Gang signaled the possibility of a shift from the actions that Mao had 
encouraged. However, for China to visibly move from Mao’s disposition, Hua Guofeng himself 
had to have his influence circumscribed because he was a handpicked successor by Mao (Nathan 
2003) and was poised to continue Mao’s policies and legacy (Fontana 1982). The fact that Hua 
had turned on the Gang of Four did not disabuse some sections of the CCP of the perception that 
he was still a fanatical Maoist. The political jostling that eventually led to the severe limitation of 
Hua in the ranks of the CCP justifies this line of argument. Those who came to prominence after 
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Mao’s death were more progressive and ‘revisionist’, to use a common word of the day, than the 
radicals who chose to retain Mao’s ideas.  
The treatment that was meted out on the Gang of Four and Hua Guofeng was a direct admission 
that the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution were costly disasters and hence those 
who represented their implementation had to be purged if post-Mao China was to style itself in a 
new identity in pursuit of new interests. In 1980 and 1981, the CCP allowed debate and criticism 
of the Cultural Revolution44 and attributed blame to Mao, though still applauded him for his part 
in the making of the PRC and that his laudable contributions were more than his mistakes 
(McDonald 2011). The acknowledgement of Mao’s mistakes gave Deng latitude to deviate from 
Mao’s Marxism; on the other hand, the posthumous praise given to Mao gave justification for the 
continued rule of the CCP (Chai 1997). The Leap and the Revolution had major dimensions that 
defined China’s social, political and economic status and identity. This research shows that while 
China still retains some of its political inclinations, like limiting opposition and democracy as 
understood in the West, the country has made major changes in terms of its economic ideology 
and policy. These changes have also necessitated an evolution of how foreign players perceive 
the current China. At the centre of what China has achieved in its economic growth, which has 
been unprecedented by any measure, was Deng Xiaoping who can safely be judged to be the 
most influential Chinese politician of the twentieth century after Mao.  
 
4.10 Deng Xiaoping and China  
As aforesaid, Deng Xiaoping was one of the high-ranking CCP officials to have been purged, 
more than once in his case, by Mao during the Cultural Revolution (see Fontana 1982). Deng had 
a chequered relationship with Mao. His economic ideas, deemed reformist in retrospect, were at 
variance with communist economics as understood by Mao. The highest position he held during 
Mao’s lifetime was of Vice Premier to Zhou En-Lai. After Zhou’s death, Mao appointed Hua 
Guofeng as Premier overlooking Deng. Deng was restored in the high echelons of the CCP by 
                                                          
44 Ezra F. Vogel’s (2011) exhaustive biography of Deng states that even though Deng was wont to write what Mao 
was comfortable with during the Chairman’s lifetime, he remained unwavering in his skepticism towards the 
Cultural Revolution. Vogel also speculates that the years that Deng spent in the political wilderness, during his 
banishment, gave him ample time and a vantage position to mull over the reforms that China needed and how to 
apply them.  
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Hua and, with the help of his supporters, Deng outwitted Hua and had him stripped of his top 
positions in the Party and government in 1981. The innocuous manner with which Deng relieved 
Hua of his duties set a precedent for future transfers of power: that those who would retire or be 
made to resign would not be treated in the highhanded manner that was characteristic of the Mao 
era. Though Deng made monumental changes after Mao, he seemed to have inherited Mao’s 
personal hold on power (see Zhao 1993). For example, just as Mao appointed Hua Guofeng as 
his successor, Deng also picked Jiang Zemin as leader of the CCP without consulting with the 
Politburo (Nathan 2003).45 However, it was his reformation of the Chinese economy that brought 
Deng the praise he still enjoys more than two decades after his death. 
In promoting the Four Modernizations, Deng prioritized the economy arguing that “what we 
have to do now is to put all our efforts into developing the economy. That is the most important 
thing, and everything else must be subordinated to it.” This was akin to Hutchison’s (2001) 
argument that post-Mao China replaced revolutionary priorities with national interests.46 These 
national interests included repairing the economy which had been severely hurt by the Cultural 
Revolution. Deng Xiaoping was aware of how difficult it would be for China, as a relatively poor 
nation at the time, to spread revolution. His argument was that it was only after China had 
attained the benefits of the Four Modernizations47 that it could fulfill its “contributions to 
mankind, and especially to the Third World” (Deng 1994). Thus, China’s immediate interests 
had to be economic and pragmatic growth. This was in tandem with the motto “less talk, more 
action”, an indirect emphasis of tangible development and less emphasis on ideological rhetoric.  
An interesting fact about Mao’s China is that it used the term “revisionist” as a sobriquet for 
those whose ideologies differed from its own ideologies. However, it could be argued that by 
doggedly wanting to change the status quo of politics and economics in the international system, 
Mao’s China was essentially revisionist. The economic reforms that Deng introduced after 
assuming authority presented China as a status quo country. Deng successfully took over 
leadership of the CCP at the 11th Central Committee Congress of the CCP in 1978. Thus 
                                                          
45 This form of succession has changed in the CCP and a thorough explanation will be given in the sections to come.  
46 It is also a telling detail that Deng’s statement was to the Military Commission of the CCP’s Central Committee. 
He argued that China’s military could only fulfil its goals and development only after China has grown its economy. 
However, the real possibility that Mao understood and constructed national interests in a different way cannot be 
totally ruled out. 
47Agriculture, industry, education, and science and defence. 
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economic reform in China is often traced to 1978 (e.g. Ellman 1986; Bettelheim 1988; Stevens 
1996) with Deng Xiaoping as its principal architect (Zhao 1993).   
During Mao’s years, the economy followed a strict Maoist line, characterized by central 
planning, which in essence meant pandering to Mao’s whims. Deng favoured a more mixed 
economy. He sought to improve the “four modernizations”: agriculture, industry, education, and 
science and defence (Lumumba-Kasongo 2011).  Charles Bettelheim (1988:15) argues that post-
Mao economic reform was transitioning “from a soviet type of state capitalism towards private 
capitalism.” In the same vein, Gittings (2005:251) states that China after Mao had been 
transformed into a “quasi capitalist state.” It should be noted, however, that rhetorically, post-
Mao China still maintained that it was communist. Its economic reforms, which were visible to 
other international players made China “a communist modernizer acceptable to the capitalist 
world” (Goodman 1994:1). Deng received personal praise for tilting China’s economy towards a 
more acceptable plane (McNamara 1995). Some of the big economic changes that China under 
Deng embarked on were the establishment of Special Economic Zones (Yusheng 2013) (an 
initiative that China has introduced to Africa and Zambia in particular), the “relaxation in 1983 
of the tax and tariff rules applicable to foreign investments, and the opening of a number of 
coastal cities to foreign investment in 1984” (Ellman 1986:421).  
Expectedly, China toned down its zeal in exporting communist ideologies to other nations. Its 
relations with foreign powers also improved, especially with the United States. James Mann 
(2000:103) argued that Sino-American relations improved to the extent that “human rights was 
considered a suitable subject for high-level American diplomacy with the Soviet Union, but not 
with China.” This was a major improvement, considering that divergent views on human rights 
have been the crux of relations between the United States and China. The identity that China was 
taking up through its economic reforms was also symbolic of China’s evolving interests. No 
longer interested in spreading world revolution, China wanted to be part of the international 
system and to benefit from it. One of the major demonstrations of China’s willingness to 
subsume communist ideology under more pressing matters was its stance on Hong Kong, which 
was to be handed back to China in July of 1997. A thoroughly capitalist colony, Hong Kong was 
understandably agitated about what might happen to its economic ethos after the British handed 
it back to communist China. To avert an awkward repossession, Deng crafted the “one country, 
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two systems” formula suggesting that mainland China would not impose a communist economy 
on Hong Kong after the British withdrawal.48  
A prosperous Hong Kong was good for mainland China’s economy and it had to be taken into 
consideration that Hong Kong ranks high among investment destinations in the world. Deng was 
well aware of the direct relationship between economic success and influence in the world 
system. While Mao’s China was more vocal on trying to change the status quo, its economic 
status did not offer it the requisite influence needed for a country to meaningfully change 
international politics. The clout that China enjoys in, and the challenge it poses to, the current 
international system is a direct consequence of the economic success that the country has 
attained (Shuja 1999; Jing, Humphrey and Messner 2008; Hsiao 2012). The presence that China 
has in the world also means a change on diplomacy. Thus, certain aspects of China’s politics 
have also evolved from 1978. The role of the military has somewhat been limited and that of 
diplomats enhanced. More importance has been attached to foreign policy.49 Decentralization 
was encouraged and helped “major localities to establish their own international cooperation 
networks” (Cabestan 2009:64).    
However, certain aspects of China’s politics still rankle the West, especially with its ambiguous 
understanding of human rights and democracy. Yusheng (2013) states the despite the ideological 
changes that Deng introduced in China, he still maintained that the CCP be the sole de jure 
political party, based on the Soviet template. The good repute that China had painstakingly 
cultivated was temporarily shattered with the crackdown on the Tiananmen protest. The 
highhanded manner with which protesters were dealt was redolent of the Maoist era.  
 
4.11 Tiananmen Crisis and After 
The previous section illustrated certain changes and continuities in China’s economic 
inclinations and political behaviour. It has been shown that Deng was the protagonist of the main 
economic changes that happened after Mao. Compared to Mao’s China, the PRC under Deng 
                                                          
48 To date, Hong Kong enjoys a very high degree of political and economic autonomy. Mainland China is mainly in 
charge of military defence and foreign affairs.  
49 The choice of Jiang Zemin as leader of the CCP after Zhao Ziyang in 1989 was also an important break from the 
past. Zhao did not fit the usual description of a member of the CCP. His lack of military experience and his overseas 
education presents Zhao as a different sort of cadre, a break from communist fanaticism (Chai 1997).  
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was drifting towards an economic system akin to capitalism (Lüsted 2010). Deng was practical 
in applying practices that were suitable for a fast changing international system. Yusheng Yao 
(2013:254) suggests that the range and width of transformation that Deng introduced to post-
Mao China was “arguably the most important event in the latter half of twentieth-century world 
history.” Even though the role of the military and the military budget were reduced so as to apply 
more resources to the economy and international diplomacy, the CCP did not change, 
substantially, its antipathy towards opposition. One of the major criticisms thrown at China is 
precisely the fact that the CCP does not brook opposition and that it has remained steeped in its 
denial of political pluralism, or democracy. The Tiananmen Square Crisis of 1989, which 
happened almost at the same time as the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, could have been justifiably judged as signaling the end of the status quo in China. The 
current section looks at how the Tiananmen incident influenced, to some extent, China’s identity 
on the international scale.  
Deng’s time at the summit of Chinese society was characterized by reform and openness. China 
was opened to the West but Deng did not tolerate an importation of Western democracy to China 
(Yusheng 2013). Just like Mao had argued decades before that a copycat application of Soviet 
communism cannot fit China’s unique circumstances, Deng was also persuaded by the notion 
that Western democracy was “both inefficient and unfit for the Chinese situation” (Yusheng 
2013:255). The Tiananmen protests of 1989 that culminated in the June 4 Incident started in 
April and May of 1989, and were mainly led by students who were peacefully calling for more 
responsive governance that supported some liberties common in modern democracies (Lüsted 
2010). With time, the protests increased in momentum and numbers and the students were joined 
by workers and intellectuals who bemoaned ineptitude, corruption and other vices by Chinese 
leaders and bureaucrats (Walder and Xiaoxia 1993). There were reports of protest groups 
gathered in other parts of the country. Tiananmen was a protest unprecedented in the history of 
the PRC.  
To provide justification for what was to ensue, the CCP warned that the protesters were 
counterrevolutionary forces that wanted to illegally conduct a takeover of the PRC. A general 
analysis of what was to follow in other communist countries somewhat offers some basis for the 
fears of the CCP. Disenchantment with socialism in the Soviet Union and East Germany 
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effectively ended the Soviet Empire and led to the reunification of East and West Germany. 
Many foreign observers, including President George H. W. Bush believed that the Tiananmen 
protests would force the CCP into yielding to calls for democracy. However, instead of 
pandering to the demands of the protesters, the CCP elected to foil the protests with force. Deng 
Xiaoping purged Zhao Ziyang, the then General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CCP 
when Zhao’s actions during Tiananmen were considered as kowtowing to the demands of the 
protesters (Chai 1997).50 The disproportionate means used by the CCP sent shock waves to the 
rest of the world, and arms embargoes were imposed on China. The manner in which the CCP 
reacted to the crisis suggested that the Chinese leadership retained a deep aversion towards any 
perceived threat. This antipathy was a feature during the Mao years and seemingly continued 
even after post-Mao China embarked on the policies of reform and opening China to the rest of 
the world.  
The Tiananmen Square crisis provides an interesting dimension to political change and social 
reform. This is because, despite the international attention that the protests elicited the CCP still 
remains in power in China as one of the few remaining communist countries, if only in name, in 
the world. A number of reasons could be adduced for this situation. Instead of being weakened 
by its critics, the CCP closed ranks. Furthermore, there has been more distribution of power in 
the Politburo; power does not repose in one paramount leader. This gives the CCP some 
semblance of democracy of the few – the politburo. Furthermore, the stellar work that the CCP 
has done after Deng took over has been consolation for the millions that it has rescued from 
poverty. Another possible reason why the CCP survived Tiananmen Square is because of its use 
of alarmist rhetoric towards its foreign critics. One of the central emphases of China’s foreign 
policy is the insistence on sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of other countries. 
For this reason, China accused foreign critics of trying to interfere with its internal affairs and 
hence manifesting imperial tendencies.  
The gambit of using its past of victimhood and vulnerability to foreign powers has been an 
enduring theme in China and has been used to court the sympathy and friendship of other former 
colonies, chief among them being African states. China’s revived interests in Africa, after a lull 
during the 1980s, could be explained both from the support that African states gave the CCP 
                                                          
50 The purging of Zhao Ziyang arguably demonstrates that while China was reforming economically, the CCP was 
still intolerant of political reformers (Buruma 1996).  
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with the way it dealt with the Tiananmen protests and also with China’s growth which demands 
energy resources that Africa is abundantly endowed with and with China’s exports that find 
markets in Africa. The next section of this chapter deals with China’s political identity and 
interests after Deng Xiaoping. The following pages show how China has used its theory of 
“socialism with Chinese characteristics”, which was influenced by Deng’s pragmatism (Solé-
Farràs 2008), as a clever formula of presenting China as an acceptable member of the current 
international system rather than a relic or anachronism of communist economics. 
 
4.12 China After Deng: The Legacy of Reform and “Opening up” (1997-2017) 
Winderg Chai (1997) wrote that predicting Chinese politics is a very confounding affair both for 
the Chinese and for foreign observers. For example, he cites the Cultural Revolution (1966-
1976) and the Tiananmen Square protests (1989) as two events which both the Chinese and 
outsiders did not anticipate. However, Chai argues that it was more manageable to predict 
Chinese politics after Deng because Deng’s death was foreseeable and people were geared for it; 
for example, eight years before his death Deng had already overseen the appointment of people 
who would lead China after he relinquished power. Jiang Zemin and six more members were 
chosen to the CCP’s most powerful organ - the Politburo Standing Committee - and Jiang was 
chosen as the “core” of this “third generation leadership.” Post-Deng China also symbolized a 
change in China’s style of leadership. The selection of the third generation of leadership signaled 
the likelihood of the CCP embracing a more collective leadership from the personalized 
leadership of Mao and Deng himself.  Another possible explanation for accuracy in predicting 
Chinese politics after Deng is that China has latterly opened up to the world and in as much as it 
is an integral part of the international system, the international system is also an integral part of 
China. This relationship comes with expectations in national behaviour and some semblance of 
predictability.    
The economic reforms that had been started by Deng were continued by Jiang and China 
continued to enjoy what Justin Yifu Lin (2013:259) calls “miraculous” economic development. 
Writing in 1996, Barrie Stevens (1996:28) states that in fifteen years, “China… transformed 
itself from being a dormant, introspective giant into a dynamic powerhouse of major potential 
significance to the world economy.” China’s inclusion in the World Trade Organisation was 
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indicative of the continued policy of reform and opening up to the world to end its isolation. Wen 
Jiabao (2011), the former Premier of the PRC, described WTO membership as a “full embrace” 
of the current international system. Another victory for China in the international system was its 
successful bid to host the 2008 Olympic games. These developments indicate the acceptance 
which China has gained from other players in the world. This will be the enduring legacy of 
Deng Xiaoping’s socialism with Chinese characteristics which David Harvey (2008) has branded 
as “neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics.” The success of Deng’s reforms and opening up 
policy is so much that even in 2012 at the 18th National Congress of the CCP the then President 
of China, Hu Jintao vowed to continue with Deng’s theory.  
From the foregoing, it can be inferred that China seeks to continue the identity with which it has 
largely been associated, that is, one of an economically modernizing country seeking deeper 
incorporation in the global economy. This incorporation brings with it certain expectations on 
China’s behaviour. Opening up means conceding a certain measure of censure and scrutiny from 
international organisations and other influential powers. Ideologically, though, China still claims 
to be a socialist state. Its economy, though largely engaging a neoliberal bent, is still monitored 
closely by the government. China has also appreciated the value of cordial international relations 
and that revolutionary fervour could be abandoned if it is counterproductive. For this reason, 
China has been very successful in courting the friendship of valuable members of the 
international system. In its foreign policy, the only impediment that China faces in establishing 
diplomatic relations with some countries is that those countries have diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan. However, it should be noted that even on these grounds China has been pragmatic with 
certain countries. A clear example is the “two Chinas dilemma” (Naidu 2008) that faced post-
apartheid South Africa, when only Taiwan had formal relations with South Africa. The PRC was 
open to having relations of the highest level – short of formal relations - with South Africa for 
long as the latter retained its relations with Taiwan. Eventually, South Africa severed relations 
with Taiwan in favour of the PRC and this has been the case in many other African countries as 
well (Taylor 2006).  
China’s interests in keeping cordial relations, even with countries that recognize Taiwan, is 
prompted by the demand for energy resources that “it needs to maintain its domestic 
development” (Buhi 2014:241; see also Anderson and Chao 1998). This is a pressing demand as 
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China’s rate of consumption is likely to outstrip its industry. The growth that China has enjoyed 
and the magnanimous manner with which some players have accepted it, makes it unnecessary 
for China to take up a confrontational foreign policy.51 The best option is to cooperate with 
strategic countries. The One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative is “an ambitious foreign-
investment project designed to boost China’s trade and diplomatic ties with more than 60 
countries in the Middle East, Europe, and Africa” (Cendrowski 2016). Through this project 
China has sponsored energy generating initiatives in countries like Dubai for example and 
several infrastructure projects in Africa. The desire to cultivate a beneficial relationship with the 
United Arab Emirates and a steady import of energy is also apparent.52  
Apart from energy resources, China is also in need of political support in its relations with 
Taiwan, its outlook on human rights and the continued hold of power by the CCP in the absence 
of any other political contender. Africa has been particularly important in helping China on this 
score. Furthermore, to African states and Zambia in particular, China’s economic growth 
provides more or less an alternative development model from that of the West (Kragelund 
2014:145) which many African states have deemed ineffective when applied to the African 
situation. China continues to evoke its history of foreign domination (Hunter and Sexton 1999) 
and its emphasis on national sovereignty as a way of relating to Africa’s own colonial past and 
the continued interference of Western powers in some of Africa’s internal affairs. These 
historical intersections have bearing on the type of relations that China has with some African 
countries and have helped in reinforcing Sino-African ties and ties among countries of the global 
South in general.  
Despite the optimism that has been the attendant consequence of economic growth, China is 
confronted with myriad challenges, ranging from environmental factors to Taiwan and Hong 
Kong’s pro-democracy Umbrella Movement. The country will have to play a leading role on the 
international scene in arresting high levels of environmental pollution which, though having been 
provoked long before, have been exacerbated by the augmentation of industrialization. As a 
country of consequence with an unrivalled population, China would be remiss to shirk this global 
                                                          
51 This view is not necessarily shared by certain sectors of the West who see an inevitable confrontation between 
China and the United States especially. Some would argue that by being a communist country, China excites 
memories of the Soviet Union’s role against the United States during the Cold War (Rosen 2016).  
52 China is planning to commit $3 trillion in the long run to promote much needed infrastructure in developing 
markets through OBOR. This project is aimed at winning prospective alliances and allies for China.   
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responsibility. The Taiwan question has been stated earlier. Pro-democracy protests are likely to 
increase despite the CCP having consolidated its power after the Tiananmen Square protests and 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union. After embarking on the reform and opening up trajectory, 
Deng Xiaoping was slow to make such sweeping changes on China’s political landscape. He still 
believed in tightening the CCP’s hold on power for the Party not to be challenged in its bid to 
reform its economy and the method and pace of doing this. Thus, economic reform did not lead 
to political change at a national level. The ruling party retains the communist name and still 
promotes socialism with Chinese characteristics. These two allusions could be judged as 
anathema in twenty-first century, a century in which many would want to align with liberal 
democracy.  
 
4.13 Conclusion  
This chapter has been a presentation of China’s political identity and interests, their continuity 
and change, from the inception of the People’s Republic in 1949 to date. It has been stated that 
China during Mao was largely dominated by Mao’s own thought and political taste. China was 
largely isolated from the mainstream international political and economic system. This was 
partly because Mao’s China was a suspicious polity. From his speech of September 21, 1949 
Mao enjoined Chinese not to temper their vigilance because “the imperialists and the domestic 
reactionaries will not take their defeat lying down” (Mao 1977:17). Mao was sure that acts of 
sabotage against the CCP rule would never stop. Hence, even though Mao was aware of the need 
for a “nation-wide economic construction” (Mao 1977:17-18) he was very concerned about 
internal and international interference in China’s affairs and the CCP’s continued hold on power. 
This fear of international interference seemingly extended even to powers that were not 
capitalist. 
China’s fleeting intimacy with the Soviet Union showed that while China might have thought 
post-Stalinist Soviet communism revisionist, the CCP has always wanted to have its own variant 
of socialism, suited for China. This also implied China’s desire to present itself as a true 
custodian of communism with an overriding interest in ending imperialism and foreign 
domination. The doctrinaire Marxism that Mao sought to practise was divisive; it isolated certain 
potential allies of China, most importantly the Soviet Union and certain African political 
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movements that could have relied on China during their struggle against colonial rule in Africa. 
While the country sought to promote the identity of being a credible socialist power, those it 
antagonized perceived Mao’s China as a bellicose warmongering country. Thus China was 
largely isolated and the events such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution 
further isolated China from the international economic system. However, China’s innate role in 
international politics was recognized even during this era. Before heading to China for a 
watershed visit, President Richard Nixon spoke to Congress thus:  
It is a truism that an international order cannot be secure if one of the major powers remains 
largely outside it and hostile toward it. In this decade, therefore, there will be no more important 
challenge than that of drawing the People's Republic of China into a constructive relationship with 
the world community, and particularly with the rest of Asia (Nixon 1971).  
 
However, it was only after the death of Mao (in 1976) and the rehabilitation of the Deng 
Xiaoping (in 1978) as China’s new helmsman that China started making visible and authentic 
strides towards being part of the global economy. Anxious to repair the damage wrought by 
Mao’s Leap and the Cultural Revolution, Deng wanted to modernize China’s economy by 
embarking on a policy of reform and opening up. The new economic policies manifested market-
oriented tendencies, similar to those practised in non-communist states. Though politically China 
remained an avowed communist country, its new economic reform transformed China into a 
more acceptable power in the international political system. From being a power that was 
radically anti-capitalist and anti-Western, the emerging identity of post-Mao China suggested a 
shift to a more amenable China, pragmatic enough to realise that cordial relations with 
technologically advanced capitalist powers would help to satisfy China’s interest for economic 
growth.  
By the time China was embarking on economic reform and opening up, many countries that it 
had hitherto helped - both materially and ideologically - to fight colonialism, had attained their 
independence. This diminished the ideological basis on which China could stake its international 
relations. Its zeal to spread communist revolution the world over was thus replaced by its interest 
to integrate with other powers in the international system in order to attain economic growth. 
Deng’s socialism with Chinese characteristics presents China as a modernizing power but with a 
reference to socialism mainly because the CCP wanted – and still wants - to wield unchallenged 
power in China. The power that the party wields shows continuity in China’s political outlook, a 
132 
 
continuity that was not commensurate with the discontinuity of economic practices of the Mao 
era. Today it is because of the CCP’s reluctance to change from styling itself as a communist 
party and China as a communist country that causes divergence between China and the West. 
The anxiety that China’s rise has provoked in the West has mainly been based on the argument 
that the interests of communist and capitalist countries are as divergent and conflicting as their 
identities. It is thought that with its influence, China will spread its political character to more 
impressionable countries. However, with its growing prominence, even the West will of 
necessity be compelled to acknowledge China’s inevitable role in shaping current and future 
global politics and economics. Moreover, China is more nominally than practically socialist. 
Africa has been more optimistic of China’s rise. China shares identities of being a country that 
was under Western and foreign domination and occupation. It has also been referred to as a 
developing country, another point of intersection with the identities of African states. These 
identities have historically bred interests of fighting against foreign interference and domination 
and lessening the global South’s dependency on the global North for development. For Africa, 
China is a timely and almost irresistible opportunity to seek alternative partners in development 
from the traditional partners, among whom are erstwhile colonisers. Africa is also of great 
importance to China because the continent is glutted with energy resources that China sorely 
needs to maintain its unprecedented growth. Both in action and rhetoric, China and Africa 
accentuate their shared identity and interests as a way of deepening Sino-African relations in a 
mutually beneficial manner. The next chapter looks at the Zambia’s identities and interests from 
the establishment of the Republic in 1964. The chapter is not a history of Zambia; it is a 
presentation of events and how they have impacted on the identities and interests that Zambia 









 THE EVOLUTION OF ZAMBIA’S IDENTITY AND INTERESTS 
5.1 Introduction  
The fact that constructivism is the approach used for analysing the role of identities and interests 
in Sino-Zambian relations entails a number of things. First of all, it implies that social factors 
have had bearing on how identities and interests between China and Zambia have developed. 
Secondly, and related to the first, the impact of social forces on relations can make more sense 
when different epochs are compared. For example, one can never infer the changes and 
transformation of identity and interest without looking at how history bears this notion out. 
Vincent Pouliot (2007:359) suggests that “a constructivist methodology should be inductive, 
interpretive, and historical.” This is in line with the methodology chosen for this research and the 
type of interpretive analysis that was used.  
The current chapter will look at how Zambia’s identities and interests have been shaped over 
time. This, in the spirit of constructivism, will be done in a historical fashion. History is a 
continuum rather than a watertight separation of one era from the other. For this reason, though 
there might be some substantial changes in the identities of the two countries from one epoch to 
another, it is advisable to keep in mind that certain characteristics might defy epochal divisions. 
As Tordoff and Molteno (1974:1) assert “every nation is a product of its past”.53 It is also 
important to note whether or not the constructivist claim of identities and interests as 
consequences of both domestic dynamics and external vicissitudes is sustainable. Without pre-
empting much of what formed the analysis of this research, it is safe at this point to state that, in 
their interaction, states accentuate certain identities and interests while downplaying others, if 
they want to forge strong bonds. Conversely, nations that are opposed to each other are more 
likely to assume identities and interests that differentiate them. In order to present a credible 
canvass of Zambia’s identities and interests, the current chapter used relevant written and visual 
material, and the thoughts of Kenneth Kaunda who played a formative role in constructing 
Zambia’s identity and interests.  
                                                          
53 Specifically referring to Zambia, Miles Larmer (2006:236) asserts that “History matters to Zambia” and that “In 
the years after independence in 1964, historical studies played an important role in the self-conscious construction 




This first part of the current chapter looks at Zambian identities and interests. Though most of 
the ensuing information is based on Zambia’s identities and interests after independence, a 
paucity of information will be given predating independence, in order to imbue the chapter with 
a sense of history and continuity. The chapter divides post-colonial Zambian identities and 
interests along the three republics that the country has witnessed.  
The First Republic was ushered in at independence in 1964. It came to an end in 1973 with the 
introduction of a one-party democracy. The Second Republic ran from 1973 to 1991. The Third 
Republic started in 1991 wherein multiparty politics were reintroduced in the country and the 27-
year rule of Kaunda and his United National Independence Party (UNIP) came to an end. As of 
2017 Zambia is still under the Third Republic. During his rule, the manner with which Kaunda 
doled out positions of leadership in the public service and his cabinet attests to just how powerful 
and influential an individual he was. His shuffles and reshuffles of cabinet portfolios were also 
done with the intention of balancing ethnic representation especially after the emergence of the 
UPP taught him a salutary lesson in political pluralism (Giliomee and Simkins 1999).  It is made 
clear in the sections ahead that Kaunda as a person was influential on how Zambia came to be 
known and identified in the First and Second Republics. Though not sometimes explicitly stated, 
the identities that Zambia manifested and forged and the interests it pursued during each of these 
republics will be discernible.  
 
5.2.1 In Search of a Zambian Identity 
Politics in Africa, as any other region, is mainly about power, who wields it, who yearns for it, 
and who endures its enforcement. The binary between those who have power and those who do 
not have it is universal, but is influenced by different circumstances. For certain societies, like 
the West, contestations for power follow ideological lines and, sometimes, religious persuasions, 
to a greater degree while other influences are less powerful. Sub-Saharan African politics have 
historically been more influenced by ethnic, tribal or cultural dynamics, religious inclinations, 
and between military rule and civil leadership. According to Dressang (1974:1605), those who 
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prefer to have their ethnic kin in positions of power do so because they assume that bureaucrats 
apply themselves to their tasks according to their “social background.”  
Being a country of over seventy different ethnic groups, Zambia has had its share of tribal 
politics. However, it is noteworthy that unlike other countries (e.g. Rwanda, Uganda, Lesotho, 
Swaziland) whose very name is derived from tribal or cultural groups within those regions, 
Zambia has escaped that circumstance.  Dressang (1974) argued that evidence in Zambia seemed 
to refute the claim that ethnicity was of paramount importance in the distribution of power. He 
cited the desire for career self-advancement as being one determinant factor rather than the 
pursuit of ethnic patronage. However, it would be an exaggeration to state that ethnic, tribal or 
cultural dynamics have not influenced Zambian politics. Like in many other post-colonial states 
in sub-Saharan Africa, ethnic politics have had some measure of influence on political conduct 
and control. The national motto, One Zambia One Nation, was a unifying slogan for the different 
tribal and linguistic groups, a slogan which was crucial to holding the polity together and staving 
off any sectorial confrontation that might threaten the continued existence of Zambia as one 
political whole.  
Zambia displays a fascinating dynamic of tribal and ethnic politics. There are more than seventy 
ethnicities in Zambia, but with less than ten main languages. Politics based on linguistic 
cleavages have often concentrated more on the language that people in power speak rather than 
their original language. For example, many small languages of the Northern and Copperbelt 
Provinces of Zambia have been somewhat overtaken by the more dominant Bemba language. 
Ethnic dynamics are therefore intertwined with “regional identities” (Giliomee and Simkins 
1999:208). 
Daniel Posner’s (2005) empirical research dealt with this puzzle. After the reintroduction of 
multi-party politics in 1991, there was a relentless charge that ethnic politics in Zambia were 
primary determinants of who wielded power. The Bemba people were often accused of usurping 
power for themselves, to the detriment of other ethnic and linguistic groups. When the issue was 
probed deeper, Posner’s study revealed that a lot of people in Chiluba’s government who were 
thought to be Bemba, actually belong to small tribes. What was causing this enigma is that those 
who belong to smaller tribes with an affinity to the Bemba language are in fact categorized as 
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Bemba. Thus, Zambia in that situation was more divided between the ‘Bemba’ who held power 
and other groups.  
Along ethnic, tribal or regional lines, the biggest challenge to Zambia’s corporate identity and 
continued survival as one whole has been the Barotseland question. Barotseland is an area 
traversing the North-western region of Zambia. For a long time before independence colonialists 
had treated the area as somewhat independent of the region that came to later be called Zambia. 
Thus, the first government of independent Zambia had the task of integrating “an artificial 
colonial entity into a united and stable state” (Caplan 1970: v). Barotseland is predominated by 
the Lozi people and so the intermittent resurgence of the Barotse dilemma carries with it ethnic 
undertones. The Barotseland Agreement of 1964 gave the Litunga, who is King of the region, 
powers to have his own government and to use customary laws that applied to his subjects 
(Barotseland Agreement 1964).54 Prior to and immediately after colonialism (some might argue 
that it continues to this day) there was also a dimension of class to the conflict as the people of 
Barotseland were more exposed to Western education and mores than the rest of their future 
compatriots.   
  
5.3 The First Republic (1964-1972) 
5.3.1 Zambia against Colonialism and Minority Rule   
Zambia is a landlocked country. Unlike its coastal neighbours, Zambia was largely “untouched 
by Europeans for centuries” (Zambia Review 2016). It was after the mid-19th Century that 
missionaries and traders started making forays into the region. David Livingstone is the most 
well-known explorer and missionary to travel through Zambia and he wrote books about his 
experiences in the region. Political domination of the region was largely due to Cecil John 
Rhodes’ (from who the name Rhodesia is derived) ambitions to gain British control of resources 
in Central Africa. In 1888, after Rhodes gained mining concessions from local chiefs, Zambia 
became a British sphere of influence with administration under the British South African 
                                                          
54 The fact that a special pact had to be signed before Barotseland was integrated into the Republic of Zambia 
shows that the region was somehow unique from other regions that were automatically going to be part of 
Zambia. The powers given to the Litunga (as the Barotseland King is called) presented Barotseland almost as a self-
governing region, albeit dependent on Zambia for economic sustenance. The Agreement was abrogated in 1969.  
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Company. It was in 1924 that this responsibility was taken over by the British Colonial Office, 
and hence became a protectorate (Zambia Review 2016).  
During the period that ensued, the interests of indigenous people were represented mostly by the 
African Mineworkers Union that was formed in the 1940s. However, anti-colonial sentiment 
gained more traction in 1951 when there was a proposal to form the Federation of the two 
Rhodesias (present-day Zambia and Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi). The proposal led to 
the formation of the African National Congress (ANC) which became the main champion for 
indigenous rule in Zambia (Giliomee and Simkins 1999). However, in 1953 the proposal was 
pushed through and the Central African Federation was formed, sparking more consternation 
from the African nationalists. This decision transferred control from the colonial rulers to the 
settlers in the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland. For the subsequent years, the Northern Rhodesia 
African National Congress became more militant in its opposition to federation (Rotberg 1964).  
The ANC was rent asunder in 1958 when its leader, Harry Mwanga Nkumbula, assented to 
participating in federal elections with limited suffrage for Africans. More radical members of the 
ANC left and formed the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC). Leaders of ZANC, like 
Kenneth Kaunda, were subsequently arrested for what were deemed extremist leanings. It was 
during Kaunda’s incarceration in 1959 that the United National Independence Party (UNIP) was 
formed and initially led by Mainza Chona. After his release from prison, Kaunda took over as 
leader of UNIP:   
A two-stage election held in October and December 1962 resulted in an African majority in the 
legislative council, and an uneasy coalition between the two African nationalist parties, the ANC and 
UNIP. The council passed resolutions calling for Northern Rhodesia's secession from the federation 
and demanding full internal self-government under a new constitution, as well as a new National 
Assembly based on a broader, more democratic franchise. On Dec. 31, 1963, the federation was 
dissolved, and Northern Rhodesia became the Republic of Zambia on Oct. 24, 1964 (Zambia Review 
2016:9).  
 
The newly independent country had daunting challenges from its conception. Ethnic fissures and 
their debilitating impact on national unity threatened the existence of Zambia from the moment 
of its formation. UNIP was dogged by accusations of currying favour with Bemba speaking 
people and regions. The party was spared an awkward arrangement when the white ruled 
National Progressive Party (NPP) that had ten seats reserved for settlers in the new government 
disbanded itself (Burdette 1988:65), leaving UNIP and the ANC to be the main political parties. 
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The ANC retained a strong following in Southern Province, where Nkumbula, its leader, hailed 
from (Giliomee and Simkins 1999). Naturally, UNIP wanted to dominate the political scene 
because it could justifiably claim to represent the interests of all Zambians. As will be shown in 
the subsequent sections, a lot of UNIP’s policies and actions were tailor-made to forestall the 
growth of other political parties. Coupled with these internal dynamics, Zambia also faced 
problems that were of external provenance.  
Politically and strategically, being a landlocked country could be both be an advantage and a 
disadvantage to Zambia. At the time it gained independence, its physical position exposed 
Zambia’s vulnerability because much of the subcontinent was still under colonial or minority 
(i.e. white) rule (Zambia Review 2016). Angola and Mozambique, countries that both share 
borders with Zambia, were still under their Portuguese colonialists (Sekwat 2000). Crucially, 
Zambia depended on minority-ruled Southern Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa to export its 
resources and to access its imports (Tordoff 1977). The Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
in Rhodesia by the Ian Smith regime in 1965 compounded Zambia’s quandary (Morris 1966). In 
1976, Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia formed the original members of 
the frontline states, “in order to crisis-manage the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe war, and it was 
considerably strengthened when the resolution of the conflict resulted in an independent 
Zimbabwe becoming the sixth Front-line State in 1980” (Evans 1984:1).5556  
Zambia offered succour to many political movements from Rhodesia (later to be called 
Zimbabwe), South Africa and South West Africa (later to be called Namibia). Zambia was in a 
quandary because it needed the sea route to fuel its economy, but at the same time had to 
denounce the leaderships of the countries providing that crucial route. The fact that Zambia was 
a survivor of Western domination gave the country a moral obligation to fight Western 
domination wherever it still lingered on the African continent. This put Zambia on the collision 
course with Rhodesia and South Africa (Kasrils 1993). This dilemma was very close to defining 
Zambia as a nation. Would it forfeit its struggle commitments against minority rule and work in 
concert with minority governments in the countries through which it got its needed imports? Or 
                                                          
55 During the 1979 Commonwealth Conference held in Zambia, “President Kaunda facilitated significant progress 
towards setting up the Lancaster House negotiations” (Smith 1990:284) that eventually led to the undoing of the 
Rhodesian stalemate and led the foundation for the independence of Zimbabwe.  
56 The Frontline States, joined by Zimbabwe, also formed the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference (SADCC) in 1980 to minimize economic dependence on South Africa.   
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would it chart a moral ground by harbouring liberation movements, and incur the ire of Rhodesia 
and South Africa, a situation which could be disastrous for Zambia’s economic survival and 
political stability?  
By electing to help other African countries gain independence, Zambia was championing a Pan-
Africanist ideal, which tied the fate of the country to that of other African countries.57 Kaunda 
explained that the fight against foreign or white domination and the furtherance of Pan-
Africanism united African nationalists on their stance towards the Cold War and their position on 
choosing political and economic ideologies. Thus, Kaunda was against communism and the blind 
following of the communist bloc, however sympathetic it seemed to Africa’s quest for self-
governance and the removal of capitalist cum imperialist elements from the continent. His main 
argument was that pledging fealty to China or Moscow would be tantamount to ejecting one 
imperialist only to replace it with another. Kaunda (1966:117) actually regarded “the infiltration 
of foreign ideologies such as Marxist Communism as a threat to African Unity.” Thus, the often 
expressed fear that Africa could be swept into the communist orbit was regarded as the 
imperialist “spectre of their own making” (Kaunda 1966:118).  
However, Kaunda regarded China’s communist propaganda in Africa with more respect because 
China knew the experience of colonial domination and racial segregation. Curiously, he 
concludes that China’s “propaganda offensive is worthy of greater respect and calls for special 
vigilance because” (Kaunda 1966:121) China was not a member of the United Nations and hence 
did not adhere to the strictures of international diplomacy and the attendant moral expectations 
that come with that membership. He still cautioned that of utmost importance in Africa’s pursuit 
should be Pan-Africanism, and hence Africa was correct in not siding with either of the 
ideological and power blocs (Kaunda 1966). Ghodsee (2015) also affirms Zambia’s initial 
identity as a nonaligned state. It can be deduced from Kaunda’s arguments that he did not 
envision the possibility of Africa being a communist outpost. It was tactical to imperialists and 
minority rulers, desperately trying to retain their power, to dismiss their detractors as 
                                                          
57 Zambia was one of the many African countries that boycotted the 1976 Montreal Olympics on grounds that the 
Olympics Committee allowed New Zealand to participate in the games. The boycott came about because New 
Zealand still held sporting events with apartheid South Africa and at the time the games were commencing, the All 
Black Rugby team from New Zealand was visiting Australia. Announcing the withdrawal of Kenya from the 
Olympics, the then foreign minister James Osogo averred that “principles are more important than medals” (BBC 
1976). Zambia’s boycott could be interpreted as premised on this position.  
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communists. For Kaunda, it was nationalism that held African bonds and solidarity, rather than 
communism. It was nationalism that restored African optimism and sense of worth and it is this 
influence that shaped Zambia’s stance against minority rule, especially in Southern Africa.   
The behaviour of the UNIP government seemed to have been more inclined towards a more 
radical stance against minority rule. This is not an easy conclusion to arrive at. Susan Herlin 
Broadhead argues that though Kaunda was identified as an idealist58 (driven by principle), he 
exuded political realism by understanding the complexity of the challenges that faced him at 
home and externally. The geographical interdependence he shared with the governments of the 
minority ruled south prior to the establishment of the TAZARA rail line, made “him a moderate 
in the council of the Pan African organizations based to the North” (Broadhead 1973:698). Thus, 
the argument of whether Zambia was radical or idealistic in its foreign policy, especially in the 
first eight years after independence, needs concrete examples to buttress either line of argument. 
It is clear, though, that by choosing humanism, Kaunda’s government was effecting a veneer of 
high principles, non-violence and Christian influence as the main dimensions of national 
ideology. 
 
5.3.2 Humanism as National Ideology and Philosophy 
There is little doubt that Kaunda was influenced by high principles tinged with a firm belief in 
Christian ideals. His own writings betray an idealistic trait in his thinking. The variant of 
humanism the Kaunda government chose for Zambia was influenced by socialist ideals, Zambian 
traditional thought and Christianity. Most of the insights in this section were drawn from 
Kaunda’s own words in his book A Humanist in Africa (1966). At independence Zambia was 
confronted with a lot of challenges. Economically, the country was, and still is, “abjectly” 
dependent on copper and this meant the retention of expatriate skills and technical training was 
necessary (Morris 1966:14; Zambia Report 2016). Other economic sectors were also in the hands 
                                                          
58 Apparently, those who considered him an idealist were convinced that Kaunda’s optimism would “not survive 
the hard realities of power politics as Zambia takes her place among the community of free nations” (Kaunda 
1966:22). Kaunda argued that “it is surely better to start off with the high hopes and struggle to realise them than 
to adopt the defeatism and cynicism which is miscalled realism in those nations that preach endlessly about 
human freedom and yet have multiplied power to the point where the Man it is intended to serve has become 
irrelevant” (ibid).  
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of non-indigenous Zambians. To compound the problem, at independence the country had a very 
small number of university graduates. However, leaving the colonial status quo to continue 
unchanged would have defeated the whole purpose of fighting for self-governance. Thus, 
humanism promoted state control of the economy and the recruitment of indigenous Zambians in 
the private and public sectors (Sekwat 2000). One of the consequences of this was the creation of 
welfare services (Giliomee and Simkins 1999).59 
Kaunda’s humanism was also influenced by the thought of Teilhard de Chardin, a French Jesuit 
Priest and philosopher. The centrality of God and the human person was key to Zambia’s 
humanism (Kanu 2014).60 Kaunda, as the main proponent of humanism, has been described as 
“intensely religious” (Morris 1966:13). It might seem ironic that Zambia under Kaunda was 
secular but became Christian after he left office. However, it is arguable from reading Kaunda’s 
works and observing his personal example that he did not declare the country a Christina nation 
because he was cognizant of the important elements of other religions and, as someone who 
fought against racial discrimination, did not want to create religious discord by overlooking other 
religions present in Zambia.61  
Education and non-violence were also salient components of humanism, and Zambia’s generally 
non-violent victory over colonialism provided part of the rationale for humanism. It also testified 
to Kaunda’s moral “example and to his powers of persuasion” (Morris 1966:12). In the 
introduction to A Humanist in Africa, Colin Morris (1966:9), who professed to be “an admirer, 
quite unashamed and not little sentimental,” of Kenneth Kaunda, gave forceful notions on 
Kaunda’s stance on non-violence. Violence was a popular tactic used to command colonial 
attention. African nationalists who used violent sabotage were influenced by Marxist ideologies 
and the victories of guerrilla warfare in countries such as China and Cuba. Some saw violence as 
the only form of protests that colonisers took seriously. Even movements like South Africa’s 
African National Congress that had a history of non-violence eventually resorted to violence as a 
                                                          
59 Ironically, the provision of welfare services was to be a major point of conflict between the UNIP government, 
the people of Zambia and international financial institutions. With the foundering economies of Third World 
countries, IFIs prescribed a cut-down on state-sponsored services. A further elaboration of how this played out in 
Zambia will follow in the section dealing with the twilight of UNIP governance.  
60 It should be noted that Kaunda was born of Malawian parents. His father, David Kaunda, was a missionary of the 
Church of Scotland. Kaunda’s unwavering belief in God, the Bible and human goodness has often been attributed 
to his strong Christian upbringing.  
61 See Colin M. Morris (1966:14).  
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means to an end. Other movements whose leaders presented a prima facie commitment to non-
violence furtively encouraged their followers to engage in violence or at least did their least to 
deter them from this course. “Kenneth Kaunda, on the other hand” argues Morris (1966:11), “not 
only declared his allegiance to the philosophy of non-violence but rigidly enjoined it upon his 
followers to the point where his leadership teetered in the balance.”62 Kaunda tried to emulate the 
non-violent nature with which Mahatma Gandhi campaigned for India’s independence (Rotberg 
1964; Kaunda 1980).63 
Prior to colonial control, Zambians lived a lifestyle that had socialist or communitarian traits in 
it. However, with the encroachment of Western political, social and economic control, this 
lifestyle became hard to practise. Formally adopting humanism as the national ideology and 
philosophy on 27 April 1967 (Sekwat 2000) was an attempt to resurrect the somewhat idyllic 
manner that Africans lived prior to British colonialism. Thus, while humanism presented Zambia 
as more of a socialist country, the country’s philosophy was also idealist as shown by its 
determination to salvage the idyllic lifestyle of pre-colonial Zambia.   
Zambia was the first country to adopt humanism as a national ideology and philosophy. For this 
reason, the country did not have an example from which it could draw inspiration. Nevertheless, 
the ideology was propagated with great vigour in schools and work places. Kaunda’s personal 
influence and example ensured that humanism enjoyed attention; his stated sympathies for the 
poor and the oppressed were in tandem with his version of humanism. Zambia was a poor64 and 
vulnerable country but Kaunda still supported liberation movements from other countries, even 
though Zambia suffered violent reprisals from Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa. His stance 
was driven by tenets of humanism which are decidedly anthropocentric and harbour suspicions 
for any ideology, including capitalism, that seems to use people for political gain or profit.  
                                                          
62 This was not always successful. The Lumpa uprising of 1964 provoked violence from UNIP in the northern 
province of Zambia. The  uprising was the violent conflict between UNIP and members of Lumpa Church led by 
Alice Mulenga Lubusha who wanted to separate themselves from party politics in a physical sense and built 
separate stockade villages for this purpose. The battle for membership and allegiance between Lumpa and UNIP 
played a part in the violence that ensued (Gordon 2008).  
63 Other nationalist politicians who were influenced by Gandhi’s non-violent politics include Hastings Kamuzu 
Banda of Malawi (Short 1974). 
64 His reluctance in the 1980s to implement the structural adjustments programmes of the IMF and World Bank 




However, internal and external forces, both political and economic (like the slump in copper 
prices in the 1970s; see Zambia Review 2016) tried Kaunda’s idealism. The resurgence of tribal 
and ethnic rivals at home was equally a threat to his ideals and grip on power. The resignation of 
Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe as vice president, and the subsequent formation of the United 
Progressive Party (UPP headed by the same Kapwepwe) posed a palpable threat to the Kaunda 
government. Kapwepwe came from the Bemba people and in a country where ethnic cleavages 
were threatening political dynamics, he enjoyed the support of the biggest ethnic group. These 
external and internal forces compelled Kaunda to take a firm stance on his domestic and foreign 
policy. To enjoy a free hand, UNIP had to liquidate opposition and the most obvious manner 
with which to realise this was to institute a single-party polity, an alternative which he chose in 
1973 through “the Choma Declaration” headed by the Vice President at the time – Mainza 
Chona (Musambachime 1991:291).      
 
5.4 The Second Republic: One-Party State (1972-1991) 
As noted above, humanism in Zambia was partly influenced by African ways of living. Kaunda 
referred to traditional governance and how chiefs ruled in consultation with their subjects and 
how communal decision making was more effective in tribal polities. The fate with which many 
African countries were threatened could be traced as way back as the 1884 Berlin Conference. 
The callous manner with which different cultural, linguistic and ethnic groups were conflated to 
form colonies under one administration was portentous. Groups that had for centuries been 
virtually at war with one another could not be expected to easily relinquish their attitudes 
towards customary nemeses. The semblance of unity that such groups struck up during anti-
colonial times was not so much a permanent abandonment of old hostilities as it was a temporary 
thaw in fractious relations in the face of a common enemy. Kaunda conceded that differences 
among African groups were so much that they threatened the very existence and continuity of 
governance in Africa. Having a plethora of political parties, some of which are ethnic-based, 
could make this threat all the more certain and inevitable. According to Kaunda, “the historical 
causes of division [in Africa] tend to be so deep-seated that the very foundations of the State 
could be torn out if an opposition group were given too much latitude to inflame opinion” 
(Kaunda 1966:107).   
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Conveniently for him, Kaunda argued that the purely African mode of governance was at 
variance with political pluralism (multiparty politics as adopted from Western democracies; see 
Pettman 1974) because tribes that enjoyed unrivalled demographics could exploit such a system 
to perpetuate their hold on power, to the detriment of tribes that did not have the power of 
numbers. Kaunda (1966:106) described the Westminster Model of democracy “as a beautiful 
anachronism – a pattern ideally suited to the genius of the British people but of limited value, 
without drastic modifications, in Modern Africa.” This line of argument partly formed the 
rationale for instituting a one party state in Zambia. Though Zambia had not suffered coups that 
plunged countries like Ghana and Nigeria into chaos shortly after independence, state hegemony 
under the aegis of one-party politics, and the accretion of power in leaders, what Jackson and 
Rosberg (1984) described as “personal rule” were almost equally hostile to political debate and 
opposition, and Zambia manifested these.    
The period coinciding with one-party politics (from 1972 to 1991) is referred to as Zambia’s 
Second Republic. Initially Kaunda had stated that opting for a one-party state was the 
prerogative of the masses and so was not going to be imposed on the citizenry. In one of his 
letters to Colin Morris, more than five years prior to the institution of one-party democracy, 
Kaunda (1966:105) expected “to see the virtual obliteration of the opposition at the next General 
Election, not by draconian repressive measures, but through that ‘painless killer’ – the ballot 
box.” Furthermore, Kaunda perceived the institution of one-party states in Africa as a “natural 
consequence” (Kaunda 1966:107) of post-colonial states. His reasoning was that during the 
struggle for independence, ordinary people rallied behind a movement that they believed 
represented their interests. They did not divide their loyalty to a myriad of political organisations. 
Ordinary citizens expected liberation movements of their choice to lead the newly-born countries 
and to meet all the consequent challenges that come with nascent states. In line with his claim 
that at the centre of his variant of humanism was Man, Kaunda retained, at least for some time, 
the argument that ordinary people would ultimately decide the turn to a one-party state.  
However, the manner with which the Chona commission was established betrays the fact that 
with the passage of time Kaunda had shifted his vision on how to establish a one-party state 
(Tordoff 1977). Indeed, calling for a plebiscite would betoken the possibility of continuing with 
multiparty politics if the citizenry were not inclined to Kaunda’s hopes for a one-party state. In 
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lieu of consulting the citizenry, the commission was charged with sounding out the form one-
party democracy would take.  
The main mandate of the commission was thus to help frame a constitution that would entrench a 
one-party system. Nine principles, among which were the reaffirmation of humanism as a 
national ideology, the observance of individual rights, the prohibition of interpersonal 
exploitation, equality of all human beings and that ultimate power resides in the people, 
governed the enquiries of those charged to carry out the commission. This notwithstanding, 
jostling for power between the extant political parties of the time and the resultant, if alleged, 
emergence of tribal politics, was seminal in forming ground for the Second Republic. The 
Commission finalized its task in 1972 but the institutions for facilitating a one-party state were 
established in 1973. It should be noted that the government disregarded some recommendations 
made by the commission, like limiting presidential terms and powers (Report of the National 
Commission on the Establishment of One-party Participatory Democracy in Zambia 1972). The 
years that followed proved that the extension of presidential terms and powers was actually the 
most obvious characteristic of the one party edifice (Tordoff 1977).  
Simon Zukas, perhaps the most significant white figure fighting for Zambia’s independence, 
refused to aid the UPP because of its alleged tribal leanings.65  While regretting the steps being 
taken to “contain” the UPP, Zukas was, at the time, still a supporter of the one-party system for 
Zambia” (Zukas 2002:139). As early as 1966, Kaunda was setting the basis for a future one-party 
state. One of his arguments was that opposition parties in Africa at the time were a far cry from 
being prospective governing parties. He accused African opposition of being “a ragbag of 
disgruntled individuals and tribalists” (Kaunda 1966:107).  
The allegation of tribalism as the sine qua non for one-party participatory democracy has been 
contested by those who argue that opting for a one party system was a result of UNIP’s paranoia 
of opposition views “and its failure to meet popular expectations of social and economic change” 
(Larmer 2006:236). McCorley (2013:271) argues that those who established a one-party system, 
                                                          
65Tribal and regional cleavages were discernible when one looks the support bases of the opposition parties of the 
day. The African National Congress was strong in the Southern region of Zambia among the Tonga people 
(Giliomee and Simkins 1999) and the United Progressive Party was strong in Northern Zambia. UNIP was bent on 
presenting itself as a unifying party, representing all Zambians rather than yielding to sectarian sympathies 
(Pettman 1974).  
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were only determined “to crystallise the dominance of UNIP over all areas of social, economic 
and political life in Zambia.” As early as 1969 Thomas Rasmussen (1969:407) wrote that UNIP 
and its adherents were agitating for a one-party state because they were loath to let the two minor 
parties, the African National Congress and the United Party, continue questioning UNIP’s vision 
for the country and that a multiparty edifice was “a luxury which diverts time, energy, and 
money away from the important tasks of development.” 
However, the timing of initiating a one-party state in Zambia could not have been more 
opportune for UNIP and Kaunda’s government. Away from rhetoric about tribalism, humanism, 
Africa’s history against colonialism and the role that UNIP played to gain independence as 
justifications for one-party politics, UNIP had the onerous task of providing services for 
Zambians. It should be remembered that Kaunda’s own thought was that by liquidating 
opposition parties UNIP could forge Zambian interests unencumbered by political opposition. 
The country was still decidedly focused on, and interested in, ending minority rule in Africa 
through peaceful means. After many failed attempts to achieve this ideal, Kaunda tempered his 
devotion to nonviolent struggle in southern Africa. At the opening of parliament in 1978, Kaunda 
proclaimed that “intensified armed struggle remains the only credible and effective means by 
which southern Africa can be liberated” (Kaunda 1978a). 
In another speech given in 1978, Kaunda expressed his awareness of Zambia’s invidious 
situation; Zimbabwe and South Africa were still under settler rule and were more superiorly 
armed in comparison to majority-ruled frontline states. In the face of these circumstances, 
Kaunda maintained that Zambians are “peaceful people, peaceful loving” and challenged anyone 
in his audience to controvert the fact that Zambia was not a warmongering nation. He also 
charged that Western countries with vested interests were shoring up minority leaderships in 
Africa (Kaunda 1978).66 For this reason, Kaunda argued that the political changes it took after 
1972 were aimed at fighting minority rule and colonialism on the continent and the Western 
powers that supported these oppressive systems. Apart from this, the preceding information also 
                                                          
66 Kaunda also had made this accusation in the speech that he gave in 1970 when Zambia hosted the non-aligned 
conference (Kaunda 1970). During a press conference in 1977, Kaunda repeated that “the political support, 
economic support, social and cultural support, scientific and technological support, military support” which 
Western Europe gave to the South African government was the source of the southern African Impasse because 
without this support the apartheid government would have failed to sustain their intransigent hold on power and 
the country could transform peacefully (Kaunda 1977). 
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reveal a pragmatic facet of Zambia’s foreign policy identity. Inasmuch as it remained an 
adherent of non-violence, it promoted armed struggle in countries where this was deemed the 
only recourse. That Western capitalist countries were seen as humouring minority leaderships in 
southern Africa deepened Kaunda’s admiration for non-capitalist powers. 
Thus, apart from changes in political identity, “after 1972, the country embraced a socialist path 
to development and began to rely heavily on aid from the Eastern Bloc” (Ghodsee 2015:115). 
However, the 1970s was fraught with crises both political and economic, internal and external. 
The period coincided with plummeting copper prices, a body blow to Zambia’s economy. In 
addition, the effects of the 1973 oil crisis were of momentous dimensions and affected global 
politics and economics in general (Kepplinger and Roth 1979; Issawi 1978). Zambia was 
susceptible to the international market and hence was heavily affected by these occurrences. The 
failure to diversify the economy from copper to other resources compounded Zambia’s economic 
woes during the reduction of copper prices. As recently as 2016, the ruling Patriotic Front 
acknowledged that Zambia is dependent on copper and that agriculture offers better prospects for 
sustainable development if it is made “the mainstay of Zambia’s economy” (PF Manifesto 2016).  
 
5.4.1 Zambia as Part of the Third World and the Politics of Structural Adjustment 
As the Cold War was nearing its end, players in the international system had to decide what path 
to take in the unfolding era of uncertainty. With the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, it was abundantly clear that states that had hitherto nurtured 
close relations with the socialist bloc had to rethink their policies. The Third World’s importance 
in international politics was likely to be diminished with the end of the Cold War because much 
external support that was given to poor countries was done so with the intention of winning a 
vast section of the international system to either side of the opposing power blocs (Griffin 1991; 
Reisman 1990).  
The influence of the socialist bloc in Africa manifested itself in the form of one-party adoption, 
close government control of the economy and the lack of democracy as understood in Western 
Europe and the United States. The fact that Zambia, and a number of other countries, yielded to 
liberal democratic demands had different effects on different countries. Some countries, Zambia 
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being an arguable example, became somewhat more tranquil with the new changes, while others, 
like Kenya showed signs of more tension than was present during the era of one-party politics 
(Phiri 2000). Thus, while the last decade of the twentieth century restored optimism for the 
triumph of democratic ideals, in Africa the picture was not invariably bright. Zambia did not 
experience violent struggles that typified politics in other post-Cold War African states, but it 
had its fair share of problems that threatened economic, political and social survival. 
The current section represents the episodes that Zambia has gone through since the end of the 
Cold War which came a little earlier than the reintroduction of multiparty politics in Zambia. The 
peaceful and nonviolent manner with which Kaunda called for a multiparty election and the 
readiness with which he accepted defeat have been hailed as exemplary to Africa politics (see 
Joseph 1992; Panter-Brick 1994:231). It replicated the virtually peaceful manner through which 
the country had attained independence 27 years earlier. Again, it is politic to note points of 
continuity from the identity and interests that Zambia had hitherto chosen and been given and 
points of transformation. This helps in establishing whether or not Zambian identities and 
interests have changed and whether or not they had any influence on the country’s posturing on 
the international arena. An even-handed analysis of Zambia’s experiences should reveal that 
some of the problems confronting Zambia at the time were experienced by other similarly weak 
and susceptible nations. 
The structural adjustment programmes that the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
and the United States treasury came up with were originally designed for Latin America but later 
prescribed for African states too. The disastrous consequences that these adjustments engendered 
in Zambia stoked more agitation against Kaunda’s leadership in the last decade leading to the 
end of the Cold War. From 1985 to 1987, the Kaunda government tried to reform its economy. 
However, intensifying liberalization was inimical to certain powerful groups that had vested 
interests and benefitted from the status quo (Simutanyi 1996). This is what caused the UNIP 
government to backpedal, cancel the IMF’s adjustment programme in 1987 and revert to earlier 
economic inclinations (Bates and Collier 1995; Smith 1990). Callaghy (1990) argued that 
structural adjustment policies cannot succeed if states had the capability to implement them 
without pandering to the demands of interests groups. That the UNIP government could not do 
this suggests the existence of patronage. However, the tide of international politics and internal 
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pressure was clearly on the ascent and the UNIP government “reopened discussions with the 
IMF” (Smith 1990:284), thereby attracting aid that Britain had drastically reduced after the 
termination of structural adjustment in 1987. These developments suggested that change was 
imminent in the Second Republic. 
In conclusion, the Second Republic brought about certain visible changes in Zambia’s political 
and economic identity and outlook. The adoption of a one-party system was one of the most 
radical transformations. Apart from a shift to a socialist inclined type of economy, Zambia had 
also vowed its “fullest and irrevocable support for the intensified armed struggle in southern 
Africa until victory” was secured (Kaunda 1978a). The overt support for armed struggle was a 
radical shift if the non-violent manner with which Zambia gained its independence and Kaunda’s 
admiration of Gandhi are taken into consideration. This change also indicates Zambia’s reading 
of the international system and how it sought to respond to new challenges. Peaceful means to 
resolve conflict had achieved little and Kaunda’s interaction with South Africa’s Prime Minister 
B.J. Vorster and Zimbabwe’s Ian Smith were used as evidence that armed struggle was the only 
resort. The support for armed struggle was more pronounced in the late 1970s. The 1980s 
ushered in a period of structural adjustment programmes that were prescribed to the Third World 
and, as shown above, Zambia experimented with these Western-bred prescriptions but with no 
apparent success, forcing the UNIP government to revert to more state protectionism. However, 
trade unions, acutely aware of how unsustainable state control of the economy was and how 
authoritarian the one-party system was, became more radical in challenging the UNIP 
government and calling for economic changes and a return to multiparty democracy. The 
attainment of these two demands is what became known as Zambia’s Third Republic.  
 
5.5 The Third Republic (1991 – present) 
5.5.1 After Kaunda: The MMD and Post-Cold War Zambian Politics 
With the political and economic malaise that had been Africa’s lot during the Cold War, there 
was optimism that opening up political space in Africa and limiting state control of the economy 
would increase state accountability, attract more investment from the economically viable 
players of the West and North America and would also bolster Africa’s capacity to provide 
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public goods. The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Empire inspired hope to 
those who yearned for the collapse of Soviet-backed authoritarian powers. It was also a victory 
for those who espouse liberal democracy. Free market economies held much promise for the 
unfolding international system (Joseph 2014). Such was the hopefulness with which the majority 
of Zambians welcomed the reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1991. 
It is also worth noting that the post-Cold War era has also opened up space for middle powers to 
come to global prominence. While the emerging post-Cold War order signaled the ideological 
victory of the capitalist West over the socialist East, it was also marked by African 
disillusionment over Western initiatives like the failed structural adjustment programme. Thus, 
African countries turned to new economic powers like China for “lessons, advice, and 
assistance” (Alves and Draper 2006:24). Davies et al (2008: vii) state that Africa probably needs 
a “new approach to development” after the continent has continued to wallow in 
underdevelopment after decades of trying to apply certain development models. African 
countries have used emerging powers as alternatives and as powers of bargaining against 
traditional donors and advisors of the West. The following pages demonstrate this change in the 
international system as China, specifically, has become increasingly important in influencing the 
economy and politics of Zambia.  
 
5.5.2 Trade Unions and the Role of the MMD  
The Zambian economy had been struggling right from the 1970s with the fall of copper prices. 
However, it was in the late 1980s that Zambians became more restive, and protests broke out 
against the haphazard manner with which Kaunda experimented with structural adjustment 
prescriptions. The UNIP government was at times compelled to use high-handed means to quell 
protests. However, with the mounting frustration of the citizens came a huge political ferment 
against one party democracy. The trade Union movement was the most potent herald of renewed 
calls for political reform. It was thus that Frederick Chiluba, a trade union leader, became one of 
the well-known and most vocal opponents of the UNIP government.  
To put this section in context requires a revelation of a history, albeit abridged, of union activism 
in Zambia. The mainstay of Zambia’s economy has historically been mining copper mining. It is 
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thus explicable that one of the biggest and most influential unions to be formed in Zambia was 
the Northern Rhodesia African Mineworkers’ Union in 1948 (Bates 1972; Zambia Review 
2016). After independence, the trade union movement in Zambia has largely escaped state 
control (Sklar 1983). The Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) was very influential in 
channeling sentiment towards the reintroduction of multiparty democracy (Lise 1992). The 
pressure that unions put on the UNIP government was coupled with changes that had an 
international dimension.  
The Soviet Union had disintegrated signaling the triumph of capitalism and liberal democracy. 
Most of African countries had attained independence. The victory of liberal democracy, with its 
emphasis on competitive political contestation, fueled the call for political reform in countries 
like Zambia that had hitherto been one-party states with socialist inclinations (Sklar 1983). 
Secondly, privatization and economic liberalization were increasingly in vogue and hence the 
tight control that the UNIP had on economic practice was progressively becoming obsolete. In 
Southern Africa where Zambia played a pivotal role in proffering support for movements that 
were fighting against minority rule, change was palpable. One of the reasons, though applied in 
retrospect, why Zambia maintained the one-party state was to prevent dissension over issues 
such as solidarity towards ending minority rule in apartheid South Africa, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe.67 Zimbabwe had gained independence in 1980 and in 1990 the apartheid government 
lifted the ban on proscribed anti-apartheid movements and released influential political prisoners 
who had been jailed for their activism against apartheid.  
These changes diminished the rationale on which one-party politics was based in Zambia. 
Combined with these external factors was domestic pressure as mentioned above. The 
Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) was formed in 1990 with Chiluba as its president. 
In lieu of calling for a plebiscite on the one-party framework, Kaunda went an extra step and 
reintroduced multiparty politics. However, as stated in the introduction, a historical analysis of 
Zambia does not mean that the different epochs the country has gone through can be separated in 
a watertight fashion. In fact, though the MMD benefited from the reintroduction of multiparty 
democracy, Zambian politics continued with certain aspects that were typical of the UNIP and 
                                                          
67 It is possible that if there were opposition parties in Zambia when the country played host to liberation 
movements, Kaunda would have been challenged on grounds that continued support for liberation movements 
hurt the economy, infrastructure and social life of Zambians.  
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one-party era. Peter Burnell (2001:239) agrees with this assertion, though recoils from branding 
post-1991 politics as de facto one-party politics, only describing it as ‘a “predominant party 
system.”’ As early as 1992, some observers were already noting authoritarian traits in the MMD, 
traits that the MMD vowed to obliterate after the demise of the Kaunda era. This calls for 
questions of whether the MMD ended the UNIP era or simply transformed it (Baylies and Szeftel 
1992).68 Burnell (2001) also observed a seamless continuity between Zambia’s “past, present and 
future” political temperament.69 What seemed to be an apparent shift from the UNIP era to the 
MMD government was in terms of economic outlook and practice.  
 
5.5.3 Economic Reform After 1991 
The economic outlook and practice that Zambia had during the Kaunda years had an 
acquaintance with those of the socialist bloc (Sklar 1983). The dominance of UNIP was also 
another factor aligning Zambia during Kaunda to the socialist camp. Apart from denouncing 
what were thought to be authoritarian tendencies of the Kaunda government, those who sought to 
dislodge him decried the economic practice of his era. During the Cold War, Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) was often interpreted as the tool of possible imperialists in Africa and other 
Third World regions. This explains why foreign owned enterprises were seized by the state at 
independence – as was the case in Zambia as well. In order to win the support of international 
financial institutions and also to drift, in obvious fashion, from UNIP control of national 
economics, the MMD embarked on a frenzied adoption of privatization and liberalization of the 
market (Posner and Simon 2002).  
Prior to the attitude that Africa had towards FDI in the Cold War era, the dissolution of the 
socialist bloc and the effective end of the Cold War, inspired the realisation that FDI and 
multinational corporations could bring economic advancement. This meant privatizing and 
liberalising the economy. In essence this also entailed adopting the prescriptions of the World 
                                                          
68 Chege (1995) also observed that the euphoria that came with multiparty democracies in Africa in the early 1990s 
increasingly waned with the quick realization that those who replaced the Cold War era dictatorships and absolute 
rulers were no different in their attitude towards political opposition, abuse of power and strictures on media and 
press freedom. 
69 Simutantyi (2005:74) refers to the coming of the MMD government after UNIP as “simply a change of the guard, 
as the fundamental political structure has remained intact.” 
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Bank and the IMF – the structural adjustment agenda that had beset the twilight years of 
Kaunda’s rule. In Zambia, the changes were dramatic. The Zambia Privatization Agency (ZPA) 
was set up to facilitate the transfer of the economy from the public to the private sector. From 
state control estimated at 80% in the 1990, Zambia experienced almost 90% of it being 
controlled by the private sector (Zambia Privatization Agency 1994-2001). Writing on behalf of 
the World Bank, White and Bhatia (1998:4) concluded, in 1998, that Zambia had carried out 
Africa’s “most successful privatization program to date.” Zambia was aware that it was 
competing with other countries in trying to court investor confidence. Drastic measures had to be 
adopted, like announcing that the Exchange Control Act that limited the flow of hard currency 
would be repealed (World Bank 2004). Investors could now repatriate any amount of money out 
of Zambia.  The reduction of tax from 35% to 15% was another way of luring would-be investors 
(Rolfe and Woodward 2004).  
The reforms had undoubtedly won the confidence of investors to a degree and indeed had some 
positive effects on Zambia’s economy, like the reduction of inflation (World Bank 2004). Budget 
deficits had been mitigated and there were increases in the export of non-traditional resources. 
Adopting neo-liberal practices might have won the approval of the West, but the secret manner 
with which this was done in Zambia, not only set a precedent for the corruption that dogged the 
MMD government but compounded the poverty of many Zambians (Splisbury 2012). Beattie 
(2005) argues that in 1991 “Zambia had exchanged an inept and misguided regime for a corrupt 
and repressive one.”  
The World Bank conceded in 2004, that despite “despite the extensive economic reforms 
pursued in the 1990s, Zambia’s economy continued to decline” (World Bank 2004:3). A fair 
analysis of Zambia’s performance after liberalization should state that some of the challenges 
that confronted Chiluba’s reign were inherited from the Kaunda years. The lack of foresight and 
the ability to halt economic debility were also manifested by the UNIP government. For 
example, the UNIP government forfeited the opportunity of diversifying the economy from 
copper dependency to agriculture in 1973-74 when copper prices tumbled and oil prices shot up.  
Though Chiluba’s government presented an appreciable increase in other exports rather than the 
tradition ones, the government did not do enough to significantly reduce dependency on copper. 
When Anglo American announced that it would withdraw from Zambia Copper Mines in 2001, 
154 
 
diversification was reintroduced as a priority but to date, there seems to be no meaningful intent 
to shift the focus from copper. Technological advancement and the decline of demands for 
copper on the international market are likely to injure Zambia’s economy in the long term. This 
is likely to limit the government’s ability to meet its social obligations. However, as stated by 
Posner and Simon (2002), the MMD held on to power despite its inability to shift the fortunes of 
the citizens not because it retained their confidence but because a survey carried out showed that 
a significant number of people registered their disappointment with the MMD not through voting 
for alternative political parties (of which few offered any meaningful option) but through 
withholding their vote. This resulted in the drop in the number of voters.70 Apart from 
introducing economic reform and hence presenting Zambia as an fledgling liberal democracy, 
another change that came with the MMD government was the declaration of Zambia as a 
Christian nation.  
 
5.5.4 Zambia as a Christian Nation 
Chiluba declared Zambia a Christian nation on Christmas day in 1991, less than two months after 
acceding to the presidency. The move was arguably political in that it was partly aimed at 
winning the support of the majority of Zambian citizens who profess Christianity. Secondly, it 
also aimed at attracting the favour of three major church bodies in Zambia: the Zambian 
Episcopal Conference (ZEC) of the Catholic Church, the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia and 
the Christian Council of Zambia.71 It is noteworthy, however, that the Christian Council of 
Zambia and ZEC have been openly against the declaration (Gifford 2008) because it does not 
represent their interests (Olapdipo 2000).  The 2011-2016 Manifesto of the Patriotic Front, while 
not dismissing the Christian nation declaration, inveighed against how the MMD “has continued 
                                                          
70 Posner and Simon (2002) argue that another factor that possibly kept the MMD in power in addition to vote 
abstention was ethnic voting. This argument could be justified by the fact that Chiluba was mostly linked to the 
Bemba speaking people of Northern Zambia. Though Kaunda grew up in Northern Zambia, the fact that his parents 
were originally from Malawi gives the general impression that he should be associated with Eastern Zambia, 
bordering Malawi. When Chiluba won the 1991 election, the only place where Kaunda still enjoyed massive 
support was Eastern Zambia, thus bolstering the argument that ethnic voting was at play.  
 
71 In the 1980s the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions that Chiluba led worked very close with the Christian Council 
of Zambia to publicise the blemishes of UNIP governance (Sklar 1983). The 1991 Christian nation declaration could 
possibly be viewed from this perspective, though many other motives have been suggested.  
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to antagonise the church and marginalize it in matters of governance and national development” 
(Patriotic Front Manifesto 2011:5). 
The ZEC argued that human rights of all citizens, Christian or otherwise, could be safely upheld 
without a religious declaration. Furthermore, there was fear that this declaration could lead to the 
abuse of religion for purely political ends, a charge which was justified. Thirdly, there is a 
multiplicity of religions in Zambia and declaring it a Christian nation indicates an intolerance to 
other religions72 and could lead to “non-Christian Zambians being regarded as second-class 
citizens, or even being excluded from public office” (Quoted in Gilford 1999:2010). The 
negative potential that the declaration had on Zambia could actually bring discredit on the 
Christian religion. In 2012 when the PF government was inviting proposals for the new 
constitution, the Zambia Episcopal Conference called for the excision of the Christian nation 
declaration from the current constitution’s preamble (Lusaka Times 2012). They argued that 
Zambia cannot observe Christian principles through a mere declaration. Their appeal was 
rejected and the Constitution, as amended in 2016, has the Christian nation declaration as one of 
its first inscriptions (Constitution of Zambia 2016). 
The corrupt excesses that became characteristic of the MMD government under Chiluba put paid 
to many doubts that the declaration was a hollow red herring. Chiluba’s stated intentions of 
declaring Zambia a Christian nation were to instill Christian principles in government and to 
fight corruption. It should strike one as surprising that this declaration was not made during the 
Kaunda era when Christian values were part of national ideology and Kaunda himself was a 
devout believer. The move by Chiluba could possibly be interpreted as a political gambit, as 
alluded to above. His critics, including some evangelicals, argued that there was a glaring 
discrepancy between Chiluba’s rhetoric about Christianity and his political conduct. Indeed, the 
subsequent years of his presidency revealed corruption, intolerance to opposition and a crude 
pursuit for power. It is thus understandable why some influential Christian organizations were 
emphatically against the declaration. “This is because no one wanted to identify Christianity with 
corruption and incompetence” (Oladipo 2000:376).   
                                                          
72 This could lead to fundamentalism and, in the event that Zambia comes under the leadership of people who 
swear by other religions, be used against Christianity.  
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Phiri (1998) observed that Christian organizations that supported Chiluba’s rule did so because 
they enjoyed financial backing from the government. Furthermore, some prominent evangelicals 
were even issued with diplomatic passports by the government. Those, like Nevers Mumba, who 
had criticized Chiluba’s rule as antithetical to Christian precepts had their passports revoked. 
Apart from the rampant corruption which became the most popular legacy of the Chiluba years, 
the treatment of former president, Kaunda, seemingly contradicted Chiluba’s continued reference 
to Christian leadership. Before the 1996 elections, the MMD government amended the 
constitution, adding that only third generation Zambians would be eligible to stand as presidents 
of Zambia. This rule was expressly crafted to preclude Kaunda, whose parent were missionaries 
from Malawi, from contesting the polls. Subsequently, UNIP boycotted the 1996 election 
(Posner and Simon 2002). This amendment signified at least two things: Chiluba’s 
vindictiveness towards a leader who had previously jailed him for his stance against UNIP. 
Secondly, the first five years of Chiluba’s rule had possibly made it obvious that the new 
government was not very different from the previous one and that the conduct of the new 
leaders, especially as regards corruption and misappropriation of resources, was possibly worse 
than that witnessed during the Kaunda years. For this reason, there was a chance that Kaunda’s 
popularity could be resurrected in the wake of the new government’s excesses. It was with this in 
mind that Chiluba sought to debar Kaunda from representing UNIP at the 1996 polls, an action 
which would have been almost pointless had Chiluba not discerned a palpable threat in Kaunda.   
On matters of corruption, the possible roots were sown when decisions were made to privatize 
state controlled institutions. Allegations were legion about how politically connected individuals 
had enriched themselves through this process. Chiluba was also accused of unreasonable 
leniency towards dealing with those in his cabinet who were accused of corruption (Phiri 1995). 
It was partly because of the general restiveness of the population that on 28 October 1997, a 
group of soldiers attempted to foment a coup against Chiluba’s government. The plotters cited 
massive corruption in Chiluba’s government as the main reason for their attempt to topple it 
(McNeil 1997). The coup was foiled within three hours, but its consequences were far-reaching 
and gave Chiluba reasons to be more highhanded towards his opponents. A series of arrests was 
made which saw Kaunda being put in jail, but later released without trial. Out of the total of 59 
soldiers who were arrested in connection with the coup, 44 were found guilty and sentenced to 
death in 2003. Their sentences were commuted and the leader of the soldiers, Steven Lungu, was 
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released in 2010.  Even after his sentencing, Lungu was adamant that though he had endangered 
the life of many people, he remained convinced that attempting to end Chiluba’s leadership was 
morally defensible because the leadership was “riddled with corruption” (BBC News 2003).   
 
5.6 Legacy of the MMD 
The previous section put the MMD’s option to turn Zambia into a Christian nation in contrast to 
the mode of rule that the party practised. While the Christian nation clause received support from 
a country whose majority practise Christianity, the MMD’s political behaviour squandered all 
the goodwill that ideally informed a turn to a Christian-based constitution. Chiluba’s personal 
conduct has been exposed as vastly at variance with the Christianity he emphatically promoted. 
Furthermore, as has been written before, many argue that Chiluba’s behaviour was not very 
different from the traits he accused the UNIP government of having.   
Richard Joseph (2014:65) described Chiluba as an “aspiring autocrat” with “imperial ambitions.” 
For example, Kaunda’s 27-year rule with only one legal party in the country benefited Chiluba 
because he used that to present himself as forerunner of liberal democracy. However, towards the 
end of his rule, Chiluba aspired to extend his rule from the constitutionally permitted two terms 
to three, unwittingly manifesting the same hankering for power that has continued to characterize 
many of sub-Saharan regimes.  
Thus, even though the 1990s might have brought hope for the permanent retreat of authoritarian 
politics and one-party rule in Zambia, similarities of certain characteristics of the Kaunda era 
with Chiluba’s were blatantly obvious. Accordingly, while the prima facie identity shifts from a 
socialist inclined country to a liberal democratic one were made, the dominance of those in 
power, and the suppression of those out of power continued. What seemed to have changed was 
the power given to political opinion as shown in the way Chiluba’s third term attempt was 
thwarted. The role of the church in challenging Chiluba’s bid to amend the constitution and 
allow him a third term was indicative of how civil society tried to exercise oversight on certain 
important political matters.  
Despite the chequered legacies of the MMD, its role in opening Zambia’s economy shifted the 
country from a pseudo socialist state to an aspiring liberal democratic one. It is also interesting 
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that while this shift invited FDI from the West, it also coincided with the period of emerging 
powers like China, after the Cold War. The MMD was thus part of the global south that sought 
more cooperation among the historically poor countries and China is undoubtedly the most 
influential of these. China’s relations with Zambia could thus be explained from a shared history. 
Its impact on Zambia is such that it was used for political mobilization and support. While China 
has potential to help Zambia’s mining sector, its different labour practices have been criticised 
by trade unions and those that seek popular support. The Patriotic Front in Zambia is largely 
responsible for bringing China’s impact in Zambia to the centre of political discourse.  
 
5.7 The Patriotic Front 
After the attainment of independence in 1964, the second biggest event in the history of Zambia 
was the replacement of the UNIP government with the MMD. The third biggest milestone was 
the replacement of the MMD, after twenty years at the helm, with the Patriotic Front (PF) in 
September 2011. Just as a number of influential politicians in the MMD were former adherents 
of UNIP, those that formed the PF government were mostly erstwhile members of both UNIP 
and the MMD. Sata was himself a member of UNIP and the MMD and then left the latter to form 
the PF after Chiluba picked Levy Mwanawasa as his successor for the 2001 general elections 
(Chan 2014). In a fit of pique Sata formed the Patriotic Front, taking with him politicians like 
Guy Scott who were once MMD loyalists but had grown disenchanted with Chiluba’s leadership 
and decisions. This spill-over effect of membership nurtures continuity in ideological orientation. 
The 2011-2016 manifesto of the Patriotic Front is cited in this section to imbue the section with 
the primary information of the Patriotic Front’s vision for Zambia. The manifesto was inscribed 
before the Patriotic Front came to power. 
Members of PF were more heterogeneous in terms of tribal and ethnic demographics; in fact, 
tribalism is one of the “vices” from which the PF committed “to redeem its citizens” (Patriotic 
Front Manifesto 2011:4). This was partly because they were united by a shared disenchantment 
with Frederick Chiluba. However, to say that tribal sympathies were totally obliterated would 
simply be at variance with the truth. Sata, himself not a Bemba, but nonetheless a fluent speaker 
of the language, was always considered, by casual observers, as Bemba. Since the formation of 
his party, the Patriotic Front has its most loyal following in Bemba speaking regions of northern 
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Zambia, the Copperbelt Province and Lusaka. It is also fair to argue that, like Danielle Resnick’s 
(2012:1351) empirical study does, in lieu “of vote buying, ethnic alignments, or economic 
voting… the urban poor’s voting decisions are related to the strategies used by political parties to 
incorporate them into the political arena.” This could explain Sata’s stronghold of the urban 
areas during his time as leader of the opposition.  
Sata’s populist rhetoric (see Spilsbury 2012) struck a chord with the poor, especially those in 
urban areas (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2010) who had first-hand experience of labour injustices 
meted out by investors that the MMD’s privatization and liberalization policies had attracted. 
While Chiliuba’s reign left corruption as its most outstanding legacy, the rule of Levy 
Mwanawasa, who succeeded him, embarked on a zero tolerance stance on corruption, but was 
accused of being unreasonably lenient with investors, especially Chinese nationals. Apart from 
the gruesome picture of Chinese investment that Sata painted, he also capitalized on the 
controversial conduct of the Chinese and their labour practices. The significance of anti-Chinese 
sentiment was so high that Sata made it the central agenda of his rhetoric in the elections of 
2006. 
In 2006 Sata precipitated a diplomatic crisis between China and Zambia when he threatened to 
recognise Taiwan as a de jure independent state, should he win the election (Chan 2014). This 
was in effect a threat to sever ties with mainland China as the People’s Republic has always 
striven for the One-China policy. The Chinese ambassador to Zambia, as said in the second 
chapter, threatened to cut ties with Zambia should Sata win the polls. Arguably, it was the only 
time when China blatantly abandoned its foreign policy of non-interference with internal politics 
of other states. Larmer and Fraser (2007:611) argue that despite the MMD retaining power in 
2006, “the most important outcome of the campaign was the successful articulation of a new 
populist politics by Michael Sata's Patriotic Front (PF), which won a significant majority in 
urban areas.” It was argued that Sata’s rhetoric on the pernicious and corrupt nature of China’s 
relations with the MMD resonated with Zambians residing in urban areas who were “already 
angered by the negative impact of economic liberalization” (Larmer and Fraser 2007:611). 
The 2008 by-election after the death of Mwanawasa, which Sata lost, saw continuity in attacking 
Chinese investment. The corruption which came to be associated with Rupiah Banda’s 
government from 2008 to 2011 gave Sata another subject to overstate in his quest for the 
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presidency and also moderated his rhetoric against China, though not completely. As testament 
to how entrenched corruption became during Banda’s term, in his last year in office, “the Global 
Fund suspended health assistance and the European Union halted aid for road construction citing 
corruption in the country” (Reuters 2010). In response, Banda said that “We must not allow 
donors to feel they can interfere in the internal affairs of this country because it is a sovereign 
and independent state” (ibid). As the current research shows, China’s vow not to interfere in 
internal affairs of sovereign countries, questionable as it is, has been a major factor in cementing 
its relations with Africa. Banda’s defensiveness against the Global Fund and EU directly 
espouses China’s non-interference policy. 
 
5.7.1 The Patriotic Front in Power: 2011 to Present (2017) 
The victory of Michael Sata’s Patriotic Front in 2011 was both a confirmation of the general 
dissatisfaction with the MMD government and proof that Zambians bought into the anti-Chinese 
investment sentiment which Michael Sata had made his rallying cry. Masterson asserts that 
Sata’s victory was “the first time in Africa [that] the electorate… pronounced their opinion [on 
the China-Africa] relationship.” The PF victory was also an indication of the general attitude 
towards Rupiah Banda’s government which was seen as a return to the Chiluba era type of 
corruption which people saw as customary to MMD government, with a hiatus during 
Mwanawasa’s rule. The controversial sale of state owned Zambia Telecommunications 
Company (Zamtel)73 “and the repeal of the abuse of office provision in the Anti-Corruption Act 
in 2010” (Patriotic Front Manifest 2011: 4) all done during Banda’s rule were seized upon by the 
Patriotic Front as evidence of corruption and an unwillingness of the MMD government to 
hearken to the needs and interests of ordinary Zambians. One of the major decisions that the PF 
government took shortly after acceding to power was to reverse “the sale of Zamtel to 100 
percent government ownership” (Zamtel 2015).  
In terms of its ideology, Michael Sata described his party as espousing social democracy, an 
ideology which the MMD government also ascribed to itself. The Zambia that the PF 
government inherited was a far cry from the Zambia immediately after independence, which was 
                                                          
73 In July 2010 Zamtel was partially privatized by the MMD government with a lot shares sold to LAP Green of Libya 
(Zamtel 2015).   
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described as a middle income country or “rich by African standards” (Tordoff 1977:60). 
Unemployment and extreme poverty rates in rural areas were alarmingly high in 2011, according 
to the 2011 Human Development Report. Zambia ranked 164 out of 187 countries on the Human 
Development Index (UNDP 2011). That this period coincided with China investing in Zambia’s 
economy to an unprecedented degree aroused questions of whether or not China’s FDI is 
development oriented (Spilsbury 2013).74 One of the major challenges that the PF ascertained to 
have inherited was the lack of social justice. In its manifesto, the party states emphatically that 
“social justice shall form the core of the PF government in its domestic and foreign policy” (PF 
Manifesto 2011:5). Thus, in its dealings with indispensable aid and investment, the Patriotic 
Front committed to the promotion of social justice as a significant goal. Chinese investment was 
exposed as stymying this goal.   
The 2011 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report added to the anti-Chinese discourse of the time. 
The report claimed to have empirical insights on the labour conduct of China Non-Ferrous Metal 
Mining Co (CNMC) a Chinese state owned enterprise. The data from the research was mainly 
gathered from workers who had worked elsewhere and where now working for CNMC and those 
who had only worked for CNMC. The respondents referred to low pay, inappropriate work 
conditions, long hours of work and flouting of union rights as characteristics of CNMC 
employment. Those that defend China interpreted the HRW as akin to “the larger, highly-skewed 
Western discourse of 'China-in-Africa’” (Sautman and Yan 2011). That Zambia still relies 
mostly on mining makes controversial behaviour by investors in that sector likely to inflame 
local emotions. It can thus be argued that drawing popular attention to the perceived abominable 
conduct of Chinese investment was handy for the PF government to lure voters from the ruling 
MMD. Sata’s rhetoric was arguably a means to an end. The subsequent manner with which the 
PF dealt and continues to deal with China could bear this argument out. The 2014 Country 
Report says that even under the PF government, Chinese investors were favoured though the 
party came to power partly by whipping up anti-Chinese sentiment (see also Smith 2014). 
                                                          
74 A fair analysis of the impact of China’s FDI on Zambia’s development should take into account the fact that China 
is comparatively a new comer in Africa in terms of major economic involvement. While China has always been 
involved in Africa, this involvement has been marginal compared to Western involvement on the continent. 
Furthermore, it is suspicious to expect China’s impact in Zambia to be instantaneous.  
162 
 
The PF stance could be well explained by the daunting problems that Zambia continues to face, 
problems which could partly be relieved by the much-needed Chinese investment. There seems 
to be the realization that forcing China into a precipitate retreat from Zambia could be 
apocalyptic for a fragile economy. This could be explained as the PF’s pragmatism. The pre-PF 
government rhetoric was moderated by the reality of the situation in Zambia. One of Sata’s first 
high-level audiences in government was actually given to Chinese Ambassador Zhou Yuxiao. 
The Migration Policy Institute (2015) has stated that though the presence of Chinese nationals 
“in Zambia has received much negative media attention mainly due to the anti-Chinese rhetoric 
of late President Michael Sata, the Zambian government now largely recognizes the importance 
of the economic relationship.” 
The PF recognizes Zambia’s continued weak economic status which has partly been fashioned 
by institutional failure (Barton 2015) and the lack of diversification of the economy. For its 
second full term in power (2016-2021) the PF government promised “fulfilment of economic 
growth and diversification” (PF Manifesto 2016:78). Through the Smart Zambian Initiative 
launched in 2015 the PF government, hoped that through lessening dependency on copper 
Zambia will achieve the goal of becoming a developed country by 2064, a century after its 
independence. Tangible diversification could reduce the role that China is likely to play in 
determining Zambia’s economic future.  
 
5.8 Conclusion  
This chapter was a presentation of Zambia’s evolution from the time of independence. At the 
time of its establishment in 1994, Zambia found itself in an international system that was divided 
in terms of ideology and political domination. European countries, among whom counted 
Africa’s colonisers, were capitalist in their ideology. Thus, Zambia, like most of the third world 
and formerly colonized regions, harboured some degree of resentment towards capitalism. It was 
thus understandable that the Kaunda regime chose humanism and its economic leaning, which 
was laced with socialist practices, as its ideology. Apart from economic ideologies, the fight 
against colonialism also played a part in the formation of Zambia’s identity in the nascent stages 
of the country’s existence. At the time Zambia got independence most of southern African was 
still either under colonial or settler rule. For this reason, the UNIP government’s foreign policy 
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was to a large extent tailored towards helping other countries to gain independence. The chapter 
also noted that the attainment of independence in southern Africa and the end of the Cold War 
had an effect on Zambia’s identities and interests. After the rule of Kaunda in 1991, the incoming 
MMD government shifted towards liberalism, at least in terms of economic ideology. 
Furthermore, this opening up of the market attracted foreign investment and China, having 
started its reforms in 1978, increased its economic relations with Zambia to a huge degree. The 
exponential increase of both Chinese investment and personnel in Zambia became so significant 
that opposition political parties accused the MMD of allowing China to take advantage of 
Zambia’s labour force and to crowd out would-be Zambian small scale entrepreneurs.  
To their credit, PF leaders made apparent commitments to mitigate certain aspects of Chinese 
investment, like hiking mineral royalties and pegging tax on production rather than sales of 
mineral resources. However, the general preference for Chinese rather than Western investors 
seems to suggest more motivations on the Zambian government than the economic and 
investment promise that China represents. On the part of China, there also seems to be a 
willingness to yield to certain demands made by Zambia. The mutual importance that the two 
countries share has been arguably constructed by a similar history and the regrettable legacy that 
Western domination has had no the two countries. In other words, the bond is to a significant 
extent a construction of historical happenstance. The following chapter is a presentation of what 
was gathered during field research. The data was gathered from Zambians who submitted their 
appraisal of Sino-Zambian relations and the factors behind them. The seventh chapter is an 
analysis of national identities and interests in order to understand the role that they have played 
in the tenacious nature of China-Zambia relations. The chapter demonstrated whether or not 
constructivist analysis is germane to interpreting the roles of identities and interests in 









  A PRESENTATION OF ISSUES EMERGING FROM PRIMARY DATA  
6.1 Introduction  
As a commemoration of Zambia’s fifty years of independence and establishment of diplomatic 
relations with China, the Chinese embassy in Zambia came up with the “Zambia Through 
Chinese Eyes” initiative.75 This initiative is in form of a competition whereby Chinese nationals 
residing in Zambia submit photographs and essays recounting their experiences in Zambia and 
depicting how China in general perceives Zambia. The character of the competition is similar to 
the presentation and analysis that follow in this chapter and the next chapter. The study sought to 
present how China perceives Zambia and how Zambia perceives China. This mutual perception, 
especially when done at an institutional level, is central to shaping the quality of relations that 
the two countries have. Taylor (2006:164) has written that “bilateral relations between the PRC 
and Zambia have traditionally been among the strongest in the (southern African) region, and 
Zambia has been a valued friend of Beijing since the days of independence.” However, it is also 
in Zambia that China’s investment in Africa has come under fiercest attacks. Thus, to answer one 
of the research questions, the constructivist analysis that follows in chapter seven should explain 
why relations remain strong between the two countries despite the turbulent episodes. The 
current chapter demonstrates, through primary data, the impressions that the labour, civil society, 
Zambian workers working for the Chinese and ordinary Zambians have on China’s relations with 
Zambia. 
However, the researcher has browsed through the website of the People’s Republic of China’s 
Embassy in Zambia to see what information can be gathered from there. It can be presumed, with 
some estimation of accuracy, that officials who work for the Chinese government are wont to 
merely state what official documents reveal. For this reason, the lack of person to person 
engagement with such officials has been compensated with the usage of official documents. 
Some information has also been gathered from representatives of the Zambia Congress of Trade 
Unions (ZCTU), and a paper pertaining to Chinese investment in Zambia chronicled by the same 
                                                          
75 Zambia was the first country in Southern Africa to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of 
China. China recognized Zambia on 29 October 1964, five days after Zambia’s Independence Day (Embassy of the 
Republic of Zambia in Beijing 2014).  
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Congress. This document is of particular importance because ZCTU represents Zambia’s labour 
force, a population that has been particularly affected by Chinese investment. Impressions in that 
document will offer a different view of China’s involvement in Zambia from that offered by the 
government which is almost obliged to be more optimistic about China in Zambia.  
The first chapter already mentioned the respondents who were chosen for this particular study. 
The ubiquitous nature of Chinese presence in Zambia, be it in the mining sector, in which the 
Chinese government has invested significantly, to other sectors and small scale businesses, was 
easily noticeable by the respondents. The questions that were asked to respondents were 
occasionally tweaked in order to be tailored towards the economic, social, intellectual or 
academic orientation of the respondents. For example, with regards to the representatives of 
ZCTU, questions of labour relations assumed more prominence because ZCTU is primarily 
devoted to labour justice for Zambian workers. When interviewing a graduate of international 
studies and political science, it was more appropriate to broach issues of political ideology, 
economic practice, Third World solidarity and democracy. As will be shown, however, even 
when questions were adapted to the respondents, themes that were thought to be more academic, 
like China’s self-perception (identity) and how it appeals to Zambia, occasionally permeated the 
elicited responses from respondents who do not come from an academic background.  
 
6.2 Chinese Investment and Conduct in Zambia: From a Trade Union Perspective  
A research assistant managed to secure an interview with two employees of the Zambia Congress 
of Trade Unions. One of the respondents was the director and another was the researcher of the 
trade union. As has been reported in the second chapter, Sino-Zambian relations, especially since 
the beginning of this century have been simultaneously characterized by heightened Chinese 
investment and occasional violent misunderstandings between Zambian workers and their 
Chinese employers. Thus, the first question asked to the ZCTU officials sought to find measures 
that could be taken to ensure that Sino-Zambian relations are devoid of conflict, especially 
related to labour laws. The Researcher of ZCTU76 alluded to the impact that the media has 
exercised on shifting “the mindset of most Zambians to think that [ the Chinese] are bad” (R-1). 
                                                          
76 From henceforth referred to as R-1.   
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The seventh chapter established the veracity or lack thereof, of this perception and what exactly 
was meant by the term “the media.” Probing the meaning of what the respondent meant by the 
media is important because further responses that were given by the officials point to the fact that 
the word media was conflated with Western perceptions on China’s presence in Zambia. In fact, 
as the interview continued, the director of ZCTU77 stated that Western perceptions are 
determined to present China as scornful of labour laws; this, as will be shown shortly afterwards, 
is partly because China is undercutting the African market for Western wares.  
Furthermore, the respondent was of the opinion that while Chinese labour ethics might be 
unsavoury, the Chinese are not the only ones indulging in oppressive labour practices. However, 
the blemishes of employers of non-Chinese origin have not attracted uniform exposure by the 
media. To give what might sound to be an evenhanded analysis, R-1 mentioned that there are 
even Zambian employers who have been as culpable as the Chinese in oppressing their 
employees. During one of the focus group discussions, Mary Nkumbwa – who works for a 
Chinese employer - also questioned the biased way in which the Chinese have been isolated as 
the only labour practice delinquents. She noted that there are Zambians who are worse in their 
labour practice. There was an admission on the part of R-1 that “It’s true… that the Chinese… 
working conditions78 are usually brought into question when it comes to Zambia because 
[Zambia’s labour] laws are quite strict when it comes to workers” but that it is at the level of 
compliance or “adherence” that problems emerge. As will be seen in the subsequent pages, this 
response is linked to the idea of agency on the part of Zambia that this research has, on a number 
of occasions, recommended.  
The issue of competition for African resources and markets for foreign products was also an 
issue that came up during the interviews. As has been written elsewhere in the research, African 
leaders such as Okonjo-Iweala and Mutambara have dismissed Western suspicion and paranoia 
towards China’s incursion as hypocritical and exhibiting Western fears that their monopoly of 
African resources is now being put to the most formidable test. This was described as “a political 
war between China” and the West to get into Africa’s space. R-1 went so far as to say while 
certain Zambians, the media and the West, might deplore China’s labour record, what the 
Chinese do in Zambia is exactly what is “obtaining in China;” he actually alluded that because of 
                                                          
77 From henceforth called R-2  
78 See also Lee (2009). 
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China’s population, more Chinese in China die because of inhuman labour conditions but 
because of media censorship, such incidents are not made public. Thinly veiled in the 
perceptions presented thus far, is a defense of Chinese against the propaganda blitz, sponsored by 
the media, that seems to taint China’s incursions in Zambia.  
Despite the above, some incidents that have happened in the Chinese owned institutions have 
been too dangerously obvious to be justified by any explanations. For example, this research has 
made reference to the BGRIMM explosives factory that killed more than fifty Zambian workers. 
The response of the Zambian government to major problems emanating from Chinese investment 
has occasionally been swift and reproachful, especially when related to labour disagreements. 
This, as will be shown later, points to Zambia taking agency, even as the weaker of the two 
countries in shaping Zambia’s interaction with China. R-2 referred to a book79 that was 
published by the Africa Labour Research Network, that gave a detailed analysis of Chinese 
investment. After the book was published, the Chinese Embassy in Zambia requested an 
audience with members of ZCTU for dialogue on how some of the concerning issues raised in 
the book could be solved. As R-2 put it “the embassy actually requested for an audience so that 
we iron out issues from their perspective and also hear from us.” This willingness to listen and 
explain has a number of connotations; first of all, it shows that the Chinese do not have a cavalier 
attitude towards concerns raised by Zambians, despite Zambia being a smaller power than the 
Chinese; this incident also shows the importance that China attaches to Zambia. Connected to 
this is what has been written as China’s quest to appear as a global power that is not exploitative. 
This research has also reported how much importance China attaches to identity and image 
building. For this reason, China is likely to address issues that would present it as irrationally 
callous.  
China’s identity also formed a part of the data gathered from the ZCTU officials. One of the 
continuing themes in this research has been that the intersection of identities between Zambia 
and China has been a major factor in reinforcing relations between the two nations. The research 
has shown how China makes use of opportunities in its engagement with Africa and Zambia in 
particular to present itself as a kindred member of the global South, a Third World and 
developing country. R-1 noted that some of the challenges that influence China’s labour norms 
                                                          




are there because China like Zambia is a developing country and that its economy has only 
started to grow recently. This sentiment could possibly allude to the argument that the standards 
that are expected of economies that have long been strongly established cannot be applied to a 
power that until recently was a poor country.80 As has been illustrated in the current section, 
China’s relationship with Zambia has been a mixture of optimism, mutual recognition of 
identities and persistent attacks, mainly from the media and the West on China’s labour practice. 
The following section presents the insights from a civil society perspective.  
 
6.3 China-Zambia Relations: From the Perspective of a Single Civil Society 
Apart from trade unions, the Church in Zambia has been very instrumental in providing 
oversight over political matters. Not only has the Church contributed to political behaviour, it has 
also played a huge role in building human capital in terms of education and providing health care 
through mission schools and Church-run medical facilities. The influence of the Church on 
political matters extends to the era of Kaunda and the Church counts as one of the organs that 
helped the reestablishment of democracy in Zambia. Jimmy Carter, the former President of the 
United States, who led a delegation to prepare and monitor Zambia’s 1991 election, outlined the 
crucial role that the Church played in brokering understanding between Kaunda and Chiluba, 
through the redrafting of the Kaunda-era constitution. The church also helped in training election 
monitors (Carter 1994). One of the notable roles that the Church has played since the 
reintroduction of democracy in Zambia was its stance against Chiluba’s bid to amend the 
constitution and run for a third term.  
The Catholic Church, being one of the biggest Christian denominations in Zambia, has been very 
influential in its commentary and advocacy on Zambian politics. It has done this through bodies 
such as the Zambia Episcopal Conference (ZEC) and more decentralized civil societies like the 
Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR). The Centre is run by Jesuit priests of the 
Catholic Church. One of them is Fr Kelly Michelo, one of the respondents for the interviews 
carried out for this study. Michelo sits on the board of JCTR and writes some articles for the 
                                                          
80 As will be shown later, there are implications of this line of reasoning that this paper disagrees with. To excuse 
the country’s controversial conduct towards its own and other countries’ citizens based on the argument that the 
country in question is dealing with more practical problems is both patronizing of the ability of that country, and 
shows a casual attitude towards human welfare.  
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centre as well. This section deals with the insights that Fr Michelo gave during the interview; it 
should be noted that reference will also be used to put some insights from the interview within 
the context or perspective of convergent or divergent views from other data and literature that 
pertains to China-Zambia relations. This section will also make use of a short piece that Michelo 
wrote in 2007 regarding China-Africa relations, but with more emphasis on Chinese investment 
in Zambia.  
As mentioned in the introduction to this part of chapter, certain words and phrases used by the 
respondent(s) to answer the interview questions will be used to render the respondent’s position 
clear. Michelo’s position is that Sino-Zambian relations, in their current form “are hinged” on 
“trade and investment.” He acknowledges that historically Zambia’s multifaceted relations have 
mostly been with the West. The increasing attention that China is enjoying in Zambia is because 
Zambia has “favorable conditions for investment.” However, Michelo later points out what can 
be interpreted as favourable conditions for Chinese investment. He talks of Zambia’s leniency in 
its polices on foreign investment, most notably the five-year tax free waiver. The permissive 
nature of this waiver, according to Michelo, allows investors to establish their institutions in 
Zambia and after the five-year period lapses, they change the name of their institution in order to 
appear as a new investor, thus extending the number of years for which they are not compelled to 
pay tax. The issue of Zambian agency, which has been gleaned from other interviews, finds its 
way in Michelo’s responses because he categorically says Zambians should “blame” themselves 
regarding the laws they have that allow trade imbalances and unfair foreign investment.81 He 
goes on to argue that Zambia has an “open door policy” that does not sift through the quality of 
investment that the country attracts. This, he concludes, is “very risk for the future of the 
country.” 
The general feeling that Michelo has on China-Zambia relations can be discerned from some of 
the words and phrases he uses to describe his observations. He describes Chinese investment as 
“suspect”, “very questionable”, and that it raises a lot of eyebrows. He is also wary of what he 
calls the “aggressive” nature of Chinese investment, characterized by “flooding” Zambia with 
Chinese nationals while paying Zambians who they hire “very low salaries” (see also Michelo 
                                                          
81 The implication of this statement is that Zambians should be assertive in stating the sort of interactions that they 
want with China and other foreign investors. This is in tandem with the information given by Brian Mwale, one of 
the respondents, as indicated in one of the ensuing sections.   
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2007). Contrary to the mutually beneficial and win-win relations that China claims to promote, 
Michelo asserts that as Sino-Zambian relations stand in their current form, he can “rightly say” 
they neither embody win-win facilities nor promote “self-sustainability” on the part of Zambia 
and that if there are any benefits that Zambia gets from these relations then these are “very 
minimal.” However, the respondent conceded that pursing profit at minimal cost, even at “the 
expense” of Zambia, is common to all investors, whether Chinese or otherwise. He argues that 
this exposes the capitalist nature of the Chinese even if they still claim to be socialists. The 
growing number of Chinese personnel, some of whom do jobs that are deemed befitting of 
ordinary Zambians was also an issue for Michelo.82 As shown in Alden (2007), this issue has 
been raised by Zambian politicians. Chinese that engage in “micro projects like rearing 
chickens…. stifle creativity”, according to Michelo. He also argues that apart from crowding out 
small-scale traders, the Chinese are bringing their own experts and this prevents Zambian experts 
from accessing job opportunities. In a similar line of reasoning, in his first week of office, 
Michael Sata (2011) hosted representatives of the Chinese government and urged that “all 
investors coming to Zambia should bring a limited number of experts” possessing skills that are 
not found in Zambia.    
Apart from the concerns that come with Chinese investment in Zambia, Michelo ventures into 
the political dimension of Sino-African and Sino-Zambian relations. The current study has 
shown how China and Africa have used their humiliating and regrettable history with Western 
imperialism and colonialism as a badge of solidarity. Furthermore, the study has reviewed the 
works of scholars and politicians (e.g. Moyo and Okonjo-Iweala) who have argued that China 
and Africa have common circumstances that make China an authority over the West in 
ascertaining Africa’s priorities. These opinions have lent support to China’s reticence on issues 
of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Michelo asserts that “China is not a player in 
terms of the rule of law” and that this characteristic of China is an incentive that gives African 
governments almost an irresistible reason to forge close ties with China. It forms the crux of 
China’s no-strings attached policy which has made Africa enamoured of China’s friendship 
(Michelo 2007). The unqualified relations that China practises provide a relief for African 
                                                          
82 Michelo is of the opinion that multinational corporations that are of Western origin are better than China in this 




countries that interpret Western conditions and censorship as unfair, high-handed and intolerant 
of Africa’s specific context.  
Finally, one of the concerns raised by Sino-pessimists is that China is working towards 
transforming Africa into its colony (see Malone 2008). Lumumba-Kasongo (2011:258) argues 
that colonizing Africa is a farfetched possibility because “to have a neoimperialist system guided 
and supported by China, it is necessary to have and maintain a monopolistic ruling class in 
Africa.” This argument goes on to state that apart from forging “strong and cultural alliances 
with the Africa elite” China would need to have an elite that is conversant in Chinese language in 
the same manner that the French and English established alliances with now Francophone and 
Anglophone former colonies (ibid). Among all the respondents interviewed for the current study, 
Michelo referred to the issue of language. He stated that China is “strongly trying to transfer” its 
language and that even some Zambian drivers who work for the Chinese are now expected to 
master the basics of Chinese languages. The swelling numbers of scholarships given to Zambians 
to study in China could be a preparatory phase for the alliances that Lumumba-Kasongo argues 
are some of the basis for neoimperialism. Furthermore, this particular study has argued that 
exploitative or colonial relations are not the preserve of former colonizers. 
Not only this, there are subtle ways through which Africa and Zambia can be dominated that, 
while not taking the form of European colonialism, could engender similar consequences for the 
continent. For example, Michelo cautions that one “thing that [Zambians] have to be very careful 
[about] and is becoming more political is the issue of land.” He rued the illiteracy of headmen 
and local chiefs who are custodians of traditional and customary land, in dealing with Chinese 
that want to purchase land. Though no further elaboration was given as to why this “will be a 
problem in the future,” it could be argued that those who purchase land might be planning to be 
permanently domiciled in Zambia, and that this could raise issues of cultural clashes and the 
suppression of Zambians who might be presumably poorer than the Chinese. The growing 
physical presence of the Chinese in all levels of Zambian society is likely to sustain the argument 
of possible colonization, especially if the fortunes of Zambia and Zambians will remain paltry 
compared to the sustained growth of China and its citizens. China’s growing diaspora and the 




6.4 China-Zambia Relations: Insights from Political Informers 
Following the nomenclature used for the ZCTU officials (R-1 and R-2), one of the respondents 
whose insights are employed in the current sub-section will be referred to as R-3. This section is 
a presentation of information that was gathered from R-3 who has done graduate studies in 
international relations and is also a native of Copperbelt Province where most of Chinese 
investment in Zambia is found. The second respondent, Laura Miti, is one of Zambia’s most 
prominent political commentators. In response to the question on what has been the main 
attribute of the longstanding relations between China and Zambia, R-3 cited economic interests. 
To the researcher’s interpretation, this response was prompted by current Sino-Zambian 
relations. This is borne out by the fact that R-3 compared the intent of Western powers to 
“civilize” African politics as a motive for relations while China concentrated solely on economic 
ties. However, when one observes China-Zambia relations from their establishment in 1964, the 
influence of ideology becomes apparent. In fact, in response to question 1 (b), R-3 conceded that 
Kaunda’s African Humanism “matched much of China’s communist approach to development, which 
is centred on social equality.” As mentioned elsewhere, Mao and Kaunda shared an affinity to 
against imperialism and capitalism.  
The shared views on perceived Western hegemony provided Zambia and China with a very firm 
basis on which to maintain their relations. R-3 argued that while Zambia was fighting 
colonialism, China was fighting against Western calls for political reform, which were perceived 
as interference in China’s internal political ethos. Thus, China and Zambia were further driven 
into the same camp because “they shared a common enemy i.e. the West” (R-3) This should be 
put in context; China resented Western influence, mainly because of its (China’s) humiliating 
surrender of Hong Kong to the United Kingdom for almost a century. However, from its Asian 
neighbourhood, China also suffered Japanese occupation from the late 1930s to 1945. These 
experiences infused in the Chinese psyche, an almost instinctual resentment to foreign 
occupation and rule, irrespective of where it emerged from. Thus, China’s relations with 
countries that were fighting against colonialism should not be judged in one-dimensional fashion 
– against the West. It was prompted by occupation by any foreign power. In a Humanist in 
Africa, Kaunda also disabused his readers of the notion that colonial tendencies were the 
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preserve of the West cum capitalist powers. From this perspective, R-3’s response suffers a 
setback not because it is untrue, but because it is incomplete.  
The current study has argued that similarities in terms of national identity and interests play a 
pivotal role in shaping cordial relations between states. The previous paragraph was an attempt 
to illustrate how an intersecting aspiration to end foreign domination helped Zambia and China 
to strengthen their relations. One of the questions given to respondents queried the effects that 
democratization – the reintroduction of multiparty democracy - in Zambia had on Sino-Zambian 
relations. R-3 gave a curious response, hitherto undiscovered by the researcher. The response 
was that democratization also came with the liberalization of the economy in Zambia, which in 
turn ushered in privatization and attracted the inflow of Chinese enterprises. This argument, as 
the researcher subsequently discovered, was also advanced by Howard French (2014) who stated 
that the privatization drive on which Zambia embarked coincided with a period when China’s 
“go out” policy was gathering momentum. As a country that had hitherto been ignored by the 
West, Zambia was an opportunity for China’s state and private owned corporations (French 
2014). This is instructive in that the changes that Zambia went through could tempt an ordinary 
observer to predict that it might have driven China and Zambia apart because the latter was 
changing from a one-party state and was also shedding its socialist inclined economics. Taylor 
(2006) cites an opinion expressed in China’s newsprint on Zambia’s political transformation, 
saying that Zambia’s return to multiparty politics was an internal affair of Zambian into which 
China would not interfere. This was a strict adherence to China’s non-interference policy, which 
R-3 tellingly called “supposed non-interference in Zambia’s political affairs”83 (emphasis 
added). 
Zambia has also never objected to China’s choice of being a socialist country. Against the 
seeming post-Cold War shift towards neoliberalism, China has doggedly maintained its 
adherence to socialism with Chinese characteristics. At the 18th CPC National Congress, Xi 
Jinping asserted that “only socialism can save China, and only Chinese socialism can lead our 
economy to development” (Zambia Daily Mail, 14 October 2015). The framing of socialism with 
Chinese characteristics exhibits a change from Mao’s communist dogmatism. As pointed out by 
                                                          
83 The word ‘supposed’ is important in the light of what happened in the build up to the 2006 general election in 
Zambia. Furthermore, this paper has argued that China would be compelled to abrogate this policy if the political 
climate of its trade partners threatens China’s interests.  
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R-3, “in as much as it denies it, [China] has gradually adopted liberal economic policies.” 
Joining the World Trade Organisation was also a sign of China’s willingness to be integrated 
into the global economy. However, all these developments should not blind one to the internal 
practical challenges confronting China. These include China’s responsibility to cater for the 
world’s biggest population, a reality which, as respondents from ZCTU mentioned, has 
compelled China to be more aggressive in pursuing its interests.84 R-3 also mentioned the search 
for markets for China’s “cheap products” as another incentive that lures China into relations with 
Zambia and Africa. Thirdly, China uses its relations to influence opinion, especially of countries 
of the South that identify with China’s history. This sentiment, as shown in the second chapter, 
was aired by Guy Scott when he dismissed China’s overtures to Africa as a ploy to buy African 
support in international fora.  
Despite the merit in the argument that China uses its relations and investment to get Zambia’s 
support, there are opportunities that the two countries can exploit to their mutual benefit. For 
Zambia, R-3 averred that China has thus far been a stable market for copper, a mineral resource 
that continues to be the principal cornerstone of Zambia’s economy. However, Zambia could 
also exploit its trade relations with China to include more goods and resources in addition to 
copper. R-3 also sees China as an opportunity for Zambia to enhance its technology. The ZCTU 
respondents stated that this is happening as observed in the new building formulae that Zambians 
have adopted from the Chinese. The infrastructure that China is poised to construct in Zambia is 
another benefit that Zambia can get from its relations with China. In her response to what 
benefits China and Zambia offer each other, Laura Miti stated “that China [helps] Zambia to 
build its infrastructure at a much faster rate” than would be case without China’s intervention 
(Miti 2017).  Despite the controversy surrounding the quality of Chinese infrastructure, 
especially roads, China’s contribution to the TAZARA Railway line gives the country a 
favourable perception in Zambia.85 Like many African countries, Zambia is in desperate need of 
infrastructure and China’s intervention seems felicitous. R-3 was more pessimistic in the way he 
presented the opportunities that Zambia offers to China. After pointing out that Zambia offers 
                                                          
84 It should also be noted that respondents from ZCTU explained that China’s stupendous demography gives the 
country an unparalleled labour force. This availability, the respondents reckon, could explain China’s seemingly 
casual attitude towards working conditions in Zambia.  
85 China’s contribution towards building the TAZARA Rail was a common feature during interviews; it was referred 
to even in one of the focus group discussions. 
175 
 
China a beneficial destination for China’s goods and services, he reiterates the old African 
lamentation of African countries being the exporters of raw material to more industrialised 
countries. Embedded in this sentiment is the feeling that Africa’s potential to industrialise is 
perpetually occluded by powers that continue to import the continent’s resources without 
nurturing the development of industries in Africa. In this manner, more industrialised countries 
export their finished products to Africa. Thus, China finds in Zambia a readily available market 
for its finished goods. For this reason, R-3 calls Zambia “a dumping site” for China’s goods.  
Another ‘opportunity’ that Zambia offers to China is that the country is not only the destination 
for China’s services but its citizens as well. The respondent goes thus:   
 
 Zambia is a destination of what I call ‘China’s Offloading Policy’; a 
policy through which Chinese contract workers and investors do not 
return home. It’s an inconspicuous measure designed to lower China’s 
population and the burdens bred by that, by ‘offloading’ to other 
countries as many Chinese citizens as possible (R-3, 14 February, 2017. 
Ndola, Zambia). 
 
This argument seems to be expressing the sentiment of people like Michelo from the JCTR who, 
in his words said “the Chinese are all over the place” in Zambia. Miti expressed a concern raised 
by respondents from ZCTU that China also brings “unskilled labour to fill positions that can be 
filled by Zambians” (Miti 2017). The fear of China taking over Africa with its physical presence 
partly informs this sentiment. In some quarters, China’s physical presence has been judged to be 
the precursor to China’s physical takeover of the continent. Andrew Malone, whose 2008 article 
has been cited in this research was categorical in his appraisal of China’s increasing physical 
presence in Africa:  
With little fanfare, a staggering 750,000 Chinese have settled in Africa over the 
past decade. More are on the way. The strategy has been carefully devised by 
officials in Beijing, where one expert has estimated that China will eventually 
need to send 300 million people to Africa to solve the problems of over-
population and pollution. The plans appear on track (Malone 2008). 
 
R-3 cited some concerns that come with the growing number of Chinese citizens in Zambia. The 
concerns are economic as well as social. Economically, R-3 argues that Chinese in Zambia have 
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the requisite “capital to engage in about every economic enterprise.” This factor puts Zambian 
business at a crucial disadvantage. In terms of social consequences, R-3 charges that the rise in 
the number of Chinese citizens in Zambia is necessitating an inclusion of Chinese culture in 
Zambia. This is “in form of Chinese schools and infrastructure emblazoned with Chinese script.” 
The observation of the respondents from ZCTU that some Zambians who work under Chinese 
employers are compelled to speak elementary Chinese seems to bear out the argument of the 
simultaneous rise of China’s population and culture in Zambia. R-3 also expressed the opinion 
that the influx of Chinese in Zambia is likely to provoke racial confrontation with the Chinese 
comporting themselves as a superior race.  
This section revealed the sentiments of R-3 and Laura Miti. In addition to presenting the 
thoughts of the respondents in question, the section put them in context and drew the connections 
that some of R-3’s opinions have with the literature used for this study. Furthermore, the study 
has noted some similar themes, as expressed in the type of language used between R-3 and other 
respondents. For example, from at least three respondents, China’s population as a concern in 
Zambia has been raised though for different reasons. R-3 saw Zambia as an opportunity for 
China to “offload” some of its citizens.86 Kelly Michelo was of the opinion that the growing 
presence of the Chinese in Zambia has diminished the intensity of debate on Chinese investment 
in Zambia. Respondents from ZCTU argued that China’s population explains its labour practice, 
which some deem as neglectful of safety. From these differing perspectives, the section 
illustrated how different and similar perspectives can be of Zambia-China relations. One factor, 
such as population, evokes different opinions from different people. The next subsection presents 
the information gathered from the focus group discussion comprising five ordinary Zambians.  
 
6.5 The Power of History and Economic Ambition: Impressions of ordinary Zambians on 
Sino-Zambian relations  
The current section presents data that was generated during the focus group discussion of five 
Zambians. The group consisted of two females and three males. It is noteworthy that four out of 
                                                          
86 The next chapter will show how deep the concern is of the presence of ordinary Chinese not only in Zambia but 
in Africa in general. A book by Howard French entitled China’s Second Continent argues that ordinary Chinese will 
be more influential in establishing a Chinese empire in Africa. 
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the five respondents hail from the Copperbelt Province where the Chinese own most of their 
mines. The Copperbelt is instructive in appraising China’s investment in Zambia because 
allegations of China being an oppressive and would-be colonizer have been bolstered by 
allegations that Chinese employers do not adhere to the safety requirements for miners. In the 
seventh chapter, these allegations will be tested against some empirical studies done by other 
researchers to establish the veracity and extent of Chinese investment as oppressive in Zambia. 
Mutale Kafwilo attributed the longstanding Sino-Chinese relations to ideologies i.e. socialism 
which China and Zambia seemed to share historically. The respondent, like R-3, cited Kaunda’s 
economic inclinations and ideologies that were akin to socialism. Though not overtly professing 
socialism, Kaunda’s notion of humanism bore a striking resemblance to the tenets of socialism. 
Thus, the respondent assumed that Zambia, during Kaunda’s rule, manifested some of China’s 
economic practice. However, both Zambia and China have changed their economic ideology, in 
practice if not rhetoric, since the time of the Cold War. The pragmatic leadership after Mao toned 
down the socialist extremism that characterized Mao’s era. When interviewed Kafwilo noted this 
change by stating that:  
 
since the death of Chairman Mao there have been more capitalist ideologies 
introduced in the Chinese way of life, so to that effect we have seen a few 
businessmen that have established businesses in China using the capitalist 
models…. We have got guys like the Alibaba guy and a few other guys that 
have established businesses that have gone multinational. I think they have been 
encouraged to lean more towards capitalism of late than they were at liberty 
during Chairman Mao’s reign (Kafwilo, 2017. Scottsville). 
 
The changes that came after Mao were not only consigned to economic transformation. By 
necessity, the shift towards more liberal economics demands a shift on certain social practices 
like giving ordinary people the latitude to start private enterprises. Essentially this means people 
are given leeway to experiment with economic ideologies that they see fit. Mao, according to 
Kafwilo, had “more or less brainwashed the entire population of” China but after his death 
Chinese “have been more free to think on their own and not just be influenced by certain 
ideologies from their leaders.” The immense control that Mao had on the mindset of Chinese, 
brainwashing to use Kafwilo’s parlance, was observed by Emmanuel Hevi (1963) during his stay 
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in China (see also Matambo and Mtshali 2016:220). That non-Chinese are able to note the 
changes is evident of an apparent evolution of China’s identity.  
The record of work that China has done in Zambia, most prominently the construction of the 
Tanzania-Zambia Railway line, was also mentioned as important to the trustworthy 
identity/image that China has cultivated in Zambia. This was also noted by a respondent of the 
first focus group discussion, Shigala Mwamulima. As shown in chapter two, building the 
TAZARA was not seen in terms of infrastructure and economics only. It was also a symbol of 
China’s commitment to end southern African dependency on then white ruled Zimbabwe and 
South Africa. In his determination of what made the Chinese to gradually start heading to 
Zambia after Zambia’s 1990-1991 reform, French (2014) argues that word of mouth suggested 
that Zambians were friendly to Chinese and there was “the lingering gratitude in Zambia for the 
immense gesture of solidarity extended by China with its construction of the TAZARA Railway 
in the 1970s.” 
 The research has shown that Tanzania and Zambia had approached prospective sponsors from 
Western countries for the project, who were more economically able than China in the 1970s. 
However, the West ruled that the project was inappropriate and too costly. The fact that China 
took over the project created an atmosphere that it is a power that can be “trusted” (Kafwilo 
2017) by Zambia. The use of the word “trust” by the respondent is important; since the quality of 
relations by countries comes from what Wendt calls social practice, the conduct of China has 
impressed on Zambia the picture of a country that can be trusted to help Zambia. From the 
respondent’s perspective, China’s current involvement in mining and building Zambia’s 
infrastructure can be understood from the reputation that the construction of the Tanzania-
Zambia Railway line nurtured. 
Judging from the longevity of China’s commitment to Zambia’s infrastructural development, 
Kafwilo stated that China’s role has been “immense.” Currently, however, Kafwilo mentioned 
that China’s relations and investment are more tailored towards material benefits such as 
building infrastructure, an allusion that ideological identity is playing a less role in cementing 
Sino-Zambian relations. Taylor (2006) argues that Zambia’s own political and economic changes 
after 1991 did not have a telling influence, at least in the negative sense, on China-Zambia 
relations. Zambia opened up its political space to allow for multiparty democracy at the time 
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when China was in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square crisis, whence the CCP actually 
augmented its monopolistic hold on power. One of the respondents conceded the fact that he was 
not sufficiently confident of his understanding of what the changes in Zambia’s identity did to 
China-Zambia relations but nonetheless opined that it might have taken China a bit of time to 
adjust to the changes that Zambia was undergoing. In the pursuit of veracity, the opinions of the 
respondent on this matter are not authoritative enough.  
At the time when Zambia was moving to its current political landscape, there was also the rising 
tide of synergy in the countries of what has become to be known as the global South. The United 
States and its neoliberal ideologies had seemingly emerged the victors of the Cold War but the 
new era also gave impetus to the development of regional powers like China that sought more 
influence on international politics. Emerging powers were also seeking to be economically 
involved in countries that had hitherto nationalized major parastatals but were now opening up 
for foreign investment. These circumstances gave China more prospects for success in courting 
African countries. The Chiluba government that came after Kaunda exploited their relationship 
with China while initiating its economic reforms that were interpreted as being influenced by 
Western ideologies. This study has argued that a country at any particular time can have 
multiple, sometimes contradictory identities and interests, subject to who it is relating with. This 
explains the tenacity of China-Zambia relations despite the points of divergence in their identity 
after the Cold War.  
One of the most threatening divergence that the two countries share is their understanding and 
practice of labour ethics. Thus, apart from the political and ideological questions that 
characterize the current research, it is sensible to tackle labour disputes between Chinese 
investors and Zambians as these have the potential to shake political and ideological relations. 
Evans Zulu, one of the participants in the focus group discussion, averred that relations between 
Zambians and Chinese are exploitative in favour of China. Coming from a mining town where 
the BGRIMM disaster happened, Zulu stated that Zambians working in Chinese corporations are 
enduring poor working conditions and very low wages. One of the most difficult episodes of 
China-Zambia relations came in 2006 and it was not linked to any ideological positions. It was 
rather provoked by a confluence of factors. One of these was Michael Sata’s charge that Chinese 
investment was abusive. In addition, the number of cases on which Chinese employers have 
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flouted labour laws further fueled anti-Chinese sentiment in Zambia. Thus, for a smoother run of 
relations between the two countries, the research undertook to find out possible measures that 
could be taken to ensure that relations between Zambia and China are stable and free of conflict 
with regards to labour disputes.  
Kafwilo argued that the “onus” to rectify disputes in terms of work ethics between China and 
Zambia resides with Zambians. This position is interpreted in this research as arguing for 
Zambia’s agency in its relations with China. As will be shown later from Mohan and Lampert 
(2012) and Odoom (2013), the tendency to perennially depict African countries as passive 
victims in their relations with China denies African countries an opportunity to mutually 
construct identities and ideas with the countries they relate to. The Zambia Congress of Trade 
Unions, as gathered from its representatives, has made strides in forcing China’s adherence to 
what they call Zambia’s “strict” labour laws. Bolstering Zambia’s say in shaping and influencing 
the Sino-Zambian nexus could result in a realistic assessment of how relations between the two 
countries are mutually beneficial and test the veracity of identities that the two countries 
apparently share. Thus far, Kafwilo asserts that he has:  
not been impressed with the way the Zambian authorities have 
been laxed about the way foreign employers treat local employees. 
I think the officials need to wake up and need to make sure they 
are closely monitoring how the labour force is being treated. That 
is the only way I feel the situation can be helped (Kafwilo, 2017. 
Scottsville). 
Respondents from ZCTU also stated that despite their advocacy and the existence of well stated 
labour laws, there are still concerns regarding adherence to the laws by Chinese employers. 
When asked on what he thought the general feeling is among Zambians working for Chinese 
employers, Kafwilo noted that there is a sense of resignation. While they may not be happy with 
Chinese work ethics, Zambians that work for the Chinese reckon that they do not have an option 
but to work for the Chinese, irrespective of the conditions under which they work and the 
“peanuts” they earn. As will be shown in the next section when information from respondents 
who have worked as casual employees for a Chinese firm is analysed, the feeling of resignation 
is notable. Apart from helping their casual workers, Mwale, one of the respondents, stated that 
“there will not be any form of development” if Zambia decides to do away with the Chinese and 
the investment that they come with. Navigating the necessity of Chinese investment and at the 
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same time not letting it endanger Zambians requires a deft method of manoeuvring on the part of 
the Zambian government; in other words, it demands a thoroughly crafted framework of 
exercising Zambia’s agency but at the same time retaining the beneficial parts of China’s 
relations and investment.  
Kafwilo stated that there have been occasions when the Zambian government has stepped in to 
condemn China’s more controversial labour practices. The representatives from ZCTU referred 
to the Sinazongwe incident where two Chinese nationals were arrested for shooting at Zambian 
workers who were protesting against what they termed poor working conditions and an unjust 
remuneration. Sinazongwe District Commissioner (DC) Oliver Pelete decried the conduct of the 
Chinese nationals and demanded their arrest (Lusaka Times 16 October 2010).87 In addition to 
China’s labour practices, the aggressive nature with which China is seeking resources has on 
occasion led to arrests. One of the more recent examples was the arrest of four Chinese nationals 
who resorted to offering bribes in order to sway the position of farmers who had rejected the 
intent of Tiang Mining Zambia Limited to start a quarry mine in Shimabala. The Anti-Corruption 
Commission of Zambia carried out a sting operation in which top members of the said firm were 
arrested (Times of Zambia, 10 January 2015). These and some other examples give the indication 
that, though to a limited extent, Zambian officials have tried to limit China’s carte blanche in 
Zambia.  
  
6.6 A Workers’ Appraisal of China-Zambia relations and China’s labour practice in 
Zambia 
The current research admits that despite offering a theoretical departure from commonly used 
theories of international relations, constructivism still confines the creation and promotion of 
national identity to the level of the elite. Judging by how powerful governments and certain 
individuals can be in dictating national identity, this tendency is explicable. However, it should 
be noted that the effect of China-Zambia relations, be it good or ill, affects most crucially the 
general populace of the two countries. For this reason, it is imperative to make strides into 
                                                          
87 As will be shown in chapter six and seven, arrests have actually been made but there has not been a clear follow 
up. The respondents for this research have noted that the Patriotic Front government has been more proactive in 
calling for the arrests of Chinese who do not adhere to labour laws and rule of law but there has not been reports 
on how the cases proceeded.  
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sounding out the impressions that ordinary Zambians have on the growing China-Zambia 
interaction. As has been argued, the most controversial aspects of China-Zambia relations have 
been provoked by labour disputes. The research thus undertook to conduct a focus group 
discussion of five respondents who are currently working for a Chinese fabric firm in the 
Kamwala Market area of Lusaka. In addition to this, the researcher interviewed Brian Mwale, a 
Zambian who has had experience working for a Chinese firm but was no longer employed at the 
time of the interview.  
For the interview to be appropriate for the respondents, the researcher and research assistant did 
not ask the respondents to give a thorough and theoretical history of Zambia’s relations with 
China and the role that identity and national interest have played. For the purpose of encouraging 
the respondents’ confidence, the questions that were asked pertained to issues that the 
interviewees could readily identify with. Furthermore, the discussion was conducted in Nyanja, 
one of Zambia’s local languages in which the researcher and respondents are fluent speakers. In 
response to what China’s interests are in its engagement with Zambia, Mulenga Nkumbwa and 
Ruth Nyirenda asserted that the Chinese are interested in making profit out of Zambia, and that 
they are doing this through selling clothing items.88 Apart from making profit out of Zambia, 
Shigala Mwamulima, another respondent in the group, opined that, from his perspective, the 
Chinese are “coming to settle” in Zambia because in China they are too many but Zambia has a 
lot of land but with a disproportionately smaller population. Mwamulima and Nkumbwa 
provided the same response to the other part of the question on what opportunities Zambia and 
China give each other. The two respondents said that the Chinese are looking for “settlement” 
and Zambians have been very open to selling land to Chinese nationals seeking to settle in 
Zambia. This sentiment was also pointed out by Michelo, though Michelo alluded this 
phenomenon to headmen who are custodians of land while Mwamulima averred that the laws of 
Zambia are what allow for such easy access to land acquisition.    
One of the foremost questions, therefore, was the effect that the growing presence of Chinese has 
had on Zambians. Just like R-1 from ZCTU cited above, Mwale was appreciative of China’s 
involvement in augmenting and improving Zambia’s infrastructure. He was also positive about 
the impact that the Chinese have had on offering hitherto unemployed Zambians with casual 
                                                          
88 Nyirenda and Nkumbwa fell short of pointing to other possible sectors of Chinese business activity, by confining 
themselves to clothing items, because they are more familiar with that type of business venture than others 
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employment. His argument was that before the arrival of the Chinese, even casual employment 
was scarce in Zambia. Mwale’s response was in tandem with what Nkumbwa and Nyirenda 
proffered in response to the question on the opportunities that China offers to Zambia. Two 
respondents decried corruption among prospective Zambian employers who demand bribes 
before they could offer employment. Nyirenda stated that the Chinese cannot be bribed into 
employing Zambians.  
Mwale was equally positive of Chinese investment despite admitting that cases of Chinese 
abusing Zambian workers are true. Nkumbwa, Mwamulima and Nyirenda stated that it is 
erroneous to support a sweeping opinion on how Chinese flout labour laws. From their 
experience, two respondents (Nkumbwa and Nyirenda) averred that their employer conformed to 
labour laws and that they were satisfied with the wages they were getting. Despite this, however, 
they were quick to point out that not all Chinese employers adhere to decent labour laws and that 
they know of other people who are being paid less than the accepted minimum wage. 
Mwamulima concurred with Nkumbwa and Nyirenda’s sentiment that Chinese employers are not 
the same, but he noted that the ideal situation should be that all Chinese adhere to decent labour 
practices. Mwamulima also went on to say that from his observation, workers in Chinese firms 
who are being underpaid are more than those who are being paid above the minimum wage. 
Mwale’s position was that the Chinese enable their Zambian employees to afford a better living 
despite they, the Chinese not having excess money. Furthermore, he urged that Zambians should 
not be impulsive in their censure of Chinese investment because if the Chinese are forced into a 
hurried withdrawal a lot of ordinary Zambians could be left desperate. Interestingly, the reliance 
which Mwale seems to note on China, is countered by his call for Zambian agency. This came 
after Mwale was asked why Michael Sata, who had made anti-Chinese sentiment the hallmark of 
his campaigns while in opposition, had changed his stance and actually reinforced official Sino-
Zambian friendship after acceding to power. His response is in line with Hess and Aidoo’s 
(2008) argument that Sata used anti-Chinese language to garner votes from a restive citizenry.  
Mwale stated that Sata used anti-Chinese rhetoric for political convenience and in order to appeal 
to the many people who viewed China as a menace and the MMD government in Zambia as 
colluding with Chinese ‘infestors.’ The respondent argued that driving the Chinese out of 
Zambia, as Sata had promised, “is not the solution.” The solution was in dialoguing with the 
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Chinese and stating categorically how Zambian workers under their charge should be treated. 
Mwamulima also stated that Zambia has the responsibility of determining the type of investment 
that the country needs. Nkumbwa actually advocated a meticulous method by government in 
determining who among the Chinese investors and/or employers are beneficial to Zambia and 
those who are not beneficial in the quest to secure the interests of Zambians. Zambia, according 
to Mwale, was for Zambians and hence it was up to them to chart how they should be treated by 
Chinese investors. In terms of benefiting ordinary Zambians, Mwale pointed out that while 
investors are quick to make returns from the natural resources they get from Zambia, Zambians 
have remained trapped in poverty.  
 
6.7 Conclusion  
The sixth chapter was mostly dedicated towards presenting the information that was gathered 
from primary data. The succeeding chapter looks at the main findings that this research has made 
from primary data, gathered mostly through interviews. It will then be compared to academic 
literature, most of which is found in the second chapter. The data presented in this chapter has 
been put in the context of a broader scope of the China-Zambia discourse in the analysis found in 
chapter seven. In response to what have been major contributors to the longevity of Sino-
Zambian relations, data from interviews did not expressly refer to intersecting identities and 
interests. Instead, China’s commitment to build the Tanzania-Zambia Railway was mentioned by 
R-3, Mutale Kafwilo and Shigala Mwamulima. Another point made was that having the West as 
a common foe was instrumental in strengthening relations between China and Zambia.  
What primary data did not reveal was a deeper meaning that underlay China’s involvement in the 
TAZARA project. Yu (1971), Mwase (1987), Corkin, Burke and Davies (2008) and Snow 
(1994) determine that apart from being China’s biggest economic contribution to the Third 
World up to that stage, the TAZARA Railway was a testimony of China’s enduring contribution 
to end white minority rule in Africa. The TAZARA is also called the Uhuru line, uhuru being a 
Kiswahili word for freedom. The project represented freedom for Zambia and Tanzania from 
dependency on South Africa and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) which were both under minority 
rule. Thus, though not expressly stated by the interviewed respondents, China’s commitment to 
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ending colonial and minority rule in the Third World has been a major contributor to its 
longstanding relations with Zambia.  
Implicitly included in China’s commitment to the welfare of Third World countries is its own 
identification as a developing country of the global South. The researcher for ZCTU who was 
interviewed stated that “China is just coming out from being a developing country.” In the next 
chapter, reference is made to President Xi’s address at the China-UN conference where he 
reiterated that China is still a part of the Third World, is still a developing country and that it 
remains an unflinching supporter of mutual development in the global South. The research has 
made mention of common challenges faced by Third World countries. These include meeting 
basic demands of Third World citizens, bolstering the influence of the South in the international 
political system, the lack of sufficient infrastructure and lessening dependency on the West. 
These challenges then breed coincident interests. As has shown, China’s credentials in 
developing Zambia’s infrastructure are well established. Zambia’s resources have also been used 
to sate China’s demands, necessitated by its huge population and economic and industrial 
growth. Thus, the conterminous nature of Sino-Zambian identities and interests has sustained 
relations between the two countries. Both primary and academic literature has shown this to be 
the case. The stance of the two countries vis-a-vis the West has also contributed to the intimacy 
they share.   
The next chapter has been dedicated to answer the questions raised by the research in relation to 
the factors that have determined the construction of identities and interests in Zambia and China. 
It has to be said that national identities and interests could actually be attributed to, or 
constructed by, certain influential individuals within a specific country. As Ted Hopf (2009:279) 
writes, national identities could just be “subjective perceptions of decision makers.” A section on 
the urgency of agency on the part of Zambia will illustrate how China-Zambia relations could 
benefit Zambia whose weaker economic status and political influence in the international system 
put it as smaller partner in the relations between the two countries. One of major concerns raised 
in this research has been anti-Chinese sentiment in Zambia. Thus, the research bears the 




 WHOSE IDENTITY, WHOSE CONSTRUCTS AND WHOSE INTEREST? 
THE SYNTHESIS OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY DATA IN ANALYSING CHINA-
ZAMBIA RELATIONS 
7.1 Introduction  
Constructivism emphasises the importance of the “social fabric” of international relations by 
which nations develop mutual perceptions (Checkel 1998). Constructivism perceives relations 
between nations as being dynamic, multifaceted and numerous. The same logic follows the 
quality of identities and interests that countries share and how these influence international 
relations. Inasmuch as they might come through interaction, identities and interests can also be 
influenced by local forces that are impinging on local policy; these forces might include the 
thoughts of influential individuals or organizations within a country that dictate how the citizenry 
perceives itself and the picture that the country should sell to the international system. The 
following pages provide a constructivist analysis and how the resultant identities and interests of 
Zambia and China have played a role in charting interactions between the two countries.  
The analysis made in this chapter is mainly focused on interpreting both primary and secondary 
data and documents that pertain to China-Zambia relations and China’s general interaction with 
Africa and the Zambian society in particular.89 Furthermore, this interpretation has been 
enhanced by thematic analysis wherein general patterns are formed from the sampled documents 
to note any consistencies and inconsistencies. The sequence with which the data and themes are 
presented in the remainder of the chapter is chronological. It starts with a brief section on how 
instrumental certain influential individuals have been on how their respective countries are 
perceived by others. That section also tackles how these leaders and their respective countries 
perceive themselves and rationalize their interests. From the outset, the research has striven to 
make it clear that during the Cold War the world was divided mainly on ideological lines, though 
for countries like China and Zambia an extra dimension has to be added; the dichotomy between 
                                                          
89 Adding the concept of China’s interaction with Africa has been prompted by the fact that, in its dealings with 
Zambia, the analysed material displayed a reference to third world solidarity and South-South cooperation as being 
influential in shaping China-Zambia relations. In this way, even though some elements of China-Zambia relations 
are unique to the two countries, the fact that these relations are also influenced by China’s general perception of 
Africa cannot be discounted.  
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the erstwhile colonizers and their former subjects. After the Cold War, the seeming triumph of 
capitalism and liberal democracy over communism and authoritarianism also had effects on 
international relations and the countries that make the subject of this study were not immune to 
this. The struggle between the traditionally capitalist West and the Third World has graduated 
from being determined by colonialism to new nomenclature between the North and the global 
South. This has also influenced the identity of China and Zambia and has subsequently provoked 
a development of certain interests in the two countries. Thus, while there are some clear breaks 
from the past to the present political situation, there seems to be an enduring pattern that divides 
the two countries from the developed world especially.  
In addition, when responding to whose identities and whose interests China and Zambia share 
and promote, the current chapter tackles how different sectors of Zambia perceive China. At the 
state level, as said elsewhere, the two countries claim that their friendship is strengthened by 
shared interests and common worldviews on global issues. Alternative forces for this friendship 
could be adduced, such as expediency and necessity, depending on who the respondent is to the 
question.   
 
7.2 The Role of Individuals in Shaping National Identities and Interests 
If constructivist analysis looks at process and culture as being influential in dictating politics and 
social relations among nations, it should concede that there is a gradation on who might 
influence the quality of such relations; in other words, there are sectors of society whose tastes 
and dispositions are likely to shape national identity, national interests and relations with other 
countries. These sectors of society could occasionally be influential individuals. Furthermore, it 
is important to include the context that influences individuals and how this shapes their outlook 
on identity and interest. The third research question sought to probe the factors that have been 
influential in the creation of identities and interests in China-Zambia relations. This section 
addresses that question with a particular attention to the influence that certain individuals played 
in constructing the identities and interests of their countries.  
The twentieth century saw major changes in defining a number of nations. This is mainly 
because a good number of nations were under colonial or foreign rule and hence the change from 
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this system to self-rule meant a change in the identity and interests of these nations. Though a 
herculean task such as winning independence from a foreign power cannot be a single-handed 
affair by an individual, certain individuals emerged within liberation movements that became 
almost the very embodiment of that nation’s identity and interests. Writing in the same vein, 
Hermann, Hermann and Hagan (1987:313) argued that once the preferences of a predominant 
leader “are known, those with different points of view stop public expression of their own public 
proposals out of respect for the leader or fear of political reprisals.” Some may continue 
sponsoring their view points but their notions fail to gain requisite traction.   
The person at the centre of the PRC’s political identity and national interests was Mao Zedong. 
His penchant for violence and his pursuit of permanent revolution were linked to China itself as a 
country (ses McDonald 2011; Mao 1961:14, 15). To some extent this was a warranted perception 
from the outside world. China’s continued insistence to retain socialist doctrine extends to the 
Mao era though adjustments on how this is promoted have been substantial. Mao’s thought was 
taken as dogma and his Red Book was widely read in China as the repository of infallible truths. 
Whether or not Chinese internalized Mao’s teachings is a contested terrain, but the perceptions 
that outside powers had of China corresponded with the perceptions that people had of Mao as a 
person. Even after his death, the violence meted out at the Tiananmen protesters in 1989 could be 
interpreted as China’s show of an instinctual resort to violence in crushing opposition that Mao 
had so freely exercised during his reign.  
Mao took drastic measures to enforce his authority, and seemed to have had a cavalier attitude 
towards human life in his pursuit for personal power. With retrospect, the number of persons 
whose lives were ruined or lost during his Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution was 
needless if one accepts the argument that these two episodes were mostly aimed at reinforcing 
Mao’s leadership of the PRC and the CCP. Even though China has changed from this accretion 
of power in one person, the CCP Politburo retains a firm grip on power and still demonstrates 
overt intolerance to opposition, especially in mainland China. The traits of Mao’s own political 
outlook and stance towards opposition and revisionism are apparent. It is also noteworthy that 
China’s socialism with Chinese characteristics resembles Mao’s view that even time-honoured 
ideologies have to be adapted to China’s unique circumstances rather than applied in the exact 
same manner as they are applied in other circumstances (e.g. see Lynch 2004). Thus, even if 
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Mao wanted revolution and a communist international order, he wanted these to bear Chinese 
characteristics. 
Kenneth Kaunda was at the centre of twentieth century Zambian politics (Barton 2015:180) in 
the way that Mao was for China. Kaunda’s importance to Zambia was so crucial that William A. 
Payne, an American journalist, asserted that “Aside from mineral wealth Zambia's most 
important asset is President Kenneth D. Kaunda” (Payne 1965:8). Unlike China, Zambia was not 
born out of physical violence against the colonial edifice. As illustrated in the fifth chapter, the 
manner with which Zambia gained its independence was indicative of Kaunda’s own antipathy 
to violence and his background as a son of missionaries. To date, Zambia is one of the few 
African countries that have shown an noticeable adherence to democratic and generally peaceful 
politicking.90 While Mao insisted that political goals are a logical consequences of violence, 
Kaunda adopted Mahatma Gandhi’s nonviolent struggle as his model.  
An interesting fact is that despite Kaunda’s documented lack of belief in the notion of political 
violence, Zambia played host to organizations that had military wings, and hence involved in 
violent struggle, like South Africa’s African National Congress and the Joshua Nkomo-led 
Zimbabwe African People’s Union. A possible explanation to this was that even though Zambia 
was to be known as essentially non-violent, the country would not impose its own political 
outlook on non-Zambian liberation movements although these organizations were formally not 
allowed to establish military camps in Zambia. Kaunda’s personal commitment to ending 
colonialism and settler rule in Africa intersects with China’s commitment during Mao to do the 
same. The resort to a one party system in 1972 could be understood as Kaunda’s way of assisting 
other countries attain independence without having to contend with opposition within Zambia 
that might use this assistance to gain political mileage.91 Whether by coincidence or otherwise, 
the decision to revert to multiparty democracy in 1991 came at a time when most of Africa was 
ruled by the majority (black people).  
                                                          
90 A note to consider is that there have been situations in which the government has used violence against certain 
internal threats, like the Lumpa rebellion in northern and eastern Zambia shortly after independence and the 
protests of the 1980s against the removal of government subsidies in adherence to structural adjustment 
recommendations.  
91 This point should also take into account other reasons behind establishing a one-party participatory democracy. 
The role of ethnic politics, as demonstrated in the fifth chapter, should not be discounted as a major factor behind 
the introduction of a one-party state.  
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After succeeding to end colonial rule through nonviolent struggle, Kaunda was faced with the 
daunting task of uniting an ethnically and tribally diverse nation. The choice of his first cabinet 
showed his readiness to have most parts of Zambia represented.92 Kaunda’s preoccupation with 
ethnic parity was also influenced by his own background – his parents were from present-day 
Malawi and so he did not have a readily available ethnic base in Zambia if he were to play on 
ethnic dynamics as is so often the case in other African countries. While ethnicity is what 
seemed to have threatened Zambia’s survival, in China what pitted citizens against one another 
was the definition of who was a true communist and who was not. There is no gainsaying that 
ethnicity played a role in Chinese politics, especially prior to the institution of the PRC. 
However, during Mao’s rule one’s ideological persuasion made a huge difference in one’s 
standing in society. In Zambia, the ideology that Kaunda promoted was humanism, an ideology 
that drew most of its inspiration from African mores of living, coupled with Christian doctrine 
and socialist sentiment.  
Humanism and its influences bore divergences from China’s socialism and discouragement of 
religion. However, as has been said in the third chapter, constructivism argues that when 
interacting, countries that are cordial with each other accentuate identities and interests that unify 
them. For this reason, in his dealing with Mao, Kaunda dwelt on Mao’s division of the world in 
terms of the first, the second and the third, without emphasizing the Christian bent of Zambia’s 
ideology. It should be noted, however, that the manner of economics in Zambia was controlled 
by the state to the extent that resembled state control of the PRC’s economy. This will be 
elaborated more in the section dealing with antipathy to the capitalist West as one point of 
convergence between Zambia and China. This section was mainly concerned with how Mao’s 
and Kaunda’s character were formative in defining China’s and Zambia’s identity and interests 
respectively. The violence that people attached, and some continue to attribute to China, was 
somewhat an attribute of Mao the individual. The nonviolent and profoundly religious nature 
with which Zambia is associated, whether rightly or wrongly, corresponds to traits that are 
associated with the person of Kaunda. The section has also shown that though there are points of 
                                                          
92 “The Bembas of the Northern Province are represented by Simon Kapwepwe, John Mwanakatwe, and Justin 
Chimba; the Lozis of Barotseland by Arthur Wina, Sikota Wina, Nalumino Mundia, and Mubiana Nalilungwe; 
Reuben Kamanga, HIyden Banda, and Alexander Zulu are from the Nyanja-speaking Eastern Province; Elijah 
Mudenda and Mainza Chona represent the Tongas of the Southern Province; and Peter Matoka represents the 
Lunda of the Northwestern Province; Solomon Kalulu, a Soli, comes from the Central Province” (Payne 1965:8).  
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convergence between Mao and Kaunda (like their identification as third world leaders and their 
shared interest in ending colonialism and foreign domination) there are points of divergences that 
the leaders sought to eschew in order to accentuate unifying identities.   
 
 7.3 The Struggle for Self-Rule: Dealing with Colonialism and Foreign Domination 
In 2007, the Centre for Chinese Studies issued a research which argued that The People’s 
Republic of China’s progressing “political and financial support for governments across [Africa], 
particularly countries rich in natural resources…is a fairly recent development in diplomatic 
relations spanning several centuries” (Centre for Chinese Studies 2007:1). This sentiment is 
general to analysts of China-Africa’s long history of relations. Long before China’s current 
insatiable need for Africa’s resources, the two sides were pressed with the battle for physical 
survival. While mainland China was not completely overtaken by colonialism, colossal amounts 
of its islands and other regions were ruled, almost entirely, by foreign powers. Japan’s rule in 
Manchuria, Portugal’s colonization of Macau and British rule over Hong Kong gave China 
justification for embarking on a long struggle to regain its territories. After China claimed some 
of its territory and managed to eject Japan from Manchuria in 1945, the PRC sought to spread the 
same fight in regions that were under foreign occupation or rule. To date, China’s relationship in 
seeking the support of erstwhile occupied or colonized territories harks back to this history. 
China’s involvement in Africa’s struggle against colonialism was heavily influenced by its own 
tragic colonial past (Ding 2008).  
Zambia’s own history of being totally colonized resonates with China’s history with domination. 
Though there is no authoritative evidence depicting whether or not China had played a part in 
Zambia’s struggle against colonialism, the relationship that followed after Zambia’s 
independence was shaped by the political identities that history had foisted on the two countries. 
As stated in the fourth chapter, the PRC was born a poor nation, its precarious economy having 
been ruined by civil war. This however, did not preclude China from carrying out a propaganda 
campaign in solidarity with colonized nations.93 Zambia’s case was similar. Though rich in 
                                                          
93 It is noteworthy that when Zhou En-Lai made his famous tour of Africa, his immortalized assessment that Africa 
was poised for revolution (Adebajo 2008) could well be interpreted as implying China’s readiness to give material 
help to African countries that needed it for the said revolution. China was still not developed to the level of the 
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minerals resources, Zambia was born a poor nation in terms of human capacity and local 
expertise. This, however, did not hinder it from supporting the struggle for independence in other 
African countries.  
Andy Deroche talks of Zambia’s “costly” struggle against racial inequality “in circumstances 
where they did not see neutrality as an option” (Deroche 2009:131). The racial dimension of 
Zambia’s struggle was almost inherently connected with the fight against colonialism and settler 
rule. Though China and Zambia are physically not contiguous, certain intersecting ideas, like the 
struggle against hegemonism and imperialism brought the two countries in concert (New China 
News Agency, September 1975; also see Anthony, Tembe and Gull 2015). Constructivism 
accentuates the importance of ideas in forging international relations and the China-Zambia 
nexus vindicates this claim. The sacrifice made by China and Zambia during the fight against 
colonialism also justifies the constructivist claim that ideas are potent in strengthening relations 
between nations.    
The foregoing brings out more similarities between China and Zambia during the struggle 
against colonial and foreign rule. What China would have called its revolutionary and communist 
vocation against exploitation was tantamount to what Zambia called its moral duty; that the 
country could not count itself as free if any inch of Africa territory was still under colonial or 
settler rule. While economic matters were a pressing necessity, the two countries were poised to 
put national sovereignty and territorial integrity above that. Zambia was in a more precarious 
position than China because at the time of its independence most of Southern Africa was still not 
independent. Zambia is also a landlocked country, and at the time it gained independence, it was 
surrounded by the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique and the settler-ruled 
Rhodesia (Taylor 2006). (Zambia’s stance on colonialism and racial inequality put it in direct 
confrontation with Rhodesia - now Zimbabwe - and South Africa, the two countries on which it 
depended for transporting its exports and imports). Thus the radical stance it took was 
detrimental to its economy but Zambia, in deference to humanism, prioritized principle (Hall 
1969). Thus, Zambia’s identity as a once colonized country, identical to those still colonized at 
the time, shared the interest of ending foreign and minority domination in other countries, even 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Soviet Union but the Sino-Soviet conflict forced China into making major undertakings that would prove costly to 




to the detriment of its economic fortunes. The interest to elevate other countries to the ranks of 
independent polities, even when this does not promise any economic or material benefits on 
one’s part, is in tandem with social altruism and the aspiration to initiate what Wendt calls a 
global community.  
It is also noteworthy that China, before the communist takeover, did not receive the support it 
needed from powers such as the United States in its bid to oust Japan from the occupied 
territories. China was probably considered of negligible importance. Its strategic importance was 
realized after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. China was then used to limit Japan’s influence and 
power. In a similar way, after independence, the Unites States could clearly understand Zambia’s 
cause in ending colonialism in Southern Africa. However, Southern Africa did not feature as a 
priority in the bigger fight against global communism, even though South Africa did. The 
Johnson Administration was reluctant to arm Zambia against Rhodesian and South African 
reprisals (see Deroche 2009) partly because of the major preoccupations that the United States 
had and partly because there were concerns about the cost of military expenditure and 
engagement on a poor country like Zambia.  
Some of the undertakings that the United States, the World Bank and other Western powers and 
institutions failed to make were readily taken up by China. While it did not offer arms to Zambia, 
China committed itself to building the Tanzania Zambia Railway (TAZARA) (Webster 2013). 
This was a strategic move on China’s stature in Africa. It manifested China’s willingness to 
lessen black Africa’s dependency on colonialists, settlers and the West (Mwase 1987; Corkin, 
Burke and Davies 2008) and hence “was a direct contribution to the liberation cause” (Snow 
1994:287). The support that China gave to emerging post-colonial African states becomes more 
important when one considers that at the time “China was itself isolated, poor, and beset with 
internal upheavals” (Gill and Reilly 2007:37). 
By embarking on the railway project when its economy was still some time before recovery, 
China was styling itself as a kindred nation of the Third World with the same Third World 
aspiration and interests of self-reliance and casting off imperialism. It is noteworthy that the 
necessity of a railway line that did not pass through minority-ruled Rhodesia and South Africa 
had been mooted in the 1960s, and that Western powers had been approached but they dithered 
to commit themselves (Hall and Peyman 1976) “on the grounds of cost and logistical 
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impracticality” (Li, Liu, Pan and Zeng 2012:11; see also Ndulo 2008). China’s intervention was 
thus a propaganda success, though Zambia could not completely isolate its southern neighbours.  
The lack of an alternative conduit for exports and imports, and the dependence on South African 
goods and companies like Anglo American meant that Zambia had to craft a foreign policy that 
was “expected to be highly pragmatic and eclectic” (Payne 1965:10).94 Thus, even though 
Kaunda was radically against white minority rule in southern Africa, he also played the role of a 
broker between liberation movements and the settler regimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa. For 
example, working with the then Prime Minster of South Africa B. J. Vorster, Kaunda managed to 
bring Ian Smith’s leadership and struggle fighters seeking to topple it to a train-based meeting on 
the Zambia-Zimbabwe border in 1975 (Seery 2014).  
 
7.4 Ideological Convergence: A United Front against Capitalism  
“China has had development cooperation ties to Africa since the 1960s, with education 
exchanges and infrastructure construction based on ideology, solidarity and establishing cold war 
allies in rivalry with Soviet communism” (Lönnqvist 2008:1; see also Naidu 2007). Since the 
institution of the PRC, China has always cited socialism and communism as its driving 
ideologies. However, as illustrated in chapter four, China touts its own version of socialist 
ideology as being the main driver for its economic miracle. Even before the onset of post-Mao 
socialism with Chinese characteristics, the ideology that Mao’s China espoused was not in 
tandem with that espoused by its communist partner - the Soviet Union. China was also faced by 
what it termed Soviet revisionism and United States imperialism. Responding to this hostile 
international structure required China to establish “ideological solidarity with other 
underdeveloped nations to promote Chinese-style communism” (Ding 2008). Though the PRC 
during Mao sought to export its version of revolution and socialism to countries that were 
deemed in immediate need of revolution, post-Mao China has been very careful not to be 
                                                          
94 In its quest to shore up its role during the Cold War and to undercut Soviet importance, China had courted the 
United States from 1971, ultimately hosting President Nixon in 1972. China’s behaviour during this period fits 
realist explanations for national interests and international relations. China wanted to present itself as an 
influential player in the world (an identity which President Nixon acknowledged) and to pursue relations that could 
sate its interests of curtailing Soviet influence. The analysis in this paper does not negate the notion that certain 
aspects of realist analysis are defensible. The current analysis contends that these aspects are learned through 
social practice rather than given exogenously to states.  
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forceful in this venture. China’s ideology has been toned down by the post-Cold War 
international system in which neoliberalism and its economic and political structures have been 
more apparent to the detriment of socialism. Nevertheless, the CCP still maintains leadership in 
China and its ideology, even after major restructuring, retains some elements largely associated 
with socialism. 
 Even after reforms were introduced, the Chinese government still wields a lot of influence on 
the economy. Zambia did not blatantly declare itself a socialist or communist country. 
Humanism as the ideology of Zambia was actually tailored to be nonaligned during the 
ideological divide of the Cold War (Shaw 1976; Taylor 2006) although as Chan (1985) argues it 
manifested a preparatory ground for a socialist-inclined ideology. However, during the Kaunda 
era Zambia practised a socialist inclined type of economy that in the final analysis proved very 
ineffective (Seery 2014). Major parastatals in the country were owned by the government. 
Despite the difference in Chinese and Zambian ideological nomenclature (socialism/communism 
and humanism respectively), the two countries shared a uniform hostility towards liberal 
capitalism. When the UNIP government arrested members of the labour movement in 1981 in 
the wake of wildcat protests, one of the charges laid against the leaders was that of having 
capitalist tendencies. Arguably, however, this proscription of union activity was aimed at 
curtailing opposition to UNIP’s hold on power rather than exhibiting an antipathy to capitalist 
activism.  
The unfortunate coincidence of colonial history is that its perpetrators were mostly capitalist 
states. Thus, to the previously colonized mindset, the label of capitalist carries with it undertones 
of exploitation and hence an association with colonial tendencies. The logical consequence with 
this is that countries that seek to end colonialism and exploitation will look askance at capitalism 
(Matambo and Mtshali 2016). China, as said in the previous chapter, has drifted towards an 
economic ethos that resembles capitalism but the PRC calls this socialism with Chinese 
characteristics and still regards itself as a socialist state. The same attitude has been exuded by 
Zambia after 1991 (as the following section illustrates). The end of the Cold War signaled an end 
to the communist-capitalist rift with the capitalist camp and its neoliberal theories emerging 
triumphant. This fact has latterly been realized even by countries like Cuba that doggedly stuck 
to socialist doctrine. Zambia and China have also appreciated these changes and policies of 
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privatization and market oriented economics have actually been formalized. Despite these 
changes, avoiding the label of being capitalist countries helps Zambia to relate with China and 
rehashes the history of capitalist exploitation to which the two countries were subjected. This 
mutual recognition of the past and its role in shaping China-Zambia relations is crucial to the 
constructivist analysis that the current research employs.  
Adebajo (2008) avers that current China-Africa relations cannot be fully understood without an 
ample understanding of the historical influences that underpin post-Cold War relations. The 
preceding sections have sufficiently grounded Sino-Zambian relations in their historical context. 
Constructivist analysis takes cognizance of how identities and interests are developed over time. 
This makes the preceding sections vital for analyzing latter-day relations between China and 
Africa. This, notwithstanding, it is crucial to recall that the identities and interests that have been 
most formidable in retaining China-Zambia comity are established at the national level with no 
exact relation to the observation of ordinary Zambians and Chinese. The following section looks 
at events that have shaped China-Zambia relations after the Cold War bearing in mind that “since 
the end of the Cold War, China’s rise has become a global phenomenon [and] much attention has 
been paid to the question of whether China’s growing power portends a threat or how China will 
wield its national power” (Ding 2008:194). 
 
7.5 Chinese and Zambian identities and interests after the Cold War 
Taylor (2006) asserts that China-Africa relations were less intimate in the 1980s. This was 
probably because of the independence that most African countries had acquired which lessened 
the political interests of self-governance - a theme that had hitherto bound China and colonized 
Africa’s relations. Another possible explanation for this was the economic policies that China 
was implementing. A country that wanted to embark on an industrialization programme was 
expected to look to powers in the international system that might be crucial for this venture. 
Africa to this day remains less industrialized, and was still less industrialized in the 1980s. The 
West was an inevitable fount of what China sought and Deng’s reforms were also palatable to 
Western economics. However, to say that China in the 1980s totally abandoned Africa because 
of the foregoing reasons would simply not conform to reality. It continued a modest presence, 
like building stadiums in countries like Zimbabwe and reviving a textile plant in Zambia.  
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However, it was in the last decade of the twentieth century that China-Africa relations took on a 
more dramatic improvement. The roots for this revival are both political and commercial. China 
emerged from the 1980s with its reputation badly tainted by the Tiananmen incident. To the 
Western mindset, Tiananmen was a blatant display of how resentful China is of dissent and 
democratic reform. To Africa, the Tiananmen method of breaking up the protests was regarded 
more benignly. China could rely on this support and denounce the West as imperialists that 
wanted to perpetuate their interference in the internal affairs of other countries. In terms of 
commercial necessities, China-Africa relations were boosted by the economic growth that China 
had impressively sustained and the resultant need for energy to keep China’s industries afloat. 
Africa had also been subjected to structural adjustment programmes that were not successful and 
prompted Africa to denounce the imposition of foreign prescriptions without taking the African 
unique context in consideration. Despite the failure of structural adjustment, the march towards 
market economics was inexorable in both Africa and China. 
Economic reforms in China, as expressed in chapter four, were initiated with the ascendance of 
Deng Xiaoping to the summit of the PRC. In Zambia, economic reform took a longer period and 
only gained full enforcement when Frederick Chiluba defeated Kenneth Kaunda at the 1991 
polls and became the Second President of Zambia. To appeal to the international community, 
Chiluba embarked on liberalizing the Zambia economy at a very dramatic pace. This might have 
mollified Western observers but the haphazard manner with which it was done did not translate 
into improving Zambia’s economy. The process of a frenzied privatization scheme increased 
corruption which to date remains the biggest legacy of the Chiluba years (Banda 2014). Even 
Chiluba’s association to democratic reform wore off after his attempts to liquidate opposition 
and his amendment of the constitution to prevent Kaunda from contesting the 1996 election. The 
difference between the MMD government’s hardline political stance and that of China, after 
initiating reform, is that the PRC did not attempt to posture itself as ready for a multiparty 
democracy with regular free elections. The two countries had transformed their economic 
practice, but were reluctant to do the same with their political outlook. Censure or counsel from 
outside forces, especially Western forces, was mostly construed as interference.   
The foregoing presented the emergence of relations between China and Zambia after the two 
countries responded to the changing international system by embarking on economic reform. 
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Zambia went a step further than China by embarking on democratic reform, though those that 
benefited from this reform comported themselves in ways similar to one-party leaderships. It was 
during Mwanawasa’s tenure as president (2001 to 2008) that China-Zambia relations, which 
Kaunda called “all weather friendship” became the centre of Zambia’s foreign policy and 
political debate. The attention that China got in Zambia during Mwanawasa’s tenure revealed 
just how social constructions of a country’s identity could be used to shape how that country 
relates to others. After being disappointed by the outcome of the Africa-European Union Summit 
in Portugal in December 2007, Mwanawasa stated that Zambia and Africa “turned to the East 
when you people in the West let us down” (Asia News 2009).95 He further stated that those who 
were leery of Chinese investment in Africa would do well to match the help that China was 
giving to Africa. As has been shown prior, in its long history with Zambia, China has been 
considered as a kindred country interested in augmenting Zambia’s and Africa’s fortunes. 
However, during the run up to the 2006 general election in Zambia, Michael Sata, then an 
opposition leader, cast China in an ominous light (Gill and Reilly 2007).  
According to Sata, China was an infestor rather than an investor in Zambia (Kopiński and Polus 
2012). Guy Scott, a high ranking official of the PF at the time, also depicted China as a neo-
imperialist country that sought to exploit Africa and use Africa’s numbers for support at 
international fora like the United Nations. China’s interests were thus interpreted as being 
diabolical to Zambia’s welfare. The MMD government was obliged to defend China’s presence 
in Zambia because a significant percentage of the infrastructure that was built during the 
leadership of the MMD was done under the aegis of the Chinese. However, judging by the 
increase in votes that Sata gained even though he did not ultimately win the election, his anti-
Chinese rhetoric seemed to have persuaded a lot of Zambians. The reaction of the Chinese to 
Sata’s rhetoric in 2006 has been cited as being the first time when China publicly abrogated its 
foreign policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Li Baodong, the 
ambassador of China to Zambia threatened that China would cut off diplomatic relations with 
Zambia if Sata was voted in as president (Reed 2006; Taylor 2006). China’s reaction was 
provoked by Sata’s criticism of China’s labour practices and Sata’s seeming sympathies for 
Taiwan, which he had reportedly called a sovereign state.  
                                                          
95 Mwanawasa’s reasons for lauding China are similar to Kaunda’s positive reaction towards China when Western 
powers recoiled from helping with the TAZARA project.  
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An interesting insight into how important social constructions of identity are in international 
relations can be gleaned from how Sata and his PF behaved towards China when Sata eventually 
became president of Zambia in 2011. To set the pace for what was to happen in 2011, Sata had 
already reassured the Chinese that their investment would not be imperiled if he won the 2008 
presidential by-election following the death of Levy Mwanawasa while in office (Shacinda 
2008). As mentioned in the second chapter, China was actually one of the first countries Sata 
visited after acceding to the presidency. Contrary to what he had threatened five years earlier, the 
PF government maintained relations with China as is the case to this day. Far from being 
perceived as an infestor, China still retains the confidence of the Zambian government.  
The backpedaling done by the PF has a lot of possible reasons. One of the reasons is China’s 
long history with Zambia and the incalculable investments the country has made in Zambia. “In 
the past decade, China provided nearly $3 billion in aid to Zambia, mainly targeted at Zambia’s 
copper mining industry” (Noland 2014:199). Furthermore, the last few decades have seen a 
number of African countries that had relations with Taiwan abandoning these relations in favour 
of China. Zambia’s opting for Taiwan would be a step in the reverse direction which would be 
out of sync with what is regarded as the international norm. From a constructivist point of view, 
all the above reasons are cogent. However, the social dimension of China-Zambia relations is 
also important to the retention of Sino-Zambian relations.  
The identities that China and Zambia attribute to each other and the win-win cooperation they 
claim to forge are more formidable than Sata’s tactical use of anti-Chinese sentiment to gain 
votes. In essence this questions the conviction of Sata’s rhetoric: was he convinced of what he 
was saying about China or he merely looked at the influx of Chinese as the Achilles heel of the 
MMD government? His stance after becoming president seems to suggest that he appreciated 
China’s role in Zambia and was not convinced that China was inherently inimical to Zambia. 
Furthermore, Zambia, like many countries in Africa, is faced with problems of infrastructure 
deficit. Harry Kalaba, the Zambian Minister of Foreign Affairs acknowledged that Zambia could 
benefit from the $60 billion that China had promised at the 2015 FOCAC summit in 
Johannesburg to improve Zambia’s road and railway network and to bolster the country’s energy 
sector especially investing in alternative sources of energy (Lusaka Times, 29 January 2016). 
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That China also needs Zambia’s mineral resources provides potential for a symbiotic relationship 
between the two countries.  
To some degree, the practical reasons for retaining China’s relations after 2011 could justify 
realism’s claims of nations being self-interested. As mentioned before, constructivism does not 
discount this argument; it only offers an alternative view of where state behaviour comes from. 
Whereas realism would argue that state identity and interests come from exogenous and innate 
characteristics, constructivism argues that states have social identities and interests that are 
shaped by social practice and these in turn influence state behaviour. Thus, China and Zambia 
have had to learn their social identities and interests through social interaction. Indeed, the social 
learning that breeds intersecting identities and ideas could actually come from factors such as the 
altruism that China expressed when it built the TAZARA line, a project which was a symbol of 
ideological solidarity from one anti-imperialist power to another (Pettman 1974). From the 
primary data presented in the sixth chapter, it is clear that the TAZARA still holds iconic 
importance in the tapestry of China-Zambia relations (see also Kragelund 2014:150). It also has 
to be mentioned, though, that the two countries have divergent identities and interests and that 
these are seldom brought to bear when the two countries are interacting with each other. Their 
regional position, economic status, and political systems have ordained the two countries with 
identities and interests that are varied. Nevertheless, this does not prohibit the force of 
corresponding identities and interests from influencing Sino-Zambian relations.  
This research argues that, ultimately, the constructions of identities and interests at the national 
level are what matter in reinforcing China-Zambia relations. Interviews conducted for this 
research have revealed that ordinary Zambians perceive China-Zambia relations in monetary and 
practical terms; the respondents observed that China is primarily involved in Zambia for the 
economic promise that Zambia holds; secondly, Michelo, R-3, Nkumbwa and Mwamulima 
indicated that the Chinese have found in Zambia a place to settle and in the long run lessen the 
stress of overpopulation in their country. These sentiments are at variance with those expressed 
at diplomatic levels, where issues of Third World solidarity, South-South cooperation and 
reconfiguration of international institutions such as the United Nations Security Council are 
given greater importance as determinants of strong China-Zambia relations. Through the 
Ezulwini Consensus crafted by the African Union in 2005 in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), African 
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states called for far-reaching reforms of the United Nations, the most radical being the call for 
two African states to be admitted as permanent members of the Security Council (African Union 
2005). At the 2017 UN General Assembly, President Edgar Lungu of Zambia called for adoption 
of the Ezulwini consensus. That China has expressed a willingness to consider reform of the 
Security Council along the lines of the Ezulwini Consensus is a further indication on the part of 
African states that China recognizes the importance of Africa on global issues.    
That Zambia is a country of the global south (comprising Africa, Asia and Latin America) gives 
another dimension to why the rise of China has not engendered much suspicion and paranoia in 
Zambia. South-South cooperation has been a major subject of the pronouncements of Chinese 
leaders in their visits to Africa (Naidu 2007). The fact that countries of the global South identify 
themselves as third world has an impact on China’s posturing in Zambia. On 26 September 2015, 
the Chinese government and the United Nations hosted a joint round-table discussion on South-
South cooperation and Edgar Lungu of Zambia was present. During his speech, Xi Jinping 
emphasized that despite its economic growth, China was a developing and third world country, 
embedded in the global South and that its commitment to foster cooperation in this region 
“remains unchanged” (Embassy of the PRC in Zambia 2015).  
China employs such statements to attract the friendship of countries like Zambia that are also of 
the global South, are developing countries and belong to the third world. China has adroitly used 
its soft power – mutually beneficial economic cooperation, educational and cultural exchanges 
and numerous high level visits – to woo would-be partners (Ding 2008). Hu Jintao spent most of 
his 2007 multi-country visit in Zambia. China also established the first special economic zones in 
Zambia (Kopiński and Polus 2012; Migration Policy Institute 2015), and a Confucius Institute is 
ensconced at the University of Zambia. The soft power that China uses, especially its policy of 
aid and investment without conditions, has been very appealing to Africa in general. In essence, 
recoiling from putting conditions on aid and investment presents China as an equal partner with 
Africa (Ding 2008; Mail & Guardian, 2014). 
The inverse of this is that countries (mostly Western) and institutions such as the World Bank 
that attach conditions to their aid and investment (Moyo 2012) do so because they regard Africa 
as an erstwhile subject and subservient partner to which they can pontificate about political and 
economic behaviour (Anthony, Tembe and Gull 2015). Of the two images, the most obvious one 
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to appeal to Africa is the image of the country that identifies itself as an equal partner. From the 
foregoing, it can be noted that relations between China and Zambia are, to some extent, a 
particular but unique, illustration of relations between China and Africa in general. The two 
countries are found in the global south and share the history of colonial domination. These 
intersecting identities have been crucial in maintaining China-Africa relations. However, from 
the onset this research has noted the tensions that have also been a part of China-Zambia 
relations. The following section tackles these tensions, but puts them in the context of continued 
Sino-Zambian relations to analyse whether or not identities and interests have played a role in 
the retention of these relations or whether the explanation of expediency being the driver of 
relations negates the role of identities and interests.  
 
7.6 Tension but continuity in Sino-Zambian relations: A Matter of Expediency or a 
Convergence of Identities and Interests?  
One of the research questions seeks to probe the forces behind the tenacity in Sino-Zambian 
relations despite occasional tensions between Chinese investors and Zambian politicians and 
employees. As mentioned in the second chapter, anti-Chinese sentiment and behaviour in 
Zambia has been unparalleled in Africa (Anthony, Tembe and Gull 2015). The main cause of 
friction between Chinese employers and their Zambian employees has been mainly about the 
Chinese work ethic or labour practice (Redvers 2011). One of the interesting findings made in 
this research is that while respondents who have not worked for the Chinese inveighed against 
China’s labour practice, Zambians with work experience at a Chinese firm were more sanguine 
about China’s presence in Zambia. Mwale stated that Chinese companies have helped previously 
unemployed Zambians to make a livelihood. The identity of China as an opportunity for 
Zambians was also cited by Nkumbwa and Nyirenda during the first focus group discussion. 
Their argument sustained the view that Zambian authorities are more to blame for some of the 
abuse wrought by Chinese investors because there is nothing wrong with those who seek to 
maximize profit. This sentiment, however, betrays a sense of resignation that previously 
unemployed Zambia have with regard to China’s employment practice. Despite the seeming 
gratitude that they express at being hired in Chinese owned firms, “casualization undermines 
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local workers’ rights to holiday pay, pension, stability, security of work and medical insurance, 
among others” (Beyongo 2015: para. 1line 5-7).  
The data gathered from ZCTU and JCTR representatives also showed that China’s labour 
practices have been adjudged to be unfavorable in Zambia. However, it is noteworthy that the 
labour union argued that Zambia’s labour laws clearly demand high standards in terms of labour 
ethics. The respondents blamed the Chinese for not adhering to established rules. It has to be 
mentioned that respondents from ZCTU did not proffer concrete evidence to show exactly the 
measures that have been taken by both ZCTU and the Zambian government to ensure 
compliance to labour standards in Chinese-run firms. The high premium that Michael Sata had 
placed on what he perceived as China’s abhorrent labour practice during the run-up to the 2006 
general election showed just how important China is in shaping Zambian politics and economics. 
It is fair to say that some of the claims Sata made were founded though the populist rhetoric 
(Hanson 2006) with which he made them appeared to have been an exaggeration. From the 
finding of this research, secondary data revealed that China is a rogue employer probably 
because most of this data concentrated on Chinese labour practices in mines while the primary 
data collected from Zambians working for Chinese employers in the clothing sector revealed a 
more optimistic picture of Chinese employers. The identity that came across was of China as a 
solution to unemployment, especially of Zambians who are not qualified for high-level corporate 
appointment.  
By far the biggest human disaster to happen at a Chinese-owned facility in Zambia was the death 
of fifty-one workers at BGRIMM Explosives, “a major supplier of explosives to Zambia's copper 
mines” (BBC News 2005). Though the Chinese owners were quick to regard the explosion as an 
accident, it gave more traction to the notion that Chinese employers had a casual attitude towards 
the safety of their African employees. During the second focus group discussion, Evans Zulu, 
who coincidentally comes from Chambishi where the accident took place, referred to that 
incident as one of the many illustrations of China’s exploitative nature in its relations with 
Zambia. As has been shown in chapter six, according to Michelo, R-3 and respondents in the 
second focus group discussion the identity of China as a possible and actual exploiter of 
Zambia’s resources and labour was more strongly noted than from workers in a Chinese firm.  
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The 2011 Human Rights Watch report on China’s labour practices in state-owned copper mines 
painted a gloomy picture of China’s work ethic.96 The Report concluded that while Zambian 
employees are sanguine about Chinese investment and its positive impact on job creation “they 
suffer from abusive employment conditions that fail to meet domestic and international standards 
and fall short of practices among the copper mining industry elsewhere in Zambia” (Human 
Rights Watch 2011). The report drew on empirical data gathered from a wide range of 
respondents, mostly those who had worked under Chinese employers. Another sample included a 
comparison of Chinese owned companies and non-Chinese owned companies. While workers at 
Chinese-owned companies were paid emoluments higher than the minimum wage, these pays 
were lower in comparison to other mining companies. There were also reports of Chinese 
investors preventing their employees from engaging in union-related activities (ibid).  
Furthermore, Zambia has had a long history of influential union movements that were a 
formidable challenge even to the Kaunda government. Thus, preventing workers from being part 
of an organized labour movement is a direct denial of their labour rights. The Zambia Congress 
of Trade Unions (ZCTU) noted that globalization, privatization and the influx of foreign 
investment, have had a negative impact on Zambia, even though these trends are a norm in the 
current international system. Casualization and deregulation of labour laws are just some of the 
realities of Chinese and foreign investment in Zambia (Chikuta 2012). The conduct of the 
Chinese to “flout” labour laws was said to be widespread. To its credit, it was commendable that 
the Patriotic Front government managed to put pressure on Non-Ferrous China Africa to 
reinstate the more than one thousand workers it had fired following strikes (Human Rights Watch 
2011).  
Despite the foregoing illustrations of labour challenges that have come to be associated with 
China, Sino-Zambian relations have remained largely formidable. The findings of this study 
suggest that occasional spates of anti-Chinese sentiment in Zambia have not negatively affected 
China-Zambia relations to a radical extent. While tensions between ordinary Zambians and their 
Chinese competitors and employers might be awkward or hostile, the governments of the two 
countries have managed to portray an image of stable intimacy. Chinese investment has also 
continued unabated.  
                                                          
96 A brief critique of the Report in question has been included elsewhere in the research for the sake of giving 
another viewpoint. The views expressed in the said critique are not those of the researcher.  
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It is telling that in 2015, during the current PF-led government in Zambia, trade volumes 
between China and Zambia had risen to $US2.1 billion representing a growth of 18.4% between 
January and September (Lusaka Times, 16 November 2016). A possible explanation for this 
consistency could be based on the relations that nations build at the level of government to 
government interaction and the fact that Zambia is in dire need of Chinese investment.97 Though 
Sata tapped into the sentiment of mine workers and other segments of society that dealt first hand 
with Chinese labour, when judged with the advantage of hindsight his stance was aimed at 
getting votes at the expense of those he accused of kowtowing to China. Once in government, he 
was somewhat bound by relations at a national level and the history that influences them. This 
sentiment was also expressed by Brian Mwale, a respondent for this research and a person who 
once worked as a casual employee at a Chinese firm.  
Constructivism talks of social constructions of international relations. However, socially 
constructed power relations are always at play on whose constructs are more influential and 
could substantially change relations between nations. Thus, while many workers who endure 
Chinese employment might have an ambivalent picture of Chinese investment, the government 
or certain influential individuals within it, with more potential to influence opinion, would be 
able to create, or construct, a more appealing picture of why Chinese investment is vital to 
Zambia. For example, Taylor (2006:165) asserts that apart from Zambia’s geo-strategic 
importance, Kaunda’s personality and political orientation played a huge role in determining 
why China was so concerned about Zambia.98 The strength of the ruling establishment to 
influence opinion is even more visible in China where the citizenry do not directly vote for the 
national government. Zambia presents a different case in that the government is more likely to 
pay attention to the perceptions of the citizenry to which it owes its rule. This being said, its 
power to influence opinion, to create constructs, cannot be undermined.  
                                                          
97 This argument could somewhat appear to be pragmatic and hence smack of realist influence. However, 
constructivism is also applicable in understanding pragmatic relations among nations; the ideas that are bred by 
countries seeking to bolster their material fortunes can be found in the scope of constructivist analysis, although 
this type of analysis looks at social interaction and learning as the basis for material interests.  
98 This assertion dovetails with the role that certain individuals play when it comes to shaping the identity of their 
countries. In section 7.2 the indelible marks that certain individuals made on their nations in the twentieth century 
(like Mao in China, Fidel Castro in Cuba) was alluded to. In the same vein, Taylor (2006) argues that Zambia was to 
some extent judged by Kaunda’s comportment, especially his desire to bring about self-rule in southern Africa. 
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This section concludes that though China’s labour practices might have a negative impact on 
those directly exposed to it, perceptions at the level of government to government relations might 
influence opinion or discourage any threat to Sino-Zambian relations. At state level, the two 
countries still hold each other in high regard and, as gleaned from the Human Rights Watch 
(2011) report, workers who experienced Chinese employment welcome Chinese investment and 
the employment it has brought, though they loathe certain practices by their Chinese employers. 
From the primary data gathered for this research the respondents who are currently working for a 
Chinese firm and the respondent who is no longer working for the Chinese were satisfied with 
the opportunities that China has brought to Zambians who would otherwise be unemployed. 
Furthermore, Nkumbwa and Nyirenda stated that they have no problem with the terms on which 
they are working. However, responsible governance would dictate a more responsive sort of 
engagement with ordinary citizens who experience the impact of Chinese investment firsthand. 
Cisse (2012: n.p.) has the same notion when arguing that Africa’s “cooperation and partnership 
with China should benefit people who mostly remain disadvantaged in their livelihoods.” It 
should also be stated that though appreciative of employment opportunities that come with the 
presence of China and the Chinese in Zambia, Zambians who work in Chinese firms, as argued 
by Kafwilo, have resigned themselves to the inevitability of the presence of the Chinese and that 
they are poised to settle for anything, without which they would have no income as the Zambian 
government battles to provide employment.  
An elite based form of engagement with Chinese investment risks glossing over justifiable 
critiques of China’s incursions into Zambia. Indeed, the identities and interests that the countries 
share, though constructed, could be more beneficial if they took into consideration the welfare of 
the general populace and how relations between the two countries impact on it. The impressions 
that ordinary Zambians have of China, as established by this research, are more influenced by 
their interactions with ordinary Chinese rather than Chinese diplomats. Mwamulima, Nkumbwa, 
Nyirenda and Nkonde in the first focus group discussion were more sanguine about Chinese 
employers in mines and the textile industry but they were leery and uncomfortable with the 
Chinese that are venturing into areas of business that can be done by ordinary Zambians. Just 
like Michelo, the respondents noted that Chinese who are into areas of business such as chicken 
rearing and selling of vegetables are not bringing any new expertise that has hitherto been 
needed but absent in Zambia. R-3 noted that with the advantage in terms of capital that the 
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Chinese have over Zambians, they might crowd out Zambians who are involved in these 
ventures. Hannah Postel of the Migrant Policy Institute estimated that there was a 60% increase 
of Chinese coming to Zambia in various capacities from 2009 to 2015.  
The concern over ordinary Chinese and how they are likely to shape China’s presence in Zambia 
and Africa has recently been explored in Howard F. French’s book - China’s Second Continent 
(2015). The book notes that more energy has been invested in looking at China at state level and 
how it is likely to impact on Africa. Howard concentrated on ordinary Chinese - like the chicken 
sellers that he met in Zambia- and how these are likely to shape Sino-African relations. The 
current research has noted the importance of disentangling the analysis of Sino-Zambian 
relations from perspectives that are confined to the state level of interaction. The input and 
observations of non-state actors and how their constructions of identities and interests of China 
and Zambia are likely to shape relations between the two countries is vital. Thus, the following 
section looks at China’s corporate identity in Zambia, especially regarding to land acquisition 
and the growing demographics of ordinary Chinese in Zambia.  
 
7.7 Corporate and Social Identity in Zambia’s Interaction with China and “the Chinese” - 
The Question of Land and Settlement 
One of the most alarming indictments of the “China in Africa” discourse is that China is not 
different from the purveyors of colonialism and that Africa risks being colonized anew with 
China’s growing presence (see Atwi-Boateng 2017). As demonstrated by Sautman and Hairong 
(2014:1074), it is the Chinese state that is accused of cultivating “a neo-colonialism that 
subjugates Africans.” However, the primary data collected for this research demands that the 
study makes a clear-cut difference between how Zambians perceive the Chinese government and 
non-state Chinese actors plying their trade in Zambia. Of course this is done with the cognizance 
that ordinary Chinese who are in Zambia will always retain the support of their government.   
As a state, China will seek to maintain its territorial integrity as one of its corporate pursuits. It is 
for this reason that the country had warned that it would sever ties with Zambia if Sata had won 
the 2006 election, with the promise that once in power he would recognise Taiwan. Apart from 
its territorial integrity, China has the trying responsibility of catering for a vast population. 
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Zambia has been a strategic partner on both these scores by maintaining relations with China and 
hence endorsing the One-China policy, and by being a destination for ordinary Chinse who do 
not necessarily come under the auspices of the Chinese government. In terms of social identity, 
China and Zambia have multiple of these and bring to prominence the ones that fit well 
depending on whom they are interacting with. In their interactions the two countries have 
capitalized on the all-weather friendship crest that Kaunda proclaimed, and political 
conveniences have been used to downplay the role that material diplomacy plays in relations 
between the two countries. Thus, at a state level, relations between the two nations are shaped by 
conveniently cultivated identities and interests.  
The two focus group discussions revealed that the respondents were more concerned with 
ordinary Chinese who have come to Zambia and with the passage of time, the identities of these 
ordinary Chinese will be salient in determining the feelings of ordinary Zambians towards 
China’s identity in general. The respondents look askance at the Chinese who are seemingly 
coming to Zambia to settle. The effects of the Chinese who are buying land in Zambia with the 
view of permanently settling in the country will become more apparent with time. However, 
there are already fears that “the Chinese” are a threat to ordinary Zambians. Furthermore, it is 
feasible that ownership of large masses of land by the Chinese might provoke in Zambians the 
feeling of Zambia’s corporate identity and territorial integrity being threatened.  
Nyirenda noted that the rising number of Chinese in Zambia could lead to “dictatorship.” This 
fear might be inflamed by the fact that the Chinese population in Zambia has been growing 
steadily since 2008. Postel (2015) established that it is difficult to keep track of the number of 
Chinese currently residing in Zambia. She estimated the number to be 18,000. The difficulty 
resides in the fact that when admitting migrants, immigration laws in Zambia only take the 
details of the migrant holding a visa and those who are coming with the migrant, like family 
members, do not have to procure a visa. Thus the number of visas issued is not commensurate 
with the number of Chinese entering Zambia (Migrant Policy Institute 2015). Nkumbwa and 
Mwamulima also advocated for a limited number of Chinese coming to Zambia because they use 
their capital to gain an advantage over Zambians when venturing into medium and small scale 
businesses. This is the notion that informed Howard French’s China’s Second Continent. This 
finding challenges the extent of the first hypothesis of the current research which hypothesizes 
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that when two nations shape identical images and interests, whether real or contrived, then it is 
possible for them to behave in a manner that is mutually beneficial. The hypothesis followed into 
the inclination of looking at international relations, national identity and interests from state 
actors only.  
The current study discovered that contrary to the possibly mutually beneficial relations shared at 
state level, ordinary Chinese residing and making a living in and out of Zambia are perceived as 
a threat to Zambians and their behaviour is far from promoting mutually beneficial interaction 
with their Zambian counterparts. As Chatelard (2011) avows, “Individuals and families have 
their own agenda which is often quite separate from the concerns of the Chinese government.” 
For example, members of the first group discussion are not employed by a representative of the 
government. Apart from being grateful for the job they have, they stated towards the end of the 
discussion that they are in constant fear of their employer because of his temperament and that he 
is capable of resorting to violence when not happy with his employees. It is noteworthy that most 
respondents for this research emphasized the responsibility of the Zambian government to play 
an active role in shaping China-Zambia relations. This is essentially calling for agency in China-
Zambia relations.  
 
7.8 The Role of Agency in China-Zambia Relations 
Section 7.6 dealt with tensions that have occasionally blighted China-Zambia relations and how 
the two countries continue to forge a formidable bond amid this. The manner with which the PF 
government has reacted to China’s labour practices – like pressuring Non-Ferrous China to 
rehire the more than one thousand workers it had fired - illustrates how African countries can use 
their leverage to regulate the possible negative impacts that China might herald in Africa. During 
the first focus group discussion, Mwamulima argued that if the Zambian government was to state 
to China the type of investment it wants, the Chinese government is likely to conform to 
Zambia’s exhortations because it is a pragmatic government and it is aware of Zambia’s 
importance. This study has presented how the West, by and large, contemplates China’s rise and 
its likely consequences in the international system, and especially in the developing world that 
China is courting and where it is being courted. 
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Fears of China establishing a “slave empire” in Africa or transforming this continent into a 
colony, or embarking on another scramble for Africa have an oblique interpretation of Africa 
being too impressionable and pliant and hence likely to be overridden by China in a subtle 
manner that might not replicate European colonialism.  The current section puts this assertion to 
the test to see whether or not Zambia can use its leverage to check China’s controversial 
practices and hence display its agency not passivity in China-Zambia relations. One disclaimer is 
apt: the fact that China has a bigger economy and is more industrialized than Zambia gives China 
certain advantages in its dealing with Zambia but the effects of history and certain mutual 
identities and interests between the two countries have the potential to curb how far China could 
wield its superiority to the detriment of Zambia. One of the findings of this research is that 
Zambia should shoulder the responsibility of garnering long-term benefits from its relations with 
China. Three respondents (Kafwilo, Mwale and Michelo) converged on the point that Zambians 
know better what they want and hence should play a leading role in charting where relations with 
China should take the country. Furthermore, data from the focus group discussions also 
suggested that the Zambian government has the responsibility to determine the type of relations 
Zambia should have with China and the quality of investment that Zambia needs from China.  
Studies on the role of agency in shaping Sino-African relations are increasing (Odoom 2013). 
This venture seeks to look at whether or not Africa is a passive partner in its relations with an 
economically developed and politically powerful China. Mohan and Lampert (2012) stated that a 
plethora of analyses of Sino-African relations treats “China as the driving force with little 
recognition for African agency”. The manner with which China has subtly used its influence to 
hector decisions of certain countries gives some measure of understanding to this attitude. For 
example, in 2011 the South African government failed to issue the Dalai Lama with a visa to 
enable the Nobel Peace Laureate to attend the 80th birthday of Archbishop Emeritus Desmond 
Tutu. This trend repeated itself again when in 2014 the spiritual leader was again unable to get 
the visa to attend the meeting of Nobel laureates in South Africa. Because he is seeing more 
sovereignty for Tibet, the Dalai Lama has been accused of being an irredentist by China. It is 
widely understood that the South African government is reluctant to issue the Dalai Lama with 
the visa because this might provoke China (The Guardian 2014). It is instructive to note that the 
Dalai Lama visited South Africa in 1996 before formal diplomatic relations were established 
between China and South Africa. This example, coupled with China’s threat to the Mwanawasa 
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government in Zambia in the run-up to the 2006 general election could hint at China being the 
driving force of China-Africa relations. However, there have been occasions when decisions 
taken at the high levels of governance in Zambia have been implicit demonstrations of agency 
and acknowledgement of Zambia’s importance to its investors.   
In 2011 Alexander Chikwanda, the then Minister of Finance in Zambia’s Patriotic Front 
government, announced that Zambia would be doubling its mineral royalties for base metals – 
that include copper - from 3% to 6 % (England 2011). This has to be understood in the context 
that China is one of the biggest investors in copper in Zambia, and thus the decision to double 
royalties was partly aimed at gaining more from China’s investment. As another display of 
agency, “in February 2013, the Zambian government revoked three Chinese mining permits, and 
the Zambian Ministry of Mines stepped in to manage the mines until another investor could be 
found” (Noland 2014:199). In June 2017 31 Chinese nationals were arrested and shortly 
afterwards deported after accusations that they were involved in illegal mining activities in 
Chingola (Business Day 2017). Apart from the state level agency, even ordinary Zambians, such 
as the rioting miners mentioned to above, can meaningfully draw attention to certain Chinese 
practices that should not have free rein in Zambia (see also Gill and Reilly 2007). During his 
visit 2007 visit to Zambia, Hu Jintao “was forced to cancel his planned visit to the Copperbelt 
due to the post-2006 election growth of anti-Chinese sentiments and the real threat of anti-
Chinese demonstrations” (Kopiński and Polus 2011:188). This further illustrates the palpable 
influence that ordinary Zambians can have on China’s presence in Zambia.  
Events in the international system have given African countries room to manoeuver in their 
relations with more powerful countries. Compared to Western trade partners China is a relatively 
newcomer in Zambia. As such, China is more likely to present itself as a more attractive 
alternative to traditional trade partners. In addition to this, the growing demand for strategic 
minerals in the international system provides Africa with more opportunities to relate more 
deeply with countries whose relations are more attractive. It is almost inconceivable that in the 
twenty-first century, China could wield the unchecked influence on Africa that European powers 
once enjoyed (see Lumumba-Kasongo 2011). While China has made major inroads in Africa, the 
United States has also acted on Africa’s strategic importance in global security, especially after 
the September 2001 terrorist attacks (Carmody and Owusu 2007). Thus, the United States, other 
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international players and influential transnational and multinational corporations and institutions, 
coupled with Africa’s own realization of its importance, are likely to circumscribe China’s 
manoeuvres on the continent.  
The more assertive attitude of the PF government towards China was influenced by Sata’s initial 
stance on China, though his alarmist anti-Chinese stance had been toned down just before he 
became president. The manner with which the Chinese government courted Sata after his 2011 
election victory was symbolic of how important Zambia’s relations are with China. As noted in 
the second chapter, Hu Jintao spent most of his 2007 Africa visit in Zambia, symbolizing the 
importance that Zambia has for China (Kopiński and Polus 2011). Immediately after winning the 
presidency, one of the first major appointments Sata had at State House was to host the Chinese 
ambassador to Zambia. Sata also honoured an invitation by the Chinese government to visit 
China for a week. The number of high level and extended visits that China embarks on in Africa, 
and Zambia in particular, is demonstrative of the importance China attaches to Africa. This 
challenges Segal’s (1992) prediction that as China continues to develop, it will attach less 
importance to Africa in its foreign policy. African countries like Zambia have been of great 
importance to China in a number of ways, ranging from economics to political support.  
As has been said before, one of the identities that has latterly been influential in reinforcing 
China-Zambia relations is the South-South cooperation discourse. This cooperation has seen 
China strike closer relations with all regions of the South prompted mostly by China’s growth 
and its go-out policy. Specific to Africa, however, China established the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC) as the main framework for Sino-Africa cooperation in the twenty-first 
century. The following section looks FOCAC and how it has been influential in China-Africa 
relations and, ipso facto, China-Zambia relations.  
 
7.9 FOCAC 
The reality that China was once a poor nation has never been lost on Africa. China’s economy 
might have improved but the formidable realization of mutual interests with Africa lingers on. 
Payne and Veney (1998:868) write that “China and many developing countries have converging 
interests.” To secure these interests the two regions have come up with country-to-country 
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initiatives. These relations have a background: what is currently obtaining is the continuation of 
“cold war solidarities” (Mohan and Power 2008:23). The most illustrious framework for China-
Africa relations has been FOCAC. With the increased forays into Africa that China embarked on 
after the Cold War, a platform such as FOCAC was necessary to prevent a haphazard 
relationship between China and Africa. Indeed, China’s involvement in Africa is currently the 
most important development between Africa and the outside world (see Taylor 2010). The first 
Ministerial Conference of FOCAC was held between 10 and 12 October in the year 2000 and 
Frederick Chiluba, the then President of Zambia, was one of the few African presidents that 
attended (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 2004).  
The summit was a milestone in Sino-African relations similar to the 1955 Bandung Conference. 
The declaration that the ministers signed at the summit mentioned the fact that the world is still 
divided by a gaping economic rift “between the rich North and the poor South” (Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation 2000). The countries represented made a case that the current 
international system is more detrimental to the weak regions of the South and hence far from 
sustaining global peace. China and Africa conducted dialogue on what was said to be a platform 
of equality, seeking ways to bring about mutual development. Among other high ideals, the 
parties present urged that stakeholders in the international system should adhere to the United 
Nations Charter, the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity and the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence. Taken on face value, FOCAC emphasizes the similar history, identities 
and interests that China and Africa share. It also responds to the pressures of economic 
globalization of which China has become an integral part (Cisse 2012). It was in 2006, branded 
China’s year of Africa, that China came up with the “first formal White Policy Paper on China’s 
African Relations” (Naidu 2007:283). The White Paper exhorted Africa and China to uphold 
“mutual support and close coordination” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC, 2006).  
Since its inception FOCAC has facilitated political, diplomatic and economic growth between 
China and Africa (Grimm 2012). African leaders have used FOCAC as a platform to excoriate 
traditional donors and former colonizers, while praising China’s increasing footprint in Africa. A 
clear example was Mugabe’s sentiments at the 2015 FOCAC Summit in South Africa. Before 
launching into his script for the day, Mugabe (2015) started off by praising China and its 
commitment to embark on different “facets of assistance.” Mugabe called China a country which 
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was once regarded poor but is doing “to Africa what [Africans] expected those who colonized 
[the continent] to do” (Mugabe 2015). Mugabe went on to criticize Sino-African “detractors” 
who reduce China-Africa relations to a purely commercial relationship driven by China’s search 
for resources. The multidimensional ties that FOCAC committed itself to were used to discredit 
this argument (Mugabe 2015). However, the reality of China-Africa trade relations does not 
paint an invariably bright picture. For example, President Jacob Zuma of South Africa stated that 
even in the China-Africa trade equation, Africa continues to be a net exporter of raw materials to 
China and that this is not sustainable (see McDonald 2012; Zuma 2013). This trend can be noted 
in many African countries and the explicable reason for this is Africa’s underdeveloped industry. 
Thus, China-Africa relations are still relations between economically unequal powers. Apart 
from the fear that China has engendered as a competitor for African resources, some Western 
observers perceive China as an exploiter of Africa and a bad political example. The following 
case tackles some negative Western perceptions on China’s involvement in Africa and Zambia. 
 
7.10. Western Perception of China’s Involvement in Africa and Zambia 
China’s rise has been greeted with apprehension in the West. Michelo (2007) argues that “the 
structure of the debate on [the] China-Africa relationship centres on the Western hegemonic 
interest in Africa which are threatened by the fast growing Chinese influence not only in the area 
of trade, but also culture, aid and ideology.” The current section gives a brief presentation of 
Western perceptions of China, drawing much on the literature that has already been reviewed in 
the second chapter of the study. Most of the rhetoric about China being the new imperial power 
in Africa has been of Western provenance, even though certain sectors of Africa (e.g. Hevi 1967) 
have also warned of China’s imperialist tendencies and expansionism (see Simmons 2014). In 
chapter two, Andrew Malone’s article was quoted in which he forcefully argued that China’s rise 
and its incursion in Africa is ominous and that it is happening at a scale faster than the forays of 
European powers prior to colonialism.  Malone’s argument is that China’s involvement in Africa 
is tailored towards transforming Africa into China’s colony (see also Hitchens 2008). The current 
study has also noted that the media, whether Western or African, has mainly been negative 
towards “China in Africa” hence bearing resemblances with Western political perceptions of 
215 
 
China in Africa. As written in the second chapter, Hilary Clinton also warned Zambians about a 
possible “new colonialism” that China might introduce to Africa (Reuters 2011).  
From the beginning, the current research has alluded to the fact that China’s rise and its 
implications on Africa are understood according to theories of international relations that 
observers subscribe to. Academics who subscribe to realism perceive China’s rise as likely to be 
revisionist in that a more influential China will want to reshape the international system in its 
favour. This means that China will challenge the hegemony long enjoyed by the United States. 
After China overtook Japan as the world’s second largest economy, some observers predict that 
if China maintains its unparalleled growth rate it might overtake the United States by 2025 (see 
Ito 2010; Moyo 2012:17-18). Mearsheimer (2005) argued that China is not likely to rise 
peacefully and that if it maintains the momentum of its growth it is likely to embark on security 
competition with the United States that would increase the prospects for war. In terms of its 
relations with Africa, China has provoked anxiety because it seems to challenge the monopoly 
over African resources that was long enjoyed by Western powers, especially the United States, 
Great Britain and France (Ampiah and Naidu 2008; Chatelard 2011:175).  
With its export oriented economy and its crucial dependency on energy resources, China’s 
involvement in Africa has been understandably interpreted as being materially driven. Peter 
Brookes (2007) argues that China is not bolstering its relations with Africa out of kindness. He 
argues that China is using Africa “to increase its international commercial markets through 
generous but self-serving diplomatic, financial, and military assistance” (Brookes 2007:5). 
However, in addition to fears of losing access to African resources to China and the resurgence 
of colonialism, one of the major causes of Western concern over Africa stems from perceptions 
of national identity. The West is neo-liberal in its economic practice; it has its own 
comprehension of human and political rights and it subscribes to a version of democracy that is 
not present in China. To the Western mind, development can only come through the adoption of 
neo-liberalism (Murray 2009) and an open political system wherein people directly elect their 
leaders to public office.   
China still differs from Western countries and their economic ideologies even though it has 
embraced some aspects of neoliberalism. State capitalism has become common lore when 
describing China’s economy, as an allusion to the influence that the government continues to 
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exercise on markets. Secondly, China does not have liberal democracy as practiced in the West. 
Hilary Clinton (2011) feared that China’s influence might undermine the importation of Western 
and United States democracy in Africa. Thirdly, China has been controversial for its human 
rights record. These three factors point to differences between China and the West that are 
almost fundamental. When analyzing national identity through theories such as realism that tend 
to freeze state identity in eternity, it becomes explicable why China today is perceived the way it 
was perceived even during the era of Mao. This line of argument could appreciate a change in 
China’s behaviour but not a change in identity and interest. The current analysis, however, 
argues that change and multiplicity in state identities and interests are both real and possible. 
Ideas that lie behind these identities and interests are a formative component of a nation’s self-
perception and interactions with other states. Individuals or influential groups or organizations 
within a state have the potential to create the ideas that drive a country’s identity and interest.  
A state cannot be clinically divorced from the agents that aggregate to form it. Hui (2004) 
proposes a theory of international relations that views international dynamics as a process. This 
means that politics among nations are not doomed to any innate and immutable inclinations but 
rather are processes which should keep in mind the agency of human action.  “Realist theories of 
international politics tend to focus on structural mechanisms and overlook agential strategies” 
(Hui 2004:175). The current research has shown just how powerful personalities – Mao, Kaunda 
and Deng – shaped or constructed the identities and interests of their respective countries. Hence, 
a constructivist analysis acknowledges the constructed nature of international relations and that 
China’s divisive reputation in the international system is mainly because to different players in 
the international system, it carries different identities and pursues different interests.  
Dambisa Moyo (2013), a Zambian born academic who has written positively about China’s 
growth, argues that while the West has denounced China’s economic and political system, the 
PRC has gained the respect and admiration of the developing world because China’s model is 
suited to countries that are still developing. Deborah Brautigam (2009) asserted that most of the 
Western-bred criticism flung at China is both simplistic and hypocritical in that most of what the 
West accuses China of doing in Africa has been done by Western players. The response of R-1 
and R-2 from the interviews with ZCTU officials follows this line of reasoning, and attributes 
criticism of Chinese investment to the media and the West. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, in the same 
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vein argues that Western perceptions of China are driven by the fact their monopoly over African 
resources is increasingly being challenged by China. She concludes that “China should be left 
alone to forge its unique partnership with African countries and the West must simply learn to 
compete” (Okonjo-Iweala 2006). Brautigam goes further to argue that China’s increasing 
presence in Africa is a positive development. The West, according to Moyo (2013), is losing the 
bond of developing countries because of insistence on liberal democracy and the prioritization of 
political over economic rights, the conditions that Okonjo-Iweala (2006) calls “niceties.” 
Developing countries are more concerned about tackling the basic needs of their citizens and 
hence put a high premium on issues of shelter and nutrition over policies such as democracy and 
suffrage. Thus, China identifies with developing countries and the West is seemingly losing out.  
Even though Moyo’s argument seems condescending to developing countries (because it 
implicitly argues that developing countries, in their present state, should be more concerned with 
basic needs rather than aiming at higher ideals such as human freedom and liberty), it has been a 
major factor in cementing Sino-African relations. It explains why China has been closely 
involved with countries that are notoriously known for curtailing human and political rights. 
Sudan and Zimbabwe have often been cited (e.g. see Brookes 2007) as rogue states that Beijing 
is propping up without taking into consideration how the leaderships in these countries are a 
menace to their citizens. One example that roused international attention was the Chinese ship 
that was destined for Zimbabwe in 2008, loaded with arms for the government of Zimbabwe at 
the time when controversial elections in Zimbabwe had just been held and there was profound 
concern that political opposition could be suppressed even more with the addition of more arms 
(BBC, 2008). The concord that China has with countries that share its political and economic 
outlook justifies the convergence that constructivism explains in countries with similar identities 
and interests. However, it should be noted that intersecting identities and interests should not 
always be seen in an idealistic manner. China’s authoritarian type of politics, for example, would 
be consonant with the Sudanese and Zimbabwean regimes to some extent, but this in no way 
means that the force behind relations among these countries is a positive one. The importance of 
emphasizing this point is that constructivism has to be disentangled from idealism.  
The current research uses a species of constructivism that looks at how ideas are powerful in 
international relations and how identities and interests, be they negative or positive, are socially 
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constructed and influence relations among nations. Jim Woodward (2009) gives an easily 
understandable explanation of how players can cooperate with one player while being at odds 
with another. The explanation he gives is important for constructivist analysis because according 
constructivists, one player’s rise might fill some sectors of the international system with 
foreboding but might be hailed positively by other players. Woodward acknowledges the 
multiplicity of identities in players when he asserts that “the same person may cooperate for very 
different reasons in different situations, depending on the circumstances in which the cooperation 
occurs, the behavior and the motivation of others with whom they cooperate and so on” 
(Woodward 2009:219). This is in tandem with Wendt’s theory of social identities of nations. 
Through social process, a nation assumes socially constructed identities that are numerous and 
when in contact with other nations, different social identities are given precedence over others.  
If person is taken as an illustration for a for nation, in relation to the current research, China and 
Zambia cooperate for reasons that are contextual and according to a certain confluence of ideas, 
identities and interests that they possess. Kopiński and Polus (2011:181) “believe that Sino-
Zambian relations are exceptional to a remarkable degree, and do not seem to fall into the pattern 
used to describe Sino-African relationships elsewhere.” The amity that the two countries share 
should not be understood as an inherent condition. Structural change in international relations is 
possible and “occurs when actors redefine who they are and what they want” (Wendt 1999:336). 
Thus, if China and Zambia deliberately and fundamentally promote ideas, identities and interests 
that put them on diametrically opposed planes, relations among the two countries are likely to go 
through transformation. 
 
7.11 Conclusion  
This chapter was aimed at applying the arguments of constructivism to analyse Sino-Zambian 
relations. The research problem was mainly focused on the role that identities and interests have 
played in shaping relations between Zambia and China. For countries whose relations have 
proved so tenacious, despite periods of bilateral and international political turbulence, there has 
to be a force that is powerful behind such relations. Constructivism argues that ideas in 
international relations are a very big determinant and that identities and interests that countries 
create in their relations are also a crucial factor of how countries relate.  
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When analyzing Sino-Zambian relations, some themes are constantly evoked as lynchpins of 
such international intimacy. The fight against colonialism, imperialism, foreign domination and 
hegemonism have historically cemented China-Zambia relations. Both countries have experience 
with foreign domination and hence share an intersecting interest in fighting foreign domination 
wherever it seems to thrive. The contributions that China and Zambia made towards the 
eradication of colonialism, at the time when the two countries had overwhelming internal 
challenges of their own, shows the importance of other social factors influencing international 
cooperation and solidarity. If relations among countries seeking to end colonialism were driven 
solely by material ambition and incentive, then China and Zambia would have used other means 
of fighting colonialism that would not imperil their material fortunes.  
The research has shown that by its stance on minority-ruled southern Africa, Zambia forfeited 
some benefits of having a stable and well established trade route through which it could export 
its resources and receive its imports. At the time when China was helping to build the Tanzania 
Zambia railway, the PRC was facing the economic and social stagnation brought by the Cultural 
Revolution. During his congratulatory address on Zambia’s fifty-one years of independence, 
Yang Youming, China’s ambassador to Zambia, referred to this historical, almost altruistic, 
contribution of China towards southern African liberation (Youming 2015). What counted most 
to Mao’s China was the purity of the revolution he sought to maintain at home and export to 
other countries. These ideological factors were crucial determinants of China-Zambia relations.  
During the Cold War, China and Zambia also shared a skepticism towards capitalism, an 
economic system that was mostly associated with exploitation of the less developed countries. 
What compounded this skepticism was the fact that colonizers of Africa and China practiced 
capitalism. This, as Hevi (1967) shows, bred the mentality – among formerly colonized 
countries, that colonialism was the preserve of certain powers – the capitalist powers. The fight 
against domination and the intersecting antipathy for colonialism were crucial to building and 
strengthening Sino-Zambian solidarity.  
The period after the Cold War ushered in democratic and economic reform in Zambia while as 
China had embarked on economic reform in 1978. It is noteworthy that the end of the Cold War 
has brought regional politics and the importance of regional powers to the fore. This period has 
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also brought South-South cooperation99 into mainstream politics. Countries of the South identify 
themselves in similar terms: they are developing, they are against domination of the global North 
and they are historically the third world. These identities have bred identical interests such as 
changing the status quo of international organisations like the United Nations that seem to pay 
cursory attention to the input and plight of developing countries in the international system. 
China has supported the African aspiration of reforming the United Nations Security Council 
(Embassy of the PRC in Zambia 2015). The South-South conference that the Chinese 
government co-hosted with the United Nations illustrates just how much importance China 
attaches to South-South cooperation and how it still wants to identify itself as a developing, third 
world country, an identity that has powerful resonance with Zambia.  
For a constructivist analysis, China-Zambia relations have gone through stages and periods that 
could appeal to realist and other international relations theories. However, a historical assessment 
of these relations shows a constant contribution of ideas such as solidarity in the third world to 
China-Zambia relations. This puts paid to the assertion that relations among nations are driven 
by material desires in an anarchic international system. Zambia was of strategic importance to 
southern Africa when most of the region was still not yet independent. In terms of economic 
importance to China, there is no convincing evidence that Zambia was of any strategic material 
importance to China. This importance became more palpable after the Cold War when China’s 
industrialization success compelled the country to look for energy and mineral resources that 
Zambia can provide. Thus, China’s post-Cold War friendship with Zambia could convince 
realists of their analysis, but when surveyed from a historical and social perspective, other factors 
behind strong Sino-Zambian amity become apparent. It is in this sense that Checkel (1998:324) 
argues that constructivism does not dismiss the arguments of other theories of international 
relations: it merely accentuates what they overlook: “the social fabric” of international relations. 
Indeed, by their nature, relations among nations are social, like all forms of human interaction. 
This assertion allows even for self-interested relationships that inhere in certain relations. 
However, nations learn, through “social learning” (Wendt 1999:326-327) and experience, to 
behave in self-interested ways. Self-interest and anarchy are thus not natural and immutable; they 
are subject to social circumstances and factors. In other words, as Wendt (1992:395) says, 
                                                          
99 South-South cooperation is more of a continuation of the solidarity of the countries that formed the non-aligned 
movement during the Cold War.  
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anarchy “is what states make of it.” Most of the foregoing has issued from constructions of 
China-Zambia identities and interests at the state or institutional level.  
The primary data showed that Zambians are concerned about the identities and interests of 
ordinary Chinese who are not under the direct guidance of their government. At state level, 
relations between the two countries have been shaped by factors such as colonialism and South-
South cooperation that have been structures of the international system. This was not the case 
with the impressions that were derived from the respondents interviewed for this research with 
the exception of the ZCTU. Michelo, Nkumbwa and Nyirenda were concerned that the growing 
number of ordinary Chinese might portend trouble for Zambia. Michelo was disconcerted with 
the level at which the Chinese are buying land in Zambia, with the allusion being that they are in 
the country to stay. Nkumbwa and Nyirenda feared that a large population of Chinese in Zambia 
might be a big threat for the country and has the potential to take Zambia back to the colonial 
days. Thus, while at the state level China might be regarded as a kindred country, the data 
collected suggests another identity for the Chinese. This research has make a distinction between 
China – as a state – and “the Chinese.” While the former refers to China at state level with its 
corporations, “the Chinese” are non-state Chinese actors whose presence is increasingly 














SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND GENERAL CONCLUSION 
8.1 Introduction  
This study acknowledged how the rise of China has divided opinion largely according but not 
confined to regional and political perceptions. Generally speaking, China’s rise has been hailed 
with optimism in Africa while in the West it has been noted with presentiment. China appeals to 
Africa for a variety of reasons. First of all, Africa is a poor continent and “China knows what it 
means to be poor” (Okonjo-Iweala 2006). After acceding to the presidency, Sata (2012) referred 
to the “harsh” internal conditions facing China and that those are similar to the conditions that 
face Zambia. He spoke highly of the work ethic of the Chinese and how they are able to adapt to 
the rigours of difficult rural lifestyles in Zambia. For this reason, China’s development is seen as 
a consequence of determination and grit. African countries are apprised of their economic 
weakness and are entranced by China’s rise. The research problem asserted that the use of 
realism as a theory of analyzing international relations has been influential in forming Western 
opinion on China’s growth. If China conforms to the tenets of realism, then its rise cannot be 
expected to be peaceful and its insistence of contributing to the formation and sustenance of a 
harmonious world is a smokescreen for its crude and aggressive pursuit of augmenting its 
influence and meeting its material needs in a competitive and self-help (anarchic) international 
system. This research has noted that the theoretical confinement of international relations to 
common theories such as realism has obviated the employment of less known, but cogent 
theories of international relations.  
Constructivism is one of the less utilized approaches of international relations, but it has been 
gaining momentum especially after the end of the Cold War. This research sought to challenge 
what seems to be the orthodox manner of interpreting relations among nations, in this case 
China-Zambia relations. As mentioned in the research problem, the current study comes with 
two main points that carry some measure of novelty in interpreting China-Zambia relations. 
First, the research used constructivism, an approach of international relations that is yet to be 
used in interpreting China’s relations with Zambia. Studies have been done using constructivism 
to understand China, but not its relations with Zambia, especially at an academic level. With the 
use of constructivism, the research sought to advance a valid argument on how identities and 
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interests have been cardinal determinants of Sino-Zambian relations. The belief that ideas rather 
than material ambitions are shapers of interaction among nations also forms a core essence of 
constructivism and has been supported by this research. It has been, shown, though, that the 
ideas crafted by influential sectors of society hold sway at the level of state-to-state interaction. 
The second matter addressed in the research problem is that this study had the responsibility of 
giving an evenhanded analysis of what China’s rise and its deepening relations with Zambia 
entail.  
From this background, the current chapter will be a recapitulation of how the research tackled the 
research problem, how it answered the research questions and how it met the research objectives. 
The first part of the chapter is a summary of the findings that this research uncovered.  The 
second part of chapter focuses on the recommendations that this research makes. This includes 
recommendations on how China and Zambia can forge a more mutually beneficial friendship. 
This chapter also points out areas where future researchers could focus in order to contribute to a 
plausible academic discourse on China’s posture in the international system. The final part of 
this chapter is the general conclusion of the research.  
 
8.2 SUMMARY  
This section of the current chapter presents the general summary of the research. The main 
arguments and themes that have been submitted in the research will be condensed in a 
summarised version. The importance of this section resides in the fact that some information in 
the research might not have been presented with due clarity and concision. For example, the 
previous chapter used constructivist analysis to determine the role that identities and interests 
have played in strengthening China-Zambia relations. However, some of the themes mentioned 
in that chapter might not be readily identifiable to readers. This chapter bears the responsibility 
of remedying that possibility. In its flow, the section cascades into subsections that trace the 
sequence of the chapters and the epochs of China-Zambia relations that this research dealt with. 
The first subsection deals with the incipient stages of Sino-Zambian relations. The second deals 
with the reforms, both economic and political, that the two countries have undergone. The third 
section is a summary of the tensions that have occurred between China and Zambia. The final 
subsection is a summary of the application of constructivism to understanding the role that 
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identities and interests have played in Sino-Zambian relations. In other words, the final 
subsection is a synopsis of the chapter seven.  
 
8.2.1 The Nascence of Sino-Zambian Relations 
One theme that has permeated a significant number of pages of this research is the longevity of 
Sino-Zambian relations and how historical events placed China and Zambia in the same position 
with regard to colonialism, foreign domination and capitalism. The current summary presents 
salient points that led to the establishment of solid Sino-Zambian relations that have defied 
changes in the two countries and in the international political system. It is also important to note 
that relations between China and Zambia have also been influenced by China’s view of Africa in 
general. Indeed, some of analyses and theories used to deal with relations between China and 
Africa usually employ blanket generalisations, an attitude that supposes that China deals with all 
countries in the same manner and with the same intentions. For instance, Taylor (2006) and 
Botha (2006) wrote about China’s relations with a number of African countries and concluded 
that these relations were all driven by realist instincts. Perhaps what could justify this attitude is 
China’s stance on Africa, a continent that to some extent is faced by easily generalizable 
challenges in terms of economics, infrastructure and political stability. These are concerns that to 
some extent were easily discernible in China, especially immediately after 1949. At the Bandung 
Conference in 1955, Zhou En-Lai had “proposed the principle of seeking common ground while 
reserving differences” (Song 2015:49). This has been an important factor in deepening relations 
because, as shown in the previous chapter, constructivism looks more at how countries relate 
because of shared ideas, identities and interests and the eschewal of factors that might imperil 
these relations. 
Thus, the inchoate stages of Sino-Zambian relations were driven by certain accentuated 
determinants of international relations. One of the major rallying cries of the two countries was 
to end colonialism, imperialism and foreign domination, especially in countries that were 
previously or still under these types of leadership (Camilleri 1980). China and Zambia both had 
history with foreign domination and hence they were almost morally bound to end it where it still 
lingered. This was seen as a vocation for countries that identified themselves as belonging to the 
Third World (Yu 1977; Akindele 1985). One of the biggest commitments that China made to 
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Africa’s liberation and economic independence was the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia 
railway. Two respondents interviewed for this research referred to China’s role in building the 
TAZARA as a defining moment in emboldening China-Zambia relations.  
An empirical research done by Song (2015) has recently revealed that the construction of the 
railway was mooted from as early as 1963 before Zambia got independence. The declassified 
material Song uses states that both Kaunda and Nyerere had made continuous appeals to the 
United States, Britain, the World Bank and the USSR, with their appeals failing to attract aid. 
China was at the time involved in a conflict with the Soviet Union and was thus reasonably eager 
to find allies at the international level. Its decision to carry out a project from which richer 
players had shrunk was a victory to China’s anti-colonial propaganda and firmly established it as 
a strong member of the Third World. It has to be said that Kaunda was initially reluctant to enlist 
Chinese aid and to put a high premium on Zambia’s relations with China (see Taylor 2006). 
However, the seeming reluctance of bigger economies to help with the construction of the 
railway, and the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Ian Smith’s Rhodesia, gave more 
urgency to the necessity of the railway and China’s willingness to commit to its construction 
convinced Kaunda of China’s intentions in ending dependency on colonial powers and minority-
ruled countries (Song 2015).   
Furthermore, China’s actions leading to the construction of the Tan-Zam railway confirmed the 
veracity of the eight principles that Zhou Enlai said were guidelines for China’s foreign 
investment and economic aid in Africa. As usual, China stated that the aid it gave to its partners 
was not conditional (see Onjala 2008) and that national sovereignty was sacrosanct and as such 
China would not interfere in the internal matters of other powers (Akindele 1985). Linked with 
this principle was an acknowledgement of equality between China, as a donor country, and the 
recipients (see Wang 2017). These are principles that China formally espouses even in its current 
engagement with Africa.  
The policy of non-alignment to which Zambia had committed itself was also formative in 
strengthening China-Zambia relations. The non-aligned movement sought to maintain the 
ideological autonomy of countries that were considered to be small in terms of economic 
standing and political influence. The Cold War had relegated much of the Third World to a status 
of less importance, unless Third World countries proved important for the tussle between the 
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USSR and the capitalist West (see Akinde 1985). As a country that cherishes its freedom and 
independence, China was an ally of the non-aligned members (Hassan 1976). Again, the Sino-
Soviet split played a huge role because China was determined to demonstrate that there was an 
alternative to Soviet socialism in the socialist camp.  
When presenting the nascent stage of China-Zambia relations, the second and sixth chapter of 
this research also touched on the powerful personalities of Mao and Kaunda and how their 
personalities and political inclinations played a part in influencing relations between China and 
Zambia. Mao had been skeptical of the Soviet Union, even during the era of Stalin, whence Sino-
Soviet animosity was still concealed. Kaunda’s disappointment with the Soviet Union regarding 
the TAZARA railway (see Song 2015) forced him to reach out to China. Mao’s era was mostly 
characterized by the institution of Mao’s thought in China and the promotion of revolution in the 
world. He was also driven by the desire to more or less create a new Chinese culture ex nihilo 
(Meisner 1986) - that is to erase the history China had of exploitative economics on the masses 
by the powerful elite or non-socialists, and those in Maoist parlance who were described as 
capitalist roaders. Thus, to find allies, if not converts, China had to court the Third World. As 
mentioned in the second chapter, in conversation with Kaunda, Mao raised his famous three-
worlds theory, which put Zambia and China in the Third World. This identification has been 
carried to date, with variations such as the Global South, and the developing world.  
In conclusion, this subsection sought to summarise the findings of the research on the role that 
identities and interests played in Sino-Zambian relations from their establishment. As has been 
illustrated, the analysis showed that the themes that kept coming up in China-Zambia relations 
were mostly tied to Third World identities and the consequent interests of ending colonialism, 
imperialism, hegemonism and minority rule that issued from Third World identities. Related to 
this influence is the history that countries of the Third World have with Western and capitalist 
domination. The unified solidarity to transform an asymmetric North-South nexus was potent in 
strengthening China-Zambia and China-Africa relations. The two parties considered each other 
as allies with a similar history that begot similar identities and similar interests. Scholars of 
Asian and African extraction have generally supported the argument of the ideological and 
historical factors that underlie Afro-Chinese relations. Western media and opinion have mainly 
been driven by realist analysis which takes a more cautious and negative appraisal of China’s 
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relations with Africa. However, the current research has been undergirded by constructivism and 
as such accentuates the role of intersecting identities and interests in relations among nations. 
The following subsection will be a summary of China-Zambia relations after the Cold War.  
 
8.2.2 Reform in China and Zambia and South-South Cooperation 
China and Zambia were unified by a non-aligned stance whose genesis could formally be traced 
to the Bandung Conference. Kaunda, as shown in the fifth chapter, had warned that colonialism 
was not the sole preserve of capitalist countries. Communists could as well be colonialists and 
hence Africa’s freedom from capitalist colonialism should not implant in the continent a blind 
and an uncritical submission to the communist camp, regardless of the fact that Zambia was not 
colonized by a communist nation. It was on this basis that Zambia chose to remain non-aligned. 
The escalation of ideological discord between China and the Soviet Union put paid to China’s 
initial submission to the Soviet Union as the leader of global socialism. Indeed, differences were 
so formidable that China considered Soviet revisionism as a bigger threat to China than United 
States imperialism. Thus, in the aftermath of the Sino-Soviet conflict, China courted non-aligned 
powers, if for ideological reasons. The end of the Cold War had an impact on how China and its 
partners were to continue their relations. This end of an era had far-reaching consequences for 
global politics and relations in the international system as a whole (see Cingranelli and Richards 
1999).  
The end of the Cold War ushered in an era where neoliberalism was the trend and hence 
countries like Zambia that had practiced an economic system akin with socialism had to reform. 
Economic reform in China, as has been numerously mentioned, started in 1978, more than a 
decade before the end of the Cold War. After assuming power in 1978, Deng Xiaoping put “less 
stress on ideology, and more on results” (Minzner 2013:13). For this reason, China had a 
pragmatic outlook on international relations and hence adapted to changes, both political and 
ideological, that resource-rich countries such as Zambia, had made. The two countries continued 
to emphasise the longstanding relations they had and how China had played a pivotal role in 
promoting propaganda against colonialism and how the Tanzania-Zambia railway was an 
enduring legacy of China’s commitment to aid the development of Africa. The Tanzania-Zambia 
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railway, as has been mentioned was China’s “largest aid commitment to the Third World” 
(Camilleri 1980:111).  
When the then Chinese Premier Li Peng visited Zambia in 1997, he acknowledged how the 
international system had fundamentally changed but that China-Zambia relations had remained 
largely cordial and unadulterated by the vicissitudes of global politics. He also talked of the great 
importance with which China regards Zambia and Africa (Segell 1998). With the end of 
colonialism and the Cold War, China stood a better chance of being enthusiastically accepted in 
African countries. History was against Western involvement on the continent.  Even the United 
States, a player with no history of colonialism in the continent, has often been treated with the 
same suspicion as erstwhile colonisers. Horace Campbell (2008) dismissed AGOA, a post-Cold 
War initiative by the United States ideally aimed at promoting conjoint benefits and respect 
between the United States and African entrepreneurs. Campbell (2008:90) argues that “in reality 
…there was never any respect for Africans or any real change in the racist policies of the US 
government.” 
The zeal with which Zambia and China have continued to regard each other is partly informed by 
the pervasive incredulity towards Western pronouncements of goodwill towards Africa and the 
failure of the Washington Consensus (see Halper 2010). The two countries have continued to 
ignore points of difference such as Zambia’s democratic reform since 1991 against the Chinese 
Communist Party’s consolidation of power since the Tiananmen Square crisis in 1989. The 
common challenges of Third World countries, such as economic and industrial advancement, 
political stability, and a shared skepticism towards former colonisers and the West in general 
have had a lot of influence on China-Zambia relations even after the Cold War. This, of course, 
has to be mentioned against the fact that when it suited them, certain political players in Zambia 
have whipped up anti-Chinese sentiment (Haglund 2008) and branded China as a colonist in 
order to augment their political fortunes.  
China and Zambia find themselves in what has increasingly become to be known as the Global 
South. From the previous chapter, it has to be remembered that this region is the same that is 
traditionally regarded as Third World though the term risks obsolescence with changes in 
countries such as Brazil, India, China and South Africa (Dirlik 2007). Sheng Ding (2008:193) 
states that due to Beijing’s deft use of soft power in Africa, East Asia and Latin America, “the 
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global south has become an increasingly harmonious environment for Beijing to cultivate a 
favorable national image, exert its political influence on regional affairs [and] benefit its own 
domestic economic developments.”100 Naturally, as quoted in chapter seven, China and Zambia 
perceive South-South cooperation as mutually beneficial and steeped in historical bonds (Negi 
2008). China insists on its unwavering commitment to the development of the South (Embassy of 
the PRC in Zambia 2015). Using South-South solidarity to explain Sino-Zambian relations 
pointed to the enduring theme of Third World amity. Most of the data that was analysed in the 
previous chapter exposed this excessive emphasis. Thus, in sum, the data reached a point of 
saturation wherein nothing substantially new was adduced by non-Western writers to explain the 
reasons behind the enduring intimacy between China and Zambia. Another excessively used 
reason, drifting away from converging national identities, was the proportionate rise in demand 
for energy resources that China’s rise has given birth to. The extreme version of this dimension 
is what African leaders (e.g. Mugabe (2015) dismiss as reductionism – the confinement of Sino-
African relations to strictly economic influence. The following sub-section offers a unique trend 
in Sino-Zambian relations. The current sub-section dwelt on what has kept Sino-Zambian 
relatively strong after the Cold War. The next sub-section summarises certain tensions that have 
taken place between Zambia and China.  
 
8.2.3 Tensions in China-Zambia Relations 
Despite the influential rhetoric about South-South cooperation, Third World solidarity and all-
weather friendship, there have been moments when Sino-Zambian relations were embroiled in 
tension, both at an ordinary level and at an institutional level. It has been argued that, in Zambia, 
“popular opposition to China has arguably been the most intense of all African countries” (Negi 
2008:43). At an institutional level, the Patriotic Front political party in Zambia seized on China’s 
controversial labour practice to excite anti-Chinese sentiment. China was called unsavoury 
names such as “infestor” (Migration Policy Institute 2015) rather than investor and that it was a 
                                                          
100This line of argument, however, has been relentlessly countered by (mostly Western) perceptions of China as an 
incarnation of a new colonial power. People who sponsor this attitude are also persuaded by the argument that a 
developed China will adopt a more bellicose and confrontational stance in its international behaviour. However, 
this argument has to contend with the counter argument that China has benefited from the current international 
status quo and would hence want to maintain it (Breslin 2013). This rhymes with China’s stated in interests in 
maintaining a harmonious world as it rises (Goldstein 2005).  
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selfish authoritarian nation that sought to exploit Africa for its self-serving ambitions, both 
politically and economically. The stance of the PF has to be taken in context; it was mainly 
during the 2006 general election campaign that the PF whipped up anti-Chinese sentiment.101 
The PF was still in opposition and the Levy Mwanawasa-led MMD of the time had made great 
strides in economic stability and its policy of zero tolerance to corruption.102  
Under such circumstances, the PF seized on the influx of Chinese business men, the conduct of 
Chinese employers in the mines, and the quality of Chinese wares penetrating the Zambian 
market as a weakness of the Mwanawasa government. Michael Sata, the PF leader, accused the 
MMD government of kowtowing to China to the detriment of ordinary Zambians. The MMD 
government was compelled to paint a more positive picture of China (Mhandara, Manyeruke and 
Nyemba 2013) because it was during their time at the helm that economic relations and the 
physical presence of China in Zambia took unprecedented proportions. The people who 
resonated mostly with Sata’s rhetoric were mostly from Lusaka (the capital city) and the 
Copperbelt province. Those in Lusaka have had to deal with small scale Chinese entrepreneurs 
who compete with ordinary Zambian entrepreneurs (see Michelo 2007). Dipak Patel, Zambia’s 
former minister of trade, inveighed against Chinese who engage in small businesses of selling 
groceries and other wares that can easily be sold by ordinary Zambians (see Alden 2007). On the 
Copperbelt, Chinese investment in copper mining, which still remains the mainstay of Zambia’s 
economy (Dymond 2007), have been an accelerant for tension between Zambian employees and 
their Chinese employers. Apart from the well documented conduct of Chinese employers, anti-
Chinese sentiment should also be looked at from the perspective of those who reckon that China 
is exploiting the mines that were ceded after Zambia adopted privatization. This sentiment falls 
under the general purview of a reluctance to let African natural resources be ‘commandeered’ by 
foreign powers (see Negi 2008).  
The fact that Sata’s votes kept rising prior to his ultimate victory in 2011 shows that his rhetoric 
was working, judging from the fact that amid all the subjects he raised during his campaign, his 
                                                          
101 One respondent for this research asserted that Sata’s anti-Chinese rhetoric was aimed at gaining power and 
hence lacked genuine conviction.   
102 Levy Mwanawasa, who was handpicked by Chiluba to succeed the latter as president of the MMD and Zambia, 
later turned on Chiluba and started probing him on charges of corruption. This was a positive development as it 
showed that Mwanawasa was not beholden to Chiluba  to the extent that he would ignore the suspicions of 
corruption that dogged the Chiluba government.  
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position on Chinese investment was the main topic.103 Another fact that proves this is that when 
he lost the 2006 election, riots broke out in Lusaka and the Copperbelt, the two regions with the 
largest Chinese presence in both personnel and investment (Negi 2008). As mentioned in the 
second chapter, Hu Jintao was forced to cancel his trip to the Copperbelt when he came to 
Zambia for fear that there would be anti-Chinese unrest. It is noteworthy that by the time Sata 
came to power, he had mellowed his rhetoric against China, and assured Chinese investors that 
in the event of his electoral victory their investments would remain untouched. This was the case 
when Sata eventually assumed power. Even though Sata’s changed stance regarding Chinese 
investment could be interpreted as depicting his duplicity, Spilsbury argues that retaining 
Chinese FDI was a rational move and that Chinese investment was valuable “provided it was 
appropriately regulated and channeled towards development for the entire population” (Spilsbury 
2012:238).  
One of the things that anti-Chinese attitudes from ordinary Zambians teach us is that maybe the 
enthusiasm with which African leaders greet China’s presence in Africa is incommensurate with 
the feeling of ordinary citizens. This possibility qualifies what this study has addressed regarding 
whose constructs of one’s nation and another’s hold sway in the creation of national identities. 
Governments that need the infrastructure that China readily provides are more amenable to 
China’s interventions. Ordinary Zambians who have occasionally been exposed to the vagaries 
of Chinese labour might not share the same optimism. The misgivings that some ordinary 
Zambians have towards China are because China’s investment, while aiding economic growth, 
has benefited the elite (Spilsbury 2012). The input of ordinary people on how China’s presence 
in Africa should be treated is of immense importance. The insights gathered from ordinary 
Zambians for this research varied; in general, all respondents noted the advantages and 
disadvantages of China’s presence in Zambia. The respondents who work for a Chinese textile 
franchise firm commended the way some ordinary Zambians have benefitted from Chinese 
employment. The following subsection summarises the justification behind the usage of 
constructivism as an approach to China-Zambia relations.  
 
                                                          
103 It should also be noted that apart from his stance on Chinese, Zambians were growing increasingly impatient 
with the MMD government which was characterized by corruption.  
232 
 
8.2.4. Constructivism as an Approach to China-Zambia Relations 
From the literature that has been used for this research, it is clear that China-Zambia and China-
Africa relations have received, and continue to receive, wide academic and media attention. 
However, this research has noted the limited use of theories to understand China’s presence in 
Africa and Zambia. Furthermore, there has also been a reductionist interpretation of China’s 
current motives in Zambia, confining relations to strictly commercial incentives or to China’s 
quest for Africa’s natural resources (Council for Foreign Relations 2005). This handicap is 
related to the first in that people who employ realist analyses understand China’s motive as 
materially driven, meant only to bolster China’s national interest. This research has used 
constructivism as an approach that looks at China-Zambia relations from an arguably broader 
perspective. The research has used constructivist analysis to situate Sino-Zambian relations in 
their historical context. It has also the power of language and social interaction in creating 
national identities and interests that bind states together. History and identity play a big role in 
framing country- or regional-specific foreign policies. This is an ideational turn in understanding 
foreign policy and it emphasizes how countries perceive themselves and others in particular 
circumstances. The identities that emerge from this mutual perception, though fundamental to 
foreign policy, are socially constructed (Wendt 1992). On several occasions, this research has 
referred to China’s consistent use of its identity as a developing country to attract African 
overtures (see Alden and Alves 2008; Haglubd 2008).  
The third chapter showed a number of reasons that could be adduced for the limited use of 
constructivism in explaining and analysing international relations. One of the reasons is that 
some scholars (e.g. Nau 2012) have argued that constructivism is an appendage to what have 
hitherto been understood as mainstream theories of international relations. Another reason is that 
constructivism is not regarded as a theory, but an approach to international relations. This is an 
allusion of constructivism failing short of the criteria needed for an enterprise to amount to a 
theory (see the second chapter). With these hurdles standing in its way, it is not surprising that 
constructivism has not been used to understand China-Zambia relations. Qin (2010) interpreted 
China’s identity from a constructivist paradigm. He conceded the argument that China is not a 
closed unit impervious to change. China “is an open process of complex social relations in 
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motion” (Qin 2010:138). This research takes this line of reasoning to apply to both China and 
Zambia and the relations that they share.  
The main intent of the research was to establish the role that identity and interests have played in 
shaping China-Zambia relations. Before demonstrating that these two factors have indeed played 
a determining role in Sino-Zambian relations, the research drew the hypothesis that identities and 
interests are constructed through social interaction and that apart from being changeable, they are 
also multiple. Identities breed interests in interaction among nations. This is one of the major 
arguments of constructivism. Another major contribution of constructivism is that ideas, culture 
and social learning are very crucial in international relations. From this backdrop, the research 
proceded to test whether or not China-Zambia relations could be analysed from a constructivist 
plane. The role of ideology in strengthening China-Zambia relations seems to bear out the 
argument of ideas being important in unifying relations among nations. China and Zambia 
played pivotal roles in their respective fashions to help liberate regions that were under colonial 
or minority rule at the time when doing so was economically counterproductive. In a self-help 
system, especially when self-help is understood in material terms, the altruistic conduct of the 
two countries could confound observers. A constructivist analysis, with its allowance of the 
possibility of identical ideas bringing about solidarity, seems suitable as an explanation.  
Zambia and China shared identities of being survivors of Western and foreign domination. They 
were also identical as Third World countries (Kopin´ski and Polus 2011), or countries of the 
global South to use modern day nomenclature. They both continue to ascribe the title of 
developing countries to themselves and each other. This research has argued that from these 
identities have emerged interests that are also a unifying factor. Being survivors of Western and 
foreign domination naturally breeds a desire to preclude domination by foreign forces from 
recurring and helping those that are still under this domination to attain liberation. The interest 
that comes from Third World or global South identity is to shore up the fortunes of the countries 
of this region and to end their exploitation by former colonisers and countries of the First and 
Second World, or the global North. That China and Zambia identify themselves as developing 
countries cultivates the interests of attaining development through reliance on other developing 
countries. Countries that see each other as kindred countries of the South, striving for 
development, are wont to be positive about each other’s development. This explains why Africa 
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is generally enamaoured of China’s development as the latter proves to the former that national 
growth is possible without applying the political, social and economic homilies of the West.  
The research utilized constructivism to demonstrate the role that identities play in charting the 
course and intensity of relations among nations. The addition of occasional tensions that have 
attended China-Zambia relations justifies the argument that different sections of society could 
ascribe different identities to their and foreign nations. As mentioned in the seventh chapter, the 
identity that the Zambian government might attribute to itself and China might not exactly be the 
same as the notions that ordinary Zambians have. If identities are social constructions, which this 
research argues they are, then it is not an easy undertaking to find an identity that is accepted by 
all. This has other implications for constructivism as an approach to international relations; it 
means that if identities differ according to multiple perceptions, then an object that is considered 
positive by one sector might be considered malevolent by another sector. This is where 
constructivism departs from idealism, a theory under which Wendt (1999) and Nau (2012) have 
subsumed it. Social relations can be characterized by both concord and conflict. 
The ideas, identities and interests that emerge from relations among nations are endogenous to 
those interactions, rather than inherently foisted on them. To use Alder’s ‘seizing the middle 
ground’ analogy, constructivism recoils from realism which argues that nations are exogenously 
wired to be self-interested and be driven by the hankering for survival and augmentation of 
material power; in the same vein, constructivism does not also go the opposite extreme of 
idealism by arguing that nations inherently want peace with each other. The proverbial ‘middle 
ground’ is the one arguing that whether or not nations are interested in competition or mutually 
beneficial interaction as they relate, is caused by social learning and process. Relations between 
Zambia and China have been shaped by social learning - by specific contexts that have 
influenced the two countries. In this case, it is hard to argue that because of some inherent 
identity and interest of the two countries, relations among them can be predicted to be the same 
eternally. Social conditions might arise that could fundamentally change how the two countries 
relate. This, however, is not to say that according to constructivism relations among nations lack 
predictability. For as long as mutual identities and interests remain unchanged, predictability is 
possible. Having given the summary of the research, the following section gives 




The current section presents the recommendations that this research suggests. Relations between 
China and Zambia have yielded benefits and curious moments and motives. Thus, the 
recommendations being made are slightly prescriptive. The first subsection emphasises the moral 
superiority of a foreign policy based on principle as China and Zambia seem to have exuded in 
their stated desire to end foreign interference in their and other countries. The second subsection 
unpacks the veracity of China’s claim of non-interference and whether or not it gives Zambia 
everlasting reassurance that China will not interfere in Zambia’s internal affairs, irrespective of a 
change in circumstances. The third subsection cautions against the precipitate but subtle 
undermining of certain ideals, mostly democracy and human rights, because they are not the sine 
qua non of relations between China and Zambia. Following that, this research addresses the 
issues of the input of ordinary citizens in determining relations between Zambia and China. The 
section ends with reasons for recommending constructivism as an appreciable, albeit emerging, 
approach to international relations.   
 
8.3.1 (Foreign) Policy of Principle 
One of the hallmarks of Zambia’s foreign policy during the era of Kaunda was principle. Kaunda 
was placed in an invidious position after Zambia’s independence. Economically, Zambia needed 
settler-ruled countries as passages for its exports and imports. Not only that, South Africa was, 
and still remains, a major source of goods that are found in Zambia. Timothy Shaw (1976:79) 
writes of Zambia’s “quest for détente” in southern Africa to illustrate how to some degree 
Zambia’s diplomacy was circumscribed by economic interests. This notwithstanding, Kaunda’s 
stance on colonialism and minority rule was self-evident. He resented them and wanted to 
contribute towards accelerating their demise. In a Humanist in Africa, Kaunda’s aversion of 
foreign or colonial domination of any kind is manifestly clear. He is cognizant of the fact that 
colonialism can be carried out by both capitalists and communists. Thus, it is recommended that 
in its dealing with China, Zambia should be wary of China’s moves that could replicate the 
regrettable British domination that Zambia suffered. When Richard Hall (1970) writes about the 
high price of principle, he refers to the sacrifice that Kaunda made in defence of human dignity, 
national sovereignty, political liberation and human rights. This research recommends a 
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commitment to these high ideals. China-Zambia relations might not pay sufficient attention to 
this because of China’s own domestic record on human rights. However, China’s role towards 
the liberation of Africa should not be undermined. It is its understanding of human rights and 
political advancement that is controversial.  
That China recoils from interfering in the internal affairs of its partners should not lull Zambia 
into complacency. The economic strides that China has made since 1978 were not accompanied 
by more political freedom (Vogel 2011). To the contrary, the Chinese Communist Party 
consolidated its hold on power after the pro-democracy protests at Tiananmen in 1989. It is 
laudable that Zambia has made democratic changes that are quite exemplary in a continent that 
has taken so long to establish credible democracies. These principles should not be undermined 
just because China shows that economic growth can still be attained through “the other way” of 
political practice. The current research has mainly described China’s rise as growth rather than 
development. The differentiation was deliberate. 
Growth has been used to refer to China’s economic gains. The researcher here looked at 
development as being a comprehensive betterment of citizens’ social, political and economic 
status. From this understanding, China has attained growth but is still yet to grant its people 
development. In other words, China has used what Richard L. Sklar calls “developmental 
dictatorship” - a type of state-led economy in a polity where “liberty is suppressed; labor is 
regimented and exploited; freedom of movement is curtailed [and] personal choice is severely 
restricted” (Sklar 1983:12). Zambia, to some extent, has attained political and social maturity but 
still needs to improve its economy. Its principles will have to be accompanied with advanced 
economics. Zambia is in a continent where people like Dambisa Moyo argue that of primary 
importance to social and political reform is economic advancement. Though myopic and 
patronizing, this argument is likely to persuade Africans who reason that they are more in need 
of economic development (see Sklar 1983). Having a stable democracy and political liberty will 
mean very little if it is not accompanied by a thriving economy that will enable Zambians to 
access the services they deserve in health care, education and other needs. Zambia could be well 





8.3.2 Non-Interference: An Ambiguous Commitment 
One of the most attractive identities that China has for Africa is its own history with colonial 
domination. That China has gone through that and emerged a formidable power in the 
international system acts as inspiration. Okonjo-Iweala argues that China understands what 
poverty means and hence is better placed to understand the African situation. Marafa (2007:2) 
alleges that “having experienced a history of external exploitation, not quite successful economic 
experimentation and more recently rapid market-based development, China is in a unique 
position to understand the challenges and complexities facing Africa.” The empirical experience 
that China has of Africa’s problems encourages the perception that China is on the same side of 
the political divide with Africa, and Zambia in particular. For this reason, some argue, China 
sees hope and opportunity in Africa, a continent that the West has often regarded as backward 
and incapable of self-actualised growth in the absence of foreign (i.e. Western) tutelage. Through 
its principle of non-interference104 in internal affairs of other nations, China presents itself in 
stark contrast to powers that seek to offer tutelage to their political and trade partners.  
On face value, non-interference appears as a modest principle by a fallible country that recoils 
from imposing its worldview on other players. When seen in comparison to states that interfere 
with internal affairs of other states, non-interference becomes more amenable, especially in 
Africa where evidence of Western interference has historically been legion. From Lynch (2004) 
and Alden and Alves (2008), it can be inferred that China’s principle of non-interference also 
emanates from China’s conviction that nations should conduct their domestic affairs in ways that 
are germane to their specific contexts. In the fourth chapter, the research showed how Mao 
gradually freed himself from the Soviet orbit partly driven by the belief that China’s 
circumstances could not be controlled by a wholesale importation of an ideology whose source 
was meant to address different circumstances. On this score as well, the principle appears to be 
an earnest admission that countries are faced with certain circumstances that require well-tailored 
initiatives. From a constructivist perspective, the uniqueness of nations cannot be undermined. 
However, the principle of non-interference should be taken in context.  
Zambia, like many African countries, is still struggling with basic challenges of providing basic 
needs for its citizens. The country is also found in a continent where allegations of human rights 
                                                          
104 Non-interference is one of the five principles on which China’s Africa policy is based (See Corkin 2017).  
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abuse and flouting of democratic ethics are rife. An encouraging fact about Zambia is that its 
record of multiparty democracy has generally been exemplary. The concern that by standing 
aloof on issues of human rights and democracy in Africa, China is aiding and abetting rogue 
leaderships does not convincingly apply to the Zambia case. However, it also has to be noted that 
because Zambia is grappling with providing basic needs to its citizens, the influence of a country 
that does not offer normative conditions on other needs such as democracy and human rights 
could offer less incentive for Zambia to uphold these ideals. The onus is on the country to guard 
against such an occurrence. It is also recommended that in the same way that this research 
counsels against a precipitate rejection of China because of one-dimensional analyses, it also 
counsels against a wholesale and impulsive embrace of China.  
The dissertation notes with concern China’s stance on political openness. Zambia has made 
visible strides in transitioning itself from a one-party state to one characterized by political 
pluralism and a commitment to provide liberties in the media and other sectors of community. 
China is yet to emerge from such a political structure. The research notes that with its attenuated 
influence in international affairs, Zambia has less chances of success in converting China to 
political openness. With this acknowledgement, the research only recommends that Zambia 
continues to commit itself to an open political system, irrespective of the subtle influence from 
China which might attach less value to such openness. It is predictable that China cannot actively 
pontificate certain political decisions that Zambia should make as this could be interfering in 
Zambia’s internal affairs. This notwithstanding, China’s commitment to non-interference has 
occasionally been questioned (e.g. see Large 2008), especially in its relations with Zambia.  
Taylor (2006; see also Haglund 2008) has argued that the first time China publicly deviated from 
its policy of non-interference was in Zambia during the run-up to the 2006 general election. 
When Michael Sata condemned Chinese investment in Zambia, Li Baodong, the Chinese 
ambassador to Zambia at the time, threatened to cut off ties with Zambia if Sata won the election 
(Reed 2006; Agence France-Press [AFP], 5 September 2006). This example calls for a measured 
appraisal of how much China is ready to tolerate the internal affairs of its partners. In its pursuit 
of certain interests, China could feel compelled to intervene in the internal affairs of countries 
that are of economic and political significance to it. Zambia is such a country. 
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China has invested hugely in Zambia’s mining sector and Zambia is also important in China’s 
continued quest to isolate Taiwan from international recognition with the aim that maybe the 
Republic of China could one day be reunited with the mainland. If these prospects are 
threatened, China is likely to attempt influencing Zambian politics. Draher and Fuchs (2015) 
argue that China has used its aid to influence relations with its allies at state levels, even to the 
extent of influencing voting patterns of recipients of its aid and investment to score diplomatic 
victories regarding the recognition of mainland China at the expense of Taiwan.  These are subtle 
ways through which China impacts on the affairs of the countries benefiting from is largesse. 
From this background, the research recommends that Zambia does not attach unwarranted 
importance to the principle of non-interference.  
Carmody and Taylor (2010:504) argue that China’s principle of non-interference “is not static.” 
This research maintains the view that the principle of non-interference, as the example above 
illustrates, is an ambiguous principle which China could use to attract its partners, but which it is 
also ready to relinquish in extreme cases. Furthermore, the current research takes a constructivist 
view of interpreting factors that influence relations among nations. For this reason, social 
contexts might emerge that could influence China’s international posturing and force it to deviate 
from the principle of non-interference. The onus to realistically assess China’s claims to non-
interference rests on Zambia. It should also be mentioned that China’s principle of non-
interference should not be read in a one-dimensional manner. While it appears as though China 
adheres to this principle out of respect for national sovereignty, this principle has also been used 
by China to preclude international censure. China has thus defended itself from calls for more 
democratic liberties from other players in the international system on the basis that its internal 
affairs should not be interfered with by foreign influence. This aversion to foreign scrutiny offers 
Zambia an alternative understanding of China’s insistence on non-interference. The principle 
remains ambiguous; however attractive it sounds at a prima facie level.  
Closely related to the principle of non-interference is the understanding of sovereignty as the 
right of nations to enjoy latitude in their national dealings. China has used this to defend its 
sovereign understanding of what constitutes democracy and human rights. The following 
subsection recommends possible positions on democracy and human rights that Zambia can take 
as its relations with China continue.   
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8.3.3 Democracy and Promotion of Human Rights: Not Mere Niceties 
Zambia can imitate China for its unprecedented growth which reduced poverty from 88% in 
1981 to 4.1 in 2014 (World Bank). This was achieved by a march with the change of time, and a 
courage to move China from the ideological straitjacket into which Mao had confined it. But 
what else can Zambia emulate from China? The research has cautioned against an impulsive 
reaction to China’s presence in Zambia, whether in welcoming, rejecting or scrutinising it. In this 
case, Zambia has to assess China’s politics, its stance on social development and its interests to 
adopt that which is exemplary and prevent what could be deleterious. The process of doing this 
cannot be easy. China’s unconditional relations are deemed far better than what Daniel Vuko-
vich (2012:8) calls “a certain paternalist, even colonial arrogance” from the West. Vukovich is 
one of the emerging critics of Western perceptions of China as a colonial and/or malevolent 
force in Africa (see also Gu 2013; O’Brien 2016). The emerging school tends to be critical of 
Western perspectives on China’s rise in Africa, and Africans who are persuaded by China’s 
foreign policies buy into the clamour to embrace China and to dismiss Western speculations 
about Sino-African relations. One of the major criticisms the West has against China is China’s 
stance on democracy and human rights. This section looks at how Zambia can tackle issues of 
democracy and human rights as its relations with China deepen and recommend that the 
maintenance of democracy and human rights is essential and should not be dispensable.  
An alarming attitude of Africans towards China’s presence on the continent resides in some 
concerning sentiments and attitudes towards the conditions for governance that China does not 
demand. Okonjo-Iweala (2006) called human rights, macroeconomic conditionalities and 
structural reforms “niceties.” This wording presents a cavalier attitude towards significant issues. 
It dovetails with Moyo’s assertion that Africans are receptive of China because of primary 
importance to Africa should not be democracy and the promotion of human right but the 
securing of basic material needs. This argument is supported by the argument that Western 
countries relied on slavery and nondemocratic means for them to develop. An oblique 
implication of this is that different standards should not be set for Africa. Stefan Halper (2010: 
iii) avers that “given a choice between a market democracy and its freedoms and market 
authoritarianism and its high growth, stability, improved living standards, and limits on 
expression” developing countries prefer the authoritarian market model that China practices.  
241 
 
However, this study argues that issues of democracy and the promotion of human rights are not 
niceties and should be supported especially in a country like Zambia that has made visible 
progress compared to other African countries (see Panter-Brick 1994). The agency shown by the 
Patriotic Front government towards China’s presence should also inspire a defence for good 
political ideals, whether or not China encourages them or is indifferent.  
It is indeed laudable that politicians and scholars (e.g. Okonjo-Iweala 2006; Mutambara 2013; 
Mugabe 2015) and even Western scholars (e.g. O’Brien 2016; Douglas 2014) are questioning 
Western interpretations of China’s involvement in Africa. However, this questioning, taken to an 
extreme level, could lead to a wholesale rejection of all that Western players’ advice, irrespective 
of its worth. That the West is concerned about China’s access to African resources, and hence its 
anti-Chinese stance in Africa, is explicable. Whatever its motives, Western ideas and promotion 
of democracy and human rights are comparatively defensible than China’s continued stance on 
CCP dominance and the curtailment of liberties such as media freedom, political opposition and 
direct universal suffrage. The current research recommends that in terms of political behaviour, a 
Western orientation, already entrenched in Zambia, is a better alternative. The Constitution of 
Zambia (2016) still enjoins the country to uphold civil liberties and the ideal of multiparty 
democracy, as enunciated in Western politics. A popular Western criticism of China’s close 
involvement with some of Africa’s authoritarian regimes is well founded. By offering such 
regimes respite from Western censure and advocacy for political reform, China colludes in 
perpetuating the suppression of ordinary citizens who endure the suffering wrought by their 
leaders (Council for Foreign Relations 2005). In keeping with the aim of this research, Zambia 
and China have thus far acted on intersecting identities and interests that have served relations 
between the two countries. Identities and interests that are detrimental to any of the two parties 
could have dire consequences. It would be unfortunate if Zambia were to replicate China’s 
stance on political contestation and democracy. Thus, while China has proved to be a stable 






8.3.4 The Urgency and Necessity of National Agency 
Section 7.8 of the previous chapter referred to agency in China-Zambia relations. The manner 
with which the Patriotic Front has dealt with China, even as regards issues such as casual labour, 
lends credence to the argument that African countries are not invariably passive participants or 
bystanders in their relations with China (Beyongo 2015). Critics of China’s presence in Africa 
seem to be driven by the mentality that Africa is poor, weak and passive enough that China’s 
economic boom and consequent effects on Africa will go unchecked on the continent. In other 
words, Africa is seen as lacking agency in shaping Sino-African relations. In a realist 
interpretation of international relations, this line of argument is well founded. If relations among 
nations are determined by power and the pursuit of national interest, then nations that are more 
powerful are likely to lord it over those that are less powerful and if weaker states want to secure 
their survival interests, they can bandwagon with bigger powers or balance against them. 
This study concedes certain aspects of realist argumentation. For example, the fact that China 
enjoys more influence in the international system gives it an advantage in its dealings with a less 
influential country like Zambia. For this reason, the room for manoeurvre available to Zambia is 
limited by the economic and political imbalance between Zambia and China. In addition, the 
influx of Chinese wares in Africa, some of them substandard, and the threat that these pose to 
manufacturing and industrial potential of African countries (Council for Foreign Relations 
2005), have given the impression that African countries have not been courageous enough to 
state the level and type of investment that is urgent from China (see Rupp 2009). Sata accused 
the MMD government of being complicit in China’s indifference to the threat that small-scale 
Chinese businesses pose to entrepreneurial opportunities for small-scale Zambian traders and the 
labour and manufacturing sectors. This, however, does not condemn Zambia to perpetual 
subservience. Instances have arisen when Zambia capitalised on its strategic importance to its 
favour.  
The previous subsection cited the elements of China that Zambia can emulate and those that 
might not be exemplary. The latitude to have this choice is itself indicative of Zambia’s agency. 
From the time of Kaunda, Zambia has had longstanding relations with China but these relations 
have also, to a degree, respected the autonomy of both countries. This autonomy was mostly 
manifested in the divergent identities that the two countries had. This confirms that apart from 
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the influential intersecting identities and interests that Zambia and China have, the two countries 
had identities and interests that were not in tandem and hence were downplayed when relations 
between the two countries were in play. For example, China has to this day insisted on being 
called a socialist nation. Zambia maintained its independence from taking any side of the 
ideological divide that marked the Cold War era. Thus, non-alignment was its position and 
humanism, during Kaunda’s rule, was its ideology. It has to be mentioned, however, that the rift 
between humanism and socialism was made less steep by the fact that both countries subscribed 
to anti-capitalist ideology. This notwithstanding, Zambia retained its right to frame its national 
ideology.  
Zambia’s move to return to multiparty democracy in 1991 came a few years after the Tiananmen 
Square crisis in China whence the CCP, in lieu of yielding to political reform, consolidated its 
power even more. Relations between the two countries continued despite this fundamental 
change in Zambia’s political landscape. China called political reform in Zambia, “a choice taken 
by the Zambian people [that] China will not interfere” (Xinhua, August 18, 1992) with. Zambia 
still has the necessity and potential to maintain some measure of autonomy in its dealings with a 
more powerful China. The PRC carries itself as a champion of self-determination and this is seen 
in its insistence on nations embarking on ventures that are relevant to specific national 
conditions. Socialism with Chinese characteristics is one such venture, wherein elements of 
socialism were tailored towards addressing China’s specific needs. The same logic could apply 
to Zambia’s case. The country has specific issues and challenges that it needs to surmount and 
China might not be the panacea for these. Furthermore, Zambia’s agency in dealing with China 
could be augmented by the fact that the two countries are mutually dependent to an extent. 
Rotberg (2009:1), writing about China-Africa relations in general states that “China and Africa 
desperately need each other. China cannot grow without Africa. Nor can sub-Saharan Africa … 
subsist, and now prosper, without China.” Though an argument could be advanced on how China 
can seek the resources it gets from Zambia elsewhere, this study has shown that Zambia’s 
importance to China is not confined to China’s quest for resources. Historical and political 
factors – such as the Taiwan effect – present Zambia’s importance to China as a multifaceted 
affair. For this reason, Zambia can capitalise on this importance to play a determining role in 
shaping China-Zambia relations.  
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8.3.5 The Importance of Ordinary Citizens’ views: The Influence of Identity and Interest 
Construction from a Bottom-up Approach 
Constructivism is a social approach to international relations. One of its most telling 
contributions to international relations theory is its introduction of social forces in constructing 
influential national identities and interests that in turn determine the texture of relations that one 
country is likely to have with another. This research has acknowledged the socially constructed 
nature of identities and interests. The study has also recognized that identities and interests can 
be multiple and at times might even appear contradictory. This is because even within nations, 
different sectors of society might present contradicting notions of national identity and interests 
and might also present other nations in a picture that is at variance with other sectors of society. 
To put this in the perspective of China-Zambia relations, the research has discovered that some 
of the identities and interests that Zambia and China share are more constructed by certain 
sections of society.  
The maintenance of close relations between Zambia and China have mainly been supported by 
the views of more influential groups from both countries. The current sub-section recommends a 
stronger voice from ordinary Chinese and Zambian citizens in assessing interaction between the 
two countries. This recommendation is prompted by the argument that Sino-Zambian relations 
have mainly been championed by the elite whose ideas might not be shared by ordinary citizens. 
This research acknowledged the direct proportion between economic growth and political 
influence. For this reason, China’s presence is likely to impact on Zambia to a greater extent than 
Zambia can impact on China. Thus, while the insights of ordinary citizens from the two countries 
should be heeded, the paper looks more on how ordinary Zambians could muster agency because 
China is more influential to them than Zambia is influential to ordinary Chinese citizens residing 
in China.  
The years 2006 and 2007 stand out as years during which public anti-Chinese sentiment became 
intense in Zambia. The 2006 elections gave opposition leader Michael Sata victory in Lusaka 
and the Copperbelt, two provinces with a high Chinese presence. In 2007 Hu Jintao did not go on 
a planned visit to the Copperbelt, amid fears that Zambians would protest his presence. The two 
examples illustrate just how important ordinary Zambian voices could be in shaping Sino-
Zambian relations. They also show that despite the powerful voices of government 
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representatives from the two countries who are wont to present a different picture of China-
Zambia relations, ordinary Zambians have not been as sanguine - because they get to bear some 
of the controversial aspects of China’s presence in Zambia. This is why it is imperative for civil 
societies, like trade unions, to lend their perceptions on China-Zambia relations because they 
have a closer relationship with ordinary Zambians.  
Aleksandra Gadzala (2010:41) has argued that an exploration of “the micro-level of Chinese 
ventures” in Zambia “reveals that the continued employment of co-nationals as well as the 
generally substandard labour conditions maintained by Chinese firms lead to the offloading of 
Zambian workers into the country’s burgeoning informal economy.” Ultimately, this has led to 
Zambian entrepreneurs who cannot match competition from their Chinese counterparts to 
struggle. Apart from forcing a number of ordinary Zambians into the informal sector, some 
labour practices on the part of the Chinese have actually contributed to the already high rate of 
Zambia’s unemployment. An elite based analysis of Zambia’s attitude towards China risks 
glossing over these factors for purposes of political convenience. Thus, the views of ordinary 
Zambians are of great import and they can expose some of China’s questionable practices like 
the hiring of Chinese labourers to do jobs that can be tackled by Zambians (see Masterson 2011). 
This brings to the centre the need to focus on the ordinary Chinese residing in Zambia and the 
impact that they are likely to have on Sino-Zambian dynamics. While at a state level China 
might cut a benevolent figure in Zambia, this research has shown that the ire that certain sectors 
of Zambia harbour against China are actually directed at ordinary Chinese who have hitherto not 
formed a prominent subject of academic research in Sino-Zambian relations.  
 
8.3.6. Constructivism: An Emerging Approach in Need of theoretical Clarity  
The final sub-section of the recommendations is different from the foregoing ones that have 
mostly concentrated on what Zambia and China could do to foster the veracity of their claims of 
win-win cooperation and genuine and mutually beneficial South-South cooperation and third 
world solidarity. The current recommendations look more at the usage of international relations 
theory. One of the likely outcomes of this research is that thus far, theorists of international 
relations have been consigned to use time-honoured theories that draw certain foregone 
conclusions about China-Zambia and China-Africa relations. Constructivism, a subset of Critical 
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international relations theory, has latterly gained a prominent place in international relations 
analysis partly because of the inexplicable anomalies that emerged in the international system 
that prevalent theories could not clearly explain. As has been said in the third chapter, knowledge 
develops through the discovery of new ways of dealing with unforeseen circumstances (see 
Kuhn 1962). Constructivism has helped to explain certain aspects of international relations – like 
altruism among nations, the influence and fluidity of national identities and interests, the 
possibility of international community – and other occurrences that might elude the theoretical 
reach of mainstream international relations such as realism, liberalism and idealism.  
This research has used constructivism because of its apparent efficacy in establishing the role 
that identity and interest have played in maintaining and strengthening China-Zambia relations. 
The research by no means recommends the usage of emerging or novel theories solely for the 
sake of challenging seeming theoretical obscurantism. Approaches to international relations 
could offer more enlightenment when employed on merit and this paper has argued that 
constructivism contributes a worthy perspective of analyzing relations among nations. By nature, 
relations among individuals and consequently among nations, are social. For this reason, an 
approach that espouses a social dimension and its influence on relations among nations responds 
to the very nature of the constructed manner of relations. The social structure of international 
politics determines the identities and interests of actors, more than just shaping their behaviour 
(Wendt 1995). As Wendt argues, however, this constructed nature should not be taken to an 
extreme degree wherein even the reality of the material world is understood as social. Relations 
are social, but they occur in a world which has a visible material aspect. What social theory does 
is to interpret the material world and the workings that occur in it. Thus, China and Zambia 
operate in a world that is material, but how they relate is subject to how they identify themselves 
and each other and the meaning they render to their relations.  
This study recommends more usage of constructivism in understanding relations among nations. 
This notwithstanding, the research acknowledges that the lack of theoretical clarity that bedevils 
constructivist analysts has contributed to the limited use and success of this approach. Further 
research could delve more into how clarity could be lent to constructivism and whether or not 
this approach could be called an established theory rather than approach or meta-theory of 
international relations. This clarity could enhance some of the valid insights that constructivism 
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promises. For example, the interrogation of concepts like national identity and interests that have 
often been taken for granted is an interesting way of analysing international relations. For 
example, it is not clear whose interests are in question when both China and Zambia talk about 
them. Could they be the identities and interests that are natural and hence immutable? Or are 
they mere constructions of certain influential groups or individuals within the two nations that 
impose identities and interests as representative of the whole populace? This study has shown, 
for example, that the ideas that the Zambian government has of China are not necessarily shared 
by ordinary Zambians, especially those to whom the presence of Chinese in certain industries has 
been an encroachment and a preclusion or termination of employment.   
 
 8.4 CONCLUSION  
With its increasing presence in Africa, both in investment and personnel, China has become a 
cynosure of media, business and academic analysis. This study forms a part of the academic 
analysis. It set out to establish the role that socially constructed identities and interests have 
played in the evolution and sustenance of Sino-Zambian relations. Though unique to an extent, 
Sino-Zambian relations form a part of China’s general foreign policy objectives, of which the 
reunification of mainland China and Taiwan forms a huge part. China continues to view Taiwan 
as a renegade part of the mainland (He 2014). The seriousness of this aspiration is demonstrated 
by the fact that when Sata threatened to cut ties with China in favour of Taiwan, China broke its 
customary adherence to non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. The research 
has shown that Sata’s remarks were tailored towards whipping up anti-Chinese sentiment at the 
time when China’s labour practices were presented as oppressive. This populist rhetoric, as 
gathered from one of the interviews, was aimed at successfully canvassing Zambian votes. 
China-Zambia relations have continued in earnest despite Sata’s party being in government. 
Exchange visits between the two countries are common (e.g. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
PRC 2014). Initially geopolitical, China-Zambia relations have latterly been more geoeconomic 
due to China’s growth (Negi 2008). Expectedly, Western powers cannot evoke historical 
interactions that they had with Africa as reasons for strengthening current relations. This is so 
because while African and China look to their history to validate current relations, the history of 
Western powers and Africa was characterized by colonial exploitation (Alden and Alves 2008). 
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The research, like many preceding it, has concluded that Western policy makers, analysts, 
business personnel, media and academics “have, perhaps not surprisingly, been generally very 
critical of China's rising influence in Africa” (Samy 2010:79; see also Michelo 2007).  
 “China’s image as a developing country – indeed as a member of the Third World fraternity – 
was and remains an important part of its appeal” (Council for Foreign Relations 2005:41). The 
current research has shown that China-Zambia relations have not always been smooth but there 
are elements to these relations that have been powerful in the retention of Sino-Zambian amity. 
Some of the primary data gathered for this research suggested that China’s role in constructing 
the TAZARA Railway line bred trust between the two countries and has continued to play a 
seminal role in strengthening China-Zambia relations to this day. What primary data did not go 
to was the ideological underpinnings beyond China’s contribution. Relevant academic literature 
helped in this manner by presenting the ideological importance that TAZARA gave to China’s 
role in reducing Zambia’s dependency on its southern neighbours. The scope of China’s 
contribution was unprecedented when China’s economic situation at the time is taken into 
consideration. Thus, TAZARA cannot be explained as merely a material contribution; it stands 
as a testimony of Third World solidarity and the struggle against colonialism and settler rule.   
Using constructivism led the research towards focusing on how identities and interests between 
China and Zambia have been learned and constructed to the extent that they tend to undermine 
the likelihood of rupture in Sino-Zambian relations. Whether real or apocryphal, the identities 
and interests that the two countries claim to have are an essential component of cementing their 
relations. The brand of constructivism used for this research was mainly influenced by the 
writings of Alexander Wendt. Wendt’s central doctrines of constructivism include what he calls 
the idealist doctrine (1) and the holist doctrince (2). The current research relies on what Wendt 
said about the two doctrines, but more on what he said about the possibility of states engendering 
a community of nations. With this in mind, the research argues that Sino-Zambian relations are 
not frozen into a permanent state of bliss. Circumstances might arise that could precipitate a 
break in the synergy that the two countries share. Possible disputes that might arise between non-
state actors of both Chinese and Zambian extraction might cause tension in the two countries as 
they are naturally likely to secure the interests and safety of their citizens. The impressions 
gathered during interviews and focus group discussions point to the presence of pent up 
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frustration from ordinary Zambians towards non-state actors from China. This frustration, if not 
abated or addressed, is likely to escalate into a public confrontation among non-state actors, but 
with implications on state actors. As relations between the two countries stand, however, the 
forces (intersecting national identities and interests) that unify the two countries seem to be more 
influential than those that divide them.  
The research is also aware of the fact that the impact China has on Zambia is not commensurate 
with the impact that Zambia has on China. For this reason, it was prudent to look at how Zambia 
could benefit from its relations with a country that will play a pivotal role in shaping Zambia’s 
future. Zambia has the responsibility of not glossing over aspects of China’s presence that can be 
detrimental to it. These aspects include China’s labour practices and its equivocal stance on what 
constitutes human rights and democracy. While China’s growth has been breathtaking and could 
act as an example to Zambia, its other aspects –  regarding unqualified suffrage, freedom of 
speech etc. – do not offer Zambia a good example. Zambia would thus be well counselled to pick 
aspects of China’s identity, interests and practices that can be imported without controversy and 
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P.O. Box 37774 Lusaka, Zambia 




The Humanities and Social Sciences 
Research Ethics Committee  




RE: LETTER OF APPROVAL TO CONDUCT PROPOSED PHD RESEARCH WITH 
OUR ORGANISATION 
 
I make reference to the heading above in which we would like to inform the University of 
Kwazulu-Natal Research Office that our Organisation is aware that Mr. Emmanuel Matambo 
wants to carry out the proposed PhD research titled: The role of identity and interest in the 
evolution and sustenance of Sino-Zambian relations: A constructivist perspective with our 
Organisation. 
 
We have read his letter of introduction and explanation of the aim of this proposed research, 
we believe  that embarking on this research promotes what we believe it come at an 
opportune time in order to generate knowledge on how to improve Zambia’s relations with 
China. Our engagement with China continues to play a big role in Zambia’s political, 
economic and social welfare and sometimes it has been argued to be one sided.  Therefore, 
we hope that the finding of this research will produce recommendations, which will advocate 
a win-win situation.  
 
We are also aware that the information gathered from our staff will be used for academic 
purposes only so our willingness to participate. We are also aware that the interviewees are 
willingly giving the information and withholding their names in the report will preserve their 
integrity.  
 
Yours sincerely  
 
 













This interview is conducted with the intention of gathering data for my research. I would like to 
note that the questions are semi-structured and the interviewer might seek more clarity on certain 
matters so auxiliary questions have been added to main questions just in case the interviewee 
leaves out certain points or the interviewer wants some clarity  
Subject of Dissertation: The Role of Identity and Interest in the Evolution of Sino-Zambian 
Relations: A Constructivist Perspective.  
The research has four objectives written below which are similar to the research question of this 
study. The interviews being carried out are aimed at realizing these objectives.  
 
Objective 1: To discern what has been a central contributor to the long standing relationships 
between China and Zambia. 
Objective 2: To critically point the degree to which shared identities and interests between China 
and Zambia have played a central role in keeping relations between the two countries largely 
stable. 
Objective 3: Thirdly, while conceding the fact that China has more economic and political clout 
than Zambia, the research seeks to find ways that are likely to render Sino-Zambian relations 
mutually beneficial. 
 
Objective 4: Finally, the research aims to be evenhanded in analysing Sino-Zambian  relations 
without precipitately dismissing alarming allegations about China’s effect on Zambia and at the 
same time aims to be objective in analyzing China’s role in a way that is not naïve. 
 
1. What would you attribute to the long standing relations that China and Zambia have 
shared for more than half a century? 
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a) What was the effect of Africa’s anticolonial struggle on China-Zambia relations? 
b) What role did ideology play in cementing China Zambia relations during the Cold War?  
 
2. How does China’s self-identification shape the relations that China has with Zambia? 
a) How has Zambia responded to China’s identification as a socialist country? 
3. What substantial changes has China undergone since the death of Mao and how have 
these changes influenced China’s identity, political outlook, interests and its relations with 
Zambia? 
a) How consistent and close were China-Zambia relations after the inception of China’s 
modernization programme? 
b) What was Zambia’s response to the Tiananmen protest of 1989? 
c) How did China respond to Zambia’s shift to multiparty democracy in 1991 and the 
introduction of a liberal market system?  
4. What are China’s interests as it engages with Zambia and Africa? 
5. What are the opportunities that China offers to Zambia and vice-versa? 
6. What measures can be taken to ensure that China-Zambia relations are more stable and 
free of conflict, especially with regard to some of the violence that has happened between some 
Zambian workers and their Chinese employers? 
a) How would you describe the general feeling of Zambian workers towards their Chinese 
employers? What measures, if any, have been taken to stem violence and anti-Chinese sentiment 
among ordinary Zambians?  
7. How can China-Zambia relations benefit Zambia, as a less developed country in these 
relations? 




 University of KwaZulu-Natal,  





Informed Consent Document 
 
 Dear Participant, 
 
 My name is Emmanuel Matambo. I am a PhD candidate studying at the University of KwaZulu-
Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus majoring in political science. My student number is 212557328. 
The title of my research is: The Role of Identity and Interest in the Evolution of Sino-Zambian 
Relations: A Constructivist Perspective. The research aims to ascertain the factors that have 
contributed to the longstanding relations between Zambia and China. To be more specific, the 
research will look at the role that national identity and interest has played in influencing the type 
of relations that the two countries share. In order to make my research more credible, I am 
carrying out interviews with relevant individuals who will share with me the information needed 
on how China identifies itself and the interests that it has in respect to Zambia and vice versa.   
I kindly invite you to for an interview on this matter. The type of question that will be asked will 
be semi-structured and the interview will be face to face. You are at liberty to add any 
information in your responses and I might also ask you for clarification and qualifications of 
certain responses you might proffer. 
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I would like to emphasise that the information that you will provide will be used for scholarly 
research only. Your participation is entirely voluntary; you have a choice to participate, not to 
participate or stop participating in the research. You will not incur any penalties if you choose to 
withdraw from the interview. Your views in this interview will be presented anonymously; 
neither your name nor identity will be disclosed in any form in the study. The interview will take 
about 20 minutes long and the record as well as other items associated with the interview will be 
held in a password-protected file accessible only to myself and my supervisor. After a period of 
5 years, in line with the rules of the University of KwaZulu-Natal, it will be disposed by 
shredding and burning.  
If you agree to participate please sign the declaration attached to this statement (a separate sheet 
will be provided for signatures). 
My contact details are as follows: School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 
Pietermaritzburg Campus, Scottsville, Pietermaritzburg.  
Email: 212557328@stu.ukzn.ac.za or ematambo@yahoo.com 
Cell phone number: 078 519 8037 
 
My supervisor is Dr. Khondlo Mtshali. His contact details are: School of Social Sciences, 
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus, Scottsville, Pietermaritzburg 
Postal Address: Private Bag X01, Scottsville, 3209, South Africa 
Telephone: +27 (0) 33 260 5892 Facsimile: +27 (0) 33 260 5092 
Email: mtshalik@ukzn.ac.za 








I………………………………………………………………………… (full names of 
participant) hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the 
research project, and I consent to participating in the research project.  
I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire and 
that I will incur no penalties if I exercise this option. I understand the intention of the research. I 
hereby agree to participate.  
I consent / do not consent to have this interview recorded (if applicable)  
SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT                                                    DATE  
.…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
